Considerations of Countervailing Power

The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines set forth the current antitrust enforcement practices but do not address mergers that result in bilateral monopoly. We show that, given the presence of lawful, enduring market power, such mergers may improve social welfare. As a result, these mergers deserve careful scrutiny before condemning them as anticompetitive. In this paper, we address this issue and suggest an economically sound enforcement policy.     

Countervailing Power and Chain Stores

The countervailing power of large buyers subdues the market power of sellers, but price concessions won by large buyers in upstream markets may or may not translate into lower prices downstream as Galbraith (American capitalism: The concept of countervailing power. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1952, Am Econ Rev 44:1–6, 1954) once contended. This paper presents a model that formalizes certain previously neglected elements of Galbraith’s argument, and shows that upstream price concessions may lead to lower downstream prices. In this model, a large retail chain store with countervailing power plays one large supplier off against another to win lower prices. An indirect effect of these interactions is that small retailers also pay lower prices, although not as low as the chain. Finally, competition among the retailers drives retail prices lower. The retail-price-restraining effect of the chain is stronger than the effect that is produced by the entry of an additional supplier.     

Buyer Power and Industry Structure

This paper investigates the exercise of market power by a large buyer who emerges via growth, merger, or group purchasing. It explores the efficiency and redistributive effects of such an event when a competitive fringe of small buyers remains in the market. Terms of trade, including those for small buyers, depend on structural conditions on the supply side of the market and the nature of interactions between the newly emerged dominant buyer and suppliers. Predicted aggregate welfare effects have implications for antitrust.     

Buyer Market Power and Innovative Activities

This empirical paper deals with the effects of supplier and buyer market concentration on the innovative behavior of suppliers within the German automobile industry. The data set contains firms from all size classes and covers measures of innovation input as well as innovation output. It can be shown that (a) firms' innovation and R & D-employment intensity will decline (increase) in buyer concentrations if supplier markets are low (high) concentrated; (b) buyers' pressure on input prices reduces suppliers' innovation expenditures and their incentive to develop new products; (c) a small number of competitors in suppliers markets and a large stock of customers stimulates innovative behavior; (d) small and medium sized suppliers invest more in their innovative activities but have less probability of realizing innovations than larger firms; and (e) higher technological capabilities lead to higher innovation input and output.     

Warranty,Seller Reputation,and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions

Using data from the eBay car auction market, we test several predictions regarding warranties, seller reputation and buyer experience in the determination of the final price. We find that the presence of a warranty generates a price premium, but that its magnitude decreases when the seller has a more established reputation. Compared to private sellers, professional dealers, who are ‘repeated‐game players’ in the market, benefit less from a warranty and its substitutability for seller reputation is relatively small. In addition, a buyer with greater experience tends to pay less for a warranty or for a professional dealership.     

Proper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review

In this paper, we assess the appropriate treatment of buyer power in merger review. We conclude that, for changes in bargaining outcomes due to a buyer merger to create efficiencies, it must be the case that, post-merger, the parties are able to arrive at a more optimal price schedule, perhaps due to reduced transactions costs. Empirical tests will be important to the evaluation of such efficiencies. We further conclude that, under certain conditions, powerful buyers may be able to prevent higher prices from a merger of suppliers. Once again, empirical tests should guide the evaluation of this merger defense.     

消费网络效应与专业零售商买方势力规制

耐用品消费的网络效应导致大型专业零售商收取通道费的价格水平偏离了拉姆齐最优价格结构,这是实施政府规制的基本要件。同时,与非专业化大型零售商的情况不同,大型专业零售商经营的商品品种相对较少,品类规格相对简单,从而使得针对大型专业化零售商展开相应的经济规制具有经济上的可行性。所以应该在周密调查和研究以后,推出针对大型专业化零售商的纵向约束行为的规制措施,一方面提高纵向结构的效率,另一方面提高社会福利水平。     

Buyer opportunism in business-to-business exchange

A phenomenon of significance in buyer–supplier relationships is opportunism. In lieu of the known negative effects of opportunistic behavior on buyer–supplier relationships, the circumstances in which a sourcing professional engages in acts of opportunism are unclear. Combining theories from multiple disciplines, a comprehensive model tested buyer–supplier relationship-specific factors, environmental factors, an individual-difference factor, and situational factors likely to affect a buyer's decision to use opportunistic tactics. Results reveal how these different theories combine to provide a more comprehensive explanation of buyer behavior than existed in prior literature. Using structural equation modeling of a sample of 328 procurement transactions, factors found to affect buyer opportunism included buyer power, corporate ethical values, honesty/integrity, leader opportunism, willful ignorance, and subjective expected utility. This study also provides empirical support for distinguishing between two types of opportunism — strong and weak. The research concludes with implications for theory and practice, limitations, and areas for future research.     

Buyer attentiveness in buyer-supplier relationships

How do a manufacturing firm's (supplier) relationship marketing activities lead to more profitable business-to-business (B2B) customers? This research proposes that a supplier's relationship activities develop a buyer's attentiveness toward the supplier, which, in turn, leads to profitable buyer purchasing behaviors. Findings from 119 buyer organizations support this contention, and, additionally, buyer attentiveness was found to have a stronger positive influence on favorable buyer behavior than does either buyer dependence or relationship length. This study contributes to our understanding of long-term buyer-supplier relationships in B2B markets.     

