我国银行存款保险制度的路径选择研究

明确存款保险制度应当作为我国金融安全的重要组成部分。基于风险定价的存款保险费应当由政府和银行共同承担。政府提供的隐性存款保险随着存款保险制度完善逐步减少,为银行积累资本赢得时间。银行应当通过充实资本,降低存款保险费,为实施明确存款保险创造条件。我国最终应当建立信息透明、市场机制主导、政府严格监管、风险处置及时的明确存款保险制度。     

Deposit insurance and depositor discipline: direct evidence on bank switching behaviour in Japan

As Japan's financial system becomes more market oriented, depositor discipline is playing a larger role in the monitoring of banks. Matching household survey data with banks’ financial data, we examine households’ response to bank risk and different deposit insurance schemes. We find that bank switching in response to risk increased between 1996 and 2001 and households’ choice of bank adequately reflects banks’ financial health. We also examine the determinants of households’ knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme and how this affects switching behaviour. The results suggest that depositor discipline works and could play an important supplementary role in bank monitoring.     

IDENTIFYING CREDIT CRUNCHES

This article identifies four U.S. credit crunches—periods of sharply increased non-price credit rationing—between 1960 and 1992. Extreme intimidation of banks by the Federal Reserve and U.S. federal government through jawboning and credible threats of increased regulatory oversight caused the crunches of 1966 and 1969. Thus, this article overturns the conventional wisdom that Regulation Q produced the 1960s credit crunches. The 1980 crunch was the unintended effect of direct regulatory limits on credit extensions. More recently, a market-induced crunch occurred from early 1990 through 1992 when a collapse of commercial real estate values made pricing risk on real estate-collateralized loans extremely difficult.     

市场约束与银行风险承担的文献回顾

市场约束是指银行的利益相关者出于时自身利益的考虑,会在不同程度上关注银行的经营和风险状况,并根据其掌握的信息采取一定措施影响相关的利率和资产价格,从而通过市场对银行的经营产生约束作用.市场约束是维护银行业稳定的重要机制.巴塞尔协议Ⅱ的新的监管框架中把市场约束与资本监管、政府监督共同作为有效银行监管的“三大支柱”,同时2006年底中国也全面开放了银行业市场,市场对中国商业银行风险承担的约束作用也越采越大.本文系统的回顾了国内外关于市场约束对商业银行风险承担的影响,包括市场约束的存在性、存款保险、政府监管对市场约束作用的影响以及危机时的市场约束,这对我国商业银行市场约束作用的发挥具有很好的借鉴意义.     

Deposit insurance and moral hazard problem: the case of Turkish banking system

We investigate the effect of full deposit insurance introduced in 1994 on the financial performance of Turkish commercial banks. We construct a model, under reasonable assumptions, with deposit insurance where banks undertake excessive risk –?moral hazard risk. Empirical investigation using experimental design approach supports our moral hazard hypothesis. Our findings indicate that banks subject to the moral hazard behaviour show significant increases in foreign exchange position risk and deterioration in capital adequacy relative to their benchmark after introduction of full deposit insurance system. We relate this excessive risk-taking to the moral hazard behaviour by commercial banks. The research results indicate that complete deposit insurance system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus, prevents proper functioning of market discipline mechanism and leads to the taking excessive risk-taking.     

我国商业银行跨业经营保险的风险收益状况研究——基于模拟合并法视角

商业银行跨业经营保险在理论上具有规模经济效应、范围经济效应和协同效应,但也可能带来经营风险的增加。采取模拟合并法,利用2005～2009年的数据对我国商业银行跨业经营保险的风险收益状况进行实证分析,结果表明:银行跨业经营保险具有风险分散效果,且一定比例的产险业务对于银行跨业经营保险达到最佳效果是必需的,建议通过对保险业务资产比重进行限制来防止银行因追求收益而增加自身的风险。     

Idiosyncratic Risk in the United States and Sweden: Is There a Role for Government Insurance?

We examine the effects of government redistribution schemes in an economy where agents are subject to uninsurable, individual specific productivity risk. In particular, we consider the trade-off between positive insurance effects and negative distortions on labor supply and saving. We parameterize the model by estimating productivity processes on Swedish and U.S. data. The estimation results show that agents in the United States are subject to more idiosyncratic risk than agents in Sweden. Although distortions are significant, the welfare benefits of government redistribution and insurance systems can be substantial. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E20, H21.     

