Foreign Debt,Foreign Direct Investment and Volatility

We investigate how foreign debt and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the growth and welfare of a stochastically growing small open economy. First, we find that foreign debt influences the growth of domestic wealth by lowering the cost of capital, while FDI affects the country's welfare by providing an additional source of permanent income. Second, a decline in domestic investment may improve domestic welfare as FDI replaces the gap. Even when the welfare deteriorates, its magnitude is mitigated, leaving more room for discretionary fiscal policy. Third, a fiscal policy aimed to stabilize domestic output fluctuations needs to be conducted not to crowd out the welfare benefit of FDI too much. Fourth, an economy with both types of foreign capital experiences wider welfare swings by external volatility shocks than the one with foreign debt alone, while the welfare effects from domestic volatility shocks are mitigated. The welfare effects of fiscal shocks are much smaller with both types of foreign capital. Lastly, the first-best labor income tax covers the government absorption by the labor's share of total output, and the capital income tax covers the rest. Investment is penalized or subsidized depending on the social marginal cost-gain differential.     

Foreign Direct Investment, inequality, and growth

This paper examines the interactions between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), inequality, and growth, both from an empirical and a theoretical point of view. Using a panel of 119 developing countries, we observe that FDI promotes both inequality and growth, and tends to reduce the share of agriculture to GDP in the recipient country. We then set up a growth model of a dual economy in which the traditional (agricultural) sector uses a diminishing returns technology, while FDI is the engine of growth in the modern (industrial) sector. The main predictions of the model are consistent with the stylized facts observed in the data.     

社会保障税、投资动机与海外投资

在中国国外投资流入量增速放缓的背景下,如何应对劳动力成本的快速增长造成的东道国优势下降是亟待研究的问题.本文使用134个国家2008—2018年11年的面板数据,采用双向固定效应模型,实证考察了企业社会保障税对海外直接投资的影响.研究结果表明,企业社会保障税率对外国直接投资产生负向影响;企业社会保障税对外国直接投资的负向影响受投资动机的调节作用影响,在生产要素获取动机、非自然资源获取动机与非技术获取动机国家样本中更为显著;企业社会保障税对外国直接投资的负向影响存在经济体和地域差异,在G20国家、亚洲、美洲及非洲国家样本中更为显著.基于实证研究结果,本文提出了基于企业社会保障税率的促进中国海外投资流入的相关政策建议.     

中国对外直接投资的现状、差距与潜力

改革开放以来,中国已经成为令世人瞩目的国际贸易大国和引进外资大国,但是中国的对外直接投资则长期没有得到足够的重视,甚至在很长时间里没有可靠的官方统计数据公布。事实上,近年来伴随中国“走出去”战略的逐步实施,中国已成为受世界瞩目的新兴的对外直接投资来源地。2004年,商务部首次正式发布中国(大陆)2003年度非金融对外直接投资统计数据,可视为中国对外直接投资统计以及中国对外直接投资发展的一个重要标志。未来,伴随着中国整体国际竞争力的不断增强,中国将不仅作为世界经济最具活力的地区而吸引来自世界各国的投资,也将作为对外投资的重要力量参与全球经济竞争。     

Direct Foreign Investment Versus Licensing

This paper examines the choice among alternative modes of direct foreign investment, namely, the wholly owned subsidiary (the S option) and joint venture (the J option), vis-à-vis licensing (the L option). The focus is on the role of moral hazard, difference in risk attitude and the prospect of the host country's policy toward the venture. An apparently surprising result is that riskiness of the project is a factor against the J option. Moreover, in the absence of policy intervention, L is dominated by either S or J, whereas if there is an anticipation of policy intervention (i.e., there is a policy moral hazard) L may emerge as the best option.     

Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment

Despite the growing interest in capital and technology issues, certain issues still remain to be explored regarding the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation and the corporation's consequent choice of investment location. This paper addresses some of these concerns by analyzing the determinants of foreign direct investment by a multinational corporation, both theoretically and empirically. For this purpose, the paper integrates a number of traditional and nontraditional variables into the standard theory of investment based on the maximization of the expected value of the firm. The theoretical model implies that both traditional as well as nontraditional factors matter in determining the flows of foreign direct investment in a country. The generalized investment theory on US foreign direct investment then is tested empirically utilizing panel data for 44 countries from 1983 to 1990. The estimation results provide considerable support for the importance of both traditional and nontraditional factors in determining flows of foreign direct investment in a country. Furthermore, the country-specific dummies show high level of significance, reflecting the importance of the country-specific characteristics in explaining flows of foreign direct investment.     

Competing for Foreign Direct Investment

The paper analyzes 'subsidy games' between countries in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. The winner of this game results from the interaction of two factors, relative country size and employment gains from FDI: a large (or 'central') country is more likely to attract FDI, and so is a country with high unemployment. The subsidy equilibrium is compared with two alternative solutions: zero subsidies and first-best subsidies. It is shown that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero subsidies: the gains from efficient location implied by subsidy competition may more than outweigh the losses from higher subsidies. Moreover, departing from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best subsidies (without side payments) implies a gain to one country and a loss to the other. This suggests that it may be difficult to reach a consensus to move away from the status quo of subsidy competition.     

Domestic R&D,Foreign Direct Investment and Welfare

This paper provides a new rationale to examine the two‐way relationship between domestic research and development (R&D) and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as their impacts on domestic welfare. Our analysis is based on the strategic interaction in cost‐reducing investment decisions between domestic firms and a foreign firm, which is different from the common factors that are discussed in the literature such as spillovers and technology sourcing. Our results are as follows. We show that domestic R&D investment may either increase or decrease the foreign firm's FDI incentives. Further, depending on the marginal cost of domestic firms, domestic R&D incentives can always increase regardless of the effects of domestic R&D investment on the foreign firm's FDI decision. Finally, we find that domestic welfare improves under domestic cost reduction if the slope of the marginal cost of domestic R&D investment is sufficiently small.     

Trade Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, and Convergence

This paper examines the hypothesis that countries which pursue export-promoting (EP) policies are much more likely to converge than countries which pursue import-substituting (IS) policies. The hypothesis is tested statistically in the context of a sample of developing countries which have in the recent past pursued inward-looking or outward-looking or export-promotion (EP) policies. The empirical eviddence supports the hypothesis EP countries converge at approximately 1.9% per annum, while IS countries converge at approximately 0.9% per annum.     

外国直接投资、产业链联系与技术扩散

本地企业与外商投资企业的产业链联系是国际间技术扩散的主要通道。总结了影响产业链联系的各种因素，并指出目前我国发达地区的一些企业和外商投资企业已经形成了“拓展的飞地”型的产业链联系；最后提出了进一步加强产业链联系、促进技术扩散效应最大化的建议。     

Entry into a Foreign Market: Foreign Direct Investment versus Licensing

We compare foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology licensing as two modes of entry into a foreign market. While direct entry via FDI dissipates rents in the host country, opportunistic competition from a licensee may erode rents in the entrant's other markets. Since FDI increases competition in the host country while licensing stifles it. welfare is higher under FDI than under licensing.     

外商直接投资与金融创新

改革开放20多年以为，中国与世界经济一体化迅速加快，而外商直接投资已经成为中国经济快速增长的关键因素之一。外商直接投资促进了所有制结构多元化的变迁，对中国经济制度的市场化变革提供了持续的推动力。虽然我国金融市场化改革取得了很大成就，但是金融结构和金融制度安排并没有发生实质性的变化。随着中国加入WTO，外商直接投资的深度与广度将得到很大发展，这将推动我国金融结构的金融制度安排和创新。     

Foreign Direct Investment, Licensing, and Incentives for Innovation

In a two-period duopoly model, this paper considers a foreign firm's choice between licensing and FDI and studies the relative impact of these modes of technology transfer on the incentives for innovation of that firm and its domestic rival. Relative to licensing, FDI limits technology spillovers to the domestic firm but dissipates more rents in the product market. Internalization allows the foreign firm to build on an existing technological advantage. While the local firm develops its best technology if initial licensing is followed by FDI, the foreign firm transfers the most efficient technology under FDI in both periods.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.     

