共查询到20条相似文献，搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
2.
Ya‐Chin Wang 《The South African journal of economics. Suid-afrikaanse tydskrif vir ekonomie》2013,81(4):605-624
The paper investigates the optimal research and development (R&D) policy in a vertically differentiated market with managerial delegation. We consider not only discriminatory R&D policy but uniform R&D policy as well. It shows that R&D policy can vary depending on the regulator's objective: social welfare, consumer surplus or producer surplus; however, the outcomes are invariant to the nature of market competition. Undoubtedly, the relative‐performance contract plays a crucial role for elaborating policy effects. The government prefers discriminatory R&D policy to uniform policy under a consumer‐oriented objective. On the contrary, under a producer‐oriented objective, the government would prefer to choose uniform R&D policy rather than discriminatory policy. 相似文献
3.
This article proposes a Cournot model of two‐stage competition to examine the patterns of vertical product differentiation in a multiproduct duopoly. Firms simultaneously choose the number of products and their qualities at the first stage and compete in quantities at the second stage. We show that when the fixed setup cost of a product is high enough to result in a monopoly outcome, the monopolist always sells a single product. Moreover, in any equilibrium of a multiproduct duopoly, quality differentiation between them will develop into a nonsegmented pattern because each firm desires to avoid a strong effect of cannibalization. The set of equilibria reveals the properties of quality differentiation between multiproduct firms. In a multiproduct duopoly, the profit from a high‐quality product can be lower than that from a low‐quality product. This finding sharply contrasts with the literature on single‐product firms, which finds the high‐quality advantage. 相似文献
4.
We study tacit collusion in price‐setting duopoly games with strategic complements and substitutes. While this problem has been considered by several studies, this article sheds new light on the comparison by focusing on the relationship between dynamic stability of equilibrium and tacit collusion. We find when controlling for the absolute slope of the reaction functions, there are no robust differences in either the convergence properties or tacit collusion between complements and substitutes treatments. 相似文献
5.
The Bertrand paradox describes a situation in which two competing firms reach an outcome where both price at marginal cost. In laboratory experiments, this equilibrium is not generally observed. Existing empirical works on Bertrand competition have found evidence for boundedly rational models. We find that such models are useful in organizing behavior in early stages of the game, but less so in later stages. We show that a new model, coarse grid Nash equilibrium, based on the assumption that subjects discretize the strategy space, explains the data better. 相似文献
6.
sm ali abbas yuri v. sobolev 《The South African journal of economics. Suid-afrikaanse tydskrif vir ekonomie》2009,77(2):257-281
The observed increase in the level and volatility of Tanzania's Treasury yields in recent years against an otherwise benign macroeconomic backdrop presented a puzzle for policymakers, while raising concerns about the fiscal burden of rising debt interest payments and diversion of bank credit away from the private sector. Using evidence from bid-level data, and supported by a simple theorising of bidder incentives under unorthodox issuance practices, this paper traces the recent volatility in yields to the emergence of a sharp segmentation of the T-bill market between sophisticated financial market players (foreign-controlled banks) and a less-experienced group of investors (domestic pension funds and small banks). An important policy recommendation that emerges is that public debt managers should avoid micro-managing Treasury bill auctions by issuing amounts in excess of those offered or by dipping into oversubscribed segments of the yield curve, as such practices seriously disadvantage the less-sophisticated (but more competitive) investors vis-à-vis the more sophisticated players. 相似文献
7.
We report the results of duopoly market experiments where firms first commit to capacities and then compete in prices. The theoretical literature pertaining to these duopoly models suggests that the way residual demand is rationed is fundamental to the character of equilibrium outcomes when capacity costs are sufficiently low. The experiments test this prediction by varying capacity cost and demand‐rationing schemes. We find that residual demand rationing does not significantly impact the capacity choices of experimental subjects, although it does affect pricing. Regardless of rationing scheme, the Cournot outcome is common with high capacity costs and rare with low capacity costs. 相似文献
8.
