The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures

We consider the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings, i.e., where each player's payoff is completely determined by the identity of other members of her coalition. We first discuss how hedonic and nonhedonic settings differ and some sufficient conditions for the existence of core stable coalition partitions in hedonic settings. We then focus on a weaker stability condition: individual stability, where no player can benefit from moving to another coalition while not hurting the members of that new coalition. We show that if coalitions can be ordered according to some characteristic over which players have single-peaked preferences, or where players have symmetric and additively separable preferences, then there exists an individually stable coalition partition. Examples show that without these conditions, individually stable coalition partitions may not exist. We also discuss some other stability concepts, and the incompatibility of stability with other normative properties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, A14, D20.     

技术主体系统的演化过程及演化模型

通过对技术主体系统发展历史的回顾,建立其演化过程的模型,并据此来分析技术主体系统演化中的稳定与突变特征及作用机制。     

Informal sector: The credit market channel

We build a model of firms' choice between formality and informality. Complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods, enforcement of property rights and contracts, that make the participation in the formal credit market possible. In a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality, and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements. The model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality.     

Informal sector: The credit market channel

We build a model of firms' choice between formality and informality. Complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods, enforcement of property rights and contracts, that make the participation in the formal credit market possible. In a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality, and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements. The model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality.     

非正式行政指导与村民自治

在现行体制下,乡镇是压力型国家体制的末梢,而村民自治又具有合法的独立性。两者的关系难以处理。由于农村是一个公共生活、日常生活和私人生活不分化的社会,在乡镇直接指导村民自治矛盾较多的情况下,应考虑加强乡镇对于村民日常生活和私人领域的非正式行政指导。其途径应当是增进村民与乡镇干部的互信、强化乡镇及其工作人员的指导能力、强化乡村党组织配合指导的能力。     

Informal communication

The typical sender-receiver game studied in the literature assumes that receiver is uninformed. I analyze a model where receiver has private information and sender cares to be perceived as honest. If sender's honesty concerns are strong enough, the model predicts information revelation as a unique equilibrium. This uniqueness result contrasts with the multiplicity of equilibria in games with uninformed receiver. To achieve information revelation as a unique equilibrium, receiver may have to ask for information, which is extraneous for her decision. If sender's honesty concerns are not too strong, asking for extraneous information may create an incentive for lying.     

非正式组织成因的实证研究

非正式组织管理是人本管理的重要内容。本文以非正式组织的成因为研究对象，通过对国内外相关研究成果的回顾。结合组织行为学的理论，提出基于中国文化背景下非正式组织成因的三个假设。通过问卷调查，对回收数据进行可靠性分析、描述性统计分析、单因素方差分析，验证假设，得出结论。在中国文化背景下，人们是出于情感的需要、共同的价值观体系以及相似的个体偏好而自发形成非正式组织。基于非正式组织成因的实证研究。提出几点对人本管理的启示。     

Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements

We study coalition formation in "real time", a situation in which coalition formation is intertwined with the ongoing receipt of pay-offs. Agreements are assumed to be permanently binding: They can only be altered with the full consent of existing signatories. For characteristic function games we prove that equilibrium processes—whether or not these are history dependent—must converge to efficient absorbing states. For three-player games with externalities each player has enough veto power that a general efficiency result can be established. However, there exist four-player games in which all Markov equilibria are inefficient from every initial condition, despite the ability to write permanently binding agreements.     

Cabinet Formation in Coalition Systems

Theoretical and empirical issues concerning the political bargaining process over cabinet formation in coalition systems are addressed in this paper. A set of theoretical predictions is tested using a sample of 13 western European countries observed throughout the period 1950–1995. It appears that the formation delay is increasing in the degree of ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners and that the share of portfolios secured by the formateur is decreasing in the degree of complexity of the bargaining environment. A few factors affecting the degree to which the outcome of the negotiation process can be defined as balanced are also identified.