Negotiating Transfer Prices

We consider a team-investment setting in which transfer prices between two divisions are negotiable. Investments are made independently and simultaneously after the bargaining stage, i.e. with a given transfer price ‘on the table’. Both divisions’ investments jointly affect the sales price of the final product and total revenue. We analyze two transfer-pricing schemes and their corresponding bargaining problems. Both bargaining settings exhibit non-transferable utility because the transfer price not only allocates corporate profit but also affects corporate profit through the incentives it creates for the divisions’ investment and quantity decisions. In particular, we discuss how concepts from bargaining theory can be use used to determine a ‘fair’ agreement concerning the transfer price.     

Bargaining and Search: An Experimental Study

We study experimentally two versions of a model buyer and a seller bargain over the price of a good; however, the buyer can choose to leave the negotiation table to search for other alternatives. Under one version, if the buyer chooses to search for a better price, the opportunity to purchase the good at the stated price is gone. Under the second version, the seller guarantees the same price if the buyer chooses to return immediately after a search (presumably because a better price could not be found). In both cases, the buyer has a fairly good idea about what to expect from the search, but because the search is costly, he has to weigh the potential benefits of the search against its cost. It turns out (theoretically) that adding search to a simple bargaining mechanism eliminates some unsatisfactory features of bargaining theory.Our experiment reveals that the model can account for some (but not all) of the behavioral regularities. In line with recent developments in behavioral decision theory and game theory, which assume bounded rationality and preferences over the relative division of a surplus, we find that subjects follow simple rules of thumb and distributional norms in choosing strategies, which are reflected in the behavioral consistencies observed in this study.     

Strategic compliments in sales

Salespersons often spend time and money giving prospective buyers compliments such as kind words, meals and gifts. Though prior research has shown that compliments will influence a prospective buyer’s decision, it is unknown the extent to which salespersons should make these investments. In this paper, we develop an analytical model to examine how seller and buyer characteristics affect the equilibrium provision of compliments by the seller. We establish that the optimal magnitude of compliments is non-monotonic in the buyer’s sensitivity to compliments. We identify conditions for when a seller of a high-quality product will offer greater (or lesser) compliments than a seller of a lower quality product. We show that, under certain conditions, an uninformed buyer earns greater utility than a buyer who knows the quality of the seller’s product. The findings have implications for sellers in their choice of compliments and buyers in the inferences they draw from the compliments received.     

An Investigation on Incentive Strategies in Community Building in Business-to-Business Electronic Markets

ABSTRACT

Purpose: Community building is recognized as an important governance mechanism in business-to-business (B-to-B) electronic markets by enhancing firms’ participation in these platform markets. However, little research has been done regarding the role of incentive strategies in community building. The main purpose of this paper is to understand how to motivate merchants to participate in a merchant community with incentive strategies.

Methodology: Data were collected in a community of a large B-to-B electronic platform market in China. We randomly chose a sample of 605 participants from among all merchant firms registered in this community, and track their behaviors for 2 weeks. Their behaviors are recorded based on our research design.

Findings: With the empirical analysis from a community of a large B-to-B electronic platform market in China, our results show that (1) both platform and peer incentive strategies can significantly enhance community participation, while platform incentives is more effective in general; (2) platform incentive strategy is a more effective strategy as seller firm uncertainty increases; (3) peer incentive strategy is a more effective strategy as buyer firm uncertainty increases.

Originality: This paper is among the first to investigate two types of incentive strategies in community building, platform level and peer level. We also investigate the moderating role of market uncertainties due to market participants from seller and buyer when examining the effectiveness of these two incentive strategies.     

