Strategic behavior and regulation research in accounting

This paper focuses on models of political behavior that implicitly or explicitly form the foundation for empirical economic consequences studies in accounting. The studies that have appeared adopt a single-period of single-agendum-item perspective. This paper discusses differences in rational political behavior that arise naturally in single-period versus multiperiod settings. The behavioral implications of varying configurations of available information on agents' “ preferences” are also considered. Because of the tremendously complex empirical domain being studied, examples are relied on heavily to motivate the discussion rather than engaging in a formal modeling exercise.     

Agency theory,performance evaluation,and the hypothetical construct of intrinsic motivation

Cognitive evaluation theory and its hypothetical construct of intrinsic motivation are enjoying increasing popularity in the fields of business administration and economics. Consequently, intensifying skepticism towards performance incentives and agency theory is postulated. According to cognitive evaluation theory, it is argued that performance pay may undermine an agent's intrinsic motivation. In contradiction to agency theory, the principal might be worse off when providing an incentive contract to the agent than without doing so. Since the contention is substantiated by empirical evidence, it seems worrying enough for further investigation. Restricting attention to performance pay in business corporations, the scope of this article is to evaluate whether agency theory faces an urgent need to incorporate the construct of intrinsic motivation and its ‘hidden costs of reward' as postulated by supporters of the concept. The subsequent analysis reveals good and bad news for agency theory. The bad news is that hidden costs of reward do indeed exist. The good news is that the empirical evidence on undermining effects cannot be interpreted as being contradictory to agency theory. In particular, the antecedents for such effects not only seldomly prevail in business corporations, they are also easily avoidable.     

Allocation of Decision-making Authority

This paper addresses the question of what determines where in a firm’s hierarchy investment decisions are made. We present a simple model of a CEO and a division manager to analyze when the CEO will choose to allocate decision-making authority over an investment decision to a division manager. Both the CEO and the division manager have private information regarding the profit maximizing investment level. Because the division manager is assumed to have a preference for “empire”, neither manager will communicate her information fully to the other. We show that the probability of delegation increases with the importance of the division manager’s information and decreases with the importance of the CEO’s information. A somewhat counterintuitive result is that, in some circumstances, increases in agency problems result in increased willingness of the CEO to delegate the decision. We also characterize situations in which the CEO prefers to commit to an allocation of authority ex ante, instead of deciding based on her private information. Finally, even though the division manager is biased toward larger investments, we show that under certain conditions, the average investment will be smaller when the decision is delegated. These results help explain some findings in the empirical literature. A number of other empirical implications are developed.We thank Sudipto Dasgupta, Wouter Dessein, Jeff Ely, Mike Fishman, Ehud Kalai, John Matsusaka, Canice Prendergast, Chester Spatt, Lars Stole, Jan Zabojnik, two anonymous referees, participants at the 2002 Utah Winter Finance Conference, the 2002 European Finance Association Annual Meetings, the Harvard/MIT Organizational Economics Workshop, the 2002 University of Illinois Bear Markets Conference, and workshops at the University of Chicago and USC for helpful comments. Financial support from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business is gratefully acknowledged.     

Accounting elites and accounting theory: A reply to Paul Montagna

In response to Paul Montagna's review, the author draws attention to a central claim of Accounting Regulation and Elite Structures: that despite vigorous efforts it is not possible to identify separate schools of accounting thought in Sweden. Instead, what one finds are common bases of reasoning in appeals to “practice”. Consumer-oriented and producer-oriented appeals are identified. It is argued that empirical research is not governed by a Grand Theory. Norms of accounting practice are argued to develop out of the interplay between individuals arguing from points of view they consider to be right. In communicative interaction between individuals representing diverse interests, there is a high likelihood that communication will be distorted. In such situations appeals to the “practicality” of a proposed solution are likely to be successfully made.     

The effect of cognitive style and sponsorship bias on the treatment of opportunity costs in resource allocation decisions

