A Theoretical Reexamination of Privatization: Assessing its Welfare Impacts

Privatization has been one of the significant public policies adopted in the last two decades. Previous studies have focussed on efficacy gains at the firm and industry levels. This paper intends to reconsider the distributive impacts of privatization on the economy as a whole from a theoretical perspective. Specifically, it supposes an economy with two goods, two producers and two consumers, in which it is assumed that one of the consumers is not able to obtain one good that is regarded as a necessity. Since one basis of government intervention is to provide necessity to people who would not otherwise be able to obtain it, government intervention into production is assumed to satisfy this purpose. Using comparative statics, the paper analyzes how the welfare of two consumers is affected by this intervention, and shows that intervention can increase the welfare of some consumers and social welfare in general.     

A dynamic analysis of fiscal pressure and demographic transition

In this paper, the effects of demographic changes, particularly in the age structure of population, on government social expenditure is estimated. The results indicate that income elasticity of government social services is unitary in high income countries and above that level in low income countries, especially in education and welfare. The paper attempts also to forecast the pressure of these government outlays in four distinct countries characterized by different demographic parameters.     

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON EDUCATIONAL POLICY: INTRODUCTION

The two papers that follow both deal with prospects for achieving efficiency in education. Psacharopoulos identifies the extent of government-induced distortions directly or indirectly related to education, and assesses the likely effects of such distortions on social welfare. He concludes that, among other things, governments should not attempt directly to provide or manage schooling services. Levin's article focuses upon one particular management decision…namely, extending the length of the school day and increasing the number of school days per year. He argues that mechanically increasing school sessions through legislative acts or through administrative mandates does not appear, in itself, to be a promising use of scarce resources.     

Policy Rules for Exploitation of Renewable Resources: A Macroeconomic Perspective

A fundamental problem for an economy based on a common property resource is the absence of a market to trade the resource. This implies that private costs will be below social costs. This paper investigates possible government interventions that correct for such distortions in a neoclassical growth model with a production externality in harvesting. The model predicts that the welfare of the representative household increases considerably when a Piguovian tax is implemented. The policy that replicates the command optimum is highly complex and changes over time. On the other hand, a large share of the maximum welfare increase is internalized by introducing a constant quantity tax, suggesting that the potential of such policies is high.     

Redistribution and education subsidies are Siamese twins

We develop models of optimal linear and non-linear income taxation with endogenous human capital formation to explore optimal education subsidies. Optimal subsidies on education ensure efficiency in human capital accumulation and thus play an important role in alleviating the tax distortions on learning induced by redistributive policies. If the government cannot verify all investments in human capital, education policy offsets some but not all tax-induced distortions on learning. Non-pecuniary educational costs (benefits) may increase (decrease) subsidies on education, especially if they are complementary to work effort.     

THE IMPACT OF ANTI‐TERRORISM EXPENDITURE ON ECONOMIC GROWTH AND WELFARE

This paper examines the effects of increasing anti‐terrorism expenditure on economic growth rate and social welfare. It is shown that: (i) spending the least amount possible on anti‐terrorism expenditure will lead to a maximum economic growth rate; and (ii) to achieve maximum social welfare, the government should allocate its budget to anti‐terrorism expenditure. The results shed light on why the US government has chosen to uphold and pursue its anti‐terrorism policies in recent years to present day.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policies in the face of rare disasters

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policies in an economy exposed to large adverse shocks (rare disasters). We contrast optimal policies under commitment and discretion and identify several striking differences between these institutional environments. A government that can commit to its policy plans relies heavily on debt to smooth the adverse effects of large shocks over time. Lack of commitment seriously limits the government's ability to use debt as a shock absorber. Under discretion, an increase in debt leads to an increase in inflation expectations and therefore higher nominal interest rate distortions. Hence, the discretionary government keeps debt in close vicinity of its steady-state level, and the response of taxes, inflation, and interest rates to shocks is much more pronounced under discretion than under commitment. This is particularly relevant for large shocks and when the initial stock of government debt is already high at the time the shock occurs. We also argue that the adverse welfare effects of disasters are larger under discretion than under commitment, but these welfare differentials can be significantly reduced by making the discretionary government inflation averse.     

Global Distortions to Agricultural Markets: Indicators of Trade and Welfare Impacts, 1960 to 2007

Despite recent reforms, world agricultural markets remain highly distorted by government policies. Traditional indicators of those price distortions such as producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) can be poor guides to the policies' economic effects. Recent theoretical literature provides scalar index numbers of trade‐ and welfare‐reducing effects of price and trade policies which this paper builds on to develop more‐satisfactory indexes that can be generated using no more than the data used to generate PSEs and CSEs. We then exploit a new Agricultural Distortion database to provide time‐series estimates of index numbers for 75 developing and high‐income countries over the past half‐century.     