Protocols for automated negotiations with buyer anonymity and seller reputations

In many Internet commerce applications buyers can easily achieve anonymity, limiting what a seller can learn about any buyer individually. However, because sellers need to keep a fixed web address, buyers can probe them repeatedly or pool their information about sellers with the information obtained by other buyers; hence, sellers' strategies become public knowledge. Under assumptions of buyer anonymity, publicly‐known seller strategies, and no negotiation transaction costs for buyers, we find that take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers will yield at least as much seller profit as any attempt at price discrimination could yield. As we relax those assumptions, however, we find that sellers, and in some cases buyers as well, may benefit from a more general bargaining protocol. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Self-Sabotage and Durable-Goods Monopoly

We analyze a simple two-period linear demand durable-goods monopoly model with “self-sabotage.” The firm has the ability to sabotage its own production by increasing its future (period two) manufacturing costs. We find that an uncommitted monopoly seller has an incentive to engage in such self-sabotage, while a committed seller or renter has no such incentive. Unlike the previous papers on self-sabotage, we show this occurs even though the firm faces no rivals in the output market. In our durable-goods setting, the incentive for self-sabotage arises from the seller’s commitment problem with period-one buyers (the so-called Coase conjecture). Interestingly, we also find that this sort of self-sabotage can not only be profit enhancing for the uncommitted firm, but may also increase social welfare (in contrast to the earlier models on self-sabotage.)     

The Use of Accommodation in Buyer–Seller Relationships: Encouraging or Controlling Opportunism in Business Markets Middle-grounds

ABSTRACT

Purpose: In the past decades, marketing researchers have explored different strategies to control opportunism in buyer–seller relationships. Accommodation, the cooperative response to partners’ exploitive behavior in exchange relationships, has received increasing attention from research on interfirm relationships. However, less is known about whether accommodation is an effective response strategy for controlling opportunism. Drawing on the self-enforcing agreement literature, this article focuses on exploring (1) what drives a firm’s accommodation response to its partner’s exploitive behavior, (2) how a firm’s accommodation helps govern its exchange partner’s opportunistic behavior, and (3) whether monitoring magnifies or buffers the effect of accommodation on the exchange partners’ opportunism.

Methodology: The survey data were collected from 173 seller-firms in Guangdong, Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou, representing the south, east, north, and middle regions of China. The initial questionnaires were distributed mainly by mail. By assessing the nonresponse bias and the potential bias of early and late responses, we detected no significant differences, implying that the aforementioned biases are not a concern. Because PLS can readily model both formative and reflective constructs, and accommodation is a formative construct, we deployed the SmartPLS software program to test our model.

Findings: This article enables a deeper understanding of accommodation as a response strategy in buyer–seller relationships. The data analysis offers supportive evidence that a firm’s level of accommodation is positively related to two exchange attributes: joint-specific investments and observability of the exchanges. Accommodation, as a cooperative response strategy, curtails opportunism in buyer–seller relationships, and such a curtailing role is magnified when accompanied with monitoring.

Originality/value/contribution: The authors develop a framework to examine previously untested relationships, which suggest accommodation is a cooperative response strategy to mitigate opportunism. We also contribute by exploring the antecedents of accommodation from the tangible transaction attributes perspective. Specifically, two exchange attributes, joint-specific investments and observability, can explain the emergence of accommodation. In addition, we examine the combined effect of competitive response strategies and cooperative response strategies on controlling partner opportunism. That is, competitive response strategies (i.e., monitoring) strengthen the governing effect of cooperative response strategies (i.e., accommodation).     

EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES

To commit in bargaining is crucial: in the ultimatum game with its one‐sided commitment power the ‘proposer’ (almost) receives the whole pie while the ‘responder’ is left with (almost) nothing. When bargaining parties commit simultaneously the symmetric Nash (Econometrica, 1950, vol. 18, pp. 155–162) bargaining solution predicts equal shares. Continuously connecting these two games yields a one‐parameter family of games ( Fischer et al. , Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, pp. 17–33) for which we distinguish two behavioral dispositions, namely (1) neglecting commitment power and (2) reacting to it strategically. Their pay‐off implications define the evolutionary set‐up for which we derive the evolutionarily stable behavioral disposition. Our analysis sheds light on the hypothesis that in experiments participants neglect strategic aspects such as commitment power.     

The impact of buyer–seller relationships and reference prices on the effectiveness of the pay what you want pricing mechanism

Pay what you want (PWYW) is a new participative pricing mechanism that delegates the whole price determination to the buyer. Previous research on PWYW suggests that the final prices paid are not only affected by consumer characteristics but also by varying conditions, such as social distance within buyer–seller relationships and the provision of reference prices. Through an online survey and two field experiments, we test varying conditions of PWYW, such as social distance (buyer–seller relationship), provision of external reference price, product value, level of reputation, and duration of an application of PWYW. The results indicate that the provision of an external reference price is advantageous for the seller as the prices paid increase. The seller should also avoid offering products with high product value under PWYW conditions. Furthermore, increasing social distance may decrease the prices paid. Finally, a high level of reputation may be beneficial.     