The incorporation of opportunity cost is stressed in normative approaches to resource allocation decisions. Empirical evidence has revealed a variety of behaviours. A consequence of inappropriate treatment of opportunity costs is an incorrect assessment of the economic consequences of resource allocation decisions. Improved understanding of why some managers treat opportunity costs inappropriately permits identifying situations where the incorrect economic evaluations will lead to sub-optimal resource allocation and therefore provides a basis for remedial action. This study identifies two conditional factors which potentially influence the way managers respond to opportunity cost information.These factors are managers' cognitive style and whether or not managers sponsor a project (project sponsorship), and it is argued that they influence managers' decisions on opportunity costs in situations in which opportunity cost implications are implicit. In particular, the paper proposes, first, that in the absence of project sponsorship, managers with an “intuitive” style of “taking in data” will tend to incorporate opportunity costs in their economic decisions whereas those wiht a “sensation” style will not. Second, it is suggested that because sponsorship encourages managers to ignore negative economic signals (sponsorship bias) any effects of cognitive style will be moderated in conditions where sponsorship is evident.A laboratory experiment with managers as subjects was used to examine these propositions. The results indicated that intuitive managers tended to incorporate opportunity costs in their decisions whereas sensation individuals appeared to focus more on the directness of the relationship between expenditure and a project to determine the relevance of the cost. Opportunity cost implications tended not to be identified by the sensation group. Evidence was found that sponsorship moderated the influence of cognitive style on decisions to include opportunity costs.     

A Survey of Managerial Incentives and Investment Bias — Common Structure but Differing Assumptions

Recent models within the agency framework concerning investment bias are reviewed, based upon a simplified structure of the pertinent information asymmetry. Tabulated overviews of contractual structures, critical assumptions, main and ancillary results, implications for future research and management are provided. As a general conclusion, the theoretical case of investment bias is rich and wide-ranging. It is now of interest to develop models and perspectives that focus more on economic fundamentals rather than pursuing additional variations of particular assumptions. Moreover, further research is needed in empirical testing and case studies. In particular, the framework promises to bring new perspectives and managerial implications on the administrative use of capital budgeting methods.     

Reconsidering performance evaluative style

Journal of Accounting Research, 10, 156–182, modeled “performance evaluative style” as the predictor of unintended effects from performance measurement control systems, stimulating one of the few areas of cumulative research in behavioral accounting. However, despite twenty-five years of empirical testing, this stream of research has failed to converge. This paper considers the validity issues created by evolution in the conceptualisation and specification of the relevant variables and classifies them by calculation type. Results of an empirical test designed to explore comparability between the variable types are reported. Finally, implications for interpreting prior research and for future research directions are considered. ©     

The history of the gender division of labour in Britain: Reflections on “‘herstory’ in accounting: The first eighty years”

This article surveys the empirical research on the gender division of labour in Britain since pre-industrial times, seeking in particular to relate it to the history of the professions, which have been relatively little studied in this regard. It argues that industrialization brought about a less dramatic change in gender roles than is often believed. Neither simple economic nor simple biological explanations, or the influence of “domestic ideology”, can adequately explain continuing gender divisions.It relates the empirical data to the current state of feminist theory arguing that the “reserve army of labour” theory is not supported by the evidence, nor indeed is any existing body of theory. Rather a combination of theoretical perspectives, including those which incorporate male prejudice, must be used if we are to understand the long persistence of gender inequality in the workplace.     

Future negotiating skills: a development issue?

This paper examines some critical implications for those managers wishing to be effective negotiators in the future. It draws on the findings of two recent research projects conducted by the authors. These projects focus on the contribution of language to good negotiating practice and, in particular, to intended “Win–Win” outcomes. From the findings set out, it is argued that negotiators often pay an insufficient amount of attention to an appreciation of language-related influences in the negotiating process. It is contended that this lack of attention also extends to the typical training provided for managers in all types of organisations. It concludes with the view that meta language and other language forms need to be given considerably more attention if managers are to be able to behave effectively in the increasingly crucial field of negotiating.     

An institutional analysis of accounting growth and regulation in the United States

The accounting profession in the United States has experienced rapid growth in the past two decades, and growth is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Although the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission possesses explicit statutory authority to regulate accounting and financial reporting, the profession is largely self-regulated, an arrangement widely supported by the corporate business community. Yet no single current accounting theory provides a full understanding of these two very basic phenomena. This paper examines organizational models based on contractualism (agency theory and transaction cost analysis), hierarchy (radical) and Fligstein's “organizational fields” conception, and evaluates their application to the accounting process. It is proposed that institutions are central to an understanding of accounting growth and regulation. The essay then offers a theoretical critique based on the internal and external aspects of economic organizations.     

The external organizational environment and its impact on management information systems

It is argued in this paper that organizations are “living purposeful” or “adaptively rational” systems whose survival depends on their ability to interact successfully, on a continual basis, with the surrounding environment. Three states of the external organizational environment — controllable, partially controllable and uncontrollable — are identified, and the information characteristics of each state are discussed. The approaches that organizations can adopt to collect information on the environment are also discussed; these approaches use externally-based data sources and modeling and/or analytic techniques. On these bases, we consider effective strategies and methodologies which organizations can adopt for processing, evaluating and communicating information about the external environment to satisfy decision-making requirements.     