Environmental Regulation Induced Foreign Direct Investment

The last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in the relationship between environmental regulations and international capital flows. However, empirical studies have so far failed to find conclusive evidence for this so-called pollution haven or race to the bottom effect where foreign direct investment (FDI) is assumed to be attracted to low regulation countries, regions or states. In this paper we present a simple theoretical framework to demonstrate that greater stringency in environmental standards can lead to a strategic increase in capital inflows which we refer to as environmental regulation induced FDI. Our result reveals a possible explanation for the mixed results in the empirical literature and provides an illustration of the conditions under which environmental regulations in the host country can affect the location decision of foreign firms.     

外商直接投资与国家自主创新

本文将FDI(外商直接投资)和LICENSIING(技术许可)作为其潜在的渠道,建立了技术引进的模型.此模型的一个重要特征是模型中的主要假设,模型的结论以及模型的政策意义都与实际经验的观察相一致.对于包括中国在内的发展中国家(LDC)而言,技术许可比外商直接投资所带来的技术外溢更有效,在考虑制定何种政策以达到社会福利的最优化时,人力资本的水平起到了决定性的作用.     

Controlled Openness and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper investigates why a developing country may adopt a partial reform. A country is considered where the ruling elite (referred to as state capital) prevents the entry of foreign capital, and taxes the private sector before reform. A higher productivity of foreign capital always increases the attractiveness of a partial reform under which state capital can control the inflow of foreign capital, but can reduce the attractiveness of a full reform under which the entry of foreign capital is unregulated. Hence, state capital's control over foreign capital may be a necessary condition for the reform to take place at all.     

Labor Training and Foreign Direct Investment

Evidence shows that most foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from developed to developed countries (North–North) in skilled labor‐intensive industries. This paper builds a model that incorporates labor training into the proximity–concentration tradeoffs to analyze the entry mode of multinationals to a foreign country. Production requires both skilled labor and unskilled labor.. A multinational pursuing FDI needs to provide training to some workers in the host country to equip them with skills that are specific to the production of the firm. Labor training and skill specificity lead to contract friction. It is shown that in skilled labor‐intensive industries, FDI increases along with the economic development level of the host country, whereas in unskilled labor‐intensive industries, the reverse is true. This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical findings on the prevalence of North–North FDI in skilled labor‐industries and North–South FDI in unskilled labor‐intensive industries.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Contract Enforcement

A long-standing deterrent to foreign direct investment in developing countries is weak enforcement of binding contracts. A local firm may learn business skills from a cooperating multinational firm and subsequently do business on its own based on the acquired skills. In a two-period, double-moral-hazard model, non-binding contracts are shown to be preferred by all parties, implying that contract enforcement is unnecessary. Our results shed light on the puzzling phenomenon that substantial FDI has been carried out under contractual arrangements in developing countries in which contract enforcement is problematic. They can also explain some interesting stylized facts on contractual joint ventures between multinationals and local firms in the early stage of an economic transition.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1998, 26(4), pp. 761–782. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.     

外商直接投资再创新高

<正> 中国“入世”的第一年,我国利用外商直接投资更加保持了较高的增长势头,据外经贸部统计,今年1至6月全国新批设立外商投资企业15155家,比去年同期增长26.39％;合同外资金额439.9亿美元,同比增长31.47％;实际使用外资金额245.79亿美元,同比增长18.69％。截至今年6月底,全国累计批准外商投资企业405180家,合同利用外资金额7892.81亿美元,实际使用外资金额4198.02亿美元。主要指标分析 1.增长幅度较大。在2001年我国利用外资进入恢复性增长及中国加入世贸组织后的半年时间里,外商直接投资以前所未有的速度和规模涌入中国。2002年1～6月我国利用