An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

A theoretical analysis of institutional investors' trading costs in auction and dealer markets

This paper compares trading costs for institutional investors subject to liquidity shocks, in auction and dealer markets. The batch auction restricts the institutions' ability to exploit informational advantages because of competition between institutions when they simultaneously submit orders. This competition lowers aggregate trading costs. In the dealership market, competition between traders is absent but private information is revealed by observing the flow of successive orders and so reduces aggregate trading costs. We analyse the relative effects on trading costs of competition and information revelation in the two systems and derive a parameter inequality which determines which system has lower costs.     

Strategy-proofness in experimental matching markets

We introduce two novel matching mechanisms, Reverse Top Trading Cycles (RTTC) and Reverse Deferred Acceptance (RDA), with the purpose of challenging the idea that the theoretical property of strategy-proofness induces high rates of truth-telling in economic experiments. RTTC and RDA are identical to the celebrated Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms, respectively, in all their theoretical properties except that their dominant-strategy equilibrium is to report one’s preferences in the order opposite to the way they were induced. With the focal truth-telling strategy being out of equilibrium, we are able to perform a clear measurement of how much of the truth-telling reported for strategy-proof mechanisms is compatible with rational behaviour and how much of it is caused by confused decision-makers following a default, focal strategy without understanding the structure of the game. In a school-allocation setting, we find that roughly half of the observed truth-telling under TTC and DA is the result of naïve (non-strategic) behaviour. Only 14–31% of the participants choose actions in RTTC and RDA that are compatible with rational behaviour. Furthermore, by looking at the responses of those seemingly rational participants in control tasks, it becomes clear that most lack a basic understanding of the incentives of the game. We argue that the use of a default option, confusion and other behavioural biases account for the vast majority of truthful play in both TTC and DA in laboratory experiments.

     

Technology adoption in markets with network effects: Theory and experimental evidence

We examine a technology-adoption game with network effects in which coordination on either technology A or technology B constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff dominant. We define a technology’s critical mass as the minimal share of users, which is necessary to make the choice of this technology the best response for any remaining user. We show that the technology with the lower critical mass implies risk dominance and selection by the maximin criterion. We present experimental evidence that both payoff dominance and risk dominance explain participants’ choices in the technology-adoption game. The relative riskiness of a technology can be proxied using either technologies’ critical masses or stand-alone values absent any network effects.     

Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets

This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.     

An experimental investigation of overdissipation in the all pay auction

Pervasive overbidding represents a well-documented feature of all-pay auctions. Aggregate bids exceed Nash predictions in laboratory experiments, and individuals often submit bids that guarantee negative profits. This paper examines three factors that may reduce pervasive overbidding: (a) repetition (experience), (b) reputation (strangers vs. partners), and (c) active participation. Reputation and repetition reduce aggregate overdissipation, but they eliminate it only in conjunction with active participation.     

Bubble measures in experimental asset markets

We review bubble measures which are commonly used in the experimental asset market literature. It seems sensible to require that measures of mispricing should (i) relate the fundamental value and price, (ii) be monotone in the difference between fundamental value and price, and (iii) be independent of the total number of periods and the absolute level of fundamental value. We show that none of the measures currently used fulfills all these criteria. To facilitate comparability across different experimental settings with different parameterizations we propose two alternative measures which fulfill all evaluation criteria. The measure for mispricing, RAD (relative absolute deviation), is calculated by averaging absolute differences between the (volume-weighted) mean price and the fundamental value across all periods and normalizing it with the absolute value of the average FV of the market. The measure for overvaluation, RD (relative deviation), is calculated analogously, but uses raw difference between (volume-weighted) mean prices and fundamental values. Hence, it provides information on whether the mispricing stems from over- or undervaluation of the asset.     

Sick pay provision in experimental labor markets

Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental gift exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate generous sick pay with higher effort? Second, do firms benefit from offering sick pay? Our main finding is that workers do reciprocate generous sick pay with higher effort. However, firms benefit from offering sick pay in terms of profits only if there is competition among firms for workers. Consequently, competition leads to a higher voluntary provision of sick pay relative to a monopsonistic labor market.     

Price flexibility and market performance in experimental markets

Summary Posted offer and double auction pricing institutions are examples of fixed and flexible pricing institutions, respectively. In laboratory settings, double auction markets dominate posted offer institutions in terms of the amount of potential surplus which traders are able to extract. These results are invariant with respect to the experience of traders or the perishability of the good traded. Performance differences across institutions may be due to information differences. The introduction of a second price-posting in the posted offer institution results in a pricing institution which is closer to the double auction's flexible pricing environment. Laboratory results suggest that under otherwise comparable conditions, this innovation is sufficient to remove the performance differences which have been demonstrated to exist between the posted offer and double auction institutions.We acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Arts Research Board of McMaster University. We thank Robert Moir and Susan Sabourin for computational work on this project and the fifteen undergraduates who worked as recorders and recruiters. We also thank Charles Plott and seminar participants at the Economic Science Association, Canadian Economics Association, and Waterloo University for the comments received on recent versions of this work.     

The effects of one-way compatibility on technology adoption in systems markets

This paper analyzes the effects of one-way compatibility on technology adoption in a market that is characterized by a free-entry condition on the software side. We show that hardware-backward compatibility increases a new-generation hardware firm’s profit; the effects of software-backward compatibility on the hardware firm’s profits depend on the distribution of consumer types.     