Agricultural subsidy policies fail to deal with child labour under agricultural dualism: What could be the alternative policies?

We provide a theoretical explanation why agricultural subsidy policies are likely to fail to ensure simultaneous eradication of the incidence of child labour and improvement in the well-being of the poor working families in terms of a three-sector general equilibrium model with child labour and agricultural dualism. We identify both demand and supply side effects of any policy intervention on child labour. We also suggest two alternative policies, a scheme of direct cash transfer to poor people and economic growth through foreign direct investment (FDI), both of which would be effective in achieving these twin objectives of a welfare government.     

Political Economy of Conditional Aid in a Federal Economy

This paper employs a political economy approach to model the joint determination of national and subnational sectoral protection in an open federal economy. Political interactions between special interest groups and policymakers as well as economic interrelationships between federal and state government policies are analyzed. The model is applied to study the effects of conditional financial assistance on policy‐making in the aid‐receiving federal economy. We find that policy‐based financial assistance to the federal government tends to reduce the extent of distortions resulting from the federal government policy. However, if federal and state government policies are strategic substitutes, state government induced policy distortions would increase, thereby detracting from the effectiveness of conditionality in reducing overall policy distortions in the recipient economy.     

Optimal research and development and the cost of business cycles

While research and development (R&D) investment has been procyclical in the post-war period, recent literature suggests that the optimal path for R&D is countercyclical, and that the economy would be better off by subsidizing R&D in recessions. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effects of distortions in the intertemporal allocation of R&D resources and to compare diverse policy interventions so as to improve social welfare. To this end, we introduce a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Schumpeterian endogenous growth that is capable of explaining the observed procyclicality of R&D. Our results show that the cost of business cycles is lower in the decentralized economy with procyclical R&D than in the efficient allocation with countercyclical R&D. This is because the suboptimal propagation of shocks in the decentralized equilibrium offsets some of the existing steady-state distortions. In this second-best context, countercyclical R&D subsidies have no positive effect on welfare. In contrast, fiscal policies aimed at restoring the optimal steady-state produce large welfare gains.     

An open-economy transition model

This paper presents an open-economy general equilibrium model illustrating an economy such as a small eastern European country prior to economic transition. The developed model illustrates some of the inefficiencies inherent in the pre-reform economies, including the price distortions that caused resource wasting queues, as well as government domination of the production process. The model specifically provides a dynamic, analytical framework for considering the impact of government policies in determining the size of the trade balance and pre- and post-reform domestic social welfare.The author sincerely appreciates the comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper provided by the participants in the Social Sciences Research Council Workshop on the Economics of Transition to Market Systems in St. Petersburg in July 1995, as well as at the 1996 AEA and CEA meetings. Gerhard Glomm, Michael Alexeev, Joe C. Davis, and Ashok Kotwal had many helpful suggestions. The author also thanks Josh Perryman for research assistance.     

Optimal Intervention Policies for a Small Monetary Economy

We analyze the gains from trade for a small cash-in-advance economy with endogenous labor supply and learning-by-doing in the accumulation of human capital. Contrary to previous findings, we show that free trade is not optimal independently of the relative amount of cash required for the purchase of each good. Furthermore, a monetary rule à la Friedman can eliminate distortions deriving from the cash-in-advance constraint only under segmented financial markets; in any case, it cannot restore the economic optimum. Finally, we identify government intervention policies, such as wage and export subsidies, that can be welfare improving.     

Reforming social security: assessing the effects of alternative funding strategies

Population ageing implies that the large pay-as-you-go social security programmes implemented in many OECD economies will run into severe financial problems. By means of a numerical overlapping generations model, this paper investigates the intergenerational welfare effects of a transition to funded security programmes. Such programmes imply permanent increases in the welfare of the young and unborn generations. It is demonstrated that the size of the welfare gains varies significantly between alternative funding strategies. A nonindividualized funding strategy characterized by increased government asset accumulation triggers considerable welfare gains through increased asset returns in the future. Even larger welfare gains may be realized by an individual funding strategy characterized by increased asset accumulation accompanied by an adoption of actuarial supplementary pensions (i.e. actuarial supplementary pensions combined with a fixed minimum pension) which reduces future tax distortions drastically.     

