Trade credit and credit rationing

Asymmetric information between banks and firms can precludefinancing of valuable projects. Trade credit can alleviate thisproblem by incorporating the lending relation the private informationheld by suppliers about their customers. Incentive compatibilityconditions prevent collusion between two of the agents (e.g.,the buyer and the seller) against the third (e.g., the bank).Consistent with the empirical findings of Petersen and Rajan(1995), firms without relationships with banks resort more totrade credit, and sellers with greater ability to generate cashflows provide more trade credit. Finally small firms react tomonetary contractions by using trade credit, consistent withthe empirical results of Nilsen (1994).     

Do credit commitments compromise credit quality?

This paper focuses on banks’ risk-taking arising from potentially excessive growth of loans and off-balance sheet credit commitments. Credit quality is investigated both in macro and micro context, using a panel of 28 European countries over 2004–2014 and a panel of 478 European banks over 2004–2013. The dynamic panel data estimation results confirm that an increase in the ratio of credit commitments to total assets is a two year ahead warning indicator of growth in the ratio of non-performing loans and loan loss reserves. Simultaneous equation estimation exemplifies that the adverse effect of credit commitments on credit quality stems from the credit boom-bust context. As the economic impact of credit commitments to credit quality is significant compared to that of traditional credit quality determinants (real GDP growth and real growth in loans), the consideration of a credit commitments measure may improve timely recognition of credit risk accumulation episodes.     

On the nature of credit demand and credit rationing in competitive credit markets

Conventional analyses of the credit rationing problem seek to explain that problem within the context of classic demand analysis. In this paper we demonstrate that it is generally inappropriate to apply the notion of classic demand to credit markets, consequently, conventional notions of credit rationing must be rejected. In providing a new definition of credit rationing we also establish the previously rejected characterized by credit rationing.     

Counter-cyclical substitution between trade credit and bank credit

This paper explores the substitution relationship between trade credit and bank credit, and its counter-cyclic dynamic pattern through economic cycles. We propose a new theoretical model, using a mechanism design method, which predicts the substitution between the two credits and its counter-cyclic behavior, subject to the condition of technological efficiency not less than one. This model also helps explain the somewhat contradictory evidence in the literature, on the relationship between the two credits. We present empirical evidence on the substitution effect and its counter-cyclic behavior, by using a balanced panel data set of 284 listed Chinese companies for the period 1998-2006. We further find that the substitution behaves counter-cyclically with respect to the coincident macroeconomic indicator, namely, GDP. Our empirical analysis also has some new features such as treating endogeneity carefully and incorporating the lag-effect of trade credit coherently.     

Bilateral credit valuation adjustment for large credit derivatives portfolios

We obtain an explicit formula for the bilateral counterparty valuation adjustment of a credit default swaps portfolio referencing an asymptotically large number of entities. We perform the analysis under a doubly stochastic intensity framework, allowing default correlation through a common jump process. The key insight behind our approach is an explicit characterization of the portfolio exposure as the weak limit of measure-valued processes associated with survival indicators of portfolio names. We validate our theoretical predictions by means of a numerical analysis, showing that counterparty adjustments are highly sensitive to portfolio credit risk volatility as well as to the intensity of the common jump process.     

Counterparty credit risk and the credit default swap market

Counterparty credit risk has become one of the highest-profile risks facing participants in the financial markets. Despite this, relatively little is known about how counterparty credit risk is actually priced. We examine this issue using an extensive proprietary data set of contemporaneous CDS transaction prices and quotes by 14 different CDS dealers selling credit protection on the same underlying firm. This unique cross-sectional data set allows us to identify directly how dealers' credit risk affects the prices of these controversial credit derivatives. We find that counterparty credit risk is priced in the CDS market. The magnitude of the effect, however, is vanishingly small and is consistent with a market structure in which participants require collateralization of swap liabilities by counterparties.     

Exploring the components of credit risk in credit default swaps

In this paper, we test the influence of various fundamental variables on the pricing of credit default swaps. The theoretical determinants that are important for pricing credit default swaps include the risk-free rate, industry sector, credit rating, and liquidity factors. We suggest a linear regression model containing these different variables, especially focusing on liquidity factors. Unlike bond spreads which have been shown to be inversely related to liquidity (i.e., the greater the liquidity, the lower the spread), there is no a priori reason that the credit default swap spread should exhibit the same relationship. This is due to the economic characteristics of a credit default swap compared to a bond. Our empirical result shows that all the fundamental variables investigated have a significant effect on the credit default swap spread. Moreover, our findings suggest that credit default swaps that trade with greater liquidity have a wider credit default swap spread.     

