Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

This paper measures “debt disputes” between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.     

Does sovereign debt ratings news spill over to international stock markets?

The evidence here indicates that sovereign debt rating and credit outlook changes of one country have an asymmetric and economically significant effect on the stock market returns of other countries over 1989–2003. There is a negative reaction of 51 basis points (two-day return spread vis-á-vis the US) to a credit ratings downgrade of one notch in a common information spillover around the world. Upgrades, however, have no significant impact on return spreads of countries abroad. Closeness (e.g., geographic proximity) and emerging market status amplify the effect of a spillover. Downgrade spillover effects at the industry level are more pronounced in traded goods and small industries.     

The term structure of sovereign default risk in EMU member countries and its determinants

We analyze the determinants of sovereign default risk of EMU member states using government bond yield spreads as risk indicators. We focus on default risk for different time spans indicated by spreads for different maturities. Using a panel framework we analyze whether there are different drivers of default risk for different maturities. We find that lower economic growth and larger openness increase default risk for all maturities. Higher indebtedness only increases short-term risk, whereas net lending, trade balance and interest rate costs only drive long-term default risk.     

Risky public domestic debt composition in emerging economies

This paper explains why public domestic debt composition in emerging economies can be risky, namely in foreign currency, with a short maturity or indexed. It analyses empirically the determinants of these risk sources separately, developing a new large dataset compiled from national sources for 33 emerging economies over 1994–2006. The paper finds that economic size, the breadth of the domestic investor base, inflation and fiscal soundness are all associated with risky public domestic debt compositions, yet to an extent that varies considerably in terms of magnitude and significance across sources of risk. Only inflation impacts all types of risky debt, underscoring the overarching importance of monetary credibility to make domestic debt compositions in emerging economies safer. Given local bond markets' rapid development, monitoring risky public domestic debt compositions in emerging economies becomes increasingly relevant to global financial stability.     

Transmission of the financial and sovereign debt crises to the EMU: Stock prices,CDS spreads and exchange rates

This paper tests for the transmission of the 2007–2010 financial and sovereign debt crises to fifteen EMU countries. We use daily data from 2003 to 2010 on country financial and non-financial stock market indexes to analyze the stock market returns for three country groups within EMU: North, South and Small. The following results hold for both the North and South European countries, while the smallest countries seem to be relatively isolated from international events. First, we find strong evidence of crisis transmission to European non-financials from US non-financials, but not for financials. Second, in order to test how the sovereign debt crisis affects stock market developments we split the crisis in pre- and post-Lehman sub periods. Results show that financials become significantly more dependent on changes in the difference between the Greek and German CDS spreads after Lehman’s collapse, compared to the pre-Lehman sub period. However, this increase is much smaller for non-financials. Third, before the crisis euro appreciations coincide with European stock market decreases, whereas this relationship reverses during the crisis. Finally, this reversal seems to be triggered by Lehman’s collapse.     

Foreign currency debt,financial crises and economic growth: A long-run view

Foreign currency debt is widely believed to increase risks of financial crisis, especially after being implicated as a cause of the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. In this paper, we study the effects of foreign currency debt on currency and debt crises and its indirect effects on short-term growth and long-run output effects in both 1880–1913 and 1973–2003 for 45 countries. Greater ratios of foreign currency debt to total debt are associated with increased risks of currency and debt crises, although the strength of the association depends crucially on the size of a country's reserve base and its policy credibility. We found that financial crises, driven by exposure to foreign currency, resulted in significant permanent output losses. We estimate some implications of our findings for the risks posed by currently high levels of foreign currency liabilities in eastern Europe.     

Is it punishment? Sovereign defaults and the decline in trade

Sovereign defaults are associated with declines in defaulting countries trade. Are these declines the result of trade sanctions as the trade sanctions argument of sovereign borrowing would suggest? We devise an empirical strategy to evaluate this issue based on the idea that if trade sanctions are causing the declines, bilateral trade with creditor countries should fall more than trade with other countries. We find that this is not the case. The analysis does not yield much evidence of broader punishment strategies including a league of major creditors either. These results contradict the predictions of the trade sanctions theory of sovereign borrowing.     

Why does sovereign risk differ for domestic and external debt? Evidence from Scandinavia, 1938–1948

This study shows empirically that the political costs of sovereign default can differ considerably for domestic and external debt. The analysis uses new evidence from Danish and Swedish bond markets around World War II, a time when markets went from being fully integrated to fully segmented overnight. By linking the exogenous wartime shocks to changes in default costs on domestic and external debt, it is found that these costs explain a significant part of the variation in the sovereign yield spread across markets. The results suggest that governments can choose strategically on which debt, the domestic or the external, to default on, and that this decision hinges on the relative size of the political default costs.     

The impact of distressed economies on the EU sovereign market

Financially distressed economies inside the European Union (EU) are being blamed for producing a general increase in borrowing costs. This article analyzes the channels of default risk transmission within the EU countries using the information content in the sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) market. We proceed in two directions. First, we test the existence of cross-border volatility effects between the central and the peripheral EU countries. Second, we explore the effect of distressed economies on the default and risk premium constituents of sovereign default swaps. We show a significant volatility spillover from distressed to central European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) economies. This causality pattern leads to a significant impact on the default swap risk premia. On average, the risk premium accounts for approximately 42% of central EMU spreads and 56% of the spreads for those countries outside of the EMU. The peripheral risk also affects the default component of central economies, although its impact is lower.     

