Can Managers Forecast Aggregate Market Returns?

Previous studies have found that the proportion of equity in total new debt and equity issues is negatively correlated with future equity market returns. Researchers have interpreted this finding as evidence that corporate managers are able to predict the systematic component of their stock returns and to issue equity when the market is overvalued. In this article we show that the predictive power of the share of equity in total new issues stems from pseudo‐market timing and not from any abnormal ability of managers to time the equity markets.     

The Equity Share in New Issues and Aggregate Stock Returns

The share of equity issues in total new equity and debt issues is a strong predictor of U.S. stock market returns between 1928 and 1997. In particular, firms issue relatively more equity than debt just before periods of low market returns. The equity share in new issues has stable predictive power in both halves of the sample period and after controlling for other known predictors. We do not find support for efficient market explanations of the results. Instead, the fact that the equity share sometimes predicts significantly negative market returns suggests inefficiency and that firms time the market component of their returns when issuing securities.     

Predicting Returns with Managerial Decision Variables: Is There a Small‐Sample Bias?

Many studies find that aggregate managerial decision variables, such as aggregate equity issuance, predict stock or bond market returns. Recent research argues that these findings may be driven by an aggregate time‐series version of Schultz's (2003, Journal of Finance 58, 483–517) pseudo market‐timing bias. Using standard simulation techniques, we find that the bias is much too small to account for the observed predictive power of the equity share in new issues, corporate investment plans, insider trading, dividend initiations, or the maturity of corporate debt issues.     

Bank portfolio exposure to emerging markets and its effects on bank market value

This study estimates a model of banking company equity returns taking into consideration book value and market value measures of their exposure to emerging markets debt. In this estimation, general systematic market factors, such as the rate of return on the S&P500 stock index and yields on a constant maturity 5-year Treasury note, are held constant such that the exposure variables are accounting for effects due to banks’ exposure to emerging market debt. The results, although not uniform among banking companies, support the hypothesis that the extent of exposure to emerging market debt are factored into the valuation of banking company equity contemporaneously. The inclusion of a market value indicator adds to the explanation of equity returns of some banks. It is also clear that knowing the extent of the exposure on a book value basis is important information alone that may allow investors to take account of or evaluate the effects of changes in banking company equity valuation from LDC debt exposures. We also perform an event study for three major debt crises to determine whether the market recognizes the effects of these events on bank valuation. The event study results show that there is little information from identifying the time period of the crises on banking company equity returns. Explanations for this are that the information of these possible crises has been embedded in bank changes in exposure and that the market valuation of the emerging market debt is already accounted for by our model.     

Financial ratios used by equity analysts in Mexico and stock returns

A sample of recommendation reports by equity analysts covering Mexican publicly traded firms in Mexico is studied. We propose a set of “most preferred” financial ratios from this sample. It is found that the most preferred ratios by equity analysts, a group of sophisticated users, are not those ratios typically covered in financial textbooks. Moreover, by using panel regression analysis, we test the relationship between financial ratios and leading stock returns during the 1995–2011 period. Overall, consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, the results show that estimates of financial ratios most preferred by equity analysts have predictive power on 1-year future stock returns. We find no evidence of predictive power on 2-year stock returns.     

What Drives Security Issuance Decisions: Market Timing,Pecking Order,or Both?

We study market timing and pecking order in a sample of debt and equity issues and share repurchases of Canadian firms from 1998 to 2007. We find that only when firms are not financially constrained is there evidence that firms issue (repurchase) equity when their shares are overvalued (undervalued) and evidence that overvalued issuers earn lower postannouncement long‐run returns. Similarly, we find that only when firms are not overvalued do they prefer debt to equity financing. These findings highlight an interaction between market timing and pecking order effects.     

The subprime asset-backed securities market and the equity prices of large complex financial institutions

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the subprime asset-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDO) market and Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs). We attempt to account for the dynamics between the ABX index returns and the banks’ equity returns through conditioning our analysis on the historical correlation between the variables. Three key results emerge from the analysis. First, we find a positive correlation between movements of the ABX index and the equity returns for all the LCFIs. Second, the volatility of ABX index returns tend to be transmitted to the volatilities of the equity returns of the financial institutions. Third, ABX prices changes lead equity returns changes of the European-based LCFIs. For the US LCFIs a two-way linkage emerges.     

