Money,price dispersion and welfare

Summary. We introduce heterogeneous preferences into a tractable model of monetary search to generate price dispersion, and then examine the effects of money growth on price dispersion and welfare. With buyers search intensity fixed, we find that money growth increases the range of (real) prices and lowers welfare as agents shift more of their consumption to less desirable goods. When buyers search intensity is endogenous, multiple equilibria are possible. In the equilibrium with the highest welfare level, money growth reduces welfare and increases the range of prices, while having ambiguous effects on search intensity. However, there can be a welfare-inferior equilibrium in which an increase in money growth increases search intensity, increases welfare, and reduces the range of prices.Received: 25 July 2003, Revised: 12 December 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E31, D60.B. Peterson, S. Shi: We thank Gabriele Camera, Aleksander Berentsen and an anonymous referee for useful suggestions. We have also received valuable comments from the participants of the workshop at Michigan State, the Purdue Conference on Monetary Theory (2003) and the Midwest Macro Meeting (Chicago, 2003). Shi gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Bank of Canada Fellowship and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The opinion expressed here is the authors own and does not reflect the view of the Bank of Canada.Correspondence to: S. Shi     

Geographic price dispersion in retail markets: Evidence from micro-data

Using an extensive micro-price data of 266 retail goods and services across US, EU and OECD cities between 1990 and 2005, we study characteristics of geographic dispersion of deviations from the Law of One Price. We find that the magnitude of price dispersion is a function of the characteristics of both the type of good and set of locations under examination. Higher share of non-traded inputs and lower tradability of goods are both found to contribute to geographic price dispersion, with the former typically dominating in explanatory power. The role of tradability of good in accounting for the price dispersion is more significant as we move beyond an economic geography, while non-traded input level matters relatively more if we move to the interior of this geography. Our evidence suggests that the models of real exchange rates should incorporate the classical distinction between traded inputs and local inputs as well as a role for relative markups and traditional trade costs.     

参考价格影响下的两阶段回报型众筹定价策略研究

在众筹发起过程中,策略型消费者将对比众筹价格与零售价格,选择最优购买时机。基于此背景,构建了参考价格效应影响下的两阶段众筹定价模型,设计了众筹发起人的两阶段动态定价策略。发起人根据消费者的耐心程度和参考价格效应强度,选择是否公布零售价格,以及溢价或降价销售。利用理性预期均衡理论和逆向归纳法,得到了发起人与消费者博弈的均衡价格和最优发起策略。结论表明,发起人的策略选择并非单一的,同时受到消费者耐心程度和参考价格效应强度的影响。为众筹发起人的两阶段价格决策提供了理论参考和管理学建议。     

Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities

Summary. The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play. Received: October 16, 2000; revised version: March 7, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am very grateful to Robert Anderson, David Blackwell, Aaron Edlin, Peter De Marzo, Ted O'Donoghue, Matthew Rabin, Ilya Segal, Chris Shannon, Clara Wang and Federico Weinschelbaum for comments and advise.     

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.     

The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

Summary. I prove that the equilibrium set in a two-player game with complementarities, and totally ordered strategy spaces, is a sublattice of the joint strategy space. Received: May 31, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002     

Price discrimination and price dispersion in a duopoly

This paper analyses the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences both over a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). Discriminatory contracts are characterized for different market structures. It is shown that price dispersion, i.e. the observed range of prices for each class of customers, increases almost everywhere as competition is introduced in the market.     

劳动力市场搜寻与匹配理论——2010年诺贝尔经济学奖得主的重要贡献

彼得.戴蒙德、戴尔.莫滕森和克里斯托弗.皮萨里德斯三人因在劳动力市场搜寻与匹配理论及其应用的突出贡献,共同获得2010年诺贝尔经济学奖。其中,戴蒙德通过提出著名的戴蒙德悖论,开创了劳动力市场搜寻与匹配理论框架;在此基础上,莫滕森认为,建立工资公告等匹配机制有助于劳动力市场博弈实现均衡,从而拓展了摩擦性失业相关理论研究;而皮萨里德斯则通过推动匹配函数与工资议价等的确立,进一步完成了劳动力市场搜寻与匹配理论的系统化过程。借鉴该理论,中国劳动力市场应做出提高信息传播效率、提高农村的信息水平、政府制定针对性相关政策等改进。     

Choice, price competition and complexity in markets for health insurance

The United States and other nations rely on consumer choice and price competition between competing health plans to allocate resources in the health sector. While a great deal of research has examined the efficiency consequences of adverse selection in health insurance markets, less attention has been devoted to other aspects of consumer choice. The nation of Switzerland offers a unique opportunity to study price competition in health insurance markets. Switzerland regulates health insurance markets with the aim of minimizing adverse selection and encouraging strong price competition. We examine consumer responses to price differences in local markets and the degree of price variation in local markets. Using both survey data and observations on local markets we obtain evidence suggesting that as the number of choices offered to individuals grows, their willingness to switch plans given a set of price dispersion differences declines, which allows large price differences for relatively homogeneous products to persist. We consider explanations for this phenomenon from economics and psychology.     

我国战略性新兴产业发展基础与支撑体系构建研究

通过分析战略性新兴产业的基本内涵与特征,认为战略性新兴产业的形成和发展有其内在的产业和技术成长规律,需要具备一定的产业和技术基础和较为完善的支撑体系。在剖析我国战略性新兴产业发展基础及其面临主要问题的基础上,按照钻石理论模型对产业竞争优势的要求,在整合各大要素优势的基础上,从产业体系、政策扶持、服务平台3个层面构建和完善我国战略性新兴产业发展支撑体系,以促进我国战略性新兴产业稳健发展,抢占未来全球产业和技术发展的制高点。     

跨界双元搜索对双元创新绩效的影响——知识合作链与战略柔性整合视角

跨界搜索能够完善企业知识储备,驱动企业创新发展。基于开放式创新理论、知识管理理论及动态能力理论,将知识合作链与战略柔性纳入跨界合作研究框架,构建并实证检验一个被调节的中介效应模型。结果表明：技术知识搜索对突破式创新绩效具有显著正向影响,市场知识搜索对渐进式创新绩效具有显著正向影响;企业跨界双元搜索显著正向影响知识合作链;知识融合、知识转化在跨界双元搜索与双元创新绩效之间具有显著链式中介作用;战略柔性正向调节双元搜索与知识合作链之间的关系。结论揭示了跨界双元搜索对双元创新绩效的作用机理,能够为企业突破跨界合作困境,促进知识交流,提高创新绩效提供理论指导。