A Sealed-Bid Two-Attribute Yardstick Auction Without Prior Scoring

We analyze a two-attribute single item procurement auction that uses yardstick competition to settle prices. The auction simplifies the procurement process by reducing the principal’s articulation of preferences to simply choosing the most preferred offer as if it was a market with posted prices. This is done simply by replacing the submitted sealed bids by yardstick bids, computed by a linear weighting of the other participants’ bids. We show that there is only one type of Nash equilibria where some agents may win the auction by submitting a zero price-bid. Using a simulation study we demonstrate that following this type of equilibrium behavior often leads to winner’s curse. The simulations show that in auctions with more than 12 participants the chance of facing winner’s curse is around 95 %. Truthful reporting, on the other hand, does not constitute a Nash equilibrium but it is ex post individually rational. Using a simulation study we demonstrate that truthful bidding may indeed represent some kind of focal point.     

International trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size

This paper analyzes how changes in the structure and environment of trade agreements between a small and a large country affect the efficient frontier of those self-enforcing agreements and hence, negotiation outcomes. Using the autarky punishment instead of the interior Nash punishment may provide the small country with greater bargaining power. Negotiating direct transfers under free trade instead of reciprocal tariff reductions improves the worst possible negotiation outcome for the small country. The existence of irreversible investment may strengthen (weaken) the small country’s bargaining power under the interior Nash (autarky) punishment scheme.     

The impact of retail buyer innovativeness on suppliers’ adaptive selling in Japanese buyer–supplier relationships

Abstract

We investigate the critical role of retail buyer innovativeness in Japanese buyer–supplier relationships and explore its link to suppliers’ adaptive selling, cooperative relationships, and retail competitiveness. Further, we examine how process conflict between merchandizing and store divisions moderates the relationship between retail buyer innovativeness and suppliers’ adaptive selling. This study employs a structural equation model using survey data from 246 heads of merchandizing divisions at Japanese retail companies. Our findings highlight the importance of both mitigating process conflict and facilitating suppliers’ adaptive selling in order to improve Japanese retailers’ competitiveness, especially when buyers are highly innovative.     

STRATEGIC BUYERS IN A DURABLE GOODS MONOPOLY

In a simple two-period durable goods monopoly model, we study the effect of buyer behaviour on the monopolist's payoff. When the buyer behaves strategically, the monopoly seller gains from not being committed; the usual cost of a no-commitment argument collapses.     

Disagreement points in trade negotiations

This paper analyzes trade negotiations between two large countries in the framework of an alternating-offer bargaining model with endogenous interim disagreement actions. Despite of the flexibility in disagreement tariff selection, the countries would keep the status quo tariffs in disagreement periods as far as the country which benefits from keeping the status quo tariffs compensates for the other country’s foregone gains from deviating in disagreement actions. Each equilibrium outcome converges to a corresponding Nash bargaining solution whose disagreement point reflects the status quo tariff rates as well as the threat of raising the tariff to the Nash tariff rate.     

Why is the Doha Development Agenda Failing? And What Can Be Done? A Computable General Equilibrium–Game Theoretical Approach

We use a world computable general equilibrium model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and select the Nash solution of cooperative games. The solutions vary according to the objective functions adopted by the trade negotiators. When real income is the objective and services are excluded, or when optimising terms of trade is the objective, the Nash solution is the status quo. Trade liberalisation is feasible only when the negotiators focus on national exports or gross domestic product (GDP). Our assessment of some possible solutions reveals that excluding members having a GDP below a certain threshold improves the bargaining process, regardless of the governments’ objective. Formation of coalition, such as the G20, constitutes an option for its members to block outcomes imposed by rich members. We also find that side payments may be a solution, but represent a very high share of the global income gain.     

