The role of foreign currency debt in financial crises: 1880–1913 versus 1972–1997

We show that exposure to foreign currency debt does not necessarily increase the risk of having a financial crisis. Some countries do not suffer from financial fragility despite original sin. Before 1913 British offshoots and Scandinavia afflicted with it avoided financial meltdowns. Today many advanced countries have original sin, but few have had crises. In both periods, aggregate balance sheet mismatches are associated with a greater likelihood of a crisis. The evidence suggests that foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-managed. This is part of the difference between developed countries and emerging markets both of which borrow in foreign currency.     

Realizing the volatility impacts of sovereign credit ratings information on equity and currency markets: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis

We examine the effects of different types of sovereign rating announcements on realized stock and currency market volatilities and cross-asset correlations around periods of financial crises. Using intraday market data and sovereign ratings data for nine sample countries in the Asia-Pacific region over 1997–2001, we find that currency and stock markets react somewhat heterogeneously to various rating announcements and that stock markets are more responsive to rating news than currency markets. We find new evidence that ratings events have significant and asymmetric impacts on intraday market data and that national market attributes influence rating impacts during financial crises.     

Exchange Rate Crises and Fiscal Solvency

This paper combines insights from generation one currency crisis models and the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) to create a dynamic FTPL model of currency crises. The initial fixed‐exchange‐rate policy entails risks due to an upper bound on government debt and stochastic surplus shocks. Agents refuse to lend into a position for which the value of debt exceeds the present value of expected future surpluses. Policy switching, usually combined with currency depreciation, restores fiscal solvency and lending. This model can explain a wide variety of crises, including those involving sovereign default. We illustrate by explaining the crisis in Argentina (2001).     

Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

This paper measures “debt disputes” between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.     

Transmission of the financial and sovereign debt crises to the EMU: Stock prices,CDS spreads and exchange rates

This paper tests for the transmission of the 2007–2010 financial and sovereign debt crises to fifteen EMU countries. We use daily data from 2003 to 2010 on country financial and non-financial stock market indexes to analyze the stock market returns for three country groups within EMU: North, South and Small. The following results hold for both the North and South European countries, while the smallest countries seem to be relatively isolated from international events. First, we find strong evidence of crisis transmission to European non-financials from US non-financials, but not for financials. Second, in order to test how the sovereign debt crisis affects stock market developments we split the crisis in pre- and post-Lehman sub periods. Results show that financials become significantly more dependent on changes in the difference between the Greek and German CDS spreads after Lehman’s collapse, compared to the pre-Lehman sub period. However, this increase is much smaller for non-financials. Third, before the crisis euro appreciations coincide with European stock market decreases, whereas this relationship reverses during the crisis. Finally, this reversal seems to be triggered by Lehman’s collapse.     

Capital Structure and Financial Risk: Evidence from Foreign Debt Use in East Asia

Using a data set of East Asian nonfinancial companies, we examine a firm's choice between local, foreign, and synthetic local currency (hedged foreign currency) debt. We find evidence of unique as well as common factors that determine each debt type's use, indicating the importance of examining debt at a disaggregated level. We exploit the Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment to investigate the role of debt type in firm performance. Surprisingly, we find that the use of synthetic local currency debt is associated with the biggest drop in market value, possibly due to currency derivative market illiquidity during the crisis.     

Foreign exchange market efficiency under recent crises: Asia-Pacific focus

The Asia-Pacific region’s currency markets are generally efficient within-country when tested using the 30 and 31 cointegration technique whereas market efficiency fails to hold when tested using Fama’s (1984) conventional regression. Using the Pilbeam and Olmo (2011) model, we reconcile these conflicting findings. The Pilbeam and Olmo (2011) model confirms within-country market efficiency. It further confirms that free-float currency markets are more resilient than managed-float currency markets among 12 Asia-Pacific economies. From the across-country perspective, the foreign exchange markets are mostly efficient and the results show that the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis was a more disturbing event than the 2008–2009 global financial crisis in the region.     

Regionality revisited: An examination of the direction of spread of currency crises

What determines the direction of spread of currency crises? We examine data on waves of currency crises in 1992, 1994, 1997, and 1998 to evaluate several hypotheses on the determinants of contagion. We simultaneously consider trade competition, financial links, and institutional similarity to the “ground zero” country as potential drivers of contagion. To overcome data limitations and account for model uncertainty, we utilize Bayesian methodologies hitherto unused in the empirical literature on contagion. In particular, we use the Bayesian averaging of binary models that allows us to take into account the uncertainty regarding the appropriate set of regressors.We find that institutional similarity to the ground zero country plays an important role in determining the direction of contagion in all the emerging market currency crises in our dataset. We thus provide persuasive evidence in favour of the “wake-up call” hypothesis for financial contagion. Trade and financial links may also play a role in determining the direction of contagion, but their importance varies amongst the crisis periods.     

