The Modigliani and Miller Propositions: The History of a Failed Foundation for Corporate Finance?

The Modigliani and Miller (MM) propositions provide a foundation for corporate finance theory. Nevertheless, this paper argues that their adoption has led to a disengagement of such theory from the humanity of business, as well as, more broadly, from concepts of corporate strategic management. As a result, the context within which textbooks allow corporate investment and financial decisions to take place is severely distorted from reality. The paper argues that we require the context of behavioural and strategic corporate management if we are to accommodate the reality of business, the behaviour of formalised groups, and an ethical dimension to business.     

Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets

We use recent data on firm-level corporate governance (CG) rankings across 14 emerging markets and find that there is wide variation in firm-level governance in our sample and that the average firm-level governance is lower in countries with weaker legal systems. We explore the determinants of firm-level governance and find that governance is correlated with the extent of the asymmetric information and contracting imperfections that firms face. We also find that better corporate governance is highly correlated with better operating performance and market valuation. Finally, we provide evidence that firm-level corporate governance provisions matter more in countries with weak legal environments.     

企业价值与并购交易定价

企业价值是一个不断发展的概念,而企业价值理论也随之处在变化之中.在现代企业中企业价值代表了企业股权和债权价值,具有特殊的性质.并购交易定价实际上就是并购双方不同企业价值理念动态博弈的结果.中国国有企业的并购定价存在许多问题,根源在于对企业价值认识得不准确、不清晰.     

Do industries contain predictive information for the Fama–French factors?

We examine whether the returns of US industry portfolios predict the returns and volatility of Fama and French's small-minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML) factors. The analysis reveals that all 30 industry returns strongly forecast one-month-ahead SMB factor returns. Moreover, a significant number of industry returns predict the volatility of the SMB and HML factors by up to two or three months. These findings suggest that US industry returns contain profitable information on Fama–French SMB and HML factors, and since most investors cannot extract the profitable information contained in industry returns in a timely manner, this information gradually diffuses in equity markets.     

中国上市公司参与银行理财产品市场投资特征

本文对参与银行理财产品市场的中国A股上市公司进行了统计分析和模型检验,分析了其参与时的数据特征及申购动机。研究发现,中国上市公司参与银行理财产品市场的深度与其最新一期现金余额及等价物规模、净资产大小成显著正相关关系。就整体及平均水平而言,上市公司属于深圳证券交易所的中小企业时,参与银行理财产品市场越深入,不论中央国企还是地方国企,参与深度都高于私人企业,相对于地处东部沿海城市的企业,处于中西部地区的上市公司参与银行理财产品的深度较大。相对于私人企业和地处东部沿海城市的企业,公司为地方国有企业并处于中西部地区时,上市公司参与银行理财产品的弹性较低。同时,银行理财产品的收益率显著影响上市公司参与理财市场的深度和弹性。     

财经类学报的创新机制

财经类学报作为学术期刊的一部分,可以反映财经类高校教学科研工作的水平.财经类学报应当加大创新,具体包括:管理理念的创新,转变观念,强化竞争与服务意识,实施品牌战略;内容创新,突出优势学科,办出财经类学报特色;形式创新,在策划好纸介出版物的同时,要搞好网络出版物的开发;编辑观念和知识的创新,编辑的知识结构、思想水平、学术能力要不断提高;运行机制创新,适应市场经济发展需求;保障机制创新,为学报发展创造良好的政策环境.     

Valuation effects of corporate social responsibility

This paper develops a valuation model of the firm that provides for the expenditure of corporate resources in support of community, social or environmental causes. We show that under certain circumstances CSR expenditures create value for the firm. We also test our model by simulations and confirm that, at least under some conditions, CSR does pay off in the form of value creation.     

Victorian share-pricing - a problem in thin trading

This paper discusses the problems of nineteenth century share valuation and corporate governance. It is based on the summary of a 1900 appeal case, The Earl of Portsmouth v. Pease (1900), which was recorded in the Durham press and concerned the sale of shares within a local private family company in 1898. This contract was overturned in the Court of Chancery as being inequitable. The methods and assumptions employed to value the shares for the private family sale and a coincident public issue were described in detail; the effect of the case was dramatic and the issues raised are still relevant.     

One Type of Security in Retrospect

The case for capitalizing large firms solely with ordinary shares (common stock) is extended by rebutting the arguments of Williams and Finlay (1983) that common stock is obsolete. An account of the historical origins of the supporting elements of the one-security plan is provided. Of the arguments and evidence to be presented, some will be recapitulations of points made earlier and some will be additional.     

Preference hierarchies for internal finance, bank loans, bond, and share issues: evidence for Dutch firms

We estimate the incremental financing decision for a sample of some 150 Dutch companies for the years 1984 through 1997, thereby distinguishing internal finance and three types of external finance: bank borrowing, bond issues, and share issues. First, we estimate a multinomial logit model, which confirms several predictions of both the static trade-off theory and the pecking order theory as to the determinants of financing choices. Next, we estimate all possible ordered probit models to determine which financing hierarchy fits the data best. The results suggest that Dutch firms have a unique most preferred financing hierarchy: (i) internal finance, (ii) bank loans, (iii) share issues, and (iv) bond issues.     

对财经类院校图书馆学科化服务的一点思考

本文通过介绍学科化服务内涵及其在高校的发展,在此基础上阐述财经类院校开展学科化服务必要性、内容、优势及其措施。     

Monitoring the board: should shareholders have direct proxy access?

Motivated by the current discussion to reform shareholder-nominated director elections, this paper presents a model that shows that, when shareholders have direct access to proxy, the quality of the board of directors improves. This is so because more independent directors—regarded as better monitors of managerial activities—will be elected. In the model, a manager maximizes his expected utility by solving the trade-off between reputation and consumption of private benefits. The board can be of high-type (independent, only cares about reputation) or low-type (non-independent, faces a trade-off similar to the manager's). When the board can signal its type at a relatively small cost, giving shareholders direct access to proxy is better than delegating the nomination of outside directors to managers: in the first alternative, only high-type boards will be kept, whereas in the second, low-type boards will predominate.     

Ownership, managerial control and the governance of companies listed on the Brussels stock exchange

This paper examines how corporate control is exerted in companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange. There are several alternative corporate governance mechanisms which may play a role in disciplining poorly performing management: blockholders (holding companies, industrial companies, families and institutions), the market for partial control, debt policy, and board composition. Even if there is redundancy of substitute forms of discipline, some mechanisms may dominate. We find that top managerial turnover is strongly related to poor performance measured by stock returns, accounting earnings in relation to industry peers and dividend cuts and omissions. Tobit models reveal that there is little relation between ownership and managerial replacement, although industrial companies resort to disciplinary actions when performance is poor. When industrial companies increase their share stake or acquire a new stake in a poorly performing company, there is evidence of an increase in executive board turnover, which suggests a partial market for control. There is little relation between changes in ownership concentration held by institutions and holding companies, and disciplining. Still, high leverage and decreasing solvency and liquidity variables are also followed by increased disciplining, as are a high proportion of non-executive directors and the separation of the functions of CEO and chairman.