The information content of a limit order book: The case of an FX market

In this paper we examine the question of whether knowledge of the information contained in a limit order book helps to provide economic value in a simple trading scheme. Given the greater information content of the order book, over simple price information, it might naturally be expected that the order book would dominate. Using Dollar Sterling tick data, we find that despite the in-sample statistical significance of variables describing the structure of the limit order book in explaining tick-by-tick returns, they do not consistently add significant economic value out-of-sample. We show this using a simple linear model to determine trading activity, as well as a model-free genetic algorithm based on price, order flow, and order book information. We also find that the profitability of all trading rules based on genetic algorithms dropped substantially in 2008 compared to 2003 data.     

Optimal order placement in limit order markets

To execute a trade, participants in electronic equity markets may choose to submit limit orders or market orders across various exchanges where a stock is traded. This decision is influenced by characteristics of the order flows and queue sizes in each limit order book, as well as the structure of transaction fees and rebates across exchanges. We propose a quantitative framework for studying this order placement problem by formulating it as a convex optimization problem. This formulation allows the study of how the optimal order placement decision depends on the interplay between the state of order books, the fee structure, order flow properties and the aversion to execution risk. In the case of a single exchange, we derive an explicit solution for the optimal split between limit and market orders. For the general case of order placement across multiple exchanges, we propose a stochastic algorithm that computes the optimal routing policy and study the sensitivity of the solution to various parameters. Our algorithm does not require an explicit statistical model of order flow but exploits data on recent order fills across exchanges in the numerical implementation of the algorithm to acquire this information through a supervised learning procedure.     

Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?

Under fairly general conditions, the article derives the equilibrium price schedule determined by the bids and offers in an open limit order book. The analysis shows: (1) the order book has a small-trade positive bid-ask spread, and limit orders profit from small trades; (2) the electronic exchange provides as much liquidity as possible in extreme situations; (3) the limit order book does not invite competition from third market dealers, while other trading institutions do; (4) If an entering exchange earns nonnegative trading profits, the consolidated price schedule matches the limit order book price schedule.     

Whose trades convey information? Evidence from a cross-section of traders

This paper contributes empirically to our understanding of informed traders. It analyzes traders’ characteristics in a foreign exchange electronic limit order market via anonymous trader identities. We use six indicators of informed trading in a cross-sectional multivariate approach to identify traders with high price impact. More information is conveyed by those traders’ trades which—simultaneously—use medium-sized orders (practice stealth trading), have large trading volume, are located in a financial center, trade early in the trading session, at times of wide spreads and when the order book is thin.     

The total cost of trading Belgian shares: Brussels versus London

Since 1990, London’s SEAQ International (SEAQ-I) has attracted considerable trading volume in Belgian equities. This paper investigates competition between the Brussels CATS market and London’s SEAQ-I. Toward this end, we gathered extensive limit order book data as well as transactions and quotation information. With regard to liquidity (indirect costs), measured by the quoted and effective bid–ask spread, the paper concludes that CATS outperforms SEAQ International for both measures. The effective spread is of course substantially smaller than the quoted spread, with the CATS effective spread showing a U-shaped form. This paper, unique in employing an extensive data set that includes all hidden orders and the whole limit order book, produces results in line with the different market microstructure models. Total trading costs on CATS are lower (higher) for small (large) trade sizes.     

The submission of limit orders or market orders: The role of timing and information in the Reuters D2000-2 system

Recent work in the market microstructure literature suggests that the speed with which orders arrive in the market impacts traders' order submission decisions. In this study we use an asymmetric autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model to empirically investigate the influence on the submission of limit and market orders of changes in the time between the past submissions of different types of orders, changes in the slope of the limit order book, and changes in price uncertainty. We find that the expected time between the arrivals of successive orders in the foreign exchange market depends on the previous type of order submitted and the slope on both sides of the order book. Price uncertainty (volatility) plays a secondary role after accounting for the impact of changes in the slope of the order book. Lastly, we find that there are fundamental changes in the level of information contained in the submission of orders at the opening and closing of markets.     

