WELFARE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC PRICE SETTING IN ANTICIPATION OF PRICE REGULATION

A single product monopolist with constant unit costs, in a simple two-period model, is aware that price regulation will be imposed in the second period. The form of the regulation is such that price in period 2 may not exceed 100 ; per cent of price in period 1, where 0 < < 1. The period 1 price will be set higher than it would be in the absence of anticipated regulation. However, it is not always the case that pre-regulation price will be raised as falls. The welfare effects are crucially dependent on the form of the demand function. Under constant elasticity of demand a reduction in will reduce both consumers' and the producer's welfare. Under linear demand, consumers benefit and the producer loses as is reduced and the resultant effect on aggregate welfare is ambiguous.     

PRICE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF OLIGOPOUSTIC MERGERS

When oligopolists merge, the new firm enjoys a lower cost structure than any of its premerger constituent parts. This is because of rationalization economies which are created as facilities previously operated at disparate marginal cost levels come under common control. The resultant price-decreasing force is countered by the loss of competition due to the merger. The latter can stem not only from reduction in the number of competitors, but also from the possibility that, with a more concentrated market structure, firms'conjectures about each others'reactions will move in the direction of being more cooperative. The paper shows that, under normal conditions, the effects of diminished competition outweigh those of rationalization so that a price increase will result from the merger. In addition, the equivalence of merger to the imposition of taxes is exploited to derive a market-share based test for mergers to cause welfare decreases. This complements a test proposed by Farrell and Shapiro that works only for welfare increases.     

THE HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES FOR AGRICULTURE AND EDUCATION IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA IN 1974

The paper reports on several results from a comprehensive study of the household incidence of public expenditure in Peninsular Malaysia in 1974. The results for education show a pro-poor distribution of expenditure when measured as a share of household income. Using however the criterion of each according to his needs (that is the number of school-age children per household) reverses this outcome. In agriculture, because of the importance of land settlement, benefits from public expenditure distribute predominantly in favor of the poor.
The research differs from the usual study of this kind in that individual government outputs such as school years, or fertilizer loans, were defined, and in the case of education their unit costs estimated and their distribution across households measured. In the case of education, both the costs of services from capital and the households' out-of-pocket educational costs were added to the current subsidies. As one consequence, it was seen that total expenditure for education in Malaysia exceeds one-eighth of GNP, nearly double the conventional estimate. Equally important, for the poor the burden of private costs for education even within a public system were seen to be very high.
The contrasts between the strong results for education, a broad based social service, and the less conclusive results for agriculture, an economic service which impacts directly on production, were instructive in suggesting the limitations of such research in measuring the effects of government budget activity on distribution.     

THE SHORT-RUN EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY WITH USEFUL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE

This paper examines the short-run effects of changing government expenditure on output, consumption and employment. It attempts to combine the Public-Finance and macroeconomic approaches to the analysis of fiscal policy by introducing government expenditure which is 'useful' in consumption into an ISLM-type macro model which is derived from the singleperiod maximizing decisions of households and firms and which includes a government budget constraint.
The principal conclusion is that the effects of fiscal policy on output and employment depend on the 'efficiency' of government expenditure. The more efficiently government expenditure meets consumption needs, the less effective is fiscal policy to the point where the fiscal-policy multiplier may be negative.     

SOCIAL STATUS,EDUCATION AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN A TWO‐SECTOR MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS GROWTH*

This paper extends the relative wealth specification of status preference to the two‐sector Uzawa (1965 )– Lucas (1988 ) model and examines the effectiveness of government spending on economic growth. It is found that the desire for relative wealth‐induced social status and/or the education component of relative wealth‐induced social status are important ingredients in determining the growth rate effects of government spending. Provided that the agent is concerned with his or her relative social position, the education‐induced social status plays a more important role than the physical‐asset‐induced social status in determining the validity of public spending on growth. If individuals do not care about their education‐driven social rewards, then an increase in government spending has no effect on the balanced growth rate regardless of the presence of the physical‐asset‐induced social status. A rise in government spending reduces the long‐run growth rate if the education‐induced social status is present.     

MEASURING THE BENEFITS FROM PUBLIC SERVICES: THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN NORWAY

The purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of how local public in-kind benefits affect the distribution of income in Norway. To this end, a method that accounts for differences between municipalities in capacity to produce the same standard of public services is used for assessing the value of sector-specific local public services in each municipality. Moreover, recipient frequencies in various demographic groups are used as basis for determining the allocation of the assessed value of services on citizens of the municipalities. The empirical results show that inequality in the (marginal) distribution of municipal in-kind benefits is rather high. The contribution of municipal in-kind benefits to inequality in the distribution of extended income (cash (after-tax) income plus municipal in-kind benefits) proves, however, to be approximately neutral.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOW WITH TARIFF-RIDDEN AND QUOTA-RESTRICTED IMPORTS*

The welfare effects of foreign capital inflow and changes in the foreign price and tariff rate of a tariff-ridden imported good are considered for a small country for both 3 times 2 and 3 times 3 trade models with a quota-restricted imported good (whose special case is a nontraded good). For the 3 times 2 model, foreign capital inflow does not affect home welfare when there is no tariff on imports, but it harms the home country if a tariff is imposed on the imports to the extent that the tariff-ridden imported good is more capital intensive than the exported good. On the other hand, for the 3 times 3 model the foreign-capital inflow benefits the home country if the tariff rate is below a certain level under the analogous capital-intensity assumptions. The welfare effects of changes in the foreign price of the tariff-ridden good and its tariff rate remain the same for both models.     

