Does inflation targeting improve fiscal discipline?

We explore the performances of inflation targeting (IT) adoption in terms of fiscal discipline (FD), while most existing studies focus exclusively on the role of FD as a precondition for IT adoption. Using a sample of developing and developed countries, we show that IT adoption exerts a positive and significant effect on FD, a result robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications. In addition, this effect is statistically significant only in developing countries, a result that may fuel the current debate regarding the relevance of IT adoption in general, and particularly for developing countries.     

Flexible inflation targets,forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in emerging countries

Emerging economies with inflation targets (IT) face a dilemma between fulfilling the theoretical conditions of “strict IT”, which imply a fully flexible exchange rate, or applying a “flexible IT”, which entails a de facto managed-floating exchange rate with foreign exchange (forex) interventions to moderate exchange rate volatility. Using a panel data model for 37 countries we find that, although IT lead to higher exchange rate instability than alternative regimes, forex interventions in some IT countries have been more effective to lower volatility than in non-IT countries, which may justify the use of “flexible IT” by policymakers.     

Does Inflation Targeting Affect the Dispersion of Inflation Expectations?

In this paper, we examine the effect of having an inflation targeting framework on the dispersion of inflation forecasts from professional forecasters. We use a panel data set of 25 countries—including 14 inflation targeters—with 16 years of monthly information. We find that the dispersion of long-run inflation expectations is smaller in targeting regimes after controlling for country-specific effects, time-specific effects, the level and the variance of inflation, disinflation periods, and global inflation. On average, the full effect is not observed until the third year after implementation of inflation targeting. When we differentiate between developed and developing countries, the dispersion of inflation expectations after inflation targeting is smaller and statistically significant only in developing countries.     

Deconstructing credibility: The breaking of monetary policy rules in Brazil

Can political interference deconstruct credibility that was hardly-earned through successful stabilization policy? We analyze the recent switch in the conduct of monetary policy by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB). Brazil is the largest Emerging Market Economy to formally target inflation, having adopted the Inflation Targeting (IT) regime in 1999. In the early years of IT, the BCB engaged in constructing credibility with price setting agents and succeeded to anchor inflation expectations to its target even under adverse conditions such as exchange rate crises. We argue that this effort to maintain IT rules-based policy ended in 2011, as a new country president and BCB board came to power. We then discuss the consequences of this credibility loss. Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) we provide strong empirical evidence of the BCB’s shift toward looser, discretionary policy after 2011; (ii) preliminary evidence suggests that this shift has affected agents’ inflation expectations generating social and economic costs.     

The impact of central bank independence on the performance of inflation targeting regimes

This paper examines the effects of inflation targeting on inflation in both advanced and emerging economies. We do not detect significant effects in advanced economies and only find small benefits in emerging economies, in line with previous studies. However, when we differentiate the impact of inflation targeting based on the degree of central bank independence, we find large effects in emerging economies with low central bank independence. Our results therefore suggest that central bank independence is not a prerequisite for countries to experience significant declines in inflation following the adoption of inflation targeting. Furthermore, we provide evidence that one channel through which inflation targeting lowers inflation more in countries with low central bank independence is the reduction of budget deficits following the adoption of an inflation target.     

Inflation targeting,credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules

In this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target. We present a stylized New Keynesian model in which agents' inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target. To (re-) establish credibility, monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past. Moreover, the central bank responds non-linearly to past inflation gaps. This is reflected in an additional term in the central bank's instrument rule, which we refer to as the ”credibility loss.” Augmenting a standard Taylor (1993) rule with the latter term, we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting (IT) economies. We find, first, that past deviations from IT feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful. Deterioration in credibility (ceteris paribus) forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps. Second, we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses, with the latter dominating the former.     

Does inflation targeting really make a difference? Evaluating the treatment effect of inflation targeting in seven industrial countries

We evaluate the treatment effect of inflation targeting in seven industrial countries that adopted this policy in the 1990s. To address the self-selection problem of policy adoption, we make use of a variety of propensity score matching methods recently developed in the treatment effect literature. Our results show that inflation targeting has no significant effects on either inflation or inflation variability in these seven countries. Further evidence from long-term nominal interest rates and income velocity of money also supports the window-dressing view of inflation targeting.     