Politicizing consumer credit

Powerful politicians can interfere with the enforcement of regulations. As such, expected political interference can affect constituents’ behavior. Using rotations of Senate committee chairs to identify variation in political power and expected regulatory relief, we study powerful politicians’ effect on consumer lending to communities protected by fair-lending regulations. We find a 7.5% reduction in credit access to minority neighborhoods in states with new committee chairs. Larger reductions occur in Community Reinvestment Act-eligible neighborhoods and when Senators serve on committees that oversee the enforcement of fair-lending laws. Banks headquartered in powerful Senators’ states are responsible for the reduction in credit access.     

Sovereign credit spreads

The paper develops a structural credit risk model to study sovereign credit risk and the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads. The model features endogenous default and recovery rates that both depend on the interaction between domestic output fluctuations and global macroeconomic conditions. We show that sovereigns choose to default at higher levels of economic output once global macroeconomic conditions are bad. This yields to default rates and credit spreads that are substantially higher compared to normal times. We derive closed-form expressions for sovereign debt values and default times and focus on the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads. As opposed to standard theories of sovereign debt, this paper’s structural model generates much richer default patterns and non-linearities through regime-shifts in the global macroeconomic environment. Moreover, changes in the global environment reveal the interconnectedness of the financial system.     

Predicting credit spreads

Predictions of firm-level credit spreads based on the current spot and forward credit spreads can be significantly improved upon by using the information contained in the shape of the credit-spread curve. However, the current credit-spread curve is not a sufficient statistic for predicting future out-of-sample credit spreads; predictions can be significantly improved upon by exploiting the information contained in the shape of the riskless yield curve. In the presence of credit-spread and riskless factors, other macroeconomic, marketwide, and firm-specific risk variables do not significantly improve predictions of credit spreads. These results have important implications for credit-spreads modeling as well as for better understanding corporate capital structure and risk management policies.     

The effect of credit guarantees on credit availability and delinquency rates

We use new data to examine whether credit guarantees affect economic incentives and whether they affect the credit available to small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). We find that firms that have both guaranteed and non-guaranteed loans are 1.67% more likely to miss payments on their guaranteed loans, but are not more likely to default on these loans. These findings suggest that guarantees affect firms’ incentives to repay loans but not their long-term performance. We also find that firms selected into the guarantee programs are 1.17% more likely to default on their loans compared with similar firms that borrow without guarantees. Since we find evidence that long-term performance is not affected by guarantees, the higher default rates among firms selected into the guarantee programs must be the consequence of adverse selection. We also find that credit guarantees increase the aggregated amount of credit; in particular, one additional dollar of guarantees increases the total credit for SMEs by US$ 0.65.     

Good and bad credit contagion: Evidence from credit default swaps

This study examines the intra-industry information transfer effect of credit events, as captured in the credit default swaps (CDS) and stock markets. Positive correlations across CDS spreads imply that contagion effects dominate, whereas negative correlations indicate competition effects. We find strong evidence of contagion effects for Chapter 11 bankruptcies and competition effects for Chapter 7 bankruptcies. We also introduce a purely unanticipated event, in the form of a large jump in a company's CDS spread, and find that this leads to the strongest evidence of credit contagion across the industry. These results have important implications for the construction of portfolios with credit-sensitive instruments.     

Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps

How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a credit default swap (CDS). With a CDS, the originating bank retains the loan's control rights; with loan sales, control rights pass to the loan buyer. Credit risk transfer leads to excessive monitoring of riskier credits and insufficient monitoring of safer credits. Increases in banks' cost of equity capital exacerbate these effects. For riskier credits, loan sales typically dominate CDS but not for safer credits. Once repeated lending and consequent reputation concerns are modeled, although CDSs remain dominated by loan sales for riskier credits, for safer credits they can dominate loan sales, supporting better monitoring (albeit to a limited extent) while allowing efficient risk sharing. Restrictions on the bank's ability to sell the loan expand the range in which CDSs are used and monitoring is too low.     