Financial crises and political crises

The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country's stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbating distortions and possibly leading to political crisis; but if lenders are optimistic, the cost of the debt falls and political crises disappear. In such a case, international liquidity packages can select the best equilibrium and rule out political crises at negligible cost.     

Foreign currency borrowing surrounding the global financial crisis: Evidence from Korea

We present a complete profile of firms’ foreign currency borrowing surrounding the 2007 global financial crisis. Employing extensive data from Korean firms during 2002–2012, we find that foreign currency borrowing is significantly related to firm attributes of export revenues, firm size, tangible assets and asset growth, as well as to macro-level factors. These results offer two important implications. First, macroeconomic factors alone cannot fully explain firms’ foreign currency borrowing. Second and more importantly, these firm attributes are indicative of a lower default probability and larger collateral value, which would not only facilitate borrowers’ access to foreign currency debt markets but also offer lenders a better protective cushion from possible loan defaults in the face of exchange rate changes and information asymmetry on borrowers’ credits. Period wise, asset-related firm attributes have more pronounced effects in the post- than pre-crisis period. We further show that banking regulations following the crisis effectively limit the access to foreign currency borrowing by Korean firms, most significantly by those belonging to large business groups.     

Remittances and Currency Crisis: The Case of Developing and Emerging Countries

Employing the first-generation currency crisis model of Flood and Garber (1984), I explore the financial effects of migrants' remittances on the economies of developing and emerging countries in a currency crisis. The model implies that remittances can contribute to a reduction in the likelihood of a currency crisis and appreciation in foreign exchange rates via the promotion of foreign exchange reserves. Panel estimation with twelve developing and emerging countries that previously experienced financial crises confirms the implications, suggesting that migrants' remittances can play a significant role in mitigating financial constraints and thus contribute to financial stability.     

Resolving the exposure puzzle: The many facets of exchange rate exposure

Theory predicts sizeable exchange rate (FX) exposure for many firms. However, empirical research has not documented such exposures. To examine this discrepancy, we extend prior theoretical results to model a global firm's FX exposure and show empirically that firms pass through part of currency changes to customers and utilize both operational and financial hedges. For a typical sample firm, pass-through and operational hedging each reduce exposure by 10–15%. Financial hedging with foreign debt, and to a lesser extent FX derivatives, decreases exposure by about 40%. The combination of these factors reduces FX exposures to observed levels.     

Banking,debt, and currency crises in developed countries: Stylized facts and early warning indicators

We construct and explore a new quarterly dataset covering crisis episodes in 40 developed countries over 1970–2010. First, we present stylized facts on banking, debt, and currency crises. Using panel vector autoregression we find that banking and debt crises are interrelated and both typically precede currency crises, but not vice versa. Banking crises are the most costly in terms of the overall output loss, and output takes about six years to recover. Second, on a reduced sample we try to identify early warning indicators of crises specific to developed economies, accounting for model uncertainty by means of Bayesian model averaging. The most consistent result across the various specifications and time horizons is that significant growth of domestic private credit precedes banking crises, while rising money market rates and global corporate spreads are also leading indicators worth monitoring. For currency crises, we also corroborate the role of rising domestic private credit and money market rates and detect the relevance of domestic currency overvaluation. The role of other indicators differs according to the type of crisis and the warning horizon selected, but it mostly seems easier to find reliable predictors at a horizon shorter than two years. Early warning indicators of debt crises are difficult to uncover due to the low occurrence of such episodes in our dataset. We also employ a signaling approach to derive the threshold value for the best single indicator (domestic private credit), and finally we provide a composite early warning index that further increases the usefulness of the model.     

Who benefits from capital account liberalization? Evidence from firm-level credit ratings data

Using a novel panel data set on corporate foreign-currency credit ratings and capital account restrictions in advanced and emerging economies during 1995–2004, we find a strong positive effect of capital account liberalization on firms' credit risk, as measured by corporate credit ratings. As an identification strategy, we exploit within-country variation in firms' ability to obtain foreign currency and, thus, their ability to repay foreign currency debt. We find that liberalizing the capital account benefits significantly more those firms with more limited foreign currency access, namely, those producing nontradables. Our findings demonstrate a novel channel through which capital account restrictions affect economic outcomes, and they are robust to a broad range of alternative specifications.     

Are twin currency and debt crises special?