International trade and finance: Complementaries in the United Kingdom 1870-1913 and the United States 1920-1930

Do international trade and finance flow together? In a variety of theoretical models, trade and finance can be shown to have the potential to be substitutes or complements, so the matter must be resolved empirically. We study trade and financial flows from the United Kingdom from 1870 to 1913 and the United States in the interwar years. These were the two major capital exporters and key financial centers in each era. We find that trade and finance were robustly correlated for each case. We consider simultaneity issues. We also discuss evidence from the British Empire which casts doubt on the idea that trade is a punishment device in the event of a default.     

The effect of IMF lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises

This paper explores empirically how the adoption of IMF programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term. We find that IMF programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1.5–2 percentage points. These results cannot be attributed to endogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign defaults and program participation simultaneously. Furthermore, IMF programs turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the Fund distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are already weak. Our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances. Other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible.     

Foreign exchange market reactions to sovereign credit news

We analyse the reaction of the foreign exchange spot market to sovereign credit signals by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P during 1994–2010. We find that positive and negative credit news affects both the own-country exchange rate and other countries’ exchange rates. We provide evidence on unequal responses to the three agencies’ signals. Fitch signals induce the most timely market responses, and the market also reacts strongly to S&P negative outlook signals. Credit outlook and watch actions and multiple notch rating changes have more impact than one-notch rating changes. Considerable differences in the market reactions to sovereign credit events are highlighted in emerging versus developed economies, and in various geographical regions.     

Control/ownership structure,creditor rights protection,and the cost of debt financing: International evidence

We explore the effect of governance on bond yield-spreads and ratings in a multinational sample of firms. We find strong evidence that ultimate ownership (i.e., the voting/cash-flow rights wedge) and family control have a positive and significant effect on bond yield-spreads, and a negative and significant effect on bond ratings. Control in the hands of widely held financial firms has a positive effect on bond ratings only, while State control has no effect on either bond yield-spreads or ratings. We also find that a higher protection of debtholders’ rights generally reduces bond yield-spreads and increases bond ratings. Our results additionally show that, for both bondholders and rating agencies, the enforcement of debt laws is crucially important. Finally, we document a negative effect of debt covenants on debt costs when there is a high expropriation risk and poor creditor rights protection.     

Incentive problems and the pattern of international risk sharing

This paper analyzes the implications of moral hazard and a lack of contract enforcement for risk sharing across countries and regions. We demonstrate that both incentive problems can considerably restrict efficient risk sharing. However, we show that the cross-sectional risk sharing component is much more affected than the intertemporal component. We argue that this may help to explain several stylized facts of international risk sharing, such as the low degree of insurance against permanent shocks.     

Realizing the volatility impacts of sovereign credit ratings information on equity and currency markets: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis

We examine the effects of different types of sovereign rating announcements on realized stock and currency market volatilities and cross-asset correlations around periods of financial crises. Using intraday market data and sovereign ratings data for nine sample countries in the Asia-Pacific region over 1997–2001, we find that currency and stock markets react somewhat heterogeneously to various rating announcements and that stock markets are more responsive to rating news than currency markets. We find new evidence that ratings events have significant and asymmetric impacts on intraday market data and that national market attributes influence rating impacts during financial crises.     

Firm values and sovereign wealth fund investments

We analyze the impact of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investments on firm values and provide evidence consistent with the tradeoff between the monitoring and lobbying benefits versus tunneling and expropriation costs of SWFs as blockholders. The data show significant positive (negative) returns to announcements of SWF investments (divestments). The returns are non-monotonic, first rising (falling) and then falling (rising) with the share sought (sold) for investments (divestments). Moreover, we find that SWFs are often active investors. Slightly more than half of the target firms experience one or more events indicative of SWF monitoring activity or influence.     

International lending of last resort and moral hazard: A model of IMF's catalytic finance

This paper analyzes the trade-off between official liquidity provision and debtor moral hazard in international financial crises. In the model, crises are caused by the interaction of bad fundamentals, self-fulfilling runs and policies by three classes of optimizing agents: international investors, the local government and an international official lender. Limited contingent liquidity support helps to prevent liquidity runs by raising the number of investors willing to lend to the country for any given fundamentals, i.e., it can have catalytic effects. The influence of the official lender is increasing in the size of its interventions and the precision of its information. Unlike the conventional view stressing debtor moral hazard, our model identifies circumstances in which official lending actually strengthens a government's incentive to implement desirable but costly policies.     

The reaction of emerging market credit default swap spreads to sovereign credit rating changes

This paper examines the effect of sovereign credit rating change announcements on the CDS spreads of the event countries, and their spillover effects on other emerging economies’ CDS premiums. We find that positive events have a greater impact on CDS markets in the two-day period surrounding the event, and are more likely to spill over to other emerging countries. Alternatively, CDS markets anticipate negative events, and previous changes in CDS premiums can be used to estimate the probability of a negative credit event. The transmission mechanisms for positive events are the common creditor and competition in trade markets.     

Leads and lags in sovereign credit ratings

This paper analyses lead–lag relationships in sovereign ratings across five agencies, and finds evidence of interdependence in rating actions. Upgrade (downgrade) probabilities are much higher, and downgrade (upgrade) probabilities are much lower for a sovereign issuer with a recent upgrade (downgrade) by another agency. S&P tends to demonstrate the least dependence on other agencies, and Moody’s tends to be the first mover in upgrades. Rating actions by Japanese agencies tend to lag those of the larger agencies, although there is some evidence that they lead Moody’s downgrades.