Management forecasts and the cost of equity capital: international evidence

We examine international differences in the effect of management forecasts (which we use to proxy for voluntary disclosure) on the cost of equity capital (COC) across 31 countries. We find that the issuance of management forecasts is associated with a lower COC worldwide but that the effect of management forecasts on the COC depends on country-level institutional factors. Specifically, management forecasts have a stronger effect on the COC in countries with stronger investor protection and better information dissemination and a weaker effect in countries with higher mandatory disclosure requirements. Further analyses reveal that these relations are more pronounced when management forecasts are more frequent, more precise, and more disaggregated. Overall, our findings suggest that the ability of management forecasts to reduce firms’ COC derives not only from country-level factors that enhance the credibility of their forecasts but also from factors that reflect the quality of the information environment in terms of the distribution of news and the availability and quality of alternative information. Thus, investor protection, media penetration, and mandatory disclosure requirements have an important effect on the ability of management forecasts to lower the COC.     

Labor protection,ownership concentration,and cost of equity capital: international evidence

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - In this study, we investigate how labor protection institutions and the presence of controlling shareholders interact to determine a firm’s...     

Corporate governance,SFAS 157 and cost of equity capital: evidence from US financial institutions

This study examines the association between fair value measurements and the cost of equity capital under different fair value valuation methods, and assesses the impact of corporate governance on this relationship for US financial firms. We find that firms’ cost of equity capital is negatively associated with more verifiable fair value assets and positively related to less verifiable fair value assets. Furthermore, the positive association between less verifiable fair value assets and the cost of equity capital is mitigated under better corporate governance. The differential impact between more and less verifiable assets becomes smaller for firms with stronger governance. Our findings contribute to the ongoing debate on fair value regulation by investigating the economic consequences of adopting Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (SFAS 157) and the importance of audit committee financial expertise on fair value reporting. We also provide evidence on the importance of board independence, internal control strength, auditor industry specialists, and audit committee financial experts in fair value reporting.     

Carbon disclosure,emission intensity and cost of equity capital: multi-country evidence

This study examines the joint effect of carbon disclosure and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on firms’ implied cost of equity capital (COC). Based on 4655 firm-year observations across 34 countries, we find firms’ GHG emission intensity to be positively associated with COC. However, we find also that the penalty linked with higher COC is moderated by extensive carbon disclosure. We provide evidence that the extent of carbon disclosure helps reduce the premium required by investors to compensate for poor carbon performance. Our study provides insights to policymakers, investors and managers on the combined effect of carbon disclosure, and emission intensity.     

Disappointment aversion and the equity premium puzzle: new international evidence

Drawing upon the seminal study of Ang, Bekaert, and Liu [2005. “Why Stock May Disappoint?” Journal of Financial Economics 76 (3): 471–508], we incorporate disappointment aversion (DA, that is, aversion to outcomes that are worse than prior expectations) within a simple theoretical portfolio-choice model. Based on the results of this model, we then empirically address the portfolio allocation problem of an investor who chooses between a risky and a risk-free asset using international data from 19 countries. Our findings strongly support the view that DA leads investors to reduce their exposure to the stock market (i.e. DA significantly depresses the portfolio weights on equities in all cases considered). Overall, our study shows that in addition to risk aversion, DA plays an important role in explaining the equity premium puzzle around the world.     

Home bias in equity portfolios, inflation hedging, and international capital market equilibrium

We test whether the home bias in equity portfolios is causedby investors trying to hedge inflation risk. The empirical evidenceis consistent with this motive only if investors have very highlevels of risk tolerance and equity returns are negatively correlatedwith domestic inflation. We then develop a model of internationalportfolio choice and equity market equilibrium that integratesinflation risk and deadweight costs. Using this model we estimatethe levels of costs required to generate the observed home biasin portfolios consistent with different levels of risk aversion.For a level of risk aversion consistent with standard estimatesof the domestic equity market risk premium these costs are abouta few percent per annum greater than observable costs such aswithholding taxes. Thus, the home bias cannot be explained byeither inflation hedging or direct observable costs of internationalinvestment unless investors have very low levels of risk aversion.     

Concentrated control,institutions, and banking sector: An international study

Using a broad sample of listed commercial banks in East Asia and Western Europe, this paper investigates the relations among concentrated control, a set of bank operating characteristics, and legal and regulatory regimes. We find that banks with concentrated control exhibit poorer performance, lower cost efficiency, greater return volatility, and higher insolvency risk, relative to widely held ones. We also document that legal institutions and private monitoring effectively reduce the detrimental effects of concentrated control and that official disciplinary power plays a weak governance role, whereas government intervention exacerbates the adverse effects. Further evidence shows that the relations between control concentration and bank operating characteristics are curvilinear and vary according to the types of controlling owners. Overall, our findings support the contention that country-level institutions play important roles in constraining insider expropriation, and that private monitoring mechanisms are more effective than are public rules and supervision in governing banks.     

