Optimal terms of contingent capital,incentive effects,and capital structure dynamics

Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCos) with conversion ratios that dilute issuer's shareholders generate incentives to preemptively raise equity capital to avoid triggering conversion. Our dynamic model provides an interior solution for the unique optimal conversion ratio and the capital structure policies that maximizes issuer's value net of deadweight costs. Preemptive recapitalization induced by moderately dilutive conversion terms leads to fewer defaults, lower borrowing rates, and higher debt capacity when compared to less dilutive terms. However, highly dilutive conversion ratios do not always enhance efficiency because issuers facing very high dilution risk recapitalize too frequently, generating excessive adjustment costs. Conversely, if CoCo's principal is written-down at the conversion without diluting shareholders, then the issuer will have perverse incentives to destroy a portion of its capital (“burn money”) to force conversion and generate windfall gains for shareholders.     

Countercyclical contingent capital

We analyze the optimal capital structure of a bank issuing countercyclical contingent capital, i.e., notes to be converted into common shares in poor macroeconomic conditions. A comparison of the main effects produced by the countercyclical asset with the simple equity-debt capital structure, the non-countercyclical contingent capital and the countercyclical callable bond is conducted. We demonstrate that this type of asset reduces the spread of straight debt and is effective in reducing the asset substitution incentive. The reduction of bankruptcy costs is strong only when the countercyclicality feature is removed. Contingent capital is useful for macroprudential regulation and we show that the countercyclical feature is important depending on priorities (moderate the asset substitution incentive or reduce bankruptcy costs).     

Dynamic optimal capital structure with regime switching

We investigate the optimal capital structure of a corporate when the dynamics of the assets (both growth rate and volatility) change following different states of the economy. Two structural models are examined in the paper. The first considers the case when the firm is not facing tax benefit and bankruptcy costs with a regime switching dynamics. This model extends the Black and Cox (J Financ 31:351–367, 1976) model to allow for regime switching risk. The second model incorporates both tax benefit and bankruptcy costs with a regime switching dynamics. This is is more realistic, and is an extension of the Leland (J Financ 49(4):1213–1252, 1994) model with regime switching risk. We obtain closed-form analytic solutions for the optimal capital structure and default barrier for both models.     

Dynamic capital structure with callable debt and debt renegotiations

We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm's capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders' own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders' bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.     

Dynamic capital structure with heterogeneous beliefs and market timing

This paper builds a dynamic trade-off model of corporate financing with differences in belief between the insider manager and outside investors. The optimal leverage depends on differences of opinion and can differ significantly from that in standard trade-off models. The manager's market timing behavior leads to several stylized facts, such as the low average debt ratios of firms in the cross section, the substantial presence of zero-debt firms that pay larger dividends and keep higher cash balances than other firms, and negative long-run abnormal returns following stock issuance. Market timing behavior leads to substantial losses of firm value through excessive financing activities. Market timing and debt conservatism depend negatively on shareholder control of the firm.     

A structural framework for modelling contingent capital

This paper develops a structural model of contingent capital. In contrast to existing approaches we explicitly link the firm’s total payout to its cost of debt, leading to a total payout that is linear in—as opposed to proportional to—asset value. In the special case that asset value evolves as affine geometric Brownian motion we derive closed-form expressions for limiting (i.e. perpetual) bond values. The proposed model is flexible, so that it can be used to gauge the relative merits of different variations of contingent capital, and parsimonious, so that it is relatively easy to implement in practice. An empirical example using data from the Canadian banking sector is provided that illustrates how the model can generate insights into problems that are of interest to both regulators and issuers of contingent capital (e.g. what range of conversion prices would be consistent with regulatory guidelines, and how expensive is contingent debt over this range).     

Dynamic capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia

This paper investigates the effect of political patronage on firms' capital structure. The evidence is from Malaysia, a country characterised by relationship-capitalism, and covers 1988 to 2009. Using a system GMM estimator we find firms set leverage targets and adjust towards them following deviations at the rate of 28% per annum. Next, we construct a natural experiment and use a difference-in-differences model to investigate if the strategic financing decisions of politically patronised firms differ from non-connected firms after an exogenous shock caused by the 1997 Asian crisis. Our results unambiguously demonstrate a significant difference in the capital structure of patronised firms relative to non-connected firms following the exogenous shock but only for the crisis period 1998–2001. After 2002 the capital structures of patronised and non-connected firms are statistically equivalent.     

