International Trade and Gender Wage Discrimination: Evidence from East Asia

The paper explores how competition from international trade affects gender wage discrimination in two open economies. According to neoclassical theory, if discrimination is costly, then increased industry competitiveness from international trade lessens the incentive for employers to discriminate against women. This effect should be stronger in concentrated sectors, where employers can use excess profits to cover the costs of discrimination. Alternatively, increased international trade may reduce women's bargaining power to achieve wage gains. Results for Taiwan and Korea indicate that, in contrast to neoclassical theory, competition from foreign trade in concentrated industries is positively associated with wage discrimination against women.     

企业异质性与加计扣除政策研发激励：来自中国高新技术企业的实证

基于2012-2015年全国高新技术企业税收数据，筛选仅享受研发加计扣除政策的高新技术企业微观数据，利用面板回归模型，检验研发加计扣除对研发投入的异质性激励效应。结果表明：加计扣除政策能够刺激企业进行研发投入。从地区看，加计扣除政策激励效应具有地域差异；从经济属性看，加计扣除政策对外资、民营企业研发激励效应较强；从行业看，加计扣除政策对科学技术行业激励效应最大。     

Choosing Among Regulatory Options in the United States Telecommunications Industry

We examine the determinants of the choice between rate-of-return regulation and incentive regulation in the United States telecommunications industry. We find that a state is more likely to select incentive regulation in any year: (1) when it has employed incentive regulation in the past; (2) when the Republican party controls both the executive and the legislative branches of the state government, but the Democratic party has controlled these branches historically; and (3) as the firms earnings under rate-of-return regulation increase toward the industry average. We also find that appointed regulators are more likely than their elected counterparts to revert to rate-of-return regulation.     

Technical efficiency,allocative efficiency,and the impact of incentive regulation in telecommunications in the United States

Incentive regulation is now an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The objective of incentive regulation is to improve productive efficiency, enhance service quality and consumer welfare, and reduce the costs of regulation. The issue that is considered here is whether incentive regulation in the form of a price cap applicable to interstate access service to local loops has resulted in an increase in the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency of local exchange carriers (LECs). After discussing the reasons for adopting incentive regulation, the nature of price caps is explored followed by an overview of the methodology for measuring the effects of incentive regulation on productive efficiency. The results indicate that for changes in technical efficiency, there is a definite randomness between 1985 and 1993 with technical efficiency increasing in some years and decreasing in others. Subsequent to 1993, however, there is a consistent improvement in technical efficiency. Given that incentive regulation in the forin of price caps was implemented for LECs in 1991, it is likely that some portion of the improvement in technical efficiency subsequent to 1993 is attributable to incentive regulation. A pronounced upward trend in allocative efficiency is observed beginning in 1985. It is problematic, however, to attribute the improvement in allocative efficiency to the adoption of incentive regulation. It is more likely an artifact of the divestiture of AT&T although some indeterminant portion is probably associated with the implementation of price caps.JEL classification: L51, L96     

装备制造业技术协同创新运行机制构建

在对装备制造业技术创新特点进行分析的基础上,指出技术协同创新是装备制造业技术创新的模式选择和发展趋势。通过对当前中国装备制造业技术协同创新存在问题和不足的深入分析,构建了由驱动力机制、资源供给机制、双元协同机制和合作激励机制4个部分构成的装备制造业技术协同创新运行机制框架。根据装备制造业技术协同创新运行机制的特点,提出了提高装备制造业技术协同创新水平的对策建议。     

The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling

We argue that repeated interaction and high-powered formal contractscan be either substitutes or complements, depending on the relativeimpact of repeated interaction on incentive problems and contractingcosts. In the offshore drilling industry, we find that oil andgas companies are less likely to choose fixed-price contractsas the frequency of their interaction with a driller increases.This supports the conclusion that repeated interaction and high-poweredformal contracts are substitutes in this setting, indicatingthat repeated interaction reduces incentive problems more thancontracting costs. In addition, we find that using instrumentalvariables to account for the endogenous matching of drillersto projects strengthens our results.     

The Revealed Preference of Regulatory Menus: Evidence from the Pre‐Nationalisation British Gas Industry

Prior to nationalisation British gas undertakings were faced with a choice of three different regulatory schemes linking the price charged for gas with the amount of dividend that could be paid. The three schemes, the maximum price system, the sliding scale and the basic price system possessed varying incentive properties. This paper investigates, empirically, the characteristics of firms under each regime. The multinomial logit results suggest that larger firms with lower unit costs were more likely to opt for regulatory options with more powerful incentive mechanisms.     