Gamal Atallah 《Southern economic journal》2016,83(1):202-235
This article analyzes endogenous efficiency gains from mergers. It considers oligopolistic homogeneous good markets and duopolistic and triopolistic markets under product differentiation (PD) (quantity and price competition). In a two‐stage game, firms invest in cost‐reducing innovation (with and without mergers) and then compete in output/prices. It is found that in homogeneous good markets, all possible mergers generate efficiency gains, and that these are most significant when R&D spillovers are very low or very high. Efficiency gains increase with the number of insiders and generally decrease with the number of outsiders. With PD, in most cases, the merger generates efficiency gains when spillovers and/or PD are sufficiently high. With PD, efficiency gains increase with spillovers, but may increase or decrease with the level of PD. The implications of the results for the relationship between competition and innovation outputs and for merger policy are discussed. 相似文献
9.
Brady Vaughan 《Southern economic journal》2016,82(4):1186-1211
Using a model of sequential search, we show that announcements to price‐match raise prices by altering consumer search behavior. First, price‐matching diminishes firms’ incentives to lower prices to attract consumers who have no search costs. Second, for consumers with positive search costs, price‐matching lowers the marginal benefit of search, inducing them to accept higher prices. Finally, price‐matching can lead to asymmetric equilibria where one firm runs fewer sales and both firms tend to offer smaller discounts than in a symmetric equilibrium. Price increases grow in the proportion of consumers who invoke price‐matching guarantees and in the level of equilibrium asymmetry. 相似文献
10.
Charles J. Thomas 《Southern economic journal》2014,81(2):323-344
This article uses computational methods that reveal substantive differences among the equilibrium outcomes from three models of procurement competition: a recently developed model requiring numerical solution and two analytically tractable models that might naturally be considered suitable proxies. The models differ in what sellers know about the buyer's preferences for their products, and they yield substantially different prices and payoffs, different implications for institutional choice, surprising intensities of competition, and qualitatively different comparative statics. These findings caution against using the analytically convenient models when the newer model is empirically appropriate. Reinterpreting the models and results also provides new insights regarding price discrimination in oligopoly. 相似文献
11.
In the present paper, we propose an extension of Spengler's (1950) analysis of successive oligopolies, to study the effects of entry in the downstream and upstream markets. Free entry is analyzed using replica economies à la Debreu and Scarf (1963) . We find that free entry may have different effects in the upstream and in the downstream market. Namely, the usual convergence of the price to the corresponding marginal cost only occurs in the downstream market. 相似文献
12.
Oksana Loginova 《International Journal of Economic Theory》2010,6(3):297-309
I adopt Hotelling's model with two firms. Each consumer has a most preferred variety and possesses a certain level of category‐specific knowledge. When a firm offers customization, consumers must interact with the firm to create their products. Consumers familiar with the brand can do this seamlessly, whereas consumers unfamiliar with the brand have difficulty expressing their individual needs (the difficulty decreases with consumers' knowledge). The firms first simultaneously decide whether to customize, then engage in price competition. Although customization makes the products less differentiated, the frictions caused by consumer co‐design activities relax price competition. Customization by one of the firms occurs in equilibrium. 相似文献
13.
Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar 《International Journal of Economic Theory》2011,7(4):331-350
In this paper we reconsider existence of Bertrand equilibrium in a symmetric‐cost, homogenous‐product oligopoly. We prove the following main results. (a) If the cost function is strictly superadditive on [0, ∞) then there exists a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium. Such Bertrand equilibria are necessarily non‐unique. (b) If the cost function is strictly subadditive on [0, ∞) then there exists no Bertrand equilibrium, either in pure strategies or in mixed strategies. 相似文献
14.
Hiroyuki Nakata 《International Journal of Economic Theory》2011,7(4):373-386
This paper studies the effects of advertising in a Bertrand duopoly model, which extends Grossman and Shapiro (1984) by introducing the spillover advertising effect on top of the direct advertising effect. It is shown that the spillover effects would make the environment more monopolistic: higher prices and lower demand. 相似文献
15.