提升我国银行资本管理效率的路径选择

如何加强银行资本管理不仅关系到银行自身的安全以及整个社会经济的稳定,而且直接决定银行的盈利能力和未来价值的创造。本文通过资本充足性、资本收益率以及资产收入结构等一系列经济指标对当前国内外商业银行资本管理效率现实差异进行比较分析,确认我国商业银行资本管理效率是低下的,而提高效率的根本途径包括资本的有序开发和资本合理配置两方面。     

Unbounded liabilities,capital reserve requirements and the taxpayer put option

When firms access unbounded liability exposures and are granted limited liability, then an all equity firm holds a call option, whereby it receives a free option to put losses back to the taxpayers. We call this option the taxpayer put, where the strike is the negative of the level of reserve capital at stake in the firm. We contribute by (i) valuing this taxpayer put, and (ii) determining the level for reserve capital without a reference to ratings. Reserve capital levels are designed to mitigate the adverse incentives for unnecessary risk introduced by the taxpayer put at the firm level. In our approach, the level of reserve capital is set to make the aggregate risk of the firm externally acceptable, where the specific form of acceptability employed is positive expectation under a concave distortion of the cash flow distribution. It is observed that, in the presence of the taxpayer put, debt holders may not be relied upon to monitor risk as their interests are partially aligned with equity holders by participating in the taxpayer put. Furthermore, the taxpayer put leads to an equity pricing model associated with a market discipline that punishes perceived cash shortfalls.     

Bank capital regulation in a barrier option framework

The barrier options theory of corporate security valuation is applied to the contingent claims of a regulated bank. The regulator/insurer of a bank owns a down-and-in call option on the bank assets which can be balanced against the expected coverage cost. Raising the regulatory barrier (critical asset level triggering bank closure) leads to a transfer of wealth from stockholders to the insurer and reduces stockholder incentives to increase asset risk. Empirical tests on a sample of 152 one-bank holding companies show that regulatory barriers are priced in the stock market and are inversely related to Tier 1 leverage ratios.     

Valuation of insurers’ contingent capital with counterparty risk and price endogeneity

This study develops a structural framework to value insurers’ contingent capital with counterparty risk (CR) and overcomes the problem of price endogeneity (PE) in the valuation model. Our results on the focal contingent capital instrument – catastrophe equity put option (CatEPut) – indicate that prices can be significantly overestimated without considering CR and be significantly underestimated without considering PE. This study also examines how CatEPuts affect the buyer’s probability of default (PD). Our results show that buying a CatEPut lowers the PD for high-risk insurers, but not necessarily so for low-risk insurers; however, without taking CR and PE into account, one may significantly overestimate the credit enhancement provided by the CatEPuts.     

Collateral and capital structure

We develop a dynamic model of investment, capital structure, leasing, and risk management based on firms' need to collateralize promises to pay with tangible assets. Both financing and risk management involve promises to pay subject to collateral constraints. Leasing is strongly collateralized costly financing and permits greater leverage. More constrained firms hedge less and lease more, both cross-sectionally and dynamically. Mature firms suffering adverse cash flow shocks may cut risk management and sell and lease back assets. Persistence of productivity reduces the benefits to hedging low cash flows and can lead firms not to hedge at all.     

Liquidity and capital structure

We examine the relation between equity market liquidity and capital structure. We find that firms with more liquid equity have lower leverage and prefer equity financing when raising capital. For example, after sorting firms into size quintiles and then into liquidity quintiles, the average debt-to-asset ratio of the most liquid quintiles is about 38% while the average for the least liquid quintiles is 55%. Similar results are observed in panel analyses with clustered errors and using instrumental variables. Our results are consistent with equity market liquidity lowering the cost of equity and, therefore, inducing a greater reliance on equity financing.     

On the relation between ownership structure and capital structure

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Prior evidence has demonstrated an association between ownership structure and firm value. This paper extends the literature by examining a further link between ownership structure and capital structure. Using an agency framework, it is argued that the distribution of equity ownership among corporate managers and external blockholders may have a significant relation with leverage. The empirical results provide support for a positive relation between external blockholders and leverage, and non-linear relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage. The results also suggest that the relation between external block ownership and leverage varies across the level of managerial share ownership. These results are consistent with active monitoring by blockholders, and the effects of convergence-of-interests and management entrenchment.     

