制度变迁中土地产权的性质与合约选择:一个有关合作经济的案例分析

This paper discusses an evolutionary process of rural collective property rights or agricultural cooperation economy in detail. We convince that both the evolution of the household contract system and the rural cooperation economy in the market elaborate the key position of property rights’ multi-attribute in the formation of contract structure and organization shape. If there were strong externality between several elements of household, the collective property rights should be chosen. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2008, (6): 61–67, 94     

Property rights and long-run capital

Proprietary capital falling into the public domain inefficiently decreases capital accumulation. As a consequence, the market steady state consumption underperforms the planner's by 4.6%–9.1% in a neoclassical infinitely-lived agents economy with constant returns to scale and standard empirically supported parameters. The results extend robustly to an overlapping generations economy, for which the gap is 10.5% when similarly parametrized. A policy decentralizing, in the latter, the planner's steady state instead consists of (i) subsidizing the rental rate of private capital at its depreciation rate, and (ii) taxing households' negative net position between, on the one hand, firm and depreciated capital ownership, and on the other, borrowing. Under this policy, the necessary tax rate on households' negative net position is smaller the bigger the absolute value of the latter and, hence, the bigger the corresponding monetary real balances held by households.     

Property rights in land and output growth in Russia

This paper tests whether the implementation of a key market‐oriented reform in post‐Soviet Russia, property rights in land, proxied by the percent of privatized land by region, affected the pace of sub‐national economic growth during two unprecedented expansion periods: 2001–2008 and 2010–2014. Individuals gained the Constitutional right to own land in 1993, but implementation was stalled. The pace of land privatization can be explained by arguably exogenous factors such as distance to Moscow, as well as climate and also regional political culture, proxied by concentration of votes in the 2004 presidential election. We show that this rate of land privatization in Russia's regions was significantly associated with output growth in 2010–2014, confirming the policy importance of this measure for developing economies. Regions where private holdings expanded most rapidly with the enforcement of property rights in land, gained a competitive advantage in the growth process through increased investment in fixed assets and private consumption.     

Property rights and information flows: a simulation approach

With the growth of the information economy, the proportion of knowledge-intensive goods to total goods is constantly increasing. Lessig (The future of ideas: the fate of the commons in a connected world. Vintage, New York 2001) has argued that IPRs have now become too favourable to existing producers and that their ‘winner-take-all’ characteristics are constraining the creators of tomorrow. In this paper we look at how variations in IPRs regimes might affect the creation and social cost of new knowledge in economic systems. Drawing on a conceptual framework, the Information Space or I-Space to explore how the uncontrollable diffusibility of knowledge relates to its degree of structure, we deploy an agent-based modelling approach to explore the issue of IPRs. We take the ability to control the diffusibility of knowledge as a proxy measure for an ability to establish property rights in such knowledge. Second, we take the rate of obsolescence of knowledge as a proxy measure for the degree of turbulence induced by different regimes of technical change. Then we simulate the quantity and cost to society of new knowledge under different property right regimes.

Property rights protection and access to bank loans

Poor protection of private property has limited the access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transition economies. Under those circumstances, private entrepreneurs have resorted to various ways of enhancing the de facto protection of private property. Using a dataset of 3,073 private enterprises in China, this paper empirically investigates the impact of political participation and philanthropic activities – informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private property – on the access to bank loans.     

产权契约与家族企业治理

家族企业是家族资产占主导,家族规则与企业规则的结合体.它在很大程度上可以看作是传统家庭生产组织功能在自由市场经济条件下的专业化拓展和规模化经营.有企业就会涉及产权和契约.从"家庭"的契约性质出发,分析了产权契约与家族企业所有权变迁,认为最优的企业产权契约必然是一个既是非人力资本拥有者的资本家, 又是有经营能力的企业家, 二者合而为一.     

Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance

We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called contract-intensive money or CIM, is based on citizens decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.     

Defining the frontiers of the firm through property rights allocation: The case of the French retailer cooperative Leclerc

France harbours three large retailer cooperatives which, put together, account for more than a third of the national market share. The largest of these is Leclerc, a leading firm on the French territory. The paper presented here shows how, through the particular distribution of property rights and decision patterns, this cooperative, although hampered by an unstable size, manages to compete with integrated firms. Indeed, the processes that have been developed enable the cooperative to acquire long-term property rights on the specific assets (stores), while remaining in the cooperative framework. The system built is efficient because incentives remain high for members to increase their own performance.     

论创新和技术传播冲突中的知识产权保护制度

知识产权是产权的重要组成部分,对于知识的生产、传播和消费,进而对经济的发展具有决定性的作用。创新和技术传播之间存在的知识产权均衡已经得到理论界的广泛认同,但是实际情况比理论研究更加复杂,对于发展中国家尤其如此。     

产权界定、产权流动与产权维护

诺斯认为,有效率的产权具有三大激励功能:即降低费用、保证人们的预期收益和使个人的投资收益充分接近于社会收益,这对经济增长起着十分重要的作用。本文认为,要使产权功能真正发挥作用,需要有合理的产权界定、规范的产权流动和公平的产权维护,三者缺一不可。文章从整体观的角度讨论了落实这三者的重要意义和各自存在的问题,并提出了党政分开和政企分开是解决问题的关键。     

坚持农地集体所有的思考

本文在系统梳理中国农村改革历程的基础上,指出改革初期,为了满足农民的温饱诉求,党和政府逐渐认同了农民推出的“大包干”做法;温饱问题解决之后,为了满足农民外出从事非农就业的诉求,党和政府赋予农民自主流转其承包土地经营权的权利;现在,为了满足农民享有土地财产权益的诉求,党和政府应赋予农民土地股份的权利,将农村集体土地产权按份共有的改革目标落到实处。股权是集体经济的基础。改革初期以含义模糊的承包权替代含义清晰的土地股权,是为了达成改革共识;现在以含义清晰的土地股权替代含义模糊的土地承包权,是改革深化和认识与时俱进的结果。     

跨国基金的产权关系:一种新诠释

本文在假定基金产权划分为直接产权与间接产权、物质产权与价值产权的基础上,以离岸基金为例探讨跨国基金的产权关系.基金产权相互分离,且归属于相对独立的不同产权所有者,是基金实施跨国经营和跨国融资的产权基础,其中关键是,基金的国家间接物质产权与国家间接价值产权相分离并分别归属于不同国家的政府.实现跨国基金的制度创新和管理创新需要,规范各类基金产权所有者的权利和行为,降低基金内部的交易费用,重新构建基金治理机制.     

论私有产权的限制

私有产权的限制可从两个层次看:一是立宪层次上的限制,它是私有财产所有者被动接受的限制,包括禁止侵害他物权的限制和保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制;二是法律上的私有产权界定后,私有产权所有者主动选择的限制,包括行使权利成本的限制和设立他物权的限制.保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制抑制了私有产权、市场交换作为调节资源稀缺性与人类欲望无限性矛盾手段的力量;其他限制则是发挥市场机制配置资源,实现产值最大化的要求,为不是限制的限制.     

土地股份合作制的产权分析

要解决好中国的农民问题 ,应重新构建中国的农地制度。土地股份制应是完善农地制度的一项创新 ,是解决土地流转的有效方法 ,很可能成为中国农地制度改革的主导模式。     

我国海洋资源性资产流失与产权管理问题探讨

海洋资源性资产的流失是海洋资源开发利用过程中存在的重要问题之一。本文在分析海洋资源性资产流失的特点、渠道和类型的基础上,对我国海洋资源性资产的产权调整、产权体系及产权管理策略等进行了探讨。     

生态产权制度建设与我国生态环境保护

文章认为,我国生态资源效率低下根源于＂公＂权,但提高其效率的出路未必就在于＂私＂权化。因此,在我国生态产权制度改革中,既要引入激励性机制,建立市场化的生态环境公共产权规制,又要打破传统＂公有＂—＂公用＂—＂公营＂中的＂公用＂、＂公营＂生态资源运行范式,把使用权和经营权按生态资源公共性、外部性做技术性分离,明确使用权和经营权各自的权能,引入民营企业、外资企业等非国有企业参与生态产权的经营和竞争,使国有企业从部分生态资源的经营领域退出,形成多元化、市场化的生态资源经营制度和生态产权混合型管理模式,实现我国生态环境的有效保护。     

产权改革社会化趋势的理论分析

经济体制转型国家的产权制度改革往往与经济市场化密切相关,在这一过程中,社会生产方式从封闭走向开放化、社会化,一切生产要素都要通过市场为全社会所用。产权的社会化,实现了资本的社会运营,形成了财产权利的社会分解、经济利益的社会分享和风险责任的社会分担,这是现代市场经济发展的必然要求。     

Property rights revisited

Over the last 20 years, a large number of papers have tried to quantify the effect of property rights on a wide range of variables like growth, trade and to a lesser extent, inequality. However, these studies have been inherently limited by measures of the security of property rights that are currently available. These suffer from any of a number of shortcomings, ranging from a lack of availability, objectivity, or the fact that they measure a broader concept like the rule of law. This paper tries to address this gap by proposing a new index of property rights. Specifically, we use a state-space model to combine all available indicators tracking the security of property rights into an index that covers 191 countries over the period 1994–2014. We compare it to the existing indicators by revisiting the link between inequality, democracy and property rights, using a panel threshold regression model with fixed-effects. Depending on the measure of property rights that is used, there can be considerable differences in the size, significance and even the sign of the estimated parameters. Specifically, in contrast with existing measures, we find that a strengthening of the security of property rights reduces inequality in highly democratic countries only via the government's redistribution channel.     

Property rights and groundwater management in the High Plains Aquifer

Groundwater is an important natural resource that needs to be managed dynamically. Ideally, institutions governing property rights to the groundwater of low-recharge aquifers should not discourage or disincentivize groundwater users from dynamic management. We develop an empirical model to examine whether agricultural groundwater users faced with prior appropriation property rights to groundwater in western Kansas exhibit dynamic, forward-looking behavior consistent with dynamic management. We find that although farmers are allotted a time-invariant maximum amount of groundwater that they can extract each year, they still behave in a manner consistent with dynamic management. Their groundwater extraction decisions are not significantly affected by the quantity they are authorized to extract, but are instead affected by expected future crop prices, expected future energy prices, and groundwater extraction by neighbors. Our results provide evidence that farmers manage their groundwater resource dynamically, even if their property rights do not necessarily encourage or incentivize them to do so.     

Moral property rights and harmonious society

To build the harmonious society needs the effect of morality.There are various kinds of moral values.Moral values can be divided into proper ones and improper ones according to whether the social benefit is bigger than the social cost of the moral behavior.The former is helpful to the optimal allocation of resources and improve the formation of the harmonious society; while the latter is harmful to the optimal allocation of resource and bad to the formation of the harmonious society.The proper and scientist moral values include： sustainable development view on ecology,fair,just and win win view on morality,credibility,right view on rich and poor,right view on consumption and so on.To build the proper and scientific moral value,the more important way is building proper moral property rights institution by recognizing properly and constructing moral property rights besides legislation,setting up moral surroundings,valuing moral penetration,strengthening moral education etc. Harmonious society;Moral property rights;Moral value