制度变迁中土地产权的性质与合约选择:一个有关合作经济的案例分析

This paper discusses an evolutionary process of rural collective property rights or agricultural cooperation economy in detail. We convince that both the evolution of the household contract system and the rural cooperation economy in the market elaborate the key position of property rights’ multi-attribute in the formation of contract structure and organization shape. If there were strong externality between several elements of household, the collective property rights should be chosen. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2008, (6): 61–67, 94     

Property rights and information flows: a simulation approach

With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lessig (The future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world. Vintage, New York 2001) has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. In this paper we look at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, we deploy an agent-based modelling approach to explore the issue of IPRs. We take the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, we take the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then we simulate the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.

Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance

We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called contract-intensive money or CIM, is based on citizens decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.     

产权契约与家族企业治理

家族企业是家族资产占主导,家族规则与企业规则的结合体.它在很大程度上可以看作是传统家庭生产组织功能在自由市场经济条件下的专业化拓展和规模化经营.有企业就会涉及产权和契约.从"家庭"的契约性质出发,分析了产权契约与家族企业所有权变迁,认为最优的企业产权契约必然是一个既是非人力资本拥有者的资本家, 又是有经营能力的企业家, 二者合而为一.     

Defining the frontiers of the firm through property rights allocation: The case of the French retailer cooperative Leclerc

France harbours three large retailer cooperatives which, put together, account for more than a third of the national market share. The largest of these is Leclerc, a leading firm on the French territory. The paper presented here shows how, through the particular distribution of property rights and decision patterns, this cooperative, although hampered by an unstable size, manages to compete with integrated firms. Indeed, the processes that have been developed enable the cooperative to acquire long-term property rights on the specific assets (stores), while remaining in the cooperative framework. The system built is efficient because incentives remain high for members to increase their own performance.     

产权界定、产权流动与产权维护

诺斯认为,有效率的产权具有三大激励功能:即降低费用、保证人们的预期收益和使个人的投资收益充分接近于社会收益,这对经济增长起着十分重要的作用。本文认为,要使产权功能真正发挥作用,需要有合理的产权界定、规范的产权流动和公平的产权维护,三者缺一不可。文章从整体观的角度讨论了落实这三者的重要意义和各自存在的问题,并提出了党政分开和政企分开是解决问题的关键。     

跨国基金的产权关系:一种新诠释

本文在假定基金产权划分为直接产权与间接产权、物质产权与价值产权的基础上,以离岸基金为例探讨跨国基金的产权关系.基金产权相互分离,且归属于相对独立的不同产权所有者,是基金实施跨国经营和跨国融资的产权基础,其中关键是,基金的国家间接物质产权与国家间接价值产权相分离并分别归属于不同国家的政府.实现跨国基金的制度创新和管理创新需要,规范各类基金产权所有者的权利和行为,降低基金内部的交易费用,重新构建基金治理机制.     

论私有产权的限制

私有产权的限制可从两个层次看:一是立宪层次上的限制,它是私有财产所有者被动接受的限制,包括禁止侵害他物权的限制和保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制;二是法律上的私有产权界定后,私有产权所有者主动选择的限制,包括行使权利成本的限制和设立他物权的限制.保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制抑制了私有产权、市场交换作为调节资源稀缺性与人类欲望无限性矛盾手段的力量;其他限制则是发挥市场机制配置资源,实现产值最大化的要求,为不是限制的限制.     

土地股份合作制的产权分析

要解决好中国的农民问题 ,应重新构建中国的农地制度。土地股份制应是完善农地制度的一项创新 ,是解决土地流转的有效方法 ,很可能成为中国农地制度改革的主导模式。     

生态产权制度建设与我国生态环境保护

文章认为,我国生态资源效率低下根源于＂公＂权,但提高其效率的出路未必就在于＂私＂权化。因此,在我国生态产权制度改革中,既要引入激励性机制,建立市场化的生态环境公共产权规制,又要打破传统＂公有＂—＂公用＂—＂公营＂中的＂公用＂、＂公营＂生态资源运行范式,把使用权和经营权按生态资源公共性、外部性做技术性分离,明确使用权和经营权各自的权能,引入民营企业、外资企业等非国有企业参与生态产权的经营和竞争,使国有企业从部分生态资源的经营领域退出,形成多元化、市场化的生态资源经营制度和生态产权混合型管理模式,实现我国生态环境的有效保护。     

