Code of ethics quality and audit fees

Using a sample of U.S. firms from 2003 to 2018, we examine the effect of an audit client’s code of ethics quality on audit fees. We find that clients with a lower code of ethics quality pay significantly higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors perceive such clients as riskier and charge greater risk premiums. We also find that such clients have higher litigation risk and auditors spend greater effort when auditing such clients. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of a client’s code of ethics quality in audit pricing. Overall, our findings are consistent with codes of ethics being useful to auditors in assessing managers’ financial representations and providing value to firms.     

Changes in the measurement of fair value: Implications for accounting earnings

With the FASB's issue of staff position papers in 2009 and the relaxation of how fair value standards are applied, there has been a change in the practice of how fair value is measured. Since the FASB staff position papers in 2009, fair value measurement by financial institutions has increasingly relied on managerial assumptions. This study examines the impact of this change on the quality of earnings. Consistent with attribute substitution theory that emphasises reliability over relevance, we find that an apparent increase in managerial discretion in fair value measurement is associated with a higher probability of earnings management and lower earnings informativeness. The results indicate that allowing more managerial discretion in fair value measurement adversely affected the quality of financial reporting. Our study highlights the issue of reliable measurement in the debate among academics and practitioners of increasing the use of fair value accounting.     

Public Disclosure of Audit Fees and Bargaining Power between the Client and Auditor: Evidence from China

Before the public disclosure of audit fees was mandated, it was unlikely for an audit client to have accurate information about how much other companies were charged by their auditors. Public fee disclosure decreases the cost of auditees' access to audit fee information for the auditor's portfolio of clients and is thus likely to increase the relative bargaining power of auditees over auditors when they negotiate audit fees. Using both proprietary and public audit fee data before and after public fee disclosure was mandated in China, we provide evidence consistent with the preceding conjecture. We find that public fee disclosure reinforces the magnitude of audit fee decreases for overcharged clients and weakens auditors' ability to raise audit fees for undercharged clients. These findings suggest the existence of unintended consequences of public fee disclosure regulation, the original rationale of which was a concern about audit pricing practices that could undermine auditor independence.     

Managerial discretion and the comparability of fair value estimates

We explore how discretion over fair value measurement affects the comparability of fair value estimates in the financial industry. We find that greater exposure to Level 2 (Level 3) measurement enhances (diminishes) the comparability of fair value estimates across firms. These contrasting results reflect a nuanced relation between discretion over fair value measurement and comparability and suggest that managers convey useful information through Level 2 estimates, whereas Level 3 measurement is subject to error and managerial opportunism. Cross-sectional analyses show that fair value estimates are less comparable when managers have stronger incentives to introduce discretion and more comparable when investor monitoring is stronger. Additional analyses demonstrate that the comparability of fair value estimates is negatively associated with non-agency mortgage backed security holdings, the asset class most likely to be held at Level 3 by our sample firms, and that our primary results hold for alternative measures of comparability. Taken together, our results highlight the critical role of discretion in shaping the comparability of fair value estimates.     

Determinants of audit fees in Bangladesh

This paper reports the results of an analysis of the determinants of audit fees of both financial and non-financial companies in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi audit services market is unusual in that there is no direct involvement of international audit firms in it. The results of the regressions show that the size of the auditee has the greatest influence on audit fees. Whilst there was no international Big Six grouping, it was possible to construct a group of Bangladeshi audit firms which commanded a price premium, based on their size and whether they had a link with an international firm of auditors. Financial services companies were found to have higher audit fees relative to non-financial companies. Subsidiaries of multi-national holding companies also had higher audit fees. The surprising result was that auditees which employed at least one qualified accountant had higher audit fees.     

Employee quality and audit fee: evidence from China

This study investigates the association between employee quality and audit fee. Using data for firm-level employee quality (as proxied by employee education) from Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2018, we find that firms operated by high-quality employees enjoy lower audit charges. The association between employee quality and audit fee is more pronounced in firms with a culture of high integrity. Our 2SLS estimation helps us establish a causal link between employee quality and audit fee. The final validity tests suggest that high-quality employees contribute to lower audit fee by reducing audit risk and audit effort.     

Adjustment of valuation inputs and its effect on value relevance of fair value measurement

The fair value accounting standards; i.e., FAS 157, FAS 157-3 and FAS 157-4, specify the circumstances where firms need to adjust valuation inputs to fair value measurements in response to changes in market conditions. Such an adjustment inherently involves substantial management judgment and is accompanied with transfers of assets and liabilities among the different levels of the fair value hierarchy. We study the effect of adjusting valuation inputs to reflect market variations on value relevance of fair value measurements by comparing the value relevance of fair value assets between the banks that make transfers of assets and the banks that make no transfers. Overall, we find a significant increase in value relevance of fair value measurements for banks that transferred assets into/out of the Level 3 category. Our study examines a challenging situation in the application of fair value standards; i.e., determining fair value when there is a change in market conditions. Fair value measurement under such a situation involves substantial management judgment and potential estimate errors and manipulation. Our findings provide useful information for researchers, regulators and accounting professionals to assess the market’s perception of the reliability of fair value information when management exercises substantial discretion in adjusting valuation inputs under changing market conditions.     

