Differences in Interest Rate Policy at the ECB and the Fed: An Investigation with a Medium-Scale DSGE Model

Using two estimated models for the euro area and the United States, this paper investigates whether the observed difference in the amplitude of the interest rate cycle since 1999 in both areas is due to differences in the estimated monetary policy reaction function, differences in the structure of the economy or differences in the size and nature of the shocks hitting both economies. The paper concludes that differences in the type, size and persistence of shocks in both areas can largely explain the different interest rate setting.     

Federal reserve policy viewed through a money supply lens

Federal Reserve nonborrowed reserve supply systematically responded to changes in inflation and in the output gap over the period 1969-2000. While the feedback from output gap is always negative, the response of money supply to changes in inflation varies considerably across time. Nonborrowed reserves decreased with inflation in the post-1979 period and increased in the pre-1979 period. Applying a standard macro-model, the estimated reaction functions are shown to ensure equilibrium determinacy. Viewed through the money supply lens, Federal Reserve policy substantially changed over time, but has never allowed for endogenous fluctuations, which contrasts conclusions drawn from federal funds rate analyses.     

The Central Banker as a Risk Manager: Estimating the Federal Reserve's Preferences under Greenspan

We derive a natural generalization of the Taylor rule that links changes in the interest rate to the balance of the risks implied by the dual objective of sustainable economic growth and price stability. This monetary policy rule reconciles economic models of expected utility maximization with the risk management approach to central banking. Within this framework, we formally test and reject the standard assumption of quadratic and symmetric preferences in inflation and output that underlies the derivation of the Taylor rule. Our results suggest that Fed policy decisions under Greenspan were better described in terms of the Fed weighing upside and downside risks to their objectives rather than simply responding to the conditional mean of inflation and of the output gap.     

The impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate: evidence from three small open economies

This paper studies the impact effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the 1990s. Shocks are identified by the reaction of three month market interest rates to policy announcements that were not themselves endogenous to economic news on the same day. The main result is that a 100 basis point contractionary shock will appreciate the exchange rate by 2-3 percent on impact. The association of interest rate hikes with depreciations that is sometimes observed during periods of exchange market pressure is mainly attributable to reverse causality.     

Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy: Evidence from OECD Economies

Inflation in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was low in the 1960s, rose for a time before peaking in the 1970s or early 1980s, and then fell back to initial levels. This paper shows that a simple time inconsistency model of monetary policy does not explain OECD inflation outcomes, except in the United States. The hypothesis that time inconsistency mattered only in earlier decades fits the data no better than the baseline model. We find some, albeit limited support for a model in which inflation spills over from the United States into other countries as a result of exchange rate targeting.     

Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence

Political monetary cycles are less likely to occur in countries with independent central banks. Independent central banks can withstand political pressure to stimulate the economy before elections or finance election-related increases in government spending. Based on this logic and supporting evidence, we construct a de facto ranking of central bank independence derived from the extent to which monetary policy varies with the electoral cycle. The ranking avoids well-known problems with existing measures of central bank independence and provides independent information about average inflation and inflation volatility differences across countries.     

The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Political Monetary Cycles in Advanced and Developing Nations

This paper examines the extent to which monetary policy is manipulated for political purposes during elections. We do not detect political monetary cycles in advanced countries or developing nations with independent central banks. We do find evidence, however, in developing countries that lack central bank independence. Furthermore, we find some evidence that these cycles are not caused by monetization of election-related fiscal expansions. This suggests that pressure by politicians on the central bank to exploit the Phillips curve may be an important factor in generating political monetary cycles.     

The Eurosystem, the U.S. Federal Reserve, and the Bank of Japan: Similarities and Differences

The paper provides a systematic comparison of the Eurosystem, the U.S. Federal Reserve, and the Bank of Japan. These monetary authorities exhibit somewhat different status and tasks, which reflect different historical conditions and national characteristics. However, widespread changes in central banking practices in the direction of greater independence and increased transparency, as well as changes in the economic and financial environment over the past 15–20 years, have contributed to reduce the differences among these three world's principal monetary authorities. A comparison based on simple "over-the-counter" policy reaction functions shows no striking differences in terms of monetary policy implementation.     

Quantifying and sustaining welfare gains from monetary commitment

Our objectives are: to quantify the stabilization welfare gains from commitment; to examine how commitment to an optimal rule can be sustained as an equilibrium; to find a simple interest rate rule that approximates the optimal commitment one. We utilize an empirical micro-founded euro-area DSGE model, a quadratic approximation of household utility as the welfare criterion, employing a nominal interest rate lower bound. In contrast to previous studies, we find significant commitment stabilization gains of around a 0.4-0.5% equivalent permanent consumption increase, and with higher price stickiness gains over 2%. We find that a simple optimized commitment rule responding to inflation and the real wage mimics the optimal one.     

Consumption Habits in a New Keynesian Business Cycle Model

Consumption habits have become an integral component in new Keynesian models. However, consumption habits can be modeled in a host of different ways and this diversity is reflected in the literature. I examine whether different approaches to modeling consumption habits have important implications for business cycle behavior. Using a standard New Keynesian business cycle model, I show that, to a first-order log-approximation, the consumption Euler equation associated with the additive functional form for habit formation encompasses the multiplicative function form. Empirically, I show that whether consumption habits are internal or external has little effect on the model's business cycle characteristics.     