自然灾害、巨灾保险与政府主导

近年来,中国各地频频发生地震、干旱、洪水等自然灾害,给人民群众的生命和财产造成了损失,影响了社会经济的运行。巨灾保险作为一种有效转移自然灾害风险的市场手段,对分担巨灾带来的经济损失、稳定社会经济发挥着重要的作用。而当前中国巨灾保险体系的建设还离不开政府的主导推动,只有政府和保险公司紧密合作,加大巨灾险种的引进创新,利用好再保险和巨灾保险基金等多样化风险转移工具,尽快构建巨灾保险体系,才能有效保障中国经济继续保持又好又快增长。     

大数据信贷的“第三条道路”*

目前，我国开展大数据信贷创新业务的主体主要有两大类：互联网公司和传统商业银行。互联网公司主要依赖自身电商平台或社交平台所积累的海量数据来获取用户信息。传统商业银行则利用自有账户或政府平台开放的数据信息自行搭建大数据平台，或通过与现有电商平台进行合作获取数据。但两种模式都存在一个共同的问题——可推广性较差。本文基于对中国最大的三家互联网银行——微众银行、网商银行和新网银行的一手调研资料，探索既不依靠自有互联网商业生态系统的数据，又不完全依赖自有账户或政府平台数据，适用于中小型商业银行的大数据信贷“第三条道路”。     

HOW DO STATE INFERTILITY INSURANCE MANDATES AFFECT DIVORCE?

The technological developments in infertility treatments have increased the success of childbearing among women with impaired fertility. Fifteen U.S. states have mandated insurance coverage of assisted reproductive technology, thus subsidizing and increasing the use of the technology. We exploit the variation of mandates across states and over time to examine the relationship between state mandates and the likelihood of divorce. Using individual‐level data from the 1984–2008 Survey of Income and Program Participation, we find that women are less likely to divorce after the state adopts infertility insurance mandates. We find the effect is larger among women in their 40s, covered by private insurance, with a college degree, and without children. (JEL J12, J13, J18, I13, I18)     

环境保险是商业银行管理不确定性较高的环境风险的有效手段

环境保险是商业银行转嫁项目融资中不确定性程度较高的环境风险的重要手段,是各国环境立法不断强化商业银行环境责任背景下商业银行环境风险管理的重要内容。同时,环境保险也对商业银行加强环境风险管理发挥着重要的监督和促进作用。我国环境立法的日趋完善对商业银行贷款的环境风险管理提出了更高的要求,特别是在国际项目融资业务方面,面对的环境风险将更为复杂。为了提高国际竞争力,我国商业银行要积极借鉴国际经验,运用环境保险合理转嫁和规避环境风险,提高环境风险管理水平。     

商业银行保增长与有效防范风险论析

全球金融危机对实体经济的影响超出预期，而实体经济的下滑过程也是银行信贷风险的暴露过程。在当前应对金融危机、支持经济健康发展的大形势下，保增长是政府、企业和银行的共同责任，需要各方面共同努力．以降低经济下滑带来的系统性风险。商业银行如何切实承担起自身的社会责任，既促进经济发展又有效控制风险，也成为当前面临的重大挑战。     

An empirical note on the impact of federal deposit insurance on bank failures in the U.S.

This study empirically examines the impact of federal deposit insurance coverage on the failure rate of commercial banks in the U.S. over the 1963–91 period. The analysis allows for the potential bank failure rate impact of the growth rate of real GDP, the real prime lending rate, the real cost of funds, and the commercial bank tangible capital-to-asset ratio, while measuring federal deposit insurance coverage as the percentage of deposits at federally insured banks that was covered by federal deposit insurance. The instrumental variables' estimates indicate that the greater the extent of federal deposit insurance coverage, the higher the bank failure rate.     