The effect of additional guidance on fair value measurement and disclosure in illiquid or inactive markets

This paper examines fair value accounting – specifically, the application of FASB FSP 157-4 in the US. Data is analyzed from financial firms before and after FSP 157-4 was implemented to examine how this standard changed fair valuations and disclosures. We consider whether managers took advantage of the flexibility in the new standard by classifying their assets at level 3. We find that there is no significant change in the amount of assets that are transferred into level 3 after FSP 157-4 as compared to before. We also find a significant increase in the extent of disclosures as measured by word count. Fair value disclosures increased by an average of 52%. After further partitioning the sample based on size, we find that both main results hold for small and big firms in our additional sample. There is no evidence managers used the flexibility of the new standard to classify more financial assets at level 3; however, managers responded to the new standard with a significantly longer disclosure.     

The effect of mandatory auditor assignment and non-audit service on audit fees: Evidence from Korea

In Korea, regulators could assign auditors to firms. We investigate the relationship among audit fees, mandatory auditor assignment, and the joint provision of non-audit and auditor services in Korea. We find that assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than freely selected auditors. We also find that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services does intensify the relation between auditor assignment and audit fees. Combined with the results of other studies that have shown that firms audited by assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals than firms audited by freely selected auditors, our results suggest the possibility that mandatory auditor assignment may improve auditor independence.     

The fair value of guaranteed annuity options

We discuss the fair valuation of Guaranteed Annuity Options, i.e. options providing the right to convert deferred survival benefits into annuities at fixed conversion rates. The use of doubly stochastic stopping times and of affine processes provides great computational and analytical tractability, while enabling to set up a very general valuation framework. For example, the valuation of options on traditional, unit-linked or indexed annuities is encompassed. Moreover, security and reference fund prices may feature stochastic volatility or discontinuous dynamics. The longevity risk is also taken into account, by letting the evolution of mortality present stochastic dynamics subject not only to random fluctuations but also to systematic deviations.     

The potential harms of goodwill impairment avoidance: Evidence based on future performance and stock prices

The rapidly increasing volume of goodwill assets in the capital market generates potential risks due to the possibility of an untimely recognition of goodwill impairment. In this paper, we investigate the financial consequences of goodwill impairment avoidance based on firms’ future performance and stock prices. Using Chinese A-share listed firms with goodwill balances, we find that avoiding goodwill impairments negatively affects a firm’s performance growth and increases its risk of a future stock price crash. These adverse effects continue for the three years following the goodwill impairment avoidance. Our results indicate that goodwill impairment avoidance has detrimental impacts on a firm’s future performance and stock price and that these impacts are persistent. Our conclusions are helpful for regulators on how to prevent the risks hidden in goodwill impairment recognition and maintain the stable development of the financial market.     

The effects of corporate governance and audit and non-audit fees on IPO Value

This paper examines the effects of non-executive board members, audit committee composition and financial expertise, and fees paid to audit firms on the value of 375 UK initial public offerings (IPOs). Empirical findings show that underpricing decreases in audit fees whereas it increases in non-audit fees. A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the firm’s board and audit committees with a higher proportion of non-executive directors and financial accounting expertise of their members positively moderate the inter-relationships between underpricing and both audit and non-audit fees paid by companies going through an IPO. Further investigations using the adjusted price-to-book value as a proxy for firm value at IPO confirm our main findings that internal governance mechanisms may complement services provided by the auditors in terms of generating higher valuations. Controlling for the simultaneous determination of audit and non-audit fees, our results remain consistent.     

The impact of the Multi-jurisdiction Disclosure System on audit fees of cross-listed Canadian firms

The Multi-jurisdiction Disclosure System (MJDS), a treaty between Canada and the United States (U.S.), was intended to facilitate the cross-listing of a firm's securities in the neighboring country. Under this system, eligible Canadian companies are allowed to use home-country documents to meet U.S. disclosure requirements and these documents are generally not reviewed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We posit that the single-reporting requirement and lower SEC scrutiny may result in lower audit fees for MJDS firms. Based on audit-fee disclosures mandated by the SEC rule-making authority granted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, we find a negative association between audit fees paid by U.S. cross-listed Canadian companies and their use of the MJDS. This result suggests that the lower audit fees provide an economic incentive to use the MJDS. Thus, our study provides evidence that the implementation of the MJDS may help facilitate cross-border listings by reducing audit costs. Additionally, this study confirms, for Canadian firms, some of the audit-fee determinants reported in earlier studies.     