The Effects of Monetary Policy on Unemployment Dynamics under Model Uncertainty: Evidence from the United States and the Euro Area

This paper explores the role that the imperfect knowledge of the structure of the economy plays in the uncertainty surrounding the effects of rule-based monetary policy on unemployment dynamics in the euro area and the United States. We employ a Bayesian model averaging procedure on a wide range of models which differ in several dimensions to account for the uncertainty that the policymaker faces when setting the monetary policy and evaluating its effect on real economy. We find evidence of a high degree of dispersion across models in both policy rule parameters and impulse response functions. Moreover, monetary policy shocks have very similar recessionary effects on the two economies with a different role played by the participation rate in the transmission mechanism. Finally, we show that a policymaker who does not take model uncertainty into account and selects the results on the basis of a single model may come to misleading conclusions not only about the transmission mechanism, but also about the differences between the euro area and the United States, which are on average essentially small.     

The Liquidity Effect in the Federal Funds Market: Evidence at the Monthly Frequency

In this paper, we argue that much of the research into the link between money and interest rates suffers from misspecification. The measure of money and the measure of interest rates are not always well matched. In examining the transmission of monetary policy, we show that using an appropriate measure of money, Federal Reserve balances, and the appropriate interest rate, the federal funds rate, a clear liquidity effect exists. Furthermore, we explain how a lack of a clear institutional understanding may have contributed to the finding of a "liquidity puzzle" in the past.     

Monetary policy transmission in vector autoregressions: A new approach using central bank communication

In this paper, we study the role played by central bank communication in monetary policy transmission. We employ the Swiss Economic Institute’s Monetary Policy Communicator to measure the future stance of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. Our results indicate, first, that communication has an influence on inflation (expectations) similar to that of actual target rate changes. Communication also plays a noticeable role in the transmission of monetary policy to output. Consequently, future work on monetary policy transmission should incorporate both a short-term interest rate and a communication indicator. A second finding is that the monetary policy transmission mechanism changed during the financial crisis as the overall effect of monetary policy on (expected) inflation and output is weaker and of shorter duration during this period compared to the overall sample period.     

On money and output: Is money redundant?

There is an emerging consensus that money can be largely ignored in making monetary policy decisions. Rudebusch and Svensson [1999, Policy Rules and Inflation Targeting. In Taylor, J.B. (Ed.), Monetary Policy Rules. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 203-246; 2002, Eurosystem Monetary Targeting: Lessons from US Data. European Economic Review 46, 417-442] provide some empirical support for this view. We reconsider the role of money and find that money is not redundant. More specifically, there is a significant statistical relationship between lagged values of money and the output gap, even when lagged values of real interest rates and lagged values of the output gap are accounted for. We also find that inside and outside money provide significant information in predicting movements in the output gap.     

An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy

We propose a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi-commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans, to be tempted to renege on them, and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector. By interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the (lack of) credibility of the monetary policy authority, we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility. Our main finding is that, in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism, most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility.     

Inflation Band Targeting and Optimal Inflation Contracts

In this paper we provide a theoretical treatment of how inflation target ranges cope with the time-inconsistency problem arising from incentives for the monetary policymaker to exploit the short-run trade-off between employment and inflation to pursue short-run employment objectives, as in a Barro-Gordon (1983) model. Inflation band targets are able to achieve many of the benefits that arise under practically less attractive solutions such as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts. Our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economy.     

The impact of Milton Friedman on modern monetary economics: Setting the record straight on Paul Krugman's “Who was Milton Friedman?”

Paul Krugman's essay “Who Was Milton Friedman?” seriously mischaracterizes Friedman's economics and his legacy. In this paper, we provide a rejoinder to Krugman on these issues. In the course of setting the record straight, we provide a self-contained guide to Milton Friedman's impact on modern monetary economics and on today's central banks. We also refute the conclusions that Krugman draws about monetary policy from the experiences of the United States in the 1930s and of Japan in the 1990s.     

The international transmission of bank capital requirements: Evidence from the UK

We use data on UK banks? minimum capital requirements to study the impact of changes to bank-specific capital requirements on cross-border bank loan supply from 1999Q1 to 2006Q4. By examining a sample in which each recipient country has multiple relationships with UK-resident banks, we are able to control for demand effects. We find a negative and statistically significant effect of changes to banks? capital requirements on cross-border lending: a 100 basis point increase in the requirement is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of cross-border credit of 5.5 percentage points. We also find that banks tend to favor their most important country relationships, so that the negative cross-border credit supply response in “core” countries is significantly less than in others. Banks tend to cut back cross-border credit to other banks (including foreign affiliates) more than to firms and households, consistent with shorter maturity, wholesale lending which is easier to roll off and may be associated with weaker borrowing relationships.     

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve: From Sticky Inflation to Sticky Prices

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) model of inflation dynamics based on forward-looking expectations is of great theoretical significance in monetary policy analysis. Empirical studies, however, often find that backward-looking inflation inertia dominates the dynamics of the short-run aggregate supply curve. This inconsistency is examined by investigating multiple structural changes in the NKPC for the U.S. between 1960 and 2005, employing both inflation expectations survey data and a rational expectations approximation. We find that forward-looking behavior plays a smaller role during the high and volatile inflation regime to 1981 than in the subsequent period of moderate inflation, providing empirical support for sticky price models over the last two decades. A break in the intercept of the NKPC is also identified around 2001 and this may be associated with U.S. monetary policy in that period.     

Monetary Policy in a Forward-Looking Input–Output Economy

This paper examines the implications for monetary policy of sticky prices in both final and intermediate goods in a New Keynesian model. Both optimal policy under commitment and discretionary policy under simple loss functions are studied. Household utility losses under alternative loss functions are compared; additionally, the robustness of policy performance to model and shock misperceptions and parameter uncertainty is examined. Targeting inflation in both consumer and intermediate goods performs better than targeting inflation in one sector; targeting price levels of both final and intermediate goods performs significantly better. Moreover, targeting price levels in both sectors yields superior robustness properties.