An Equitable Trust in The Building Industry in 1794

Japanese manufacturing in the developed regions of Europe and North America has been strongly associated with the more competitive sectors of Japan's high growth economy, such as consumer electronics, semi-conductors and transport equipment. During the earliest years of Japanese productive investment in Europe, however, a significant number of projects from Japan's less competitive chemicals sector were being established. These projects, together with those from other chemicals-related sectors of Japan's domestic industry, will be shown to have emerged in response to the widespread concern over environmental and pollution issues which dominated public affairs in Japan during the decade after 1965.     

Japan's Growing Outward Direct Investment in East Asia

Japan's outward direct investment (ODI) began to show an obvious expansion since 2005, accompanied by a greater importance in East Asia and in the manufacturing sector. By analyzing the new wave of Japanese ODI, three points are elaborated in this article. First, the recent Japanese ODI did not result in the same industry to be passed from one country to another as elucidated in the flying geese model. Instead, Japan's ODI only promoted the regional divisional of labor in the transport equipment and electrical machinery industries. Second, this study advances the theory of vertical production network by exploring two regional production networks constructed by Japanese ODI, including one between China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and the other between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Finally, since Japan's economy has been tightly connected with foreign demand via overseas production, this article argues that any sign of Japan's declining ODI will have serious impact to its domestic economic prosperity. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Trends in the growth of Japanese international banking in Western Europe

Changes in Japan's domestic economy and the emergence of stronger trade and investment links between Japan and the world economy have created substantial pressures for her banks and other financial institutions to expand overseas. The following article examines trends in Japanese international banking since the beginning of the 1970s and, in particular, the growing presence of Japanese banks in Western Europe.     

Successes and dangers of Japanese foreign trade strategy

Japan's high and increasing trade and current account surpluses have aroused in the other industrialized nations a growing fear of Far Eastern competition. Some countries consider that protectionist measures are the only suitable response to increasing imports from Japan. Japan's “unfair” conduct of its foreign trade is often cited as a reason for such a reaction. Is this reproach justified? What can be done to avert the dangers to both Japan's foreign trade and the world economy caused by this situation?     

The Foreign Exchange Origins of Japan's Economic Slump and Low Interest Liquidity Trap

Japan's macroeconomic problem has yet to be properly diagnosed. Throughout the 1990s, policy makers could not decide on the proper macro economic measures to combat the country's severe economic slump. We propose a unified explanation, with deep historical roots, of why aggregate private demand failed to recover after Japan's stock and real estate bubbles burst in 1991 and deflationary pressure continues. The problem is not purely ‘made in Japan’. It arises from Japan's unbalanced mercantile relationship with the United States. Starting in the early 1970s, numerous trade disputes between the two countries created tensions that were (temporarily) resolved by the yen going ever higher against the dollar up to 1995. In the last two decades, this persistent pressure for the yen to rise was further aggravated by Japan's large current‐account (saving) surpluses as the counterpart of America's large current account (saving) deficits. The legacy is the expectation that trade and financial tensions will recur so that the yen will be higher 10, 20, or 30 years from now –with Japan's (wholesale) price level forced correspondingly lower and nominal interest rates on yen assets remaining more than four percentage points less than those on dollar assets. This fear of yen appreciation, whose timing is erratic and unpredictable, now inhibits private domestic investment by both Japanese firms and households. Our theory also explains why, in the late 1990s, nominal interest rates on short‐term yen assets were compressed toward zero so as to destroy the normal profit margins of the banking system. In this liquidity trap, the Bank of Japan –whose monetary policy has been quite ‘expansionary’–is powerless to stimulate the flagging economy. To spring the liquidity trap, eliminate deflationary pressure, and restore macro economic balance in Japan, the American and Japanese governments must act jointly to quash the expectation that the yen will be higher in the future than it is today.     

