Divergence in Reservation Prices and Its Impact on Housing Market Liquidity: A Theoretical Analysis

In this paper, we build a two-period English auction model to study the relative movements between buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices in the housing market. We show that changes in sellers’ reservation prices are jointly determined by changes in buyers’ reservation prices, probability of buyers offering a high or low price, and the arrival rate of buyers. When the divergence between the buyers’ and sellers’ reservation prices widens, the probability of sale increases in the upward market and decreases in the downward market, contributing to the increases or decreases in market liquidity.     

Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets

I present a strategic model of a bilateral oligopoly with asymmetric information to examine (i) the validity of the conjecture of price-taking behavior in such markets as the number of agents becomes large and (ii) the effect of the rate that individual information precision decreases with increased number of agents on convergence to price-taking and efficiency. I show that with downstream competition, increasing the number of sellers may make all participants price-takers in the limit, but increasing the number of buyers may not. When the total precision of information in the market is high, price-taking and full social efficiency is achieved in the limit with large numbers of buyers and sellers. However, if the total precision of information in the market is poor, price-taking conjecture may fail and large inefficiencies, including full inefficiency, can occur in the limiting outcome. The rate of decrease of individual information precision with increased number of agents determines the rate of convergence to efficiency, and the convergence is slower than that predicted by single-unit auction models in the literature. I also demonstrate that when the number of sellers or both the number of buyers and the sellers go to infinity, price-taking and information aggregation tend to go together. When the number of buyers goes to infinity, however, information can get aggregated when the agents do not become price-takers in the limit. Albeit, in the latter case, the aggregated information is masked by the noise in the sellers’ signals and the cost variability.     

Raising the bar (7)

This editorial summarises the papers published in issue 13.1 so as to raise the bar in applied spatial economic research and highlight new trends. The first paper adopts a scale neutral approach to investigate the spatial mechanisms that cause regional innovation and growth. The second paper claims that population-weighting when calculating indices of regional inequality might lead to inconsistent outcomes. The third paper estimates the effect of distance between family residence and higher education institution on a student's academic performance, thereby accounting for endogenous regressors. The fourth paper shows an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic development at region of origin and the propensity to migrate using a multilevel approach. The fifth paper provides spatial econometric evidence of price competition between sellers of used books on Amazon.com. The last paper estimates a hedonic housing price equation and parameterizes the spatial weight matrix to determine how far back in time buyers, sellers and realtors are looking at the housing market.     

SEARCH AND VACANCY COSTS IN THE TOKYO HOUSING MARKET: ATTEMPT TO MEASURE SOCIAL COSTS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION

The social cost of imperfect information, in terms of buyers' search costs and sellers' opportunity costs of vacancy, is estimated in the real estate market of resale condominiums in central Tokyo by using a new, comprehensive dataset of resale condominium transactions. The results suggest a substantial social cost. Specifically, if housing information were perfectly available and marketing time were null, sellers would get benefits of 22.59% of imputed net rents of their property. In addition, buyers would save 1,042,000 yen spent on search activities for one transaction, if information were perfect. This is equivalent to 13.2% of buyers' average annual income.     

An intertemporal analysis of the shifting of FHA discount points to buyers

In this paper, hedonic regressions are used to analyze a seven-year sample of monthly sales of bungalows in Chicago. Even when sales are considered within individual sections of Chicago, the FHA dummyindependent variable and the ‘points’-independent variable usually have negative coefficients. In certain areas of Chicago there is an absence of conventional loans and conventionally qualified buyers. Consequently, sellers in these neighborhoods must sell using FHA-insured mortgages and may be prevented from fully shifting points to the FHA buyer in the absence of competing financing alternatives. The use of FHA mortgages in these transactions means that the standard hedonic approach cannot correctly measure the extent of point-shifting because the housing/demographic characteristics decrease sales-prices at the same time the point-shifting increases them. The estimated FHA coefficients reflect the net result of these effects.     

Fear of crime and housing prices: Household reactions to sex offender registries

Megan's Law requires public dissemination of information from sex offender registries. Opponents to this controversial law have questioned whether households misinterpret or even use this information. One concern was that the information might simply induce a “fear of crime.” This study finds evidence for both use and misinterpretation of the publicly available information on sex offenders. Using a unique dataset that tracks sex offenders in Hillsborough County, Florida, the results indicate that after a sex offender moves into a neighborhood, nearby housing prices fall by 2.3% ($3500 on average). However, once a sex offender moves out of a neighborhood, housing prices appear to immediately rebound. Surprisingly, these price impacts do not appear to differ in areas near high risk offenders labeled as “predators.”     