Auctions in financial markets

In this article I discuss how auctions and tools developed for their empirical analysis can inform empirical analysis of financial markets. Since virtually all markets organized as auctions have well-specified and known rules that map nicely into game-theoretical models, I demonstrate using several applications that one can often leverage particular details to study issues that have nothing to do with the auction per se. To do so, I first review an estimation method, which is widely applicable in many settings where a researcher needs to recover agents’ beliefs, in order to establish a link between observables and unobservables using some version of a necessary condition for optimality. I then discuss applications to quantification of front-running, evaluation of quantitative easing operations and estimation of a demand system for financial products.     

One‐Stop Shopping Behavior,Buyer Power and Upstream Merger Incentives

We analyze how consumer preferences for one‐stop shopping affect the (Nash) bargaining relationships between a retailer and its suppliers. One‐stop shopping preferences create ‘demand complementarities’ among otherwise independent products which lead to two opposing effects on upstream merger incentives: first a standard double mark‐up problem and second a bargaining effect. The former creates merger incentives while the later induces suppliers to bargain separately. When buyer power becomes large enough, then suppliers stay separated which raises final good prices. We also show that our result can be obtained when wholesale prices are determined in a non‐cooperative game and under two‐part tariffs.     

Reserve Prices in Repeated Auctions

This paper aims to estimate the effect of imposing a reserve price in repeated auctions of homogeneous items. I model the behavior of impatient bidders who search for the best auction outcome over time. The model is used to develop estimating equations for the bidders’ valuations, and to evaluate the effect of reserve prices on bids and revenue. Using data collected from surplus auctions of personal computer processors, I find economically significant gains from imposing a reserve price. The revenue-maximizing reserve price improves revenue by about 23% for a large subsample of the auctions in the data.     

Buyer information sources in the capital equipment industry

To maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of industrial marketing communications, industrial marketers should provide product and/or service information to their customers via the communications channel considered most important by industrial buyers. This study attempts to determine if industrial marketers and industrial buyers attach equal importance to five channels of communication. The findings raise some important questions regarding traditional practices in industrial marketing communications.     

Buyer/seller relationships in international industrial markets

This article examines the hypothesis that industrial purchasers' assessments of their suppliers are not based on views of suppliers' technical and commercial skills in isolation. Instead they are closely associated with their assessment of suppliers' skills in developing a relationship with them.     

Buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets

Suppliers and consumer organizations have become increasingly concerned by the build-up of buyer power of retailers in many markets. A major concern is that strong retailers will abuse their power to exclude products and rival retailers from the market to be able to increase prices to consumers. As a consequence, remedies to limit buyer power are discussed and implemented in many countries. In this paper we compare the incentives for exclusion, and the effect on consumers prices, under both buyer and seller power. We study a model with a dominant upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe of producers offering their products to two differentiated downstream retailers. We compare the equilibrium outcome of this model when i) the dominant supplier holds all the bargaining power, and (ii) the retailers have all the bargaining power. We show that full or partial exclusion of either the competitive product or downstream retailers occurs when inter and intrabrand competition are strong. This is true both under seller and buyer power. However, in contrast to the received literature, we find that buyer power weakly enhances welfare compared to seller power because buyer power will lead to both more product variety (less exclusion) and lower retail prices.     

Determinants of Buyer Search in a Housing Market

Using data collected from specially-designed questionnaires, the duration of search by a house buyer is estimated. Duration is measured in two ways: in terms of time and in terms of the number of houses seen. To explain this data, several features must be added to a simple model when search models are applied to a housing market. Many of the statistically significant variables, such as prior information and the quality of information provided by a newspaper or a real estate agent, deal with the provision of information. The type of agency that employs the agent and the characteristics of the buyer have little effect.     

Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey

This paper empirically investigates the effect of the competitive environment (number of participants) on the cost of procurement. We use a unique dataset provided by the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) of Turkey that covers all of the government procurement auctions for the years 2004–2006. First, after controlling for possible endogeneity, we show that the number of bidders significantly and negatively affects the procurement price. Thus, the existence of a more competitive environment significantly decreases procurement costs in Turkey. Second, when auctions are open to foreign participation, the auction price tends to be lower. Finally, prices in services and goods sectors are more sensitive to changes in the number of bidders than is true for the construction sector. The results of this paper have several policy implications for e-procurement and efficient procurement design.     

Bid Roundness Under Collusion in Japanese Procurement Auctions

We analyze the “roundness level” of bids—defined as the number of zeros at the end of the bid—in public procurement auctions for construction works in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, where a bid-rigging case was filed. We hypothesize that bid rigging increases the roundness of bids through the bid coordination process. Specifically, winners choose round numbers to avoid any miscommunication when they announce their planned bids to other ring members, and losers prefer round numbers when they arbitrarily bid above the winning bid. We find that (1) there is a positive relationship between the roundness of a bid and its relative value as a fraction of the reserve price, (2) the roundness of bids is higher when collusion is active than when it is inactive, (3) among the ring bids, the roundness of the lowest bids is even higher than that of the other bids, and (4) bids by non-ring members are also round when collusion is active.