The social cost of rent seeking in Europe

Direct measurement of the social cost of rent seeking is impeded by non-observable and non-reported activities. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to compute the social cost of rent seeking in Europe. Our estimate is based on competition among interest groups for privileges provided by governments, including income transfers, subsidies, and preferential tax treatment. The model, which is calibrated to the euro area as a whole and also to individual euro member countries for 1980–2003, performs well vis-à-vis the data. We find that significant proportions of GDP are extracted as rents available to be sought by rent seekers.     

The effects of MFA quota elimination on Indian fibre markets

This article examines the effects of multi-fibre arrangement (MFA) quota elimination on Indian fibre market. The partial equilibrium Indian fibre model was developed using a theoretically consistent framework and incorporated regional supply response, substitutability between cotton and man-made fibres, and appropriate linkage between cotton and textile sectors. Baseline projections were developed for supply, demand and prices of cotton, man-made fibres and textiles under a set of exogenous assumptions. The effects of MFA textile quota eliminations were introduced into the model by conducting three scenarios, i.e. increasing textile exports by 10, 20 and 30% from the baseline level. The results suggest that on an average, cotton imports rise by 4–8% annually, while the man-made fibre exports from India decline with the opening of textile markets in the developed countries. The higher domestic cotton prices encourage acreage expansion in cotton in all the three regions in India, but not enough to meet rising mill demand under the scenarios of higher textile exports. The rise in cotton imports from India has little effect on world cotton prices.     

An experimental analysis of the effects of automated mitigation procedures on investment and prices in wholesale electricity markets

In this paper we report the findings of an economic experiment that examines the effects of an automated mitigation procedure (AMP) on prices and capacity investment choices of suppliers in a wholesale electricity market. Specifically, we examine the effects of different market power incentives on markets with and without an AMP. While we find that the AMP does not affect overall investment in capacity, the most significant determinant of long-run prices is investment in new capacity. The AMP also does not reduce long-run prices relative to markets without an AMP. Furthermore, our participants successfully manipulated the AMP’s trigger price. The data and a sample copy of the instructions are available upon request. This article reflects the opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or any individual Commissioner.     

The role of optimal threats in auction design

This paper studies revenue-maximizing auctions when buyers' outside options depend on their private information and are endogenously chosen by the seller. We show that the revenue-maximizing assignment of the object can depend crucially on the outside options that the seller can choose as threats. Depending on the shape of outside options, sometimes an optimal mechanism allocates the object in an ex-post efficient way, and, other times, buyers obtain the object more often than is efficient.     

Concurrent trading in two experimental markets with demand interdependence

Summary. We report results from fifteen computerized double auctions with concurrent trading of two commodities. In contrast to prior experimental markets, buyers' demands are induced via CES earnings functions defined over the two traded goods, with a fiat money expenditure constraint. Sellers receive independent marginal cost arrays for each commodity. Parameters for buyers' earnings functions and sellers' costs are set to yield a stable, competitive equilibrium. In spite of the complexity introduced by the demand interdependence, the competitive model is a good predictor of market outcomes, although prices tend to be above (below) the competitive prediction in the low-price (high-price) market.     

The determinants of rent extraction in the parent-subsidiary relation

A recurring problem in financial development is to understand which poor quality institutions lead to substantial rent extraction by controllers. When rent extraction is high and its extent difficult to predict, outside investment in firms may decline. Recent work has emphasized the quality of the legal system and the overall quality of political institutions as explaining the degree to which rent extraction can occur. Here we exploit a comprehensive parent-subsidiary data-set to shed light on these questions. Using the relation between parent and subsidiary Tobin’s Q to measure the extent of parent companies’ rent extraction from partially-owned subsidiaries, the results indicate that governmental quality, legal origin, rules on self-dealing and political stability all predict the degree of rent extraction.     

Water markets design and evidence from experimental economics

Market mechanisms are gaining increasing acceptance all over the world as a way of making more efficient use of scarce water resources. Designing regulatory frameworks that ensure both inter- and intra-temporal efficient allocations is a daunting task, especially if supply is stochastic and there is ample storage capacity. In addition to defining tradable rights, specific provisions must regulate the use of reservoirs. Commonly, water statutes include provisions that establish asymmetries regarding the allocation of water, and market restrictions that ban water trading across different users. In this article, we use data collected in a laboratory to test two specific market regulations included in the 1999 Water reform in Spain. First, junior right holders are not allowed to buy water from senior users. Second, the law does not explicitly define water rights over units left in reservoirs for the following season. Results suggest that trading restrictions among water right holders lead to welfare losses for senior users. It is shown that removing this restriction would increase senior right holders’ benefits, without reducing those of junior users. Results show that defining water rights over saved units across periods would increase the average stock levels of reservoirs, and reduce market price instability. The lessons learned from the Spanish experience are applicable to settings characterized by unstable natural water supply and the availability of large storage facilities.      

The all-pay auction with complete information

Summary In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium.We are grateful to Jacques Crémer, Chuangyin Dang, Jürgen Dennert, Chaim Fershtman, Martin Hellwig, Arthur Robson, Heinrich Ursprung, Eric van Damme, Ton Vorst, and the referees for helpful comments. We benefitted from presentations at the World Congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona, the European Meeting on the Economics of Information at Tilburg University, the Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings at the University of Illinois, and seminars at Texas A&M University, The Pennsylvania State University, Tilburg University and the University of Montreal. Baye is grateful for support from the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University and the Tinbergen Institute where earlier versions of this paper were completed. Kovenock acknowledges support from Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Tinbergen Institute, the Center for Economic Studies at the University of Munich, the Institut d'Analisi Economica CSIC at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the Krannert School of Management, and the Jay N. Ross Young Faculty Scholar Award.