Japanese managerial and organizational learning

The article describes how the external forces of Japanese culture, industrial organization, and government intervention support managerial and organizational learning. It provides an overview of the culturally explicit philosophies that govern and stimulate learning in Japan, then explains how these philosophies are exhibited in Japanese management practice today. A model is presented which demonstrates the relationships among external forces, philosophical origins, management practice, and managerial and organizational learning. The conclusion is that managerial and organizational learning constitute one of Japan's most valuable competitive advantages. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Industry Structure as a Competitive Advantage: The History of Japan's Post-war Steel Industry

This article examines the role of the Japanese government in the development of Japan's post-war steel industry. It argues that the Japanese government's industrial policies facilitated the rapid growth and success of Japanese steel companies in the world market. During the early post-war years, the government instituted a set of comprehensive policies which constrained the supply of steel in Japan's market and contributed to the development of large-scale plants and the full exploitation of the economies of scale in steel manufacturing. The Japanese steel industry's sizable cost advantage, of course, derived from more than government policies alone. But, as this article will argue, through the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Japanese government used its power to exploit the economics of capital-intensive industries and accelerate the formation of an efficient steel oligopoly in Japan.     

New business entrepreneurship in the Japanese economy

This article presents the results of a study focused on the role of new business entrepreneurship in the Japanese economy. Particular attention is paid to the activities of various government agencies in relation to new business entrepreneurship and to the barriers to this activity in Japan. New business entrepreneurship was defined as the formation and rapid growth of a business enterprise through unique approaches to the firm's activities.In contrast to the American stereotype of Japan as an economy of a few large, interconnected firms, it is, in fact, characterized by small- and medium-sized enterprises. Over 99% of all Japanese enterprises are categorized as small or medium and over 80% of all employed Japanese are employed by such firms. However, very few of these firms are entrepreneurial in nature. The vast majority are small firms that are either subcontractors to a single larger firm or small retail, wholesale, or restaurant establishments.The start-up rate for all types of businesses in Japan has been declining for the past 10 to 15 years. More importantly, the rate of start-up s for independent firms, as opposed to firms started by a larger firm to serve primarily as a subcontractor, declined even more sharply. This indicates a significant weakness in Japan's otherwise strong economy.The low and declining rate of new business entrepreneurship in Japan is a function of structural, governmental, and cultural barriers. Structural barriers include an acute, long-term labor shortage, high financial start-up costs due in large part to high land prices, and a shortage of venture capital funding. Government barriers include “red tape,” financial and other support for small firms that is withdrawn as they enter rapid growth, and the persistent protection of inefficient industry structures. Cultural barriers involve Japan's strong group/collective orientation, the traditional career path in Japan, bounds on creativity, and the fact that entrepreneurship is not assigned a high social value.While the government provides an extensive, well-developed network of services for small- and medium-sized firms, these programs are not designed to facilitate rapid growth into the large firm phase. The Japanese experiences and programs offer useful insights for policy and tactics by other governments.     

ASEAN's role in Japan's economic policy in East Asia

Although Japan's economic and trade policy with the United States and Europe has been widely researched in such works as Tyson (1992), relatively less research has been done on Japan's recent trade and economic policies towards other East Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan. Since the mid-1980s, because of rising labor costs and appreciation of the Japanese yen, Japan has increased manufacturing production in ASEAN countries such as Thailand and Malaysia. The purpose of this short article is to discuss Japan's increased economic focus in Asia, and implications for East Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Can the Japanese Economy Rebound?

The Japanese economy has begun to show signs of recovery from its deepest post WWII recession. Although it is generally acknowledged that the recovery is not based on solid foundations, there is elation within Japan regarding the prospects for renewed economic growth. Yet little or no attention seems to be paid to what is happening to Japanese technological innovation, the engine that drives growth. The article shows that the impressive technological excellence of the famed Japanese companies is simultaneously accompanied by a decline in overall Japanese technological innovation. This is attributed to the dual nature of the Japanese economy, where super‐strong exporting industries co‐exist with super‐weak domestic sectors, and to Japan's adherence to outdated perceptions and policies. However, the potential for recovery is within reach: galvanise the backward leg of the dual economy and healthy growth would ensue; restore confidence in the healthy leg and things would be better still; add to this a recipe for responsible macroeconomic management and the prospects would be rosier.     

