经济适用房不同补贴方式的效果

通过数学模型,分析政府对经济适用房生产商或购买者实施补贴对购买者的效用影响、对生产商行为的影响、对政府补贴成本的影响,及至对经济适用房成交量、成交价格和净社会福利的影响。研究结果表明:对经济适用房生产商采用降低土地价格的补贴方式不如对其按单位价格补贴或按成交价的一定比例补贴,这后两种方式都更有效率,能够降低政府补贴成本,减少政府腐败行为,促进房地产商开发适合低收入者所需要的住房并提高销售效率。     

要不要另选补贴方式

日前,我读到一篇题为“经济适用房十惑”的文章。该文提出:经济适用房这种补贴方式不合理,政府不应通过减免税费来建造低价房,而应把这种补贴转化为货币,直接发放给中低收入者,让他们到市场上去买房子。但笔者认为,直接向中低收入者发放购房补贴,会显著地增加地方财政负担,需要慎重考虑。     

对中国政府大豆产业补贴的博弈分析

加入WTO后,中国减少对进口征收关税和壁垒,大豆产业将面临进口大豆的冲击。大豆的比较优势较弱,进口贸易依存度逐年增长。建立博弈模型来分析政府对我国大豆产业补贴的策略选择,通过分析发现,中国政府的补贴对中国大豆产量起了促进作用,而对美国大豆产量起到了抑制的作用。而且当美国大豆生产商选择高价格策略时,中国政府选择补贴国内高技术大豆生产商;当美国大豆生产商选择低价格时,中国政府选择补贴普通豆农。     

双重政策下汽车动力电池再制造闭环供应链决策与协调

考虑回收补贴与碳交易双重政策下由电池生产商和零售商组成的汽车动力电池再制造闭环供应链,构建由生产商主导的集中定价决策模型与分散定价决策模型,采用数值仿真的方法量化分析动力电池梯次利用质量门槛、回收补贴、动力电池再制造碳排放量三种因素对回收价格、供应链利润以及回收价格与销售价格比值的影响。结果表明：集中决策能够带给消费者更低的购买价格和更高的回收价格;梯次利用质量门槛、动力电池再制造碳排放量的降低均会带来回收价格、供应链利润以及回收价格与销售价格比值提高;回收补贴的升高会带来回收价格、供应链利润以及回收价格与销售价格的比值的增加。     

关税视角下跨境双渠道供应链的政府补贴策略

针对当前跨境电商贸易面临的国际关税壁垒和绿色壁垒问题,构建考虑政府补贴干预的跨境双渠道供应链模型,分析了关税视角下不同政府补贴策略对供应链成员决策以及利润的影响。研究表明:关税增加导致产品绿色度和供应链成员收益均降低;生产成本补贴下制造商的利润更高,但研发成本补贴下决定价格变化趋势的绿色化效率系数阈值更低,同时产品绿色度更优;固定补贴比例下政府补贴支出随关税和研发成本增加而减少,随消费者绿色偏好提高而增加。     

政府补贴、道德补偿与企业捐赠

根据道德补偿理论,企业无偿接受政府补贴后,面临道德赤字上升的压力,可能会做出更多回报社会的补偿善意行动。文章从道德补偿视角,利用2011—2018年沪深A股上市公司样本研究了政府补贴对企业捐赠行为的影响。研究结果表明,政府补贴提高了企业参与捐赠活动的积极性,这一结果在改变企业捐赠度量方式、控制内生性问题后同样成立。进一步研究发现,企业道德赤字水平越高,政府补贴对企业捐赠的促进作用越显著,具体表现为当企业有违规行为或取得超额创新补贴时,政府补贴对捐赠行为的促进作用更显著。研究不仅丰富了政府补贴社会效益方面的理论,也补充了企业捐赠的动机理论。     