Corporate governance—A multi-theoretical approach to recognizing the wider influencing forces impacting on organizations

It has been argued by researchers that agency theory has limitations as the underpinning theory for governance given its inability to recognize the wider environmental influencing forces impacting on organizations. This paper provides a case for incorporating a number of management-based theories to augment agency theory in recognizing these wider environmental influencing forces and the consequent extended governance paradigm it creates. Through a theory building approach that reviews and critically analyses the extant literature, a case is built to integrate four existing theories that complement each other to recognize these wider influencing forces. The paper argues that the proposed approach will narrow the theoretical practical gap in governance and will consequently have policy implications on governance guidelines. Further research is suggested to validate the approach with a wide range of real life organizational settings.     

Consumption smoothing channels in open economies

Many intertemporal open economy macro models imply a theory of consumption smoothing channels; thus we build an empirical model to analyze the intertemporal smoothing role of saving components (fixed investments, inventories and trade balance) through the use of VAR impulse responses to different types of shocks. We find that for the OECD countries the bulk of intertemporal smoothing has been carried out domestically, via gross fixed investments and inventories, but the trade balance has also played a relevant – albeit volatile – smoothing role. We also characterize the dynamic behavior of each component: the trade balance and inventories are mostly used as short-run smoothing tools while fixed investment provides more and more smoothing over time. We can also address some empirical puzzles, such as the “excess sensitivity of investment” anomaly (Glick, R., Rogoff, K., 1995. Global versus country-specific productivity shocks and the current account. Journal of Monetary Economics, 35, 159–192) and the “saving-investment correlation puzzle” (Feldstein, M., Horioka, C., 1980. Domestic saving and international capital flows. Economic Journal, 90, 314–329).     

Corporate precautionary cash holdings

This paper models the precautionary motive for a firm's cash holdings. A two-period investment model shows that the cash holdings of financially constrained firms are sensitive to cash flow volatility because financial constraints create an intertemporal trade-off between current and future investments. When future cash flow risk cannot be fully diversifiable, this intertemporal trade-off gives constrained firms the incentives of precautionary savings: they increase their cash holdings in response to increases in cash flow volatility. However, there is no systematic relationship between cash holdings and cash flow volatility for unconstrained firms. We test the empirical implications of our theory using quarterly information from a sample of U.S. publicly traded companies from 1997 to 2002, and find that the empirical evidence supports our theory.     

Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism

Drawing on a wide range of literature and ideas, a new “second-generation theory of fiscal federalism” is emerging that provides new insights into the structure and working of federal systems. After a restatement and review of the first-generation theory, this paper surveys this new body of work and offers some thoughts on the ways in which it is extending our understanding of fiscal federalism and on its implications for the design of fiscal institutions.JEL Code: H77, H11     

Accounting systems in organisational contexts: A case for critical theory

This paper starts from the view that accounting systems in organisational contexts are more than technical phenomena and that to understand and change these technical elements the social roots must also be both understood and changed. To develop these insights, it is argued, requires major changes in the methodologies we adopt. This paper is addressed to arguing a case for a methodological approach to further these purposes which is derived from a German philosophical school of thought called “critical theory” — more specifically from Jürgen Habermas' interpretation of this thinking which gives particular emphasis to the social and technical aspects of societal phenomena which includes accounting systems.     

Towards an understanding of the phases of goodwill accounting in four Western capitalist countries: From stakeholder model to shareholder model

The objective of this paper is to illustrate that the change in shareholders’ attitude towards firms (from stakeholder model to shareholder model) influences the accounting treatments of goodwill. Our study is based on four countries (Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and France) and covers more than a century, starting in 1880. We explain that all these countries have gone through four identified phases of goodwill accounting, classified as (1) “static” (immediate or rapid expensing), (2) “weakened static” (write-off against equity), (3) “dynamic” (recognition with amortization over a long period) and (4) “actuarial” (recognition without amortization but with impairment if necessary). We contribute several new features to the existing literature on goodwill: our study (1) is international and comparative, (2) spans more than a century, (3) uses the stakeholder/shareholder models to explain the evolution in goodwill treatment in the four countries studied. More precisely, it relates a balance sheet theory, which distinguishes four phases in accounting treatment for goodwill, to the shift from a stakeholder model to a shareholder model, which leads to the preference for short-term rather than long-term profit, (4) contributes to the debate on whether accounting rules simply reflect or arguably help to produce the general trend towards the shareholder model, (5) demonstrates a “one-way” evolution of goodwill treatment in the four countries studied, towards the actuarial phase.