In the literature on currency and banking crises it has become the standard procedure to distinguish pure currency crises, pure banking crises and combined (“twin”) currency and banking crises. We show theoretically and empirically that a similar differentiation should be chosen with regard to currency and debt crises. Twin currency and debt crises differ from both pure currency and pure debt crises in their determinants, course of events, and economic consequences. We find that each type of crises has a unique set of macroeconomic causes. We also identify internal contagion and selection bias effects, which may lead to biased empirical estimates if twin crises are not treated as a specific type of crises. Such a separation allows in significantly improving the efficiency of early warning systems especially for debt and twin crises.     

Unobservable shocks as carriers of contagion

We propose an identified structural GARCH model to disentangle the dynamics of financial market crises. We distinguish between the hypersensitivity of a domestic market in crisis to news from foreign non-crisis markets, and the contagion imported to a tranquil domestic market from foreign crises. The model also enables us to connect unobserved structural shocks with their source markets using variance decompositions and to compare the size and dynamics of impulses during crises periods with tranquil period impulses. To illustrate, we apply the method to data from the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis which consists of a complicated set of interacting crises. We find significant hypersensitivity and contagion between these markets but also show that links may strengthen or weaken. Impulse response functions for an equally-weighted equity portfolio show the increasing dominance of Korean and Hong Kong shocks during the crises and covariance responses demonstrate multiple layers of contagion effects.     

THE ASIAN CRISIS: LESSONS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION

The succession of financial crises that swept through Asia, Russia, and Latin America in 1997 and 1998 has led to considerable debate about both the role of the IMF and possible actions to limit further crises. Some have argued that international financial markets do not function well and are subject to periodic contagious panics that can be stemmed by an international lender of last resort. This paper argues that the IMF has neither the resources nor the superior information to play such a role. However, there may be a need for an international financial institution that can use its leverage to secure policy changes in the affected countries.
The paper also takes issue with the view that the IMF is simply bailing out imprudent international banks and that measures are needed to "bail them back in" again. The source of the Asian crisis lay in the real economy, but the effect of the crisis was greatly exacerbated by the financial structure of the affected countries. In particular, much of the risk was borne by domestic banks that borrowed dollars in the short-term interbank market and made longerterm loans in the local currency. Public policy needs to be directed to ensuring that the risks in emerging markets are distributed efficiently across both foreign and domestic investors. That involves greater use of equity finance and structured debt, as well as possibly a more direct role for foreign banks in funding local activities.     

Crises,contagion and cross-listings

We investigate whether cross-listing shares in the form of depositary receipts in overseas markets benefits investors in emerging market countries during periods of local financial crisis from 1994 to 2002. We regress cumulative abnormal returns for three windows surrounding the crisis events on the cross-listing status while controlling for cross-sectional differences in firm age, trading volume, foreign exposure, disclosure quality and corporate governance. Further, we examine cross-listing effects in countries popularly thought to experience contagious effects of these crises. We find that cross-listed firms react significantly less negatively than non-cross-listed firms, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis. The results on contagious cross-listing effects are however mixed. Our findings are consistent with predictions based on theories of market segmentation as well as differential disclosure/governance between developed and emerging markets. We do not find evidence that foreign investors “panic” during a currency crisis.     

Risky public domestic debt composition in emerging economies

This paper explains why public domestic debt composition in emerging economies can be risky, namely in foreign currency, with a short maturity or indexed. It analyses empirically the determinants of these risk sources separately, developing a new large dataset compiled from national sources for 33 emerging economies over 1994–2006. The paper finds that economic size, the breadth of the domestic investor base, inflation and fiscal soundness are all associated with risky public domestic debt compositions, yet to an extent that varies considerably in terms of magnitude and significance across sources of risk. Only inflation impacts all types of risky debt, underscoring the overarching importance of monetary credibility to make domestic debt compositions in emerging economies safer. Given local bond markets' rapid development, monitoring risky public domestic debt compositions in emerging economies becomes increasingly relevant to global financial stability.     

Thresholds in the process of international financial integration

The financial crisis has re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of financial globalization and its implications for growth, especially for developing countries. The empirical literature has not been able to conclusively establish the presumed growth benefits of financial integration. Indeed, a new literature proposes that the indirect benefits of financial integration may be more important than the traditional financing channel emphasized in previous analyses. A major complication, however, is that there seem to be certain “threshold” levels of financial and institutional development that an economy needs to attain before it can derive the indirect benefits and reduce the risks of financial openness. In this paper, we develop a unified empirical framework for characterizing such threshold conditions. We find that there are clearly identifiable thresholds in variables such as financial depth and institutional quality—the cost-benefit trade-off from financial openness improves significantly once these threshold conditions are satisfied. We also find that the thresholds are lower for foreign direct investment and portfolio equity liabilities compared to those for debt liabilities.