我国海洋资源性资产流失与产权管理问题探讨

海洋资源性资产的流失是海洋资源开发利用过程中存在的重要问题之一。本文在分析海洋资源性资产流失的特点、渠道和类型的基础上,对我国海洋资源性资产的产权调整、产权体系及产权管理策略等进行了探讨。     

产权改革社会化趋势的理论分析

经济体制转型国家的产权制度改革往往与经济市场化密切相关,在这一过程中,社会生产方式从封闭走向开放化、社会化,一切生产要素都要通过市场为全社会所用。产权的社会化,实现了资本的社会运营,形成了财产权利的社会分解、经济利益的社会分享和风险责任的社会分担,这是现代市场经济发展的必然要求。     

Moral property rights and harmonious society

To build the harmonious society needs the effect of morality.There are various kinds of moral values.Moral values can be divided into proper ones and improper ones according to whether the social benefit is bigger than the social cost of the moral behavior.The former is helpful to the optimal allocation of resources and improve the formation of the harmonious society; while the latter is harmful to the optimal allocation of resource and bad to the formation of the harmonious society.The proper and scientist moral values include： sustainable development view on ecology,fair,just and win win view on morality,credibility,right view on rich and poor,right view on consumption and so on.To build the proper and scientific moral value,the more important way is building proper moral property rights institution by recognizing properly and constructing moral property rights besides legislation,setting up moral surroundings,valuing moral penetration,strengthening moral education etc. Harmonious society;Moral property rights;Moral value     

对企业国有产权交易投招标模式的分析

企业国有产权是我国国有资产的重要组成部分,规范企业国有产权转让行为,有利于加强企业国有产权交易的监督管理。现有监管体制下,可以拍卖、招投标、协议转让以及国家法律、行政法规规定的其他方式进行交易。针对实践中国有产权交易模式存在的问题,对投招标模式进行了分析,提出了交易程序中应注意的问题。     

中国企业产权改革浅析

在西方现代产权制度理论的基础上,剖析中国现代企业在产权制度改革上的不足,进一步探讨在新经济中,如何深化对国有产权制度的改革,塑造符合社会主义市场经济的又有活力的国有资产产权结构,以及充分认识私营企业在产权发展中的弊端,如何帮助私营企业引进先进的现代产权管理方式,打破现有的产权束缚,完善企业治理机制,发挥私营企业的巨大潜力。     

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

论环境资源产权制度功能

环境资源产权制度功能是环境资源产权制度对整个经济关系和经济运行的作用,是环境资源产权制度内在的并与环境资源产权制度的内在属性相联系,适当的环境资源产权制度安排可以更为充分地发挥其内在功能。环境资源产权制度的功能主要包括:有效的环境资源产权制度可以促进环境资源合理定价和有效配置、激励环境治理技术创新、促进经济持续有效增长和收入合理分配。     

我国环境资源产权制度构建模式探讨

由于经济的发展和人口的增长,我国的环境问题日益突出,为了有效解决经济发展和环境保护的矛盾,必须进行环境治理和环境保护政策的创新,而环境资源产权制度的构建就是有效的手段之一。根据我国环境资源产权制度构建的制约因素和我国环境资源产权制度改革的实践经验,当前环境资源产权制度的构建主要可以采取两种可行的模式:构建排污权交易制度和构建森林资源环境产权补偿制度。     

我国旅游资源产权安排:一个新的分析框架

随着旅游产业的发展,旅游资源的外延逐渐扩大,旅游资源产权问题越发复杂.如果依然笼统地实行僵化的旅游资源管理模式,不但会使资源的利用效率降低,而且会对资源本身造成极大的危害.本文基于产权的角度,在对旅游资源重新进行分类的基础上,构建新的旅游资源产权体系,进而根据不同产权的有效性条件,提出了调整旅游资源的具体管理、运行制度的思路.     

Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights

To analyze effects of imperfect property rights on economic growth, we consider economies where some fraction of capital can be owned only by local oligarchs, whose status is subject to political risk. Political risk decreases local capital and wages. Risk-averse oligarchs acquire safe foreign assets for insurance, thus increasing wages in other countries that protect outside investors. We show that for empirically reasonable parameter values, reforms to decrease political risk or to protect more outsiders' investments can decrease local oligarchs' welfare by increasing wages, making such reforms prone to political resistance from the ruling elite. We suggest measures of property rights imperfections derived from empirically observable data, and we test the quantitative predictions of our model using those measures and other parameter values routinely assumed in growth theory.