Foreign equity investment restrictions, capital flight, and shareholder wealth maximization: theory and evidence

This article provides a theory of foreign equity investmentrestrictions. We consider a model where the demand functionfor domestic shares differs between domestic and foreign investorsbecause of deadweight costs in holding domestic and foreignsecurities that depend on the country of residence of investors.We show that domestic entrepreneurs maximize firm value by discriminatingbetween domestic and foreign investors. The model implies thatcountries benefiting from capital flight have binding ownershiprestrictions such that foreign investors pay a higher pricefor shares than domestic investors. The empirical implicationsof this theory are supported by evidence from Switzerland.     

CAPM for estimating the cost of equity capital: Interpreting the empirical evidence

We argue that the empirical evidence against the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) based on stock returns does not invalidate its use for estimating the cost of capital for projects in making capital budgeting decisions. Because stocks are backed not only by projects in place, but also by the options to modify current projects and undertake new ones, the expected returns on stocks need not satisfy the CAPM even when expected returns of projects do. We provide empirical support for our arguments by developing a method for estimating firms' project CAPM betas and project returns. Our findings justify the continued use of the CAPM by firms in spite of the mounting evidence against it based on the cross section of stock returns.     

Industry cost of equity capital: European evidence for multifactor models

We estimate the costs of equity capital for 117 industries from 16 European countries employing the CAPM and 8 multifactor asset pricing models as well as a variety of different econometric techniques. In doing so, we extend previous research on cost of equity estimation in mainly two ways. First, our study involves European instead of US or UK industries, which are investigated in previous research, and we find that cost of equity estimates obtained from the CAPM or multifactor asset pricing models are as imprecise for European industries as for US and UK industries. Second, in addition to the CAPM, the Fama and French [1993 Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 1993. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(93)90023-5[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56] three-factor model, and the Carhart [1997 Carhart, Mark M. 1997. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance.” The Journal of Finance 52 (1): 57–82. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance.” The Journal of Finance 52 (1): 57–82] four-factor model, which are usually employed, our study includes six multifactor models that have not yet been examined on their ability to provide precise estimates of the costs of equity: the five-factor model of Fama and French [1993 Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 1993. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(93)90023-5[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56] as well as the multifactor models of Pástor and Stambaugh [2003 Pástor, Lubos, and Robert F. Stambaugh. 2003. “Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns.” Journal of Political Economy 111 (3): 642–685. doi: 10.1086/374184[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns.” Journal of Political Economy 111 (3): 642–685]; Campbell and Vuolteenaho [2004 Campbell, John Y., and Tuomo Vuolteenaho. 2004. “Bad Beta, Good Beta.” American Economic Review 94 (5): 1249–1275. doi: 10.1257/0002828043052240[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Bad Beta, Good Beta.” American Economic Review 94 (5): 1249–1275]; Hahn and Lee [2006 Hahn, Jaehoon, and Hangyong Lee. 2006. “Yield Spreads as Alternative Risk Factors for Size and Book-To-Market.” Journal of Financial &; Quantitative Analysis 41 (2): 245–269. doi: 10.1017/S0022109000002052[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Yield Spreads as Alternative Risk Factors for Size and Book-To-Market.” Journal of Financial &; Quantitative Analysis 41 (2): 245–269]; Petkova [2006 Petkova, Ralitsa. 2006. “Do the Fama–French Factors Proxy for Innovations in Predictive Variables?” The Journal of Finance 61 (2): 581–612. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00849.x[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Do the Fama–French Factors Proxy for Innovations in Predictive Variables?” The Journal of Finance 61 (2): 581–612]; and Koijen, Lustig, and van Nieuwerburgh [2010 Koijen, Ralph S., Hanno N. Lustig, and Stijn G. van Nieuwerburgh. 2010. “The Cross-Section and Time-Series of Stock and Bond Returns.” Working Paper, University of Chicago, University of California at Los Angeles, New York University. [Google Scholar]. “The Cross-Section and Time-Series of Stock and Bond Returns.” Working Paper, University of Chicago, University of California at Los Angeles, New York University]. Our results suggest that these models provide even more imprecise cost of equity estimates. One main reason for these inaccurate estimates is the large temporal variation of the risk loadings on the non-traded factors in these models.     

The international effect of managerial social capital on the cost of equity

We examine the effect of managerial social capital on the firm's cost of equity capital. We argue that social ties alleviate information asymmetry and agency problems, which in turn leads to a decrease in the cost of equity. Using a large panel of companies from 52 countries over the period 1999–2012, we document that social capital inversely affects the cost of equity. Our evidence suggests that the association between social capital and the cost of equity capital is stronger in underdeveloped financial markets and those characterized by weak legal protection. The marginal effect of social capital is also stronger for constrained firms with profitable investment opportunities. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and tests for endogeneity.     

Political institutions,stock market liquidity and firm dividend policy: Some international evidence

In this cross-country study, we draw on the dividend liquidity hypothesis and the political economy literature to examine whether political institutions affect the relationship between stock market liquidity and a firm’s dividend policy. In countries with weak political institutions, we expect that investors are less able to demand higher dividends for stocks with low liquidity. Using a sample of 52 countries, we show that the negative association between stock market liquidity and dividends is more pronounced in countries with sound political institutions, consistent with the “outcome” model of dividends. These results are stronger in countries with better legal institutions and weaker for firms with financial constraints.     

