Factor Endowments,Democracy, and Trade Policy Divergence

We develop a stochastic model of electoral competition in order to study the economic and political determinants of trade policy. We model a small open economy with two tradable goods, each of which is produced using a sector‐specific factor (e.g., land and capital) and another factor that is mobile between these tradable sectors (labor); one nontradable good, which is also produced using a specific factor (skilled labor), and an elected government with the mandate to tax trade flows. The tax revenue is used to provide local public goods that increase the economic agents’ utility. We use this general equilibrium model to explicitly derive the ideal policies of the different socioeconomic groups in society (landlords, industrialists, labor, and skilled workers). We then use those ideal policies to model the individual probabilistic voting behavior of the members of each of these socioeconomic groups. We use this model to shed light on how differences in the comparative advantages of countries explain trade policy divergence between countries as well as trade policy instability within countries. We regard trade policy instability to mean that, in equilibrium, political parties diverge in terms of the political platforms they adopt. We show that in natural resource (land)–abundant economies with very little capital, or in economies that specializes in the production of manufactures, parties tend to converge to the same policy platform, and trade policy is likely to be stable and relatively close to free trade. In contrast, in a natural resource–abundant economy with an important domestic industry that competes with the imports, parties tend to diverge, and trade policy is likely to be more protectionist and unstable.     

Export performance of developing countries: Does landlockedness matter?

Landlockedness imposes additional costs on trade and reduces international competitiveness. This paper examines the determinants of export performance in developing countries, within a comparative perspective of landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and non‐landlocked developing countries, by using a standard gravity modeling framework. The study covers data from 1995 to 2015. The results suggest that despite recent trade policy reforms, the overall export performance of LLDCs is lower than that of non‐landlocked developing countries due to the inherent additional trade costs associated with landlockedness. The conventional wisdom that export performance is aided by economic openness also applies to LLDCs, but distance‐related trade costs have a greater negative impact on exports from LLDCs than on other developing countries. The immediate trade policy challenge for LLDCs is therefore to create a more trade‐friendly environment by lowering tariffs, reforming exchange rates and entering into regional trade agreements.     

Growth in fragile states in Africa: Conflict and post‐conflict capital accumulation

This article analyses the pattern of capital accumulation in Africa and its interaction with political fragility. Political fragility, defined as armed conflict or civil war, retards or reverses gains with respect to capital accumulation, slowing long‐term economic growth. Many countries experience negative rates of capital accumulation, particularly during periods of acute political instability. In post‐war periods, countries generally continue to experience capital destruction, lending support to the “war ruin hypothesis.” This has implications for long‐term economic growth in view of the strong association between capital accumulation and economic performance. The main policy implication of the analysis is that African countries and their international partners should pay more attention to capital accumulation, including capital reconstruction after periods of political instability, to lay the foundations for sustainable economic growth.     

Political stability and growth: An application of dynamic GMM and quantile regression

This paper studies the effect of political stability on economic growth by taking 120 developing countries over the period of 1996–2014. We apply relatively advanced dynamic two step system-GMM and quantile regression. Political stability is found to be a key determinant of economic growth. More importantly, political instability (or risk) is found to be higher in the OIC countries and is a deterrent to economic growth. Also, for the lower and middle income OIC countries, political instability appears to affect economic growth more severely perhaps due to the absence of strong economic and political institutions. Moreover, political instability is also found to be significantly higher in the oil-dependent OIC countries. Notably, political instability is likely to affect growth through the channels of investment and human capital accumulation in the developing countries. Finally, the impact of political stability and political instability on growth is found to be equally distributed across the OIC countries with higher or lower growth level. Therefore, the development of political and economic institutions along with human capital development is recommended for all the developing countries in general and the OIC countries in particular.     

Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers

In this paper we analyze empirically the effect of terms of trade shocks on economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes. We are particularly interested in investigating whether terms of trade disturbances have a smaller effect on growth in countries with a flexible exchange rate arrangement. We also analyze whether negative and positive terms of trade shocks have asymmetric effects on growth, and whether the magnitude of these asymmetries depends on the exchange rate regime. We find evidence suggesting that terms of trade shocks get amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. We also find evidence of an asymmetric response to terms of trade shocks: the output response is larger for negative than for positive shocks. Finally, we find evidence supporting the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates.     