Sovereign debt risk in emerging market economies: Does inflation targeting adoption make any difference?

Based on a sample of 38 emerging economies, we find that inflation targeting (IT) adoption improves sovereign debt risk. Next, we show that this favorable effect is sensitive to several structural characteristics, and to the considered time span. Finally, the measure of sovereign risk (sovereign debt ratings or government bond yield spreads) and the IT form (full-fledged or partial) equally influence the effect of IT adoption on sovereign debt risk. Thus, our paper provides valuable insights regarding IT implementation as a device for improving emerging market economies' access to international financial markets.     

Testing the transparency benefits of inflation targeting: Evidence from private sector forecasts

Using inflation forecast data for 11 IT adoption countries, IT adoption is found to promote convergence in forecast errors, suggesting that it enhances transparency. This result, which is subjected to several robustness checks and found to be robust, supports Morris and Shin's (2002) contention that better public information is most beneficial for forecasters with bad private information. However, it does not support their hypothesis that better public information could make private forecasts less accurate.     

Are inflation expectations rational?

Several recent papers report evidence of an apparent statistical bias in inflation expectations and interpret these findings as overturning the rational expectations hypothesis. In this paper, we investigate the validity of such an interpretation. We present a computational dynamic general equilibrium model capable of generating aggregate behavior similar to the data along several dimensions. By construction, model agents form “rational” expectations. We run a standard regression on equilibrium realizations of inflation and inflation expectations over sample periods corresponding to those tests performed on actual data and find evidence of an apparent bias in inflation expectations. Our experiments suggest that this incorrect inference is largely the product of a small sample problem, exacerbated by short-run learning dynamics in response to infrequent shifts in monetary policy regimes.     

Inflation Targeting Matters: Evidence from OECD Economies' Sacrifice Ratios

Using data from OECD economies, we show that inflation targeters suffered smaller output losses during disinflations when compared to nontargeters. We also study why some countries choose to inflation target while others do not and find that higher average inflation and smaller debt levels render the adoption of the regime more likely. Applying Heckman's procedure to control for selection bias does not alter the link between inflation targeting and less costly disinflations.     

Discretionary monetary policy and inflation persistence

Rational expectations models of staggered price/wage contracts have failed to replicate the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflationary periods. The current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal contract model with imperfect credibility and learning. In this paper, I re-examine the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy. I show that when the central bank is allowed to re-optimize a quadratic loss function each period, imperfect credibility and learning, even in the absence of staggered contracts, can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment losses during a disinflationary period.     

Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence

Political monetary cycles are less likely to occur in countries with independent central banks. Independent central banks can withstand political pressure to stimulate the economy before elections or finance election-related increases in government spending. Based on this logic and supporting evidence, we construct a de facto ranking of central bank independence derived from the extent to which monetary policy varies with the electoral cycle. The ranking avoids well-known problems with existing measures of central bank independence and provides independent information about average inflation and inflation volatility differences across countries.     

Inflation Announcements and Social Dynamics

We propose a new framework for understanding the effectiveness of central bank announcements when firms have heterogeneous inflation expectations. Expectations are updated through social dynamics and, with heterogeneity, not all firms choose to operate, putting downward pressure on realized inflation. Our model rationalizes why countries stuck at the zero lower bound have had a hard time increasing inflation without being aggressive. The same model also predicts that announcing an abrupt target to disinflate will cause inflation to undershoot the target, whereas announcing gradual targets will not. We present new empirical evidence that corroborates this prediction.     

Inflation Targeting Does Not Matter: Another Look at OECD Sacrifice Ratios

Recently in this journal, Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009) concluded that inflation targeters were able to bring inflation down at less cost than nontargeters (p. 242). This comment shows that their conclusion is not robust but instead is the result of comparing a particular subset of inflation targeting (IT) disinflations with nonsimultaneous disinflations that occurred under very different macroeconomic conditions. In their sample, simple extensions such as justifiably varying the treatment group of IT disinflations, to control for common time‐varying effects or to control for the Maastricht Treaty effects, suggest that IT does not matter.     