政府保障房供求补贴的不同效果

解决中低收入人群的基本住房问题是实现社会公平的基本国策之一。为了有效地实施保障性安居工程，通过构建数学模型研究在财政补贴率相同的条件下，住房消费补贴与住房供给补贴的成交价格、成交量与社会福利情况，可以发现这两者之间存在较大的差别，前者的成交价格、成交量和社会福利都高于后者，但前者比后者的财政补贴额更多。如果提高财政补贴率，那么前者成交价格会不断提高，而后者成交价格会不断降低，成交量都会呈现扩大趋势。成交价格、成交量和社会福利不但与财政补贴率及其补贴方式有关，也与住房的需求弹性和供给弹性有关。研究结论的政策意义在于，如果在政府财力有限、住房价格上涨压力较大的条件下，应当采用住房供给补贴；如果在政府财力相对宽松、住房价格上涨压力相对较小、依靠住房拉动经济增长的压力较大的条件下，则应当采用住房消费补贴，同时它还能实现公平与效率兼顾的目的。无论是采用住房消费补贴还是住房供给补贴，都应当增大供给弹性，减小需求弹性。     

政府补贴、机构股东与成本粘性

以2013—2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本,采用拓展的成本粘性模型,探究“八项规定”后政府补贴、机构股东对企业成本粘性的影响,以及机构股东的调节作用,研究发现：政府补贴增强了成本粘性,机构股东能抑制成本粘性,机构股东对政府补贴与成本粘性之间的关系起负向调节作用。进一步研究发现,政府补贴对成本粘性的影响与企业产权性质无关;机构股东对成本粘性的影响以及机构股东的调节作用仅在非国有企业中存在。不同地区,政府补贴、机构股东、成本粘性之间关系不同。政府补贴对成本粘性的影响仅在地方政府官员未发生变更年份时存在;机构股东对成本粘性的影响与地方政府官员变更无关,但机构股东的调节作用仅在地方政府官员未发生变更年份存在。     

取消经济适用房是大好事

知名财经评论家、财经专栏作家叶檀称：近日，取消经济适用房传播蛊广，同时公租房与廉祖房并轨运行，通过财政发放房租补贴的方式，区别对“城市低保人群”“城市中低收入人群”等进行住房保障的手段，对于“低保”人群提供大比例租金补贴，     

考虑碳排放差异的闭环供应链补贴机制研究

考虑到再制造碳排放差异闭环供应链的决策与补贴问题,运用stackbelberg博弈理论,研究了补贴机制对闭环供应链均衡价格与节点企业利润的影响,探讨了政府补贴力度、碳排放差异与制造过程总碳排放量之间的关系。研究表明:补贴机制能有效提升回收率与节点企业利润,降低节点企业决策价格与单位产品平均碳排放量,并能根据补贴力度、碳排放差异与碳排放总量之间的关系,制定合适的补贴制度,在提高再制造水平的同时控制总碳排放量。最后通过数值算例验证了上述结论。     

Government subsidy provision in biomass energy supply chains

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the government’s optimal subsidy provision strategy for a biomass energy supply chain that consists of the power plant, the villagers’ committee and farmer. We examine three possible subsidy provision strategies depending on which party (the power plant, the villagers’ committee or the farmer) the government chooses to subsidise, and compare how it can influence the government’s target by assuming that the subsidy price is exogenously given. We also extend our findings when the government can endogenously determine the subsidy price. Moreover, our analyses reveal the optimal stakeholder selection strategy for each party to maximise its payoff.     

基于成本差异的最佳贸易与产业政策选择

本文讨论了存在成本差异的第三国市场模型的最佳贸易与产业政策选择问题，讨论了社会成本和私人成本、本国和外国成本差异情况下的Cournot竞争和Bertrand竞争的情况。本文发现，在Cournot竞争下，政府首先行动时，当政府基金影子价格低于4／3时，政府对出口进行补贴，并且本国越有成本优势，补贴越高，补贴的利润转移效应越大；当政府基金影子价格高于4／3时，政府对出口征收出口税，且本国越有成本优势，征税越多。在Bertrand竞争下，当政府先行动时，对出口征收出口税；当政府后行动时，对出口进行补贴。当本国企业具有劣势时，事后补贴是最佳政蓑。     