The ‘miracle’ of car ownership in Japan's ‘Era of High Growth’, 1955–73

The ‘Era of High Growth’ in Japan is well known for its ‘miracle’ economy, although the reasons why car ownership increased during this period have been largely ignored. Both the ‘miracle’ and the process of motor manufacturing have been viewed from the perspective of supply rather than demand. This article examines the ways in which the formidable barriers to mass car ownership were removed during this period by analysing quantitative data and also reconsidering narratives of Japanese manufacturing predicated on Japanese cultural uniqueness (nihonjinron). It considers the Japanese as consumers as well as workers, and concludes that car ownership is less a ‘miracle’ than a manifestation of Japan's process of modernisation during the twentieth century.     

Japan's Role in China's Economic Transformation Since 1978

Since the initiation of the open door policy in 1978, the Chinese leaders have sought trade with and investment from advanced countries, including Japan, which has been a major trading partner since the 1960s. Much of Japan's investment to date, however, has been indirect, through govern ment loans for sectors like infrastructure. Major Japanese manufacturers are just beginning to invest heavily in China. In their relationship with China, the Japanese have the advantage of shared cultural heritage, geographical proximity and economic complementarity. In addition, in order to effect the transition from a command to a market economy, the Chinese have sought to follow, where appropriate, Japanese practices in such areas as enterprise reform, taxation and the training of managers. Japanese investors are encouraged by low labour costs and a growing Chinese domestic market but inhibited by such factors as low skill levels and poor infrastructure. Finally, China and Japan are set to become major players in the Asia-Pacific region, whether in competition or cooperation.     

Japanese multinationals in the post-bubble era: new challenges and evolving capabilities

Since the bursting of Japan's bubble economy, from 1990 onwards, Japanese multinational companies (MNCs) have faced new competitive challenges and questions about the management practices on which they had built their initial success in global markets. Japanese engagement in the international economy has undergone a number of phases. In the period before the Second World War, Japanese companies learnt from foreign MNCs in trading, shipping, and manufacturing, frequently through strategic alliances, and leveraged their capabilities to succeed in overseas and largely Asian markets. In the immediate post-war decades, during the Japanese ‘economic miracle’, there were notable examples of MNC investment in raw materials and labour intensive production, but both inward and outward foreign direct investment were not significant. Japanese companies achieved leadership in management and technology, in order to support a strategy of export-orientated industrialization. Changes in government policies in the developed economies of the US and Western Europe forced leading Japanese manufacturers to convert themselves into MNCs and to transfer their home-grown capabilities to overseas subsidiaries. The period after 1990 marked declining Japanese competitiveness and it asked questions about the ability of Japanese MNCs to be more responsive and global in their strategies, organization and capabilities.     

The Bubble and the Lost Decade

In this overview of the Symposium papers, we note that the bubble that occurred in Japan's asset markets in the late 1980s came at a time when the conventional indicators of Japan's economic performance were relatively stable. Following the collapse of the bubble, neither the Bank of Japan (BOJ) nor the Ministry of Finance (MOF) took timely and effective measures to deal with the recession that followed. While the evidence suggests that looser fiscal policy would have been ineffective, monetary policy measures might have worked. However, the BOJ followed a relatively tight monetary policy in 1991–93. In the face of the liquidity trap that ensued in the last of the 1990s, the conventional tools of stabilisation policy appeared to be of limited use. To help the Japanese economy to recover from the ‘lost decade,’ we thus discuss a number of unconventional and bold measures that the BOJ and MOF could pursue. It appears, however, that the political will is absent to undertake such measures. So long as this is the case, the effects of the lost decade will continue to act as a drag on the economy.     

Export Dynamics,Strategies and Performance within Japan's Machine-Tool Industry

Despite increased global market competition, Japan remains a leading producer of metal-cutting machinery. Exporting plays an important role in firm-level strategies, an approach that has occurred with much success in many of Japan's capital goods sectors. This article examines the dynamics of exporting within Japan's machine-tool sector in the context of recent industry changes and in terms of evolving product make-up. Evidence from a recent series of interviews mainly conducted in 2006 suggests that firms use a variety of strategies to succeed in export markets, with an emphasis on increased precision and service. These strategies continue to keep many Japanese producers in prominent market positions, despite spatial redistributions of world manufacturing activities.     