Does the quality of political institutions affect intra-industry trade within trade blocs? The ASEAN perspective

There has been a renewed resolve for deeper integration and cooperation within ASEAN. Intra-industry trade (IIT) is often viewed as a way of achieving economic as well as political integration. This article tests for the effect that political regime and governance may have on the intensity of IIT. We particularly examine if quality of political institutions which includes corruption and democracy indices as well as economic factors comprising corporate tax rate, regional FDI flow, flexibility of exchange rate regime, size of the market, economic distance affect the intensity of horizontal and vertical IIT. The study finds that control of corruption and good governance both increase the vertical IIT but not the horizontal IIT. The study further finds that intra-economy FDI flow, stable exchange rate regime, market size and proximity positively affect IIT within the trade bloc. However the negative effect of corporate tax rate suggests that if countries were to coordinate their tax policies, they could avoid harmful tax competition and promote IIT across their borders. The findings regarding the effect those economic and political factors have on the intensity of IIT certainly warrants the attention of policy makers and researchers alike.     

What determines public education expenditures in Russia?1

Recent studies suggest that the allocation of expenditures in education is important for growth. The state of public education spending in many transition economies highlights the need for an assessment of the nature of education expenditures in these countries. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by estimating the determinants of education expenditures in the Russian Federation. Results from panel data analysis show that revenue and the student‐population ratio have a positive impact on education expenditures while the effect of population density is negative. Three regional variables also show significant impact. The income and price elasticity of public education expenditures are estimated to be 0.57 and ?0.18, respectively, a result comparable to studies from other countries. The results presented here provide insight into how fiscal institutions and the structure of the political process in Russia may affect the degree of resource allocation in the educational sector during the transition process.     

新时代南海区域海洋合作研究

我国与南海周边国家共建 “21世纪海上丝绸之路”以来，南海区域贸易来往日益密切，政治互信不断加强，新时代 “海洋命运共同体”的提出为南海区域海洋合作提供了新的机遇。目前我国与南海周边国家海洋合作主要有海洋经济、海洋生态环保、海洋防灾减灾等领域取得了一定的进展，但也面临着战略沟通及互信有待提高、海洋经济合作层次不高、缺乏成熟的海洋环保合作机制以及海洋减灾防灾合作动力不足等制约因素。新时代南海区域海洋合作应本着打造南海海洋命运共同体的理念，从增强海洋合作的战略互信、构建多边合作机制和法律机制、深入互利互惠的蓝色经济合作、深化海洋生态环境协同治理以及共建共享海洋公共服务产品等路径推进海洋合作的不断深入。     

Political instability and households’ investment behavior: Evidence from Burkina Faso

There is a large, rather macroeconomic, literature that shows that political instability and social conflict are associated with poor economic outcomes including lower investment and reduced economic growth. However, there is only very little research on the impact of instability on households’ behavior, in particular their saving and investment decisions. We merge six rounds of household survey data and a geo-referenced time series of politically motivated events and fatalities from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Base (ACLED) to analyze households’ decisions when exposed to instability in Burkina Faso. For identification, we exploit variation in the intensity of political instability across time and space while controlling for time- and municipality-fixed effects as well as rainfall and nighttime light intensity, and many other potential confounders. Our results show a negative association of political instability and financial savings, the accumulation of durables, investment in house improvements, as well as investment in education and health. Instability seems, in particular, to lead to a reshuffling from investment expenditures to increased food consumption, implying lower growth prospects in the future. With respect to economic growth, the sizable education and health effects seem to be particularly worrisome.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.     

Nationalism and government effectiveness

Nation-building is believed to have a positive influence on economic and political outcomes, especially in countries with ethnically fragmented populations. Yet nationalism, an indicator of successful nation-building, has been empirically linked to protectionism and intolerance, which suggests that dismal performance is a more likely outcome. This paper empirically identifies an inverted U-shaped relationship between nationalism and government effectiveness. The results suggest that the level of nationalism in the population is higher than optimal in most countries. It is further shown that nationalism may mitigate the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity in former colonies. We find no clear linkages between nationalism and trade openness.     

中亚国家区域经济合作现状及发展缓慢的原因分析

鉴于对外贸易和区域经济合作对本国经济增长和可持续发展的重要性,中亚五国纷纷发挥各自的自然资源优势,将发展外向型经济和加强对外贸易作为经济发展战略,但总体上说,中亚区域经济合作还较为分散,尚未形成合力。中亚国家政治诉求和经济利益目标不同,相互间贸易量小且投资很少,导致中亚经济体内部经济联系减弱,加之西方大国的利益角逐和对“主权”的敏感性,这些都减缓了中亚区域经济合作的进程。     

When does coordination for free trade regimes fail?