美国的廉租住房保障措施及借鉴

美国廉租住房保障的措施主要包括:以政府的直接支出开发公共住房、政府资助开发私有出租房、要求或鼓励开发商提供廉价(租)住房以及向租住家庭提供租金补贴以扩大其住房需求。分析了这些措施的优势和不足。认为我国应建立以中央政府为主导的廉租住房保障机制;在建设和保有一定量的公共廉租住房的同时依靠优惠政策吸引私人投资,扩大廉租住房的供给;进一步完善廉租住房货币补贴保障机制;要求或鼓励开发商在建设经济适用房、普通商品房的同时配建廉租住房。     

保障性住房财政补贴模式效率评价——基于住房供给市场差异的研究

加大保障性安居工程财政补贴支持力度,确保财政补贴的高效运行成为推进安居工程建设的关键。依据住房供给弹性和住房过滤理论,从经济学角度分析了供方补贴和需方补贴的实施效率。基于不同城市的住房市场差异,考察我国11个典型城市的住房供给弹性和住房过滤,在识别本地区住房市场特性的基础上探讨适宜采取的补贴方式。研究表明,不同城市由于住房供给弹性和过滤情况的不同,保障性住房财政补贴的效率存在显著差异,采取合适的保障房补贴方式,能够优化资源配置,打破财政压力对推进保障房工作的限制。     

Location incentives in the low-income housing tax credit: Are qualified census tracts necessary?

The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) is the largest project-based housing subsidy in the United States. Within the program, private developers receive a subsidy in exchange for constructing apartment units that rent for a predetermined affordable rate. Because the subsidy requires apartment buildings to charge a lower rental rate, the opportunity cost of developing subsidized housing in a location is the market rent that a developer could have charged if he had not received the subsidy. This study characterizes how profit incentives motivate location decisions within the LIHTC program by showing that opportunity cost causes more LIHTC development in locations with low market rent. This result implies that additional financial incentives, like the qualified census tract, may not be necessary to promote construction of subsidized housing in low-rent areas.     

Tax expenditures and other programs to stimulate housing: Do we need more?

Discussions to aid the housing industry raise several questions. First, does stimulation of housing demand require new direct subsidy programs? And, second, are any programs to increase demand worth their costs to society? The results in this paper indicate that the answer to both questions is no: the existing subsidy to homeownership in the tax code is, when combined with mortgage instruments that offset cash flow problems, fully capable of generating large increases in demand at the cost of significant tax expenditures; and the social benefits of increased housing demand are shown to be worth only about 60% of their costs. Consequently, increasing housing demand can be readily achieved, but doing so will be costly to the government and inefficient for society.     

Estimation and policy implications of rental housing demand

The demand for rental housing using the Annual Housing Survey SMSA sample for 1977 is estimated. The principal determinants of rental housing demand, namely housing price and permanent/transitory income, are computed through spatially varying hedonic price techniques and instrumental variables methods (relating to human and nonhuman capital), respectively. Based on the demand estimation results, impacts of hypothetical cash and rent subsidy programs are analyzed in terms of “housing” and “welfare” effects. It is found that a rent subsidy achieves considerably larger effects than does a cash subsidy.     

经济适用房定价中的讨价还价博弈模型

近年来,经济适用房价格过高一直是社会关注的焦点。本文基于开发商与消费者的讨价还价模型,给出一个最优的政府指导价。     

Transaction costs, capital-gains taxes, and housing demand

The paper considers the effect of transaction costs—particularly in the form of capital-gains taxes—on the aggregate demand for owner-occupied housing. The framework is an overlapping-generations model, where consumers can avoid the transaction costs (taxes) by keeping the same house for both periods of life. The first part of the paper analyzes the consumer's choice problem. It distinguishes between costs that are fixed irrespective of the size of the house bought or sold, and costs such as capital-gains taxes that are related to the house value. It is shown that higher transaction costs have lock-in effects, inducing consumers to keep the same house for both periods. Also it is found that under a wide variety of circumstances the amount of housing demanded will increase as the household is being locked in. Finally, the paper looks at the effects on aggregate demand from an increase in capital-gains taxes. It is shown that an increased rate of taxation decreases demand for low tax rates. But for high tax rates, when lock-in effects become important, one generally gets the opposite effect; high tax rates tend to increase housing demand.