Determinants of discretionary fair value measurements: the case of Level 3 assets in the banking sector

The objective of our research was to respond to the call of Barth and Taylor ( 2010 ) for more research to examine the role of discretion in fair value estimates. Specifically, we investigate factors that explain banks’ accounting choices to use Level 3 valuation inputs from the fair value measurement hierarchy. Using hand‐collected data from a sample of international banks during 2009–2013, we find that incentives to use discretionary Level 3 valuation inputs, which can provide an opportunity to manage earnings, are associated with both firm‐level and country‐level determinants. Additional tests provide evidence that Level 3 ‘transfer‐in’ behaviour is related to changes in bank characteristics.     

In pursuit of legitimacy: A history behind fair value accounting

An examination of the history of attempts by regulators, practitioners and scholars from the mid nineteenth century to 2005 to establish an appropriate accounting measurement basis for financial reporting here leads to an evaluation of the likelihood of fair value accounting (FVA) practices becoming fully institutionalised. Using concepts drawn from theories of legitimation, it is shown here that historic cost accounting (HCA) only enjoyed an episodic legitimacy in the 1940s–70s and that prior and after this period mixed measurement incorporating market values is routinised. Although principles of FVA have been legitimised to an extent, it is argued here that this has resulted in the practice of mixed measurement bases being taken for granted.     

The impact of PCAOB international registration on audit quality and audit fees: Evidence from China

Despite the importance of registration with the PCAOB, there is surprisingly little academic research on the registration process and its impact on audit outcomes (Abernathy et al., 2013). The PCAOB allows registration of audit firms from non-US countries. However, China and a few other countries do not allow the PCAOB to conduct inspections of audit firms. We take advantage of this setting to investigate whether PCAOB-registered audit firms improve audit quality in the absence of inspections and whether they charge an audit fee premium. Our findings indicate that audit quality increases following PCAOB registration and that clients pay higher audit fees for audits by PCAOB-registered firms.     

Auditor specialization, perceived audit quality, and audit fees in the local government audit market

Prior governmental research implies a positive relation between auditor specialization and audit quality, but the effect of specialization on audit fees is mixed. However, no single governmental study investigates the effect of auditor specialization on both audit quality and audit fees. Also, prior studies focus on either large- or small audit firms and often employ indirect proxies for audit quality. We study the effects of auditor specialization on perceived audit quality and audit fees. Our data represent both Big 5 and smaller audit firms and include three market-based measures of specialization. We survey 241 Florida local government finance directors and find that specialization is positively associated with perceived audit quality but not with audit fees. We also find that Big 5 auditors, often used as a proxy for higher audit quality in prior research, are not uniformly associated with increased perceived audit quality but consistently charge higher audit fees. Our results confirm a relation between measures of audit firm specialization and audit quality and raise questions regarding audit firm size and audit quality in the municipal sector. Our findings suggest that engaging specialized auditors may be good policy for many local governments.     

The effect of political visibility on audit effort and audit pricing

This study examines whether auditors adjust their effort and pricing decisions for political visibility. We argue, from the behavioural literature, that political visibility will create the need for more justification by auditors. Using data on actual audit fees, hours and billing rates for a sample of New Zealand public sector companies, we find that total audit fees are positively related to the number of press mentions (our proxy for political visibility). Consistent with our expectations we find that audit fees are monotonically related to audit fees. We also find that auditors increase the hours spent on the audit but not billing rates, which further suggests defensive bolstering by auditors.     

Audit market concentration,audit fees,and audit quality: A cross-country analysis of complex audit clients

Regulators around the world are concerned about the potentially harmful effects of high audit market concentration on audit pricing and quality. However, results in the overall literature have failed to reach consensus on this issue. We contribute to this debate by arguing that the audit market is segmented and that concentration in the Big 4 segment of the market leads to higher audit pricing. Accordingly, our analyses use international data and focus on concentration within the Big 4 group of firms across countries. We find that audit fees are increasing in our concentration measure for clients where the barriers to entry by competing auditors are higher, as proxied by client size, international operations, and IFRS use. Finally, we find evidence that audit quality is decreasing in Big 4 market concentration for these types of engagements. This indicates a wealth transfer from shareholders to audit firms when auditor concentration is high because these complex clients are charged more, but receive audits that are of lower quality.     

IFRS fair value measurement and accounting policy choice in the United Kingdom and Australia

This study investigates the use of fair value measurement by 228 listed companies in the UK and Australia around the time of adoption of IFRS from 1 January 2005. We test whether within and between country comparability in policy choices (as measured by T indices) has changed in relation to (a) mandatory and (b) optional use of fair value measurement. Mandatory requirements related to financial instruments (IAS 39) and share-based payments (IFRS 2) have increased comparability, with a weaker effect for biological assets (IAS 41). In relation to the optional use of fair value, comparability increased in relation to property (IAS 16) because some companies discontinued fair value measurement. Under IAS 39, the fair value option for other financial assets and other financial liabilities decreased comparability. Options to use fair value in other areas (intangible assets, plant and equipment and investment properties) are not generally taken up, either for on-going measurement or on IFRS adoption (under the ‘deemed cost’ option). The results suggest a conservative approach and/or lack of incentives to use fair value measurement for most companies. Exceptions include some banks and insurance companies (for other financial assets and liabilities) and companies holding investment properties.