List price and sales prices of residential properties during booms and busts

This paper investigates the relationship between the list and sale price of residential properties over the housing cycle. In down or normal markets the list price generally exceeds the sales price; however, when the housing market is strong, homes sell for more than their list price. This observation is not consistent with the assumptions made in the standard model of home sellers’ search behavior. We consider alternative models. In one, sellers set list prices based on their expectations of future changes in sales prices and the arrival rate of buyers; however, demand shocks occur. This model partially explains our data from the Belfast, U.K. housing market, but it fails to predict the list to sales price ratio during a sustained housing boom. We next describe a model where sellers’ endogenously select their search mechanism depending on the strength of the housing market. We find support for the conjecture that sellers switch to an auction-like model during housing booms. There also is evidence that during a downturn in the market, sellers’ list prices are sticky.     

中国房地产交易真的是卖方市场吗？——基于双边随机边界模型的实证研究

科学测算房地产交易市场买卖双方议价能力对市场价格形成的影响作用，是当前政府制定“因地施策”宏观调控机制的重要前提。采用双边随机边界模型，考察房地产交易环节中买卖双方议价能力的差异,结果表明：（1）买卖双方讨价还价因素对商品房销售价格的最终形成存在显著影响；（2）从全国平均水平看，对于整体市场以及住宅、写字楼和商铺等细分市场，卖房者议价能力在双方讨价还价过程中占主导地位，但买方议价能力的影响作用也不容忽视；（3）从一线、新一线、二线和三线城市角度看，除了一线城市商铺市场以及三线城市总体城市、住宅市场和写字楼市场外，其他均处于卖方市场阶段。     

The influence of seller learning and time constraints on sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market

This paper investigates the formation of prices in a perishable goods market where agents bargain repeatedly through pair-wise interactions. After extensive field observations, we chose to focus on two aspects that seem important to actors of this market: the passage of time and update in judgement when gathering information. The main feature of the market is that a seller bargaining with a buyer has incomplete information about buyer's willingness to pay and is not sure how her trading partner will evaluate an offer or compare it with other options. On the other hand, buyers have limited time to look for goods and cannot meet all possible sellers before making a decision. Hence agents cannot calculate the best price to offer but receive information through limited interactions, and use this information to choose their actions.An agent-based model was built to represent a framework that mimics the observed market institution and where agent's possible behaviors and learning was made as consistent as possible with gathered data. Simulations were run, first for sensitivity analysis concerning main parameters, then to test the dependance of agents’ learning to (a) the time buyers can spend on the market and (b) the frequency of update in learning by sellers. To validate the model, features produced by the simulated market are compared to the stylized facts gathered for negotiation about four goods. We reproduce the main features of the data on the dynamics of offers, transaction prices and agents’ behavior during the bargaining phases.     

House prices and consumer welfare

We develop a new approach to measuring changes in consumer welfare due to changes in the price of owner-occupied housing. In our approach, an agent's welfare adjustment is defined as the transfer required to keep expected discounted utility constant given a change in current house prices. We demonstrate that, up to a first-order approximation, there is no aggregate change in welfare due to price increases in the existing housing stock. This follows from a simple market clearing condition where capital gains experienced by sellers are exactly offset by welfare losses to buyers. We show that this result holds (approximately) even in a model that accounts for changes in consumption and investment plans prompted by current house price changes. There can, however, be changes in welfare due to additions to the stock of housing, or to changes in the price of renovating and upgrading the existing stock of housing. For the United States, we estimate the welfare cost of house price appreciation to be an average of $127 per household per year over the 1984–1998 period.     

Managing hedonic housing price indexes: The French experience

Despite their theoretical advantages, hedonic housing price indexes are not so commonly computed by statistical agencies or real estate professionals. Many published indexes still rely on mean or median prices, or favor repeat-sales methods, which require less information about the attributes of the housing units and less econometric expertise on the part of the index compilers, but may be less accurate and robust. In France as in other countries where housing sales have to be recorded in front of a notary, data on transaction prices and characteristics of dwellings are available. Such data have been centralized since 1994, and quarterly hedonic housing price indexes have been computed for more than 10 years. This paper describes the institutional setting of housing transactions in France, and the collaboration between the notaries and the national statistical agency (INSEE). The former are responsible for data collection and regular computation, whereas the latter takes scientific responsibility for the method. The detailed information on the individual properties transacted remains proprietary data, but disaggregated indexes are publicly and freely available. This organization and assignment of roles has proven effective and might be extended to countries with similar institutional settings.     

Does relationship learning lead to relationship value? A cross-national supply chain investigation

In global business-to-business markets, shared resources between buyers and suppliers often result in competitive advantages and enhanced relationships between firms. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of research regarding learning capabilities between business partners in a cross-border setting. This study takes the approach to integrate customer value literature into interorganizational learning theory and adopts the often-neglected theoretical perspective of transaction value by contextualizing inter-firm collaboration in terms of relationship learning and value co-creation viewed by both the buyers and sellers in one single study. Through the development of a conceptual framework that examines how global environmental and inter-organizational conditions influence learning capabilities, the study investigates how relationship learning influences relationship value for both supplying and buying firms. Using a survey of 126 cross-border dyads in the industrial chemical, packaging, consumer durable, and apparel industries, the authors show how relationship learning is valued by both buyers and suppliers, and how it is critical when viewing the “supplier as a customer.” The results indicate the strategic nature of relationship learning in maintaining cross-border business-to-business relationships. Simultaneously, the findings provide evidence that cultural distance is not a significant influence on the firm's propensity to share knowledge with its global partners. It helps advance our understanding of the significance of cultural-pollination in the era of globalization.     