More on a statistical analysis of log-periodic precursors to financial crashes

In this paper, we extend the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between the state of the limit order book (LOB) and order choice. Our contribution is twofold: first, we propose a sequential ordered probit (SOP) model which allows studying patient and impatient traders’ choices separately; second, we consider two pieces of LOB information, the best quotes and the book beyond the best quotes. We find that both pieces of LOB information explain the degree of patience of an incoming trader and, afterwards, its order choice. Nonetheless, the best quotes concentrate most of the explanatory power of the LOB. The shape of the book beyond the best quotes is crucial in explaining the aggressiveness of patient (limit order) traders, while impatient (market order) traders base their decisions primarily on the best quotes. Patient traders’ choices depend more on the state of the LOB on the same side of the market, while impatient traders mostly look at the state of the LOB on the opposite side. The aggressiveness of both types of traders augments with the inside spread. However, patient (impatient) traders submit more (less) aggressive limit (market) orders when the depth of the own (opposite) best quote and the length of the own (opposite) side of the book increase. We also find that higher depth away from the best ask (bid) quote may signal that this quote is ‘too low (high)’, causing incoming impatient buyers (sellers) to be more aggressive and incoming patient sellers (buyers) to be more conservative.     

Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets?

We develop a model in which limit order traders possess volatilityinformation. We show that in this case the size of the bid–askspread is informative about future volatility. Moreover, ifvolatility information is in part private, we establish that(i) the size of the bid–ask spread and (ii) its informativenessabout future volatility should change in the same directionwhen limit order traders' identifiers stop being disclosed.We test these predictions using data from the Paris Bourse.As expected, we find that the average quoted spread and itsinformativeness are significantly smaller when limit order traders'identifiers are concealed. These findings suggest that the limitorder book is a channel for volatility information.     

Characteristics of the order flow through an electronic open limit order book

We estimate and examine certain characteristics of the order flow through an electronic open limit order book, using order (not trade) data. In doing this, we bring out new evidence on order flow from a market with microstructure different from that of the NYSE. We find that the proportion of informed orders is less than 10%, lower than previous estimates. Informed traders choose smaller orders than uninformed traders, but do not materially differ in their choice of limit or market orders. The proportion of informed investors is similar between good and bad news days. Finally, there are U-shaped intraday patterns in order arrival, and the information content of the order flow appears to follow this pattern across the day.     

Lifting the Veil: An Analysis of Pre-trade Transparency at the NYSE

We study pre‐trade transparency by looking at the introduction of NYSE's OpenBook service that provides limit‐order book information to traders off the exchange floor. We find that traders attempt to manage limit‐order exposure: They submit smaller orders and cancel orders faster. Specialists' participation rate and the depth they add to the quote decline. Liquidity increases in that the price impact of orders declines, and we find some improvement in the informational efficiency of prices. These results suggest that an increase in pre‐trade transparency affects investors' trading strategies and can improve certain dimensions of market quality.     

Order aggressiveness as a metric to assess the usefulness of accounting information

Motivated by the availability of high-frequency data on trading activity, this paper proposes the use of order aggressiveness as a metric to evaluate the usefulness of accounting information. I test, through an analysis of order aggressiveness, whether earnings announcements of firms listed on the Italian Stock Exchange limit order book have information content. I estimate an ordered probit relating order aggressiveness to unexpected earnings and to three market determinants of aggressiveness. Consistent with the theory on the choice between limit and market orders, I find that order aggressiveness increases with the absolute value of unexpected earnings. The results provide evidence on the extent to which the information contained in earnings is used by traders.     

Decomposing liquidity along the limit order book

In this paper, we estimate the asymmetric information and order processing components of liquidity at extended depths along the limit order book. Using data from the INET ECN, we find that the asymmetric information component decreases as depth increases. Inactive stocks have more information asymmetry at the inside quotes, but it decreases more rapidly along the book than for active stocks. The order processing component of liquidity has fixed and variable constituents, consistent with a fixed cost per order as well as a variable portion based on the size of the order.     

Liquidity determination in an order-driven market

We exploit full order level information from an electronic FX broking system to provide a comprehensive account of the determination of its liquidity. We not only look at bid-ask spreads and trading volumes, but also study the determination of order entry rates and depth measures derived from the entire limit order book. We find strong predictability in the arrival of liquidity supply/demand events. Further, in times of low (high) liquidity, liquidity supply (demand) events are more common. In times of high trading activity and volatility, the ratio of limit to market order arrivals is high but order book spreads and depth deteriorate. These results are consistent with market order traders having better information than limit order traders.     