Time-varying risk premia and the cost of capital: An alternative implication of the Q theory of investment

Evidence suggests that expected excess stock market returns vary over time, and that this variation is much larger than that of expected real interest rates. It follows that a large fraction of the movement in the cost of capital in standard investment models must be attributable to movements in equity risk-premia. In this paper we emphasize that such movements in equity risk premia should have implications not merely for investment today, but also for future investment over long horizons. In this case, predictive variables for excess stock returns over long-horizons are also likely to forecast long-horizon fluctuations in the growth of marginal Q, and therefore investment. We test this implication directly by performing long-horizon forecasting regressions of aggregate investment growth using a variety of predictive variables shown elsewhere to have forecasting power for excess stock market returns.     

Emerging Market Exposures and the Predictability of Hedge Fund Returns

We examine emerging market and global macro hedge funds and find a significant positive relation between hedge funds’ future returns and their exposure to both emerging market equities and emerging market currencies. We present evidence that the strong predictive power of emerging market betas is related to the superior market‐timing ability of these fund managers. Results are robust after controlling for commonly used hedge fund factors, the emerging market equity index, lagged fund returns, liquidity risk, and fund characteristics. Our results suggest that hedge funds can earn positive excess returns by timing their exposure to emerging market securities.     

Financial Restatements, Cost of Debt and Information Spillover: Evidence From the Secondary Loan Market

Abstract:  In this paper, we investigate the effect of financial restatements on the debt market. Specifically, we focus on the secondary loan market, which has become one of the largest capital markets in the US, and ask the following: (1) whether financial restatements increase restating firm's cost of debt financing and (2) whether the information about restatements arrives at the secondary loan market earlier than at the stock market? Using 176 restatement data, we find significant negative abnormal loan returns and increased bid-ask spreads around restatement announcements. Furthermore, this negative loan market reaction is more pronounced when the restatement is initiated by either the SEC or auditors, and when the primary reason for restatement is related to revenue recognition issues. Additionally, we find restatement information arrives at the secondary loan market earlier than at the equity market, and that such private information quickly flows into the equity market. We also show that stock prices begin to decline approximately 30 days prior to the restatement announcements for firms with traded loans. However, we do not find such informational leakage for firms without traded loans. Collectively, the results of this paper suggest: (1) increased cost of debt financing after restatements and (2) superior informational efficiency of the secondary loan market to the stock market.     

Evidence on the Trade-Off between Risk and Return for IPO and SEO Firms

Do the low long‐run average returns of equity issuers reflect underperformance due to mispricing or the risk characteristics of the issuing firms? We shed new light on this question by examining how institutional lenders price loans of equity issuing firms. Accounting for standard risk factors, we find that equity issuing firms' expected debt return is equivalent to the expected debt return of nonissuing firms, implying that institutional lenders perceive equity issuers to be as risky as similar nonissuing firms. In general, institutional lenders perceive small and high book‐to‐market borrowers as systematically riskier than larger borrowers with low book‐to‐market ratios, consistent with the asset pricing approach in Fama and French (1993) . Finally, we find that firms' expected debt returns decline after equity offerings, consistent with recent theoretical arguments suggesting that firm risk should decline following an equity offering. Overall, our analysis provides novel evidence consistent with risk‐based explanations for the observed equity returns following IPOs and SEOs.     

Nonfinancial Firms as Cross‐Market Arbitrageurs

I demonstrate that nonfinancial corporations act as cross‐market arbitrageurs in their own securities. Firms use one type of security to replace another in response to shifts in relative valuations, inducing negatively correlated financing flows in different markets. Net equity repurchases and net debt issuance both increase when expected excess returns on debt are particularly low, or when expected excess returns on equity are relatively high. Credit valuations affect equity financing as much as equity valuations do, and vice versa. Cross‐market corporate arbitrage is most prevalent among large, unconstrained firms, and helps account for aggregate financing patterns.     

Corporate financing decisions, managerial market timing, and real investment

Both market timing and investment-based theories of corporate financing predict under-performance after firms raise capital, but only market timing predicts that the composition of financing (equity compared with debt) should also forecast returns. In cross-sectional tests, we find that the amount of net financing is more important than its composition in explaining future stock returns. In the time series, investment-based factor models explain abnormal stock performance following a variety of corporate financing events that previous studies link to market timing. At the aggregate level, the amount of new financing is also more important for future market returns than its composition. Overall, our joint tests reveal that measures of real investment are correlated with future returns and measures of managerial market timing are not.     