The road from Nissan to Samsung: a historical overview of East Asian investment in a UK region

Japan's relationship with the North East of England is often charted from the 1984 investment by the car manufacturer, Nissan, in its Sunderland plant. The aftermath of that investment decision saw not only a wave of Japanese manufacturing investment descending upon the North East but also other investments from Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong following in its wake. This article attempts to situate the experience of Japanese investment in the North East in the wider context of the region's more long-term associations with Japan. It looks to the legacy of the past in the building of Japanese battleships on Tyneside and other episodes of technology transfer in the late nineteenth century. It juxtaposes the subsequent changes in the region's industrial base with the post-war history of Japanese investment in the UK. With the arrival of NSK, the Japanese ball-bearings manufacturer, in County Durham in 1974, a new relationship can be seen to have emerged along with a regional infrastructure which supported further East Asian investment at the height of the bubble economy. The spreading out of that investment, its social and cultural impact and the consequences of the bubble bursting are explored at a time when claims for the dawning of ‘the Pacific century’ have been seriously called into question.     

Japan's concessions towards trade fairness: Mistaken western views

It is now acknowledged even by US officials that Japan's recent efforts to liberalize trade have been remarkable. Our author, who has recently published a book on “Japan's Options for the 1980s”, argues that the continuing EEC complaints about Japan's behaviour as a trading partner are unjustified: Japan is simply being made a scapegoat for the EEC's own failures.     

Restructuring Japanese business through Kyosei: Capitalizing on international strategic alliances at the consumer level

Japan of the post-bubble era is the object of much reflection and speculation pertaining to risutora or restructuring of the economy. This study provides a novel, analytical perspective on the fundamental issues involved in the shift of momentum that characterizes Japanese business and economic restructuring. After examining the economic and corporate dimensions of the transitional forces that shape Japan's restructuring process, this study focuses on two powerful, yet often ignored, agents of change: the emergence of a new class of collaborative mandates, kyosei, and the rise of consumer power. The study further emphasizes the importance of planning and managing corporate-level restructuring activities with the interests of end users in mind, by empirically demonstrating the significance of strategic alliances, as a corporate restructuring option, on consumers. The results show that consumers' impression of alliances with Japanese firms have a strong effect on future attitudes toward each partnering brand. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Collective Myopia and Defective Higher Educations Behind the Scenes of Ethically Bankrupted Economic Systems: A Reflexive Note from a Japanese University and Taking a Step Toward Transcultural Dialogues

This study focused on the indirect influences of defective higher education, especially management education, on the corruption of Japanese business communities since 1997. Most arrested or penalized Japanese executives and bureaucrats since 1997 were the alumni of prestigious Japanese universities. Their levels of academic achievements are, consequently, conceived to be the highest of Japanese standards. They were, however, found guilty. Why did these highly intelligent Japanese adults make such fatal mistakes? In this article, the author argued that the event of the continuous exposure of scandals and corruptions in Japan since 1997 was an unintended consequence of Japan's educational systems through Habermasian and Foucaultian positions.     

The Evolution of Japan's Aggressive Legalism

Japan's recent trade policy is sometimes characterised as ‘aggressive legalism’ in the sense that it aggressively utilises the multilateral trade rules embodied in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation in dealing with disputes with its trade partners. This policy may appear to be a marked departure from Japan's past practice of favouring bilateral, non‐legal settlement of trade disputes. Upon closer examination, however, while Japan has been moderately active in using the WTO dispute settlement process for resolving its trade disputes, it behaves more like a country that resorts to surgical strikes on selected targets (usually the United States) under a powerful cover of the European Community. Compared to Japan, Korea's attitude in the WTO is more aggressive. While the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is not content with the status quo and is seeking to expand its aggressiveness in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it faces an uphill battle. One of the difficulties facing trade officials in Japan may be the lack of a national system for lodging WTO complaints, open to any citizens or firms, like Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 or the European Trade Barriers Regulation. Nonetheless, in the historical context, Japan is far more aggressive than in the past in utilising the rules of the GATT/WTO to advance its national interests. It will never revert to the infamous practice of bilateralism and grey area measures.