行为经济学视角的纳税遵从研究述评

论文从A-S模型的理性人假说开始,介绍了传统的纳税遵从理论的基本思想,并列举纳税遵从异像来讨论行为经济学对经典A-S模型的冲击,用以阐述行为经济学视角的纳税遵从研究产生的原因.本文综述了纳税遵从影响因素,直观推断法下的纳税遵从行为,以及有关预期效用理论在纳税遵从领域中的应用,以对纳税遵从的“非理性”行为进行解释.     

辨析财务遵从与纳税遵从

针对纳税人权利与义务,从财务角度理解税收实体法和税收程序法,增强纳税人的纳税遵从意识,从而避免涉税风险。     

企业纳税遵从成本的问题及对策研究

企业作为理性的经济人,以追求税后利润最大化为目标。提高企业纳税遵从度,有效降低纳税环节中潜在的遵从成本,对保证其生产要素的流动性、收入分配的公平性和经济决策的时效性等方面都具有十分重要的现实意义。根据佳木斯市企业及其纳税的相关数据,分析其企业纳税遵从成本存在的自觉纳税意识淡薄、纳税服务质量不高和税务代理筹划不够完善等问题,从企业视角提出了加强纳税遵从意识和制度建设、提高人员素质和代理应用程度、强化与税务机关协调能力等降低企业纳税遵从成本的基本对策。     

浅析企业纳税遵从行为及其模型构建

纳税遵从作为一国税制和征管体制优劣的一个评价指标,已引起了税务当局以及学术界的广泛关注。在税收实践中,纳税人是否选择纳税遵从,涉及很多主客观因素。本文从纳税人的角度出发。运用预期效用最大化理论,分析纳税人在做纳税决策时所考虑的成本因素,建立企业纳税遵从行为的模型,分析纳税人的纳税遵从行为,并给出相关的政策性建议。     

国内纳税遵从成本研究综述

从宏观角度理清国内对于纳税遵从成本研究的概况,对学术界在纳税遵从成本方面的研究是较为重要的一步.国内的研究主要涉及影响因素、成本构成、测算方法、对遵从行为的影响等角度,以数据为支撑的研究并不多,这将是后续研究可深入之处.     

税收遵从成本对企业纳税遵从的影响分析——基于企业逃税模型的视角

在传统的A-S逃税模型中加入税收遵从成本因素分析以及对纳税遵从的影响,只适用于个人纳税。运用企业逃税模型分析税收遵从成本对企业纳税遵从的影响不仅符合企业实际,而且在我国更有现实意义。当前,应完善税收征管,简化税制,优化税收环境,从根本上降低企业税收遵从成本。     

基于期望理论的纳税遵从行为研究

根据预期效用理论,大部分人会少报所得额、偷逃税款.然而在现实生活中,我们看到的是大部分人选择依法纳税.在较低的税务检查率和罚款率的威慑效应下,现实的纳税遵从水平为何如此之高?文章通过综合述评,将期望理论引入纳税决策范畴,对纳税主体的税收遵从行为进行分析,解释了预期效用理论下的纳税困惑,并得出结论:税率与纳税遵从水平负相关.     

纳税服务的经济学分析

由于长期的观念影响,我国的纳税服务体系一直处于一种监管型,并未向服务型转变。文章通过目前我国纳税服务体系现状的描述,从公共财政理论、新公共管理理论和税收遵从理论三个角度分析了纳税服务存在的必要性,以及如何提供纳税服务和建立一种和谐的税收体系。     

企业纳税遵从度的影响因素分析及对策探讨

文章对税务机关税收征管中存在的难点及影响纳税遵从度的因素进行了剖析,并提出了提高纳税遵从度的若干对策建议,包括以税收价格论重构税收法律意识理论基础、建立科学高效的税收征管体系、加强税法知识宣传与教育,普及税法知识等。     