IS MONEY THE MEASURE OF WELFARE IN RUSSIA?

The transformation of a non-market to a market economy ought to change fundamentally the significance of money incomes for welfare. Whereas in a stressful non-market economy such as the former Soviet Union, non-monetized resources could substitute for money income and promote welfare, in a modern market economy money income should be a good proxy for household welfare. This article tests the extent to which Russians are now in a modern market economy by analyzing data from nationwide Russian surveys in January, 1992, and April, 1994. Modern influences are increasingly important as a determinant of the distribution of money incomes, but not as an influence upon household welfare. The "randomness" of temporary disruptions of welfare is in accord with Rawlsian principles of equity.     

EXPERIENCE IN MEASUREMENT OF WELFARE COMPONENTS AND THEIR REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The paper relates the Swedish discussion and criticism of national accounting statistics, especially GNP, as a measure of welfare. It describes some results of recent Swedish attempts to find practicable measures of welfare components, i.e. the investigations of the Low Income Commission and of the Expert Group on Regional Development Research. In both cases the regional aspects of welfare are emphasized in the paper.
The results are presented as a sign of important needs for new methods and new systems of concepts in measuring welfare. The Expert Group has for instance in different ways tried to map and compare the "service structure" of separate parts of Sweden. The Low Income Commission has principally studied the position in Swedish society of low income recipients and has not been working particularly on the illumination of regional differences, but since different types of region are included as a background variable, the investigations also give certain measures of the regional aspects of welfare.
In the last part of the paper some of the risks that seem to be difficult to avoid in trying to use welfare measurements are pointed out.     

GOVERNMENT DEFICITS IN POST-KEYNESIAN THEORIES OF GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION

This paper examines the role of the government sector in post-Keynesiantheories of growth and distribution. It shows the possibilityof reconciling two views on income distribution, present inthe post-Keynesian tradition, which the literature has consideredalternative. By following Kaldor's suggestions on the role thatmonetary and fiscal policy can play in maintaining steady growthconditions, we find that distributive variables depend bothon the rate of growth of the economy, as pointed out by Kaldorand Pasinetti, and on the money rate of interest, as suggestedby Sraffa and by the subsequent elaborations of a monetary theoryof distribution. The paper first verifies the validity of thePasinetti theorem and the dual theorem, and shows that thesetheorems do not always hold when the government sector is explicitlyconsidered. It extends the analysis to the case of the corporateeconomy and institutional distribution, clarifying limits tothe neo-Pasinetti theorem related to the assumption of an endogenousvaluation ratio in steady-growth equilibrium and to the factthat this theorem does not hold when real capital investmentis also financed through the issue of firms' bonds.     

PUBLIC EDUCATION, FERTILITY INCENTIVES, NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC GROWTH AND WELFARE

Using a simple overlapping generations model of neoclassical growth, we analyse the effects of both child allowances and the system of public education on the rate of fertility, the per capita income and the individual lifetime welfare. The essential message of the present paper is that developed countries plagued by below-replacement fertility and income stagnation may raise per capita income and the rate of fertility at the same time by increasing the public education expenditure rather than by resorting to child allowances. The latter, in fact, are found to be harmful for long-run neoclassical economic growth and, in contrast with the common belief, for the rate of population growth as well. Moreover, welfare analysis has shown the existence of a Pareto-efficient welfare-maximizing educational contribution rate.     

CASELOAD IMPACTS OF WELFARE REFORM

A welfare reform demonstration program designed to reduce Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recidivism through increased employment and training services resulted in significantly higher short-term caseload growth. Demonstration sites attracted proportionally more households onto assistance early in the demonstration than did comparison sites. These entrants tended to have more extensive previous employment histories. This result suggests that the demonstration attracted individuals who previously qualified for AFDC but did not apply for benefits and/or individuals who reduced their employment to qualify for AFDC. Exits from AFDC also were delayed under the demonstration, suggesting that the more intensive services provided through the demonstration required more time to complete. Finally, certain groups—nonwhites and those with language problems, for example—apparently avoided the demonstration by not migrating into demonstration sites or by migrating out of demonstration sites. These results have important implications for the likely costs of state welfare reform efforts under the Family Support Act of 1988 .     

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR TRADE LIBERALIZATION: POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE RELATED GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR THE URUGUAY ROUND IN JAPAN

This paper investigates the effect of political factors on the interregional allocation of the budget to assist farmers in coping with agricultural trade liberalization in Japan. We present a simple model to show the relationship between political factors and interregional budget allocation and empirically examine whether political factors played a key role in the interregional allocation of Japanese government spending for the Uruguay Round agricultural trade liberalization. Our findings show that this allocation was distorted due to political reasons, which was problematic from the standpoints of fairness and social efficiency.     

ESTIMATING WELFARE IN INSURANCE MARKETS USING VARIATION IN PRICES

We provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection. We then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance. Such variation, together with quantity data, allows us to estimate the demand for insurance. The same variation, together with cost data, allows us to estimate how insurer's costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price. The slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and nature of selection, and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare. We illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employer-provided health insurance from one specific company. We detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small, in both absolute and relative terms.