创业投资引导资金发挥股权投资功能

记者:您能否介绍一下贵公司获得中关村创业投资引导资金支持的有关情况?包括时间、方式、获得融资的额度、投资机构等等. 黄显勇:我们公司成立于2001年10月,刚刚度过5周年.与中关村创业投资中心合作是从2004年开始的,当时我们是通过北京盈富泰克创业投资有限公司申请信息产业部的一笔基金.     

Sell in May and go away: the evidence in the international equity index futures markets

There are teeth in the old saw     

Managerial entrenchment, equity payout and capital structure

I develop a contingent claims model to examine the impacts of managerial entrenchment on capital structure and security valuation. The analysis shows that managers’ self-interested leverage choices deviate significantly from the optimal leverages that maximize firm values, partially explaining the suboptimal leverage ratios observed empirically (Graham, 2000). Both the extent and sensitivity of the deviations are affected by firm characteristics, debt features and default solutions. The shareholder-manager conflicts over risk level and cash payout vary dynamically with a firm’s financial health. Managerial entrenchment does not mitigate the agency problems of debt since managers’ discretionary decisions on milking properties or asset substitution could be driven by incentives to increase their own utility.     

Implied cost of capital investment strategies: evidence from international stock markets

Investors can generate excess returns by implementing trading strategies based on publicly available equity analyst forecasts. This paper captures the information provided by analysts by the implied cost of capital (ICC), the internal rate of return that equates a firm’s share price to the present value of analysts’ earnings forecasts. We find that U.S. stocks with a high ICC outperform low ICC stocks on average by 6.0 % per year. This spread is significant when controlling the investment returns for their risk exposure as proxied by standard pricing models. Further analysis across the world’s largest equity markets validates these results.     

Private equity and regulatory capital

Regulatory capital requirements for European banks have been put forward in the Basel II Capital Framework and subsequently in the capital requirements directive (CRD) of the EU. We provide a detailed discussion of the capital requirements for private equity investments under different approaches. For the internal model approach we present a structural model that we calibrate to a proprietary dataset. We modify the standard Merton structural model to make it applicable in practice and to capture stylized facts of private equity investments. We also implement the early default feature with a fast simulation algorithm. Our results support capital requirements lower than in Basel II, but not as low as in CRD, thereby giving adverse incentives to banks for using advanced risk models. A sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is robust to parameter uncertainty and stress scenarios.     

Foreign debt supply in an imperfect international capital market: Theory and evidence

We investigate the determinants of foreign borrowing costs in a stochastically growing economy. We find that these increase with the debt-wealth ratio, depending also upon the volatilities of domestic and foreign origin, and the length of debt contract. In addition, the sensitivity of the short-term debt supply to the debt-wealth ratio exceeds that of long-term debt, and the effects of volatility on the borrowing premium, growth of wealth, and its volatility, depend on the relative size of a direct effect and a secondary portfolio-adjustment effect of the initial shock, as well as the length of the debt contract. Panel regressions suggest that the empirical evidence generally support the theoretical predictions.     

Internal control and internal capital allocation: evidence from internal capital markets of multi-segment firms

We investigate the impact of internal control over financial reporting on management decisions in directing corporate resources to alternative investment projects in multi-segment firms. Results from cross-sectional and inter-temporal analyses indicate that internal control weaknesses (ICWs) are associated with distortionary internal capital allocations. The adverse impact on internal capital markets is more pronounced for firms with company-level ICWs. Our analyses also show that firms with weak existing governance mechanisms benefit more from maintaining effective internal control. We further document that the negative impact of ICWs on firms’ internal capital transfers manifests in a lower excess value of diversification.     

Dividend change announcements,ROE, and the cost of equity capital

We hypothesize and present strong evidence that dividend increases (decreases) result in a general decrease (increase) in the opportunity cost of equity capital (K_e), measured by the discount rate implicit in analysts' forecasts. Estimates of K_e obtained from analyst forecast data likely capture priced information risk that is not reflected in cost of equity capital estimates customarily obtained from empirical excess returns data. In the presence of a full menu of control variables, our measured changes in the cost of equity capital are shown to provide high explanatory power for the market reaction to dividend change announcements. We also hypothesize and demonstrate that the impact of dividend changes on the cost of equity is conditional on how preannouncement K_e relates to preannouncement return on equity (ROE). Specifically, dividend increases result in a reduction in the cost of equity capital only when currently experienced ROE < K_e. This is consistent with shareholders preferring earnings to be reinvested by managers to earn a higher rate than their opportunity rate. When ROE > K_e, on the other hand, the cost of equity capital actually increases. For dividend decreases, the cost of equity capital increases only when ROE > K_e, consistent with firms currently experiencing positive economic income using dividend cuts to signal anticipated permanent earnings declines. Together with extensive robustness tests, our results indicate that dividend changes significantly affect shareholder value, contrary to the longstanding dividend irrelevance argument.