Financial dollarization and systemic risks: New empirical evidence

This paper explores the persistence of financial dollarization in a group of 79 economies with different levels of development. Our main hypothesis is that a high level of domestic debt combined with default risk explains this persistence, even after a decline in inflation rates. Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) in a panel data analysis, our results show that inflation risks caused by increasing probability of default account for financial dollarization more than inflation rate itself. After the decrease in inflation rates, the foreign currency-denominated deposits remain large because of the high debt-to-GDP ratios, particularly in speculative-grade economies. High public indebtedness leads to expectations of default. Dollarization is a rational response to the future inflation associated with investors' expectations of default observed in highly indebted economies.     

New tests of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve

Lagged dependent variables typically play an important role in empirical models of inflation. Do these lags reflect backward-looking inflation expectations, or do they proxy for rational forward-looking expectations, as in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve? Galí and Gertler [1999. Inflation dynamics: a structural econometric analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 44, 195-222] attempt to answer this question using GMM to estimate specifications incorporating both lagged and future inflation. They report small coefficients on lagged inflation and conclude that the new-Keynesian model provides a good first approximation to inflation dynamics. We show that these tests have low power against alternative backward-looking specifications, and demonstrate that their results are also consistent with a backward-looking Phillips curve. Using an alternative approach, we find that the new-Keynesian pricing model cannot explain the importance of lagged inflation in standard inflation regressions, and find that forward-looking terms play a very limited role in explaining inflation dynamics.     

Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? Household Expectations of Inflation Based on Micro Consumption Data

Survey data on household expectations of inflation are routinely used in economic analysis, yet it is not clear how accurately households are able to articulate their expectations in survey interviews. We propose an alternative approach to recovering households' expectations of inflation from their consumption expenditures. We show that these expectations measures have predictive power for consumer price index (CPI) inflation. They are better predictors of CPI inflation than household survey responses and more highly correlated with professional inflation forecasts, except for highly educated consumers, consistent with the view that more educated consumers are better able to articulate their expectations. We also document that households' inflation expectations respond to inflation news, as measured by the unpredictable component of inflation predictions in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The response to inflation news tends to increase with households' level of education, consistent with the existence of constraints on household's ability to process this information.     

A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation

Under a conventional policy rule, a central bank adjusts its policy rate linearly according to the gap between inflation and its target, and the gap between output and its potential. Under “the opportunistic approach to disinflation” a central bank controls inflation aggressively when inflation is far from its target, but concentrates more on output stabilization when inflation is close to its target, allowing supply shocks and unforeseen fluctuations in aggregate demand to move inflation within a certain band. We use stochastic simulations of a small-scale rational expectations model to contrast the behavior of output and inflation under opportunistic and linear rules.     

Inflation targeting & implications of oil shocks for inflation expectations in oil-importing and exporting economies: Evidence from three Nordic Kingdoms

In the context of the debate on inflation targeting, this paper analyses the impact of the oil shocks on inflation expectations in three Nordic Kingdoms. A NARDL framework is applied to data from Jan 1994 to June 2018 on the Kingdoms of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Our key findings suggest that there are considerable nonlinearities and asymmetries in the relationship between inflation expectations, oil shocks and economic determinants of inflation expectations. The expectations formulated in the past have a very significant negative impact on future inflation expectations (adaptive expectations) and there is heterogeneity in the adaptiveness pace. A country's net oil trade position seems to reflect on the impact of oil price shocks on the inflation expectations and there is asymmetry and downwards inflation expectations rigidity. There is strong evidence of exchange rate pass-through to inflation expectations. Prevailing regimes of price stability can support to anchor future inflation expectations. Reduction in fiscal deficit and increases in money supply has a positive impact while unemployment has a negative impact on inflation expectations. The cumulative multiplier analysis showed that the impact of oil shock was symmetric in Sweden and Denmark but asymmetric in Norway which is a large net oil exporter. Besides the adoption of explicit inflation targeting regime by Sweden and Norway, the inflation expectations in the underlying economies are prone to the oil price shocks and macroeconomic determinants. These shocks pose a whole set of challenges to monetary authorities in these economies and the findings in the subject treatise provide some guidance on how each shock may transmit.