DOES SPEED MATTER? THE ROLE OF HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING FOR ORDER BOOK RESILIENCY

We analyze limit order book resiliency following liquidity shocks initiated by large market orders. Based on a unique data set, we investigate whether high-frequency traders are involved in replenishing the order book. Therefore, we relate the net liquidity provision of high-frequency traders, algorithmic traders, and human traders around these market impact events to order book resiliency. Although all groups of traders react, our results show that only high-frequency traders reduce the spread within the first seconds after the market impact event. Order book depth replenishment, however, takes significantly longer and is mainly accomplished by human traders’ liquidity provision.     

Liquidity,information, strategic trading in an electronic order book: New insights from the European carbon markets

The electronic limit order book (LOB hereafter) has rapidly become the primary way of trading European carbon assets over the 4 years of the EU ETS programme (2008–2012). In this first attempt of examining the informational content of an electronic order book, we evidence that order flow imbalances have a moderate capacity to predict short term price changes. However, we find that both LOB slope and immediacy costs help to forecast quote improvements and volatility in the next 30 min. Further, we explain why informed trading is highly influential and show that it consists in mixing order splitting strategies and posting fleeting orders once the asymmetric information is reduced (Rosu, 2009). Overall, the consolidated status of the order book mirrors a high level of market uncertainty and a low degree of informational efficiency. In this way, strategic trading can in itself explain some of order book properties, independently of the degree of traders’ sophistication and market competition.     

Multiple-limit trades: empirical facts and application to lead–lag measures

Order splitting is a standard practice in trading: traders constantly scan the limit order book and choose to limit the size of their market orders to the quantity available at the best limit, thereby controlling the market impact of their orders. In this article, we focus on the other trades, multiple-limit trades that go through the best available price in the order book, or ‘trade-throughs’. We provide various statistics on trade-throughs: frequency, volume, intraday distribution, market impact, etc., and present a new method for the measurement of lead–lag parameters between assets, sectors or markets.     

Order aggressiveness and quantity: How are they determined in a limit order market?

Dealers trading in a limit order market must choose both the order aggressiveness and the quantity for their orders. Since little research has considered how dealers make this trade-off, we empirically investigate how dealers jointly make these decisions in the foreign exchange market using a unique simultaneous equations model. Our model uses an ordered probit model to account for the discrete nature of order aggressiveness and a censored regression model to capture the quantity decision recognizing the clustering of orders at the smallest available quantity, $1 million. Using two currency pairs with very different trading characteristics, we find evidence of a trade-off between order aggressiveness and quantity. We also find a significant role being played by factors related to the levels of information asymmetry and liquidity in the dealers’ choices of both the order aggressiveness and quantity.     

Competition,signaling and non-walking through the book: Effects on order choice

We investigate the effects of competition and signaling in a pure order driven market and examine the trading patterns of agents when walking through the book is not allowed. Our results suggest that the variables capturing the cost of a large market order are not informative for an impatient trader under this market mechanism. We also document that the competition effect is not present only at the top of the book but persistent beyond the best quotes. Moreover, it dominates the signaling effect for both a limit order and a market order trader. Finally, we show that institutional investors’ order submission strategies are characterized by only a few pieces of the limit order book information. This is consistent with informed traders placing orders based on their own private valuations rather than the state of the book.     

Competition from the limit order book and NYSE spreads

Using the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) trades, orders, reports, and quotes data, we investigate whether competition from the limit order book reduces NYSE spreads. We replicate and extend the research design of McInish and Wood (1992). We find that there is a statistically significant reduction in NYSE spreads as a result of limit order competition and that the reduction is significantly greater in the morning than during the remainder of the trading day. We also examine the day-of-the-week differences in limit order placements and find no day of the week pattern in the number or the size of limit order placements.     

Limit order books and trade informativeness

In the microstructure literature, information asymmetry is an important determinant of market liquidity. The classic setting is that uninformed dedicated liquidity suppliers charge price concessions when incoming market orders are likely to be informationally motivated. In limit order book (LOB) markets, however, this relationship is less clear, as market participants can switch roles, and freely choose to immediately demand or patiently supply liquidity by submitting either market or limit orders. We study the importance of information asymmetry in LOBs based on a recent sample of 30 German Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) stocks. We find that Hasbrouck's (1991) measure of trade informativeness Granger causes book liquidity, in particular that required to fill large market orders. Picking-off risk due to public news-induced volatility is more important for top-of-the book liquidity supply. In our multivariate analysis, we control for volatility, trading volume, trading intensity and order imbalance to isolate the effect of trade informativeness on book liquidity.