Can Managers Successfully Time the Maturity Structure of Their Debt Issues?

This paper provides a rational explanation for the apparent ability of managers to successfully time the maturity of their debt issues. We show that a structural break in excess bond returns during the early 1980s generates a spurious correlation between the fraction of long‐term debt in total debt issues and future excess bond returns. Contrary to Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) , we show that the presence of structural breaks can lead to nonsense regressions, whether or not there is any small sample bias. Tests using firm‐level data further confirm that managers are unable to time the debt market successfully.     

The Performance of Long-run Stock Returns Following Issues of Public and Private Debt

This study uses a balance sheet-based method to identify both public and private debt issues. This feature is important because there have been no studies of the information content of private debt issues, while private debt is substantially more prevalent than public debt. We find no abnormal returns following straight debt issues. However, convertible debt issuers under-perform the market on the order of 50 to 70 percent in the following five years. In pursuit of explanations, we find that convertible debt issues signal a deterioration of future profitability, which accounts for at least part of the stock price underperformance.     

The Equity Premium: Consistent with GDP Growth and Portfolio Insurance

We find that the long‐term equity premium is consistent with both GDP growth and portfolio insurance. We use a supply‐side growth model and demonstrate that the arithmetic average stock market return and the returns on corporate assets and debt depend on GDP per capita growth. The implied equity premium matches the U.S. historical average over 1926–2001. Separately, we find that the equity premium tracks the value of a put option on the S&P 500. Our theory predicts a smaller equity premium in the future, assuming that the recent regime shifts in dividend policies, interest rates, and tax rates are permanent.     

Market liquidity as a sentiment indicator

We build a model that helps to explain why increases in liquidity—such as lower bid–ask spreads, a lower price impact of trade, or higher turnover–predict lower subsequent returns in both firm-level and aggregate data. The model features a class of irrational investors, who underreact to the information contained in order flow, thereby boosting liquidity. In the presence of short-sales constraints, high liquidity is a symptom of the fact that the market is dominated by these irrational investors, and hence is overvalued. This theory can also explain how managers might successfully time the market for seasoned equity offerings, by simply following a rule of thumb that involves issuing when the SEO market is particularly liquid. Empirically, we find that: (i) aggregate measures of equity issuance and share turnover are highly correlated; yet (ii) in a multiple regression, both have incremental predictive power for future equal-weighted market returns.     

Do Capital Structure Adjustments by Takeover Targets Influence Acquisition Gains?

We link debt issuances by target companies around takeover announcements to enhanced target bargaining power in negotiations with bidders over merger synergy gains in completed takeovers. Announcements of debt issuances by targets—especially new bank loans—are associated with more positive target equity returns relative to those made by nontargets, particularly for debt issuances immediately surrounding the takeover announcement. At least some of these gains to targets come at the expense of bidder shareholders, as bidder equity abnormal returns at target debt issuance are negative. We further show that targets issuing debt are primarily those with relatively low acquisition abnormal returns, consistent with initially poor target bargaining power. Subsequent debt issuances by targets increase the likelihood of positive adjustments to acquisition premiums offered by acquirers.     

Do option open-interest changes foreshadow future equity returns?

Recent work considers whether information is simultaneously reflected in both option and equity markets. We provide new evidence supporting Black’s (Financ. Anal. J. 31:36–72, 1975) conjecture that information is first revealed in option markets. Specifically, changes in call and put open-interest levels have predictive power for future equity returns. Large increases in call open interest are followed by significantly increased equity returns. Put open-interest increases precede weaker future returns, but the relationship is considerably less pronounced in the presence of certain controls. The recent change in the call-to-put open-interest ratio has predictive power as to equity returns over the following week, even after controlling for numerous factors.     

The role of Chinese economic variables on Australian and New Zealand equity returns

This study investigates the explanatory power of Chinese economic variables on Australian and New Zealand equity returns. Results suggest that Chinese economic variables have significant explanatory power for both market‐level and industry‐level portfolio returns. Our results are robust when using the principal component analysis (PCA) approach. We also find the predictive power is stronger for the post‐FTA period. In addition, the out‐of‐sample analysis confirms our previous results, suggesting that Chinese economic variables contain incremental information when estimating Australian and New Zealand equity market returns. We believe our findings have important implications for investors and policymakers in both countries.