The Role of Coordination Bias in Platform Competition

This paper considers platform competition in a two‐sided market that includes buyers and sellers. One of the platforms benefits from a favorable coordination bias in the market, in that for this platform it is less costly than for the other platform to convince customers that the two sides will coordinate on joining it. We find that the degree of the coordination bias affects the platform's decision regarding the business model (i.e., whether to subsidize buyers or sellers), the access fees, and the size of the platform. A slight increase in the coordination bias may induce the advantaged platform to switch from subsidizing sellers to subsidizing buyers, or induce the disadvantaged platform to switch from subsidizing buyers to subsidizing sellers. Moreover, in such a case the advantaged platform switches from oversupplying to undersupplying sellers, and the disadvantaged platform switches from undersupplying to oversupplying sellers.     

Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection

We develop a model with heterogeneous buyers and sellers in which the sellers have private information about their goods' qualities. We show that efficient trading cannot occur without middlemen. Middlemen can provide two services: one is inspection, and the other is the sorting of buyers and sellers through the rationing of sellers and the provision of two different price schedules. The latter service permits the possibility of achieving the first best. When the first best is not attainable, there is a second best characterized by two intervals, one consisting of low-quality noninspected goods, and the other of high-quality inspected goods. We determine whether first and second best outcomes can be implemented in a market equilibrium with both zero and infinite buyer-seller search costs. First and second best outcomes are attainable under a larger set of parameter values when search costs are infinite; also, typically too much inspection occurs in a market equilibrium. Welfare may be either raised or lowered by the introduction of middlemen.     

Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment

A competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have private information about their own private use value for the commodity being traded. In addition the commodity has a common value to all buyers, perhaps represented by the future resale value of the commodity. A competitive equilibrium in mechanisms is described. In every such equilibrium it is shown that sellers must offer mechanisms that are allocationally equivalent to English ascending price auctions. The reservation prices that sellers set are shown to be below their ex post cost of trading the commodity. Received: 24 April 1998 / Accepted: 8 March 1999     

Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets with decentralized trade and pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for their abstention. In stable market outcomes, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to deviations. The set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and its full characterization is provided. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel restrains trade and market participation is balanced; (ii) only one cartel is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent’s.     

Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services

What is the nature of the industrial organization of the market for physician services? Is the market “competitive?” Are there pareto-relevant market failures, such that there is room for welfare-improving policies? Economists have devoted a great deal of attention to this market, but it remains relatively poorly understood. The key features of this market are that the product being sold is a professional service, and the pervasive presence of insurance for consumers. A professional service is inherently heterogeneous, nonretradable, and subject to an asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers. These characteristics are what bestow market power on sellers, further strengthened by the fact that consumers face only a small fraction of the price of any service due to insurance. This paper considers the implications of these characteristics for agency relationships between patients and physicians, and insurers (both private and public) and physicians. Agency relationships within physician firms are also considered. Both theoretical and empirical modeling of contracting between insurers and physicians and of the joint agency problems between patient and physician and insurer and physician are recommended as areas for future research. Because failures in this market are seen to derive largely from the structure of information, the potential gains from government intervention may be sharply circumscribed. Nonetheless, careful consideration of the competitive implications of contracting between physicians, insurers, and other health care providers is an important area for antitrust policy.     

Wealth creation from high-tech divestitures

We measure the change in value to sellers and buyers of divested high-tech assets. Sellers and buyers experience favorable announcement effects in response to high-tech divestitures. However, buyers of divested high-tech assets experience more favorable announcement effects than sellers, which is opposite of the related research findings on other types of divestitures. Based on a cross-sectional analysis, the announcement effects for sellers of high-tech assets are more favorable when there is an investment bank advisor, the transaction price is disclosed, and the size of the divestiture is large. The announcement effects for buyers of high-tech assets were also more favorable when there was an investment bank advisor during the tech-bubble period. Overall, the results suggest that the stock price behavior in response to divestitures of high-tech assets is distinctly different from that of other types of divestitures.     

The political economy of housing prices: Hedonic pricing with regression discontinuity

This paper uses hedonic pricing to empirically estimate the value of publicly provided local goods and services in the constituencies of the ruling party relative to those of the opposition parties. To improve control for omitted variables that change smoothly over space, we use a regression discontinuity design to restrict the sample to houses that are near the electoral boundaries. Using resale market prices of public flats in Singapore, in some cases we find a moderate but highly statistically significant difference in housing prices across the electoral boundaries that separate the constituencies of the ruling party and the opposition parties.