An option pricing approach to corporate dividends and the capital investment financing decision

In light of a growing trend toward viewing dividends as an investable asset class, this article opens up a new perspective on their valuation. We show that dividends can be viewed as options on the cash flow of the firm. That is, a firm either pays zero dividends, in which case the option expires out‐of‐the‐money, or it pays a positive dividend, the value of which corresponds to the option's moneyness. The exercise price is determined by the capital budget, the flexibility of the company to use external financing, and whether it has minimum and maximum dividends. The model is also capable of accommodating a stochastic capital budget, which allows for uncertain growth opportunities and their correlation with the firm's cash flows. We also present an application of the model using actual data for a large multinational company.     

Subsidiary debt,capital structure and internal capital markets

I study external debt issued by operating subsidiaries of diversified firms. Consistent with Kahn and Winton's [2004. Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions. Journal of Finance 59, 2537–2575] model, where subsidiary debt mitigates asset substitution, I find firms are more likely to use subsidiary debt when their divisions vary more in risk. Consistent with subsidiary debt mitigating the free cash flow problem, I find that subsidiaries are more likely to have their own external debt when they have fewer growth options and higher cash flow than the rest of the firm. Finally, I find that subsidiary debt mitigates the “corporate socialism” and “poaching” problems modeled in theories of internal capital markets.     

Stock options and capital structure

We show that value-maximizing CEOs compensated with stock options prefer debt to equity. Our pecking order result does not depend on managerial risk aversion, managerial firm-specific human capital, or asymmetric information. Moreover, our result holds at least weakly regardless of the distribution of firm cash flows and strictly as long as the support of the cash flow distribution is big enough to bring all features of the stock option contract into play with positive probability JEL Classification Numbers: G0, G3 An earlier version of this paper was completed while Page was visiting CERMSEM at Paris 1 and the University of Warwick. Page gratefully acknowledges the support and hospitality of CERMSEM, Paris 1 and Warwick. Page also gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Department of Economics, Finance, and Legal Studies and the Culverhouse College of Business at the University of Alabama. Both authors are grateful to seminar participants in the Financial Markets Group Workshop at LSE for many helpful comments and both authors are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose detailed and insightful comments led to substantial improvements in the paper     

Book-tax conformity and capital structure

We examine the effect of increased book-tax conformity on corporate capital structure. Prior studies document a decrease in the informativeness of accounting earnings for equity markets resulting from higher book-tax conformity. We argue that the decrease in earnings informativeness impacts equity holders more than debt holders because of the differences in payoff structures between debt and equity investments such that increases in book-tax conformity lead to increases in firms’ reliance on debt capital. We exploit a natural experiment in the U.S. and find that firms facing an increase in required book-tax conformity increase leverage relative to other firms. We also provide evidence of an increase in the cost of equity (but not of debt) capital for firms facing an increase in required book-tax conformity, relative to control firms, and show that these increases in cost of equity capital are positively associated with an increase in leverage. Our findings are consistent with firms substituting away from equity and toward more debt in the presence of higher book-tax conformity.     

Liquidity and bank capital structure

Bank capital requirements reduce the probability of bank failure and help mitigate taxpayers’ sharing in the losses that result from bank failures. Under Basel III, direct capital requirements are supplemented with liquidity requirements. Our results suggest that liquidity provisions of banks are connected to bank capital and that changes in liquidity indirectly affect the capital structure of financial institutions. Liquidity appears to be another instrument for adjusting bank capital structure beyond just capital requirements. Consistent with Diamond and Rajan (2005), we find that liquidity and capital should be considered jointly for promoting financial stability.     

Complex ownership and capital structure

This paper explores pyramidal firms and their motivations for the use of debt financing. We find that pyramids have significantly higher leverage than non-pyramids and that the use of debt in pyramids is associated with the risk of expropriation. We do not find evidence for the control-enhancing, disciplining, tax-reduction, and risk-sharing explanations for the use of debt financing. Our results indicate that the capital structure of pyramids is affected by the expropriation activities of ultimate owners that have excess control rights.