税收遵从视角下的纳税服务优化路径

文章在分析税收遵从理论的基础上,探讨了优化纳税服务的有效路径,通过引导纳税遵从,提高纳税人的税收遵从度,营造一个依法诚信纳税的良好环境。     

企业税收遵从成本影响因素分析

根据国内外关于税收遵从成本影响因素的研究结论并借助因子分析法发现,企业认为影响税收遵从成本的主要因素是税收征管效率、纳税服务体系的完善、税收制度的复杂性与公平性、税率的高低,税法的稳定性与明确性及企业的纳税素质。因此,制定统一的税收法典与规范税收各项制度是降低企业税收遵从成本的关键所在。     

Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions

By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.     

Enforcing Compliance with Environmental Agreements in the Absence of Strong Institutions: An Experimental Analysis

This paper uses laboratory experiments to evaluate the performance of a deposit-refund mechanism used to enforce compliance with voluntary public-good commitments made in the absence of strong regulatory institutions. With this mechanism agents decide whether to join an agreement and pay a deposit prior to making their contribution decisions. If an agreement receives sufficient membership to form, members then make their contribution decisions and compliant members are refunded their deposits. If an agreement does not form, then deposits are immediately refunded and a standard voluntary contribution game is played. We find that the deposit-refund mechanism achieves nearly full efficiency when agreements require full participation, but is far less effective, and in some cases disruptive, when agreements require only partial participation. As the mechanism does not require the existence of strong sanctioning institutions, it is particularly suited for enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements.     

Compliance with Endogenous Audit Probabilities

In this paper, we study the effect of endogenous audit probabilities on reporting behavior in a face‐to‐face compliance situation, such as at customs. In an experimental setting in which underreporting has a higher expected payoff than truthful reporting, we find an increase in compliance of about 80 percent if subjects have reason to believe that their behavior towards an officer influences their endogenous audit probability. Higher compliance is driven by considerations about how their own appearance and performance affect their audit probability, rather than by the social and psychological effects of face‐to‐face contact.     

Efficient Environmental Policy with Imperfect Compliance

Discussions of efficient environmental policytend to recommend taxes rather than quotas ongrounds of efficiency; a uniform tax willequalize marginal abatement cost betweenpolluters. When polluters' actions are imperfectly observable, the distinction betweentaxes and quotas becomes less clear. Taxes maybe evaded by underreporting of emissions, whilequota violations will not always be discovered.This paper explores the conditions under whichthe efficiency properties of taxes continue tohold even when evasion is possible, and theextent to which the fine for quota violationsplays the same role as a tax on emissions withsimilar efficiency properties.     

The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement

This paper examines the optimal fine for violations of environmental regulations, taking into account financial constraints facing regulated firms and the hierarchical structure of regulatory enforcement. Contrary to the existing literature, which suggests that maximal fines are sub-optimal, we find that the optimal fine is either the maximum amount the firm can afford to pay or zero (i.e., no regulation). The impact of a change in industry structure on the optimal fine, firm compliance and regulatory resource strategies is considered. We identify conditions under which the equilibrium level of regulatory resources decreases with an increase in the number of firms in the industry.     

Agri-Environmental Program Compliance in a Heterogeneous Landscape

Heterogeneity of agricultural landscapes may necessitate the use of spatially targeted instruments. But costly enforcement may be needed to ensure compliance with these policies. This paper examines the design of agri-environmental policies designed to achieve reductions in fertilizer application rates and installation of riparian buffers through the use of incentive-based instruments. We derive monitoring strategies capable of ensuring perfect compliance from risk neutral farmers given realistic limits on penalties for non-compliance. We then apply that framework empirically using a parametric model reflecting Finnish agricultural and environmental conditions. The results of our simulations indicate that subsidies for installing and maintaining buffer strips, used alone, are the most cost effective means of reducing nitrogen runoff from crop production. This policy is also the most attractive politically, in that it reduces farm income less than the alternatives considered.