Markets as beneficial constraints on the government

We study the role of anonymous markets in which trades cannot be monitored by the government. We adopt a Mirrlees approach to analyze economies in which agents have private information and a benevolent government controls optimal redistributive tax policy. While unrestricted access to anonymous markets reduces the set of policy instruments available to the government, it also limits the scope of inefficient redistributive policies when the government lacks commitment. Indeed, the restrictions that anonymous markets impose on the optimal fiscal policy, especially on capital taxation and the history-dependence of income taxation, can have positive welfare effects in this case.     

Can Empathy Explain Gender Differences in Economic Policy Views in the United States?

This paper shows that different levels of empathy of men and women explain the well-documented gender differences in interventionist government economic policy views in the United States. Using the Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) to measure empathy, the study finds that more empathic people support more interventionist policies. While greater empathy leads both men and women to support more government action, there is no gender difference in the effects of empathy on policy views. When policy views are separated by area, gender differences on policies concerning poverty, inequality, and social welfare disappear once empathy is accounted for, though they persist in views on free markets.     

Information design,externalities, and government interventions

We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with spillovers. A sender provides information to persuade a receiver to take an action with external effects. We consider how government interventions, including corrective subsidy and tax, affect social welfare. In addition to internalizing externalities, government interventions affect social welfare through an informational channel. Subsidies to the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal less information, but taxes on the sender's preferred action incentivize the sender to reveal more information. Because of such an informational effect, the optimal subsidy and tax may be different from the size of the externalities. In some cases, social welfare is maximized with no government intervention.     

Intergenerational externalities,sustainability and welfare—The ambiguous effect of optimal policies on resource depletion

This paper studies an endogenous growth model with exhaustible resources, overlapping generations and human capital externalities. In the competitive equilibrium, selfish behavior and inefficient skills accumulation may prevent sustained growth. Implementing the utilitarian optimum likely induces sustainability via increased knowledge formation, but resource depletion may be faster or slower than under laissez-faire depending on the social discount rate. Heavy (modest) social discounting delays (anticipates) the achievement of net welfare gains for newborn agents and successors. The reason is that human capital accumulation magnifies the positive growth effects of policies that lower the rate of resource destruction, preserving the welfare of newborn agents. Resource-depleting policies, instead, hamper growth and reduce lifetime welfare of early-in-time generations—the first loser being the currently young.     

不同监督情境下政府创新支持对企业研发投入的影响——基于农业上市公司的实证研究

近年来,“三农”问题受到极大关注。为了应对外部资源、环境、科学技术等多重压力对农业升级与发展的影响,政府出台了诸多政策支持农业企业的技术研发与创新。本文从政府干预视角分析政府补助和税费返还两种形式的政府创新支持政策对农业企业研发投入的影响,重点分析机构投资者与大股东参与公司内部治理以及社会审计事务机构参与公司外部治理这两者所发挥的不同监督作用。研究发现：第一,不同形式的政府创新支持（政府补助和税费返还）对农业企业研发投入的影响并不一致。政府补助产生替代效应,税费返还则产生互补效应。第二,持股监督（机构投资者和大股东的持股比例上升）能增强政府补助对农业企业研发投入的替代效应,也能增强税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。第三,审计监督（社会审计事务机构的审计意见）会减弱政府补助支持对农业企业研发投入的替代效应,也会减弱税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。本文的研究发现为政府制定适宜的创新支持政策,以及合理发挥持股监督与审计监督的内外部治理作用,提供一定的决策依据和理论支持。     

地区差距、要素流动与财政分权

本文在财政分权框架下引入不完全人口流动和内生劳动供给选择 ,针对两个不对称的地方经济 ,研究了政府的最优税收、最优公共支出和最优转移支付政策。我们发现了零中央政府收入税和逆向财政缺口 ,在有限政策工具的约束下 ,对应性转移支付也具有缩小区域差距的功能。不同级别政府间的服务竞争和税收竞争极大地影响了个人和政府的最优决策 ,拥挤效应和实际禀赋效应放大了通常意义上的收入效应水平。人口流动和财政分权提高了低生产力地区的福利 ,数值模拟分析结果表明高生产力、高禀赋地区对低生产力、低禀赋地区存在隐性的区域间收入再分配 ,中央政府的干预措施一般具有协调区域发展、补贴低生产力低禀赋地区的性质。结合我国东西部的经济现实 ,我们认为中央政府应该打破已有的利益分配格局 ,优化转移支付资金的结构 ,提高财政政策效率