“Fifty in five”: The prospects for merger in the electric utility industry

By analyzing four case studies of merger attempts between electric utilities, we conclude that there are not strong incentives for a wave of combinations in the industry. Potential synergy gains do not provide a strong motivation since they are likely already being captured through joint ventures and coordination agreements. Those that still exist would most likely be distributed to rate payers by regulatory decisions. Managerial incentives of the bidder are countered by the desire of target management to remain independent. Potential gains to the financial community from a wave of mergers are large, but the regulatory process provides a dampening of this otherwise strong incentive.     

R & D税收激励有效性与影响因素

基于生产函数理论抽象出盈利能力和研发程度是R&D税收激励效应的两个关键因素,进而采用2012-2015年全国高新技术企业调查数据,分别检验了15%税率式优惠与研发加计扣除政策的有效性及其影响因素。实证结果表明：15%税率式优惠与加计扣除政策均能激励企业创新,而加计扣除激励效果显著优于15%税率式优惠;15%税率式优惠政策效应受企业盈利能力影响较大,而加计扣除政策受企业研发投入的作用较大;15%税率式优惠政策对高新制造业、服务业和文化产业创新激励效果不显著,而加计扣除对高新制造业和文化产业研发密集型行业创新具有显著的激励作用;15%税率式激励对成熟度较高企业创新具有较好的激励效应,而研发费用加计扣除政策对成熟度较低企业创新具有较强的促进作用。     

The trade reducing effects of market power in international shipping

Developing countries pay substantially higher transportation costs than developed nations, which leads to less trade and perhaps lower incomes. This paper investigates price discrimination in the shipping industry and the role it plays in determining transportation costs. In the presence of market power, shipping prices depend on the demand characteristics of goods being traded. We show theoretically and estimate empirically that ocean cargo carriers charge higher prices when transporting goods with higher product prices, lower import demand elasticities, and higher tariffs, and when facing fewer competitors on a trade route. These characteristics explain more variation in shipping prices than do conventional proxies such as distance, and significantly contribute to the higher shipping prices facing the developing world. A simple back of the envelope calculation suggests that eliminating market power in shipping would boost trade volumes by 5.9% (for the US) to 15.2% (for Latin America). Our findings are also important for evaluating the impact of tariff liberalization. Cargo carriers decrease shipping prices by 1–2% for every 1% reduction in tariffs.     

西部地区中小企业集群发展的内在驱动分析及其模式选择

文章分析了西部地区中小企业集群发展的内在驱动因素和四种基本集群模式,从区域产业发展的角度出发,提出西部不同区域应立足资源状况和经济发展水平,依据产业特色选择适宜的中小企业集群模式.     

Interactions between Agriculture and Industry: Theoretical Analysis of the Consequences of Discriminating Agriculture in Sub–Saharan Africa

Many countries in sub–Saharan Africa discriminated against agriculture to promote industry after independence. The domestic terms of trade were turned against agriculture by the price fixing of monopoly marketing boards. This policy was assumed to reduce labor costs of industry and was combined with overvaluation of the currency, protectionism, and priority rationing of imported inputs to industry. The region got the worst of both worlds—stagnation in both agriculture and industry. What went wrong? In a dual model designed to represent characteristics of the region, discrimination of agriculture is shown to contract industry through trade linkages. Export–oriented agriculture has been held back, and import–dependent industries have suffered because of the foreign exchange constraint. In a dynamic extension assuming learning–by–doing in industry and catching–up in agriculture, it is shown that discrimination against agriculture may reduce the growth rate of the economy and the technological advantage of industry.     

Religion,discrimination and trust across three cultures

We propose that religion impacts trust and trustworthiness in ways that depend on how individuals are socially identified and connected. Religiosity and religious affiliation may serve as markers for statistical discrimination. Further, affiliation to the same religion may enhance group identity, or affiliation irrespective of creed may lend social identity, and in turn induce taste-based discrimination. Religiosity may also relate to general prejudice. We test these hypotheses across three culturally diverse countries. Participants׳ willingness to discriminate, beliefs of how trustworthy or trusting others are, as well as actual trust and trustworthiness are measured incentive compatibly. We find that interpersonal similarity in religiosity and affiliation promote trust through beliefs of reciprocity. Religious participants also believe that those belonging to some faith are trustworthier, but invest more trust only in those of the same religion—religiosity amplifies this effect. Across non-religious categories, whereas more religious participants are more willing to discriminate, less religious participants are as likely to display group biases.     