Asset bubbles,banking stability and economic growth

This paper examines the relationships between the asset bubble and the banking stability from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that the moral hazard caused by the deposit insurance and limited liability might facilitate the banks to hold bubble assets for the purpose of risk premium. Meanwhile the supervisory intensity, leverage ratio and credit spread provide the conditions for banks to hold bubble assets through their effects on risk premium. Once the banks hold the bubble assets, their stability will deteriorate because of four types of effects, namely internal leverage, cash withdrawal, credit friction and network effects. This paper also utilizes the BMA-PVAR model to test the theoretical findings by employing the data from 26 representative economies for a period between 2000 and 2014. The empirical evidences are consistent with the theoretical findings that the equity bubbles will lower the banking stability. The empirical evidences also suggest that the banking instability will be detrimental to the economic growth.     

商业银行监管的国际比较:模式及影响——兼论中国的商业银行监管模式选择

本文系统研究了世界上 1 1 8个国家 (地区 )的商业银行监管模式及其对金融发展水平的影响。基于以下四种维度的不同组合 :1 )政府拥有银行的程度 ;2 )政府直接监管银行的力度 ;3 )政府授权非政府机构进行监管的力度 ;4)明确的存款保险制度涵盖范围 ,我们把世界各国 (地区 )的商业银行监管模式划分为三大类 :1 )印度 -中国型 ;2 )南非-菲律宾 -墨西哥型 ;3 )德国 -美国 -瑞士 -法国型。比较不同的监管模式 ,在促进金融业发展方面 ,德国 -美国 -瑞士 -法国型的监管模式最佳 ,南非 -菲律宾 -墨西哥型次之 ,而印度 -中国型最差。比较中国的商业银行监管模式与世界平均水平以及德国和美国的差异 ,结果显示了中国过多的对政府拥有银行和直接的事先监管的依赖。     

构建我国地震巨灾保险体系的思考

我国南方的罕见雪灾及四川汶川的地震等巨灾的发生,警示我们建立地震等巨灾风险保险体系是当务之急。通过对日本地震巨灾保险体系的研究,提出我国应从国家财政支持及政府积极参与、保险公司积极开发保险产品和提高经营策略、发展资本市场以实行巨灾债券证券化等三个方面建立我国地震等巨灾风险保险体系。     

BANK CAPITAL FORBEARANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY

Recently, the bank regulatory agencies have adopted capital forbearance programs to permit some troubled agriculture and energy banks to operate temporarily with capital levels below the regulatory minimum requirement. In a world with federal deposit insurance and a lender of last resort, bank capital is no longer viewed by all depositors as the primary protector of their funds. Thus, they reduce their market discipline. Bank owners/ managers are likely to respond by increasing their risk exposure in an attempt to regain profitability. If they win, they keep all the gains; if they lose, the losses are passed on to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). A preferred policy is to require these banks to raise additional capital at this time or to be sold. Capital forbearance is forbearance of incumbent bank management/owners, not of bank customers.     

The Effects of Competition on Banks’ Risk Taking

We consider the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on risk taking by banks when bank risk is unobservable to depositors. It turns out that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the structure and side of the market in which competition takes place. If the bank is a monopoly or banks are competing only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking. Banks in this situation tend to take risk, although extreme risk taking is avoided. In contrast, introducing deposit insurance increases risk taking if banks are competing for deposits. Then, deposit rates become excessively high, thereby forcing banks to take extreme risks.     

我国农业保险信息不对称问题研究

农业保险是现代农业发展的有力保障,也是强农惠农的重要政策之一,但信息不对称问题严重阻碍了我国农业保险的发展。研究发现,投保农户与保险公司的逆选择、心里风险和道德风险是农业保险信息不对称的主要表现形式,而农业生产的特殊性、农业风险的多样化,以及农业保险的利益外溢性和我国农民保险知识匮乏、诚信意识较差等等是导致我国农业保险信息不对称问题产生的主要原因。因此,本文提出建立适合我国国情的农业保险经营模式,积极发展由政府支持、商业保险公司参与的农业保险合作社模式经营农业保险;并根据农业保险信息不对称的不同表现形式,建立相应的博弈模型从而优化保单设计、制定合理价格策略;最后,加大科技投入建立信息甄别机制和险情评估系统、宣传农业保险以及建立农业保险监管体系等也是防范信息不对称的重要举措。     

Are private banks more efficient than public banks?

We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and, surprisingly, that domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the bank's environment, management's risk preferences, the bank's activity mix or size, the econometric approach, or the introduction of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization.