The distributional impact of foreign deposits on federal deposit insurance premia

Rapid growth of deposits in U.S. foreign bank branches and current U.S. government policies have combined to create a new inequality in the deposit insurance system. Our research shows that smaller banks are substantially subsidizing the insurance costs of the larger, multinational institutions. When insurance premiums are viewed in the context of an implicit tax, it is highly regressive with the wealth transfer growing over time. Recent reform proposals do not fully address important international influences and therefore underestimate the scope of the problem.     

The shifting value of federal deposit insurance: Implications for reform

This research examines the relationship between the value of federal deposit insurance and bank size. We conclude that the value of deposit insurance has often been greater for the largest bank-holding companies since 1981. This differential is consistent with the notion that largest banks have greater ability to circumvent regulatory and/or market discipline. The source of this differential appears to be due to holding less capital rather than greater asset risk. Insurance costs net of the value of deposit insurance are also relatively lower for the largest banks and have become more so since 1981. These results suggest that recent proposals to improve the deposit insurance system should be evaluated based on their ability to effect even-handed discipline throughout the banking industry to eliminate and forestall further creation of this large institution bias.     

The federal deposit insurance fund that didn't put a bite on U.S. taxpayers

Unlike the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and the Bank Insurance Fund, the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) survived the 1980s without falling into a state of accounting insolvency. This paper analyzes how differences in incentive structure constrain the attractiveness of interest-rate speculation and other risk-taking opportunities to managers and regulators of credit unions. Despite these better incentives, robust present-value calculations establish that NCUSIF fell into economic insolvency during the mid-1980s.Besides calculating the extent of this insolvency, the paper also seeks to explain why, after NCUSIF became insolvent, it could rebuild its reserves without an explicit or implicit taxpayer bailout. Our explanation turns on cross-industry coinsurance responsibilities and the shallowness of the fund's observed insolvency relative to industry net worth. We identify forces in the decisionmaking environment tending to limit the depth and duration of unresolved insolvencies at individual credit unions. Managerial opportunities to benefit personally from taking risks that would flow through to NCUSIF are constrained by difficulties in converting a credit union to stockholder form and by the intensity of proactive monitoring of troubled credit unions by sister institutions and other private coinsurers. We conjecture that expanded use of coinsurance and private monitoring could reduce taxpayer loss exposure elsewhere in government deposit insurance systems.     

Market discipline and deposit insurance

Cross-country evidence presented in this paper suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces required deposit interest rates, while at the same time it lowers market discipline on bank risk taking. Internationally, deposit insurance schemes vary widely in their coverage, funding, and management. This reflects that there are widely differing views on how deposit insurance should optimally be structured. To inform this debate, we use a newly constructed data set of deposit insurance design features to examine how different design features affect deposit interest rates and market discipline.     

Capital regulation and deposit insurance

A model of deposit insurance in which the bank closure rule can systematically deviate from the economic insolvency condition used in earlier models is developed. Simulation of that model for plausible parameter values suggests that the failure to close banks on a timely basis has a profound effect in increasing the insurer's liability. The implications of these results for capital regulation are discussed.     

Actuarial pricing of deposit insurance

Using a pricing formula for options on coupon bonds (Jamshidian [1989], El Karoui and Rochet [1990]) we are able to compute the actuarial pricing of deposit insurance for a commercial bank. Our formula takes into account the maturity structure of the bank's balance sheet, as well as market parameters such as the term structure of interest rates and the volatilities of zero coupon bonds. The relation with asset liability management methods is explored.     

财产保险费率市场化的生成机制研究

我国财产保险费率市场化经历了管制——解除管制——管制三个阶段,目前,费率市场化的生成机制仍未形成。本文从财产保险定价的特殊性出发,探讨财产保险费率市场化应具备的特殊条件,以及促使上述条件得以生成的机制,并对费率市场化的两种生成机制进行比较分析,提出我国下一步费率政策改革的建议。     

Variable-rate deposit insurance: A re-examination

This paper investigates the impact of variable-rate deposit insurance on the financial and real sectors of the economy and its role as an absorber of bankruptcy risk within these sectors. A variable-rate system raises the cost of funds to the real sector and increases probability of bankruptcy of the borrowing firms. When such bankruptcies occur, society experiences a dead weight loss. We argue that appropriate deposit insurance pricing must weigh the social costs connected with both financial firm failure and real-sector bankruptcy.     

Market discipline and deposit insurance reform in Japan

On April 1, 2002, the Japanese government lifted a blanket guarantee of all deposits and began limiting the coverage of time deposits. This paper uses this deposit insurance reform as a natural experiment to investigate the relationship between deposit insurance coverage and market discipline. I find that the reform raised the sensitivity of interest rates on deposits, and that of deposit quantity to default risk. In addition, the interest rate differentials between partially insured large time deposits and fully insured ordinary deposits increased for risky banks. These results suggest that the deposit insurance reform enhanced market discipline in Japan. I also find, however, that too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy became a more important determinant of interest rates and deposit allocation after the reform, thereby partially offsetting the positive effects of the deposit insurance reform on overall market discipline.     

State-contingent regulatory mechanisms and fairly priced deposit insurance

This paper presents a model of incentive compatible bank regulation under moral hazard and adverse selection. We derive a wide range of simple and conceptually implementable mechanisms that can solve each type of incentive problem separately and also achieve the first-best outcome – but only when regulatory instruments involve ex post pricing that is contingent on the bank's performance relative to the market. An important feature of these mechanisms is that they do not involve a subsidy to the bank. When the regulator faces both moral hazard and adverse selection simultaneously, we identify the conditions under which the same mechanism can achieve the first-best solution.     

Implicit deposit insurance and deposit guarantees: Characteristics of Australian bank risk premia

This paper examines the hypothesis that CD issue yields of Australian banks incorporate a premium that reflects bank risk. Our empirical analysis of Australian banks' CD premiums suggests the data is consistent with this hypothesis and hence supports the view that CD holders do not perceive their deposits as being risk-free. Nor do we find any statistically significant difference between the premiums paid by private banks with implicit deposit insurance vis-a-vis those paid by government-owned banks with explicit government guarantees.     

Private deposit insurance,deposit flows,bank lending,and moral hazard

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.     

A hierarchical agency model of deposit insurance

This paper develops a hierarchical agency model of deposit insurance. The main purpose of the analysis is to propose a micro-founded model of deposit insurance schemes and study their effects on the behavior of depositors and the monitoring problem for a bank. This paper also characterizes a risk-based premium in equilibrium, and conducts a comparative statics analysis of depositors’ optimal actions. The results supply the basic theoretical foundation for designing deposit insurance schemes. Our findings are consistent with the empirical research on depositor behavior.     

Risk-based capital standards, deposit insurance, and procyclicality

This article shows that risk-based deposit insurance premiums generate smaller procyclical effects than do risk-based capital requirements. Thus, Basel II's procyclical impact can be reduced by integrating risk-based deposit insurance. If deposit insurance is structured as a moving average of contracts, its procyclical effects can be decreased further. Empirical illustrations of this are presented for 42 banks over the period 1987 to 1996. The results confirm that lengthening the contracts' maturities intertemporally smooths premiums but raises the average premium level needed to compensate the insurer for greater systematic risk. The distribution of risk-based premiums across banks is skewed.     

Danish banking: Lessons for deposit insurance reform

As an alternative to a large deposit insurance fund, some observers have recommended prompt closure of banks that fail to maintain a high level of market-value capital. Others, however, see such an early closure policy as impractical, and potentially damaging to the competitive position of U.S. banks. Because the Danes have employed a policy of early closure based on marked-to-market portfolios, their experience is relevant to this debate. The article describes Danish banking policy, and discusses its effects on the behavior of banks and on processes for resolution of weak banks. The Danish policy appears to have provided depositor protection and resolved problems with large and small banks without a deposit insurance fund and without significant burdens on either the banks themselves or the public purse.A previous version of this article was prepared while the author was vice president, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco for the 1991 Conference on Bank Structure of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The author wishes to thank Carl Aage Otholm, inspector of the Danish Supervisory Authority of Financial Affairs for reading and commenting on earlier drafts, Deborah Martin for her excellent research assistance, Ulrike Elofson for translation assistance, and George Kaufman and George Benston for encouragement. Data on Danish bank stock prices were obtained with the gracious assistance of Ellen-Margrethe Soelberg of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange.     

美国存款保险制度对我国的启示

我国围绕建立存款保险制度酝酿已久，最近国务院已原则同意建立存款保险制度，由中国人民银行会同财政部、中国银监会、国务院法制办、国家发改委成立工作组。这意味着建立我国存款保险机制已正式启动。     

Capital standard,forbearance and deposit insurance pricing under GARCH

We propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that simultaneously incorporates the capital standard and the possibility of forbearance. The model employs the recently developed GARCH option pricing technique in determining the deposit insurance value. Our model offers two distinctive advantages. First, it explicitly considers the implications of the strict enforcement on capital standard as stipulated in FDIC Improvement Act of 1991. Second, the use of the GARCH model allows us to capture many robust features exhibited by financial asset returns. By the GARCH option pricing theory, the value of a contingent claim is a function of the asset risk premium. This unique feature is found to be prominent in determining the bank's deposit insurance value. We also examine the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard behavior in this multiperiod deposit insurance setting.     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

Understanding the motivations of coastal residents to voluntarily purchase federal flood insurance

Federally-backed flood insurance is the primary mechanism by which residents in the United States (US) prepare for and recover from floods. While there is a growing literature on the general uptake of flood insurance, little work has been done to address the factors motivating residents to voluntarily buy and maintain federally-based insurance policies. We address this issue by conducting a survey of coastal residents in four localities in Texas and Florida. Based on survey responses, we quantitatively examine the factors influencing whether residents located outside of the 100-year floodplain obtain insurance policies when it is not required. Using two-sample t-tests and binary logistic regression analysis to control for multiple contextual and psychological variables, we statistically isolate the factors contributing most to the decision to purchase insurance. Our findings indicate that a resident located outside the 100-year floodplain who has voluntarily purchased federal flood insurance can be characterized, on average, as more highly educated, living in relatively expensive homes, and a long-time resident who thinks about flood hazard relatively infrequently but who, nonetheless, thinks flood insurance is relatively affordable. Unexpectedly, the physical proximity of a respondent to flood hazard areas makes little or no discernible difference in the decision to obtain flood insurance.