This paper examines why the recent efforts to arrange free trade regimes have failed repeatedly focusing on the increased uncertainties in economic fundamentals and the asymmetric political economic characteristics of trading countries reflected in the hawkish trade retaliatory tendencies. We demonstrate that, under informational barriers due to economic uncertainties, a slight negative change in economic fundamentals as well as the signals about the economic fundamentals can lead to the collapse of free trade regimes. Moreover, the fear of a trading partner's deviation to protectionist policies might trigger preemptive protectionist measures resulting in a trade war when trade policies show strategic complementarity. However, a free trade regime is more likely to be sustained when it is commonly known that each country has strong symmetric retaliatory tendencies in case trade friction occurs. Nonetheless, if the asymmetry in retaliatory tendencies of trading countries increases the preemptive incentive, a free trade regime is more likely to collapse to a trade war.     

Regional Integration and Intra-industry Trade in Latin America, 1980–90

The decade of the 1980s saw profound changes in the political economy of Latin America. The stabilisation and debt crises forced many countries in the region to re-examine their economic policies individually as well as collectively. The consequence was both a movement in the direction of neoliberal reform that included an emphasis on export promotion as well as a revival of interest in regional integration. The specific purpose of the present paper is to examine the consequences of these changes for the structure of intra-regional trade among and between Latin American countries. More specifically, we are interested in assessing the region's performance in terms of intra-regional, intra-industry trade over the period 1980–90.     

Evidence and explanation for the Tariff-lobbying paradox: endogenous Tariffs fall as protectionist lobbying rises

Recent empirical evidence suggests that U.S. protectionist lobbying expenditures rose while U.S. trade barrier fell. We find that the same result holds in our panel data sample from 28 countries between 1995 and 2011. We find two economic drivers cause the paradox between increasing protectionist lobbying and decreasing trade barrier. First, trade barriers decline as country capital-labour ratio endowments rise because of the rising political and economic power of capital that lobbies for free-trade. Second, factor intensities in production become more similar as factor-intensity convergence. This flattens the production possibility curve between exportable and import-competing production so that changes increased magnification in both factor rewards. In our panel, the magnification parameters are twice as high for capital as for labour (8.6 vs. 5.1). And, the elasticity of the capital return with respect to country capital-labour factor endowment ratios (.59) is nearly twice those of labour (.22). Increased magnification causes thus labour’s increased lobbying for protection to be more than offset by increased capital lobbying against protection. In short, while an increasing labour lobbies for protection as countries advance, combined tariff and non-tariff protection (OTRI) decline significantly as advanced countries get richer. This explains the tariff-protectionist-lobbying paradox.     

Political instability and economic growth

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. We define political instability as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which such a measure of political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. We also discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth.     

A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism

We study a two stage game in which a transnational terrorist organization interacts with an arbitrary number of countries that may differ in their political or economic power, their military effectiveness, the benefit from cooperating against terrorism and the value they assign to damage. Only a subset of countries that emerges endogenously takes proactive measures to fight the terrorist, while all countries incur defensive expenditures to protect their soil. We characterize analytically the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and show how the equilibrium strategies depend on the key model parameters. We provide an algorithm to find the endogenous set of cooperating countries based on their benefit from cooperation and their political/economic power.     

Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality,economic freedom and democracy

We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit.     

Structural change and foreign direct investment: globalization and regional economic integration

This paper investigates flows of inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and FDI-to-GDP ratios in a sample of 62 countries over a 30 year time span. Using several endogenous structural break procedures (allowing for one and two break points), we find that: (1) the great majority of the series have structural breaks in the last 15 years, (2) post-break FDI and FDI/GDP ratios are substantially higher than the pre-break values, and (3) most breaks seem to be related to globalization, regional economic integration, economic growth, or political instability. Static and dynamic panel-data analyses accounting for and/or addressing endogeneity, simultaneity, nonstationarity, heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence show that FDI is negatively related to exchange rate volatility and GDP per capita, but positively related to some regional integration agreements, trade openness, GDP, and GDP growth. Most notably, the European Union is the only regional economic integration unit found to consistently have significant and positive effects on FDI.     

贸易开放、人力资本与 中国区域收入空间效应* ——基于地级及以上行政区域经验数据分析

本文基于中国326个地级及以上行政区域2010-2012年的数据,利用空间杜宾增长模型（SDM）来测算贸易开放对中国区域人均收入的影响。本文测算了各个区域贸易开放和人力资本对人均收入水平的直接、间接和总影响。结果表明：一个区域的贸易开放程度越高越能促进当地经济的发展,对相邻区域的人均收入也会产生正的影响。同时笔者也发现,人力资本对中国各个区域的经济增长会产生正的直接和间接影响。