Idiosyncratic risk and the cost of capital: the case of electricity networks

We analyze the treatment and impact of idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk in regulation. Regulatory authorities regularly ignore firm-specific characteristics, such as size or asset ages, implying different risk exposure in incentive regulation. In contrast, it is common to apply only a single benchmark, the weighted average cost of capital, uniformly to all firms. This will lead to implicit discrimination. We combine models of firm-specific risk, liquidity management and regulatory rate setting to investigate impacts on capital costs. We focus on the example of the impact of component failures for electricity network operators. In a simulation model for Germany, we find that capital costs increase by \(\sim \) 0.2 to 3.0 % points depending on the size of the firm (in the range of 3–40 % of total cost of capital). Regulation of monopolistic bottlenecks should take these risks into account to avoid implicit discrimination.     

Evaluating the British Model of Electricity Deregulation

Abstract ** :  A key aspect of the 1990 reforms to the British electricity supply industry was the introduction of a formal system of regulation by an autonomous regulatory body. It was expected that replacement of monopolies in some areas by markets and price‐setting in monopoly areas using a simple incentive formula would mean that regulation of the industry would be 'light'. This article examines how regulation has turned out in practice. It concludes that the promise of 'light' regulation has not been fulfilled. Regulation of competitive markets is a major regulatory activity, incentive regulation has evolved into a complex and intrusive form of rate‐of‐return, while regulation of industry structure has allowed the industry to descend into a concentrated, vertically integrated structure, at odds with the aims of the reforms .     

DOES BEHAVIOUR‐BASED PRICE DISCRIMINATION FOSTER FIRMS’ DIFFERENTIATION?

We study the impact of behaviour‐based price discrimination on the incentive of the firms to differentiate their products. We consider both ‘standard’ and ‘extreme’ behaviour‐based price discrimination: the latter always reduces the incentive to differentiate with respect to uniform pricing, while the former fosters differentiation if the consumers are sufficiently forward‐looking and/or the firms are sufficiently myopic.     

Influence in Decline: Lobbying in Contracting Industries

Recent empirical work suggests that declining industries lobby more successfully for policy concessions than do growing industries. This paper presents a novel and simple explanation for this phenomenon. It is shown that an industry in decline is constrained in its ability to raise revenue through production and therefore has a greater incentive to protect profits by lobbying for more favourable treatment. However, greater lobbying only translates into policy concessions if government policy is sufficiently responsive to lobby group contributions. The paper further explores the circumstances under which such government behaviour is likely to eventuate. We show that a self-interested government will always be more receptive to the demands of lobbyists in declining industries.     

Medical Nemesis

In addition to the material market, there is also a positional market in human society. The channel of social mobility — the institutional system that regulates the performance of individuals and groups in the positional market — is a critical dimension of the overall institutional foundation of economic growth because it underpins the incentive structure in the positional market. Understanding the interaction between the incentive structures in the material market and those in the positional market sheds new light upon economic history and some of the on-going "natural experiments" in economic development today. Most importantly, understanding the relationship between the positional market and economic growth makes it clear that states should strive to eliminate institutional discrimination because institutional discrimination is not only morally unjust but also economically costly.     

The effects of incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry: A survey

We review recent empirical studies of the performance of incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry. These studies provide evidence that productivity, infrastructure investment, profit levels, telephone penetration, and new service offerings have increased under incentive regulation. Service rates have generally remained stable or decreased slightly, and service quality does not appear to have been affected adversely. There is no evidence that incentive regulation has led to streamlined regulatory proceedings. Strong evidence that incentive regulation has reduced the costs of providing telephone service has not yet materialized.We thank Sanford Berg, Alex Larson, Larry Schelhorse, and Timothy Tardiff for very helpful comments and discussion. We are also grateful to Michael Crew and Ingo Vogelsang for a particularly careful and insightful review of this paper.     

Open access policies, regulated charges and non-price discrimination in telecommunications

Open access policies in telecommunications, including interconnection and unbundling, are implemented by regulators in an effort to increase competition in the sector. Lack of cooperation from incumbents is pervasive, given their incentives to engage in non-price discrimination and the moral hazard resulting from the inability of regulators to monitor the contract. We build a relationship between the access price and non-price discrimination, neither assuming a pre-determined market strategic interdependence or a specific demand function format. When the access charge is liberalized, the incentive for non-price discrimination disappears. It may be optimal for the regulator to set a second-best regulated access price to avoid non-price discrimination.