Sergio Galletta Mario Jametti Agustin Redonda 《The South African journal of economics. Suid-afrikaanse tydskrif vir ekonomie》2015,83(2):240-252
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the poorest countries in the world. The construction sector will play an essential part to bring the country on the path of economic growth, and competition within the sector is crucial to achieve this goal. In this paper, we analyse the effect of competition in public works tenders in the DRC, using a unique and newly assembled database on public works contracts. We find that the number of participating bidders significantly reduces contract prices, confirming our prior hypothesis that competitive pressure can enhance the overall performance of the sector. Further, we account for the possibility of heteregenous tender participants, finding that the competition effect can vary with the degree of bidders' heterogeneity. 相似文献
16.
fiona tregenna 《The South African journal of economics. Suid-afrikaanse tydskrif vir ekonomie》2008,76(S2):S175-S204
This study examines the linkages between the manufacturing and services sectors, and between each of them and the rest of the domestic economy, based on analysis of input-output tables and employment trends. This reveals that manufacturing is particularly important as a source of demand for the services sector as well as the rest of the economy through its strong backward linkages, which suggests that in this respect a decline in manufacturing could negatively affect future growth. Services are especially important in terms of employment creation, both direct and indirect. 相似文献
17.
n.m . theron w.h . boshoff 《The South African journal of economics. Suid-afrikaanse tydskrif vir ekonomie》2006,74(3):575-592
This article develops an analytical framework that can be used to assess competition in South African telecommunications and, thereafter, applies this framework in an evaluation of vertical integration patterns in the telecommunications industry. It is shown that, despite recent regulatory reforms, substantial vertical competition concerns remain unaddressed in both fixed line and mobile telecommunications markets. 相似文献
18.
willem h. boshoff 《The South African journal of economics. Suid-afrikaanse tydskrif vir ekonomie》2007,75(1):52-65
The paper focuses on the delineation of geographic markets in competition analysis, investigating the use of tests of price co‐movement in the market definition exercise. To this end, the first part is devoted to a conceptual framework for market definition (adopted from Haldrup (2003 )). Thereafter, a variety of price tests are explored that can be applied within the quantitative part of the framework. Similar to Forni (2004 ), the paper emphasizes the use of stationarity tests (that is, tests for the existence of unit roots) – illustrating their application to a recent competition investigation in South Africa. 相似文献
19.
Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Rivalry in the Swiss Automobile Market. —This paper investigates the pricing rivalry among foreign automobile producers in the Swiss market. The main results from the dynamic analysis of two categories of automobiles between 1977 and 1991 are: First, the degree of exchange rate pass-through differs among source-countries despite the absence of quantitative restrictions on imports and of domestic production facilities. However, for some countries, pricing strategies show remarkable consistency across product categories and time spans. Second, the degree of exchange rate pass-through is low, especially in the market for small-size automobiles. Third, this low degree of pass-through may be attributed to a low degree of competition among foreign sellers. 相似文献
20.
Alejandro Plastina Konstantinos Giannakas Daniel Pick 《Southern economic journal》2011,77(4):1044-1069
This study provides a new framework of analysis of the market and welfare effects of mandatory country‐of‐origin labeling (MCOOL) for fruits and vegetables that accounts for heterogeneous consumer preferences, differences in producer agronomic characteristics, and retailer market power. The market and welfare effects of MCOOL are shown to be case‐specific and dependent on the labeling costs at the farm and retail levels, the strength of consumer preference for domestic products, the market power of retailers, the marketing margin along the supply chain, and the relative costs of imported and domestic products. Simulation results for the U.S. market of fresh apples indicate that domestic producers are the most likely beneficiaries of MCOOL, followed by domestic consumers. Being unable to exercise market power on consumers or suppliers of fresh apples, retailers will lose if the implementation of MCOOL entails fixed costs. Imports of fresh apples decline after MCOOL introduction. 相似文献