Price Versus Quantity in a Duopoly with a Unilateral Effect and with Bargaining over Managerial Contracts

This study examines the endogenous choice of each firm’s strategic contract, that is, a price contract or a quantity contract, in a duopoly in which their demand functions are asymmetric when the content of their managerial contracts is determined through bargaining between the owner and the manager. The degree of asymmetry between their demand functions corresponds to the relation between the goods they produce. In contrast to the case wherein each firm’s delegation parameter is determined through profit maximization, we show that the quantity competition cannot become the equilibrium market structure when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner is sufficiently low. In particular, when the relation between the two goods is complementary, two asymmetric market structures can be observed in equilibrium. Furthermore, we consider the situation in which the relative bargaining power of the manager to that of the owner within each firm is different between the two firms.     

Buyer–seller relationships of the dental devices industry in Taiwan: perspective of relationship

Purpose: While research in marketing and management has addressed characteristics associated with buyer and seller, relatively little research has been reported on the marketing of relationship benefits and relationship bonding tactics, particularly involving their relationships with customers. Given a dyadic perspective, it can be surmised that gaps in buyer and seller perceptions may well dampen relationships, and will inevitably occur, since a perfect match is highly unlikely between two exchange parties. To enhance relationships, major gaps need therefore to be identified and eliminated. Therefore, the purpose of this study is developing matrices of customer relationship benefits and relationship bonding tactics separately from buyer’s and seller’s perspectives, together with the insights of interrelated propositions.

Methodology: This research subjects chosen for this study consist of those distributors of dental devices, procurement in hospitals, and dentists. Using the grounded theory, four stages of coding analysis are conducted.

Findings: The results indicated that buyers and sellers differed in their perceptions in all field interviews due to their different attitudes toward different benefits. While buyers’ perceived benefits were based on the consideration of confidence and trust in the practical use of purchased medical devices, sellers primarily considered specialized issues of provided services and technologies. Based on this, buyer and seller perspectives were distinguished.

Research Implications: As a self-enclosed system, the medical device industry is difficult to enter for new manufacturers. Therefore, from the perspective of product providers, academic support can increase their product visibility, improve their company’s image, and provide more opportunities to contact new clients. From the perspective of medical institutions, the participation of hospitals and clinics in relationship marketing activities and seminars can raise their prestige and provide more opportunities for gaining new information.

Originality/Value/Contribution: Theoretical contribution of this study is in building matrices of customer relationship benefits and relationship bonding tactics separately from buyer’s and seller’s perspectives, together with the insights of six propositions. These insights shall expose the undisclosed systems of the dental devices industry.     

Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing

This research examines a retailer’s incentive to share information with its supplier when the supplier can also undertake initiatives to increase retail demand. It is well known that a retailer is averse to sharing market information with a manufacturer due to concern for a manufacturer’s strategic use of such information. This research shows that despite such strategic exploitation of market information, a retailer may want to establish information sharing channels with its supplier. Information sharing essentially shifts power upstream which, in turn, enhances the manufacturer’s incentive to bear costs to boost retail demand: the manufacturer is induced to invest merely by knowing that information is on its way. Hence, the retailer benefits from information sharing ex ante despite the costly ex post exploitation by the manufacturer. This finding is a stark contrast to the most of previous results which consistently point out how bad it is for the manufacturer to have the retailer’s demand information before setting prices. In fact, due to the investment effect, information sharing can lead to gains for the retailer, manufacturer, and consumers alike.     

《国际贸易术语解释通则2010》的不完美及其应对

在对INCOTERMS 2010的学习和使用的过去两年多时间里,国际贸易界产生了一些困惑,部分学者也提出了质疑。这说明INCOTERMS 2010并不是完美的,存在意识的偏差以及由此带来的有些条文不明确、不合理的问题,有待进一步改进。如术语变形与风险转移的关联未予明确,FOB等蓝色术语存在模糊性,EXW/FCA中"卖方所在地"的含义缺失,DDP B5"风险转移"a)款不合理等。由于INCOTERMS修订周期基本上为10年一次,在未来进一步修订之前,贸易商只有通过销售合同商订和履行等环节,来规避或消除INCOTERMS 2010中不明确、不合理条款可能导致的争议和损失。