The impact of credit rating announcements on credit default swap spreads

We document the ability of the credit default swap (CDS) market to anticipate favorable as well as unfavorable credit rating change (RC) announcements based on more extensive samples of credit rating events and CDS spreads than previous studies. We obtain four new results. In contrast to prior published studies, we find that corporate RC upgrades do have a significant impact on CDS spreads even though they are still not as well anticipated as downgrades. Second, CreditWatch (CW) and Outlook (OL) announcements, after controlling for prior credit rating events, lead to significant CARs at the time positive CW and OL credit rating events are announced. Third, we extend prior results by showing that changes in CDS spreads for non-investment-grade credits contain information useful for estimating the probability of negative credit rating events. Fourth, we find that the CDS spread impact of upgrades but not downgrades is magnified during recessions and that upgrades and downgrades also differ as to the impact of simultaneous CW/OL announcements, investment-grade/speculative-grade crossovers, current credit rating, market volatility, and industry effects.     

小额信贷:信用卡的生存发展之本

有调查显示,国内兼具信用卡持卡人和网民双重身份者占信用卡客户总数的近60%.尽管存在各种纠纷和安全问题,但在管理部门、商业银行、银行卡组织及第三方支付组织的积极努力下,持卡人对网上支付的信任度和依赖度越来越高.     

Trade credit and bank credit: Evidence from recent financial crises

This paper studies the effect of financial crises on trade credit for a sample of 890 firms in six emerging economies. Although the provision of trade credit increases right after a crisis, it contracts in the following months and years. Firms that are financially more vulnerable to crises extend less trade credit to their customers. We argue that the decline in aggregate trade credit ratios is driven by the reduction in the supply of trade credit that follows a bank credit crunch, consistent with the “redistribution view” of trade credit provision, whereby bank credit is redistributed via trade credit from financially stronger firms to weaker firms.     

个人信用评分有力推进信贷风险管理转型

随着我国全面建设小康社会进程的加速,社会财富不断增加,个人客户对银行的个人业务提出了更多需求,进一步拉动了个人金融服务的增长.由于个人业务具有笔数多、单笔金额小,数据丰富的特点,所以要对其采用精细化、智能化、自动化的管理模式.然而长期以来,我国商业银行个人业务的经营管理方式一直比较粗放.中国人民银行最新研发的全国个人信用评分,可以对个人客户在未来一定时期内的违约概率进行评估和预测.它可以有效防范风险,为商业银行实现个人信贷风险管理转型提供先进的风险管理技术支持.     

Bank credit risk and credit information sharing in Africa: Does credit information sharing institutions and context matter?

The study examines credit information sharing through private credit bureaus and public credit registries and their effect on bank credit risk in low and high income countries in Africa. The study covers periods between 2006 and 2012 with 548 bank observations in Africa. Employing a Prais-Winsten panel data estimation, the study established that credit information sharing whether through private credit bureaus or public credit registries reduces bank credit risk in both low and high income countries and Africa as a whole. Further analyses reveal that credit information shared through public credit registries was only negatively and significantly related to bank credit risk when all countries that share credit information through public credit registries are observed as one unit but had no significant effect in low or high income countries. On the contrary, credit information shared through private credit bureaus reported a negative and significant effect on credit risk in low and high income countries as well as all countries that shared information through private credit bureaus. This suggests that credit information shared through private credit bureaus are more robust in dealing with bank credit risk regardless of a banks’ income bracket. Hence, countries that do not share credit information should do so especially through private credit bureaus so as to help reduce bank credit risk regardless of the income bracket differences. Again, governments in Africa must enact laws that expand the coverage and scope of credit information shared so as to enhance the effectiveness of information sharing.     

个人信用评分系统应用现状与展望

一、个人信用评分系统概述 1.个人信用评分的现实意义 (1)个人信用评分是世界上普遍采用的评估个人信用风险的方法.在欧美发达国家,信用评分专业公司根据银行的业务需要开发不同的信用评分模型.因为每一家银行的业务经营存在差异,从目标客户的选择到客户服务水平都可能有所不同,这使得各个银行开发模型所依赖的数据不同.实践证明,个人信用风险的管理有三个突破,每个突破都会给银行带来较大的利润增长.这三个突破是信用评分、自动化管理系统和决策优化.