Real liquidity and banking

In an economy where banks take numeraire goods, so called money, as deposits, money allows depositors suffering preference shocks to withdraw from banks prematurely without liquidation of real investment. If real liquidity, defined as the real value of the monetary base, is low, the amount of payment liquidity, constrained by the velocity of money, limits the short-term price level of investment goods before banks can settle their long-term loan contracts. This leads to an attractive nominal long-term investment return and over-investment. Allowing for inside money, that is, bank deposits, to be used for payment can improve social welfare but cannot fully resolve the liquidity shortage problem as the short-term interest rate offered by banks is constrained by the threat of bank runs. In the presence of systemic liquidity shocks, the price-adjustment mechanism cannot take full effects with insufficient payment liquidity, which can lead to non-zero profits for banks. Exchanging investment goods for numeraire goods through international trade can improve social welfare.     

Money, banking, and monetary policy

An important function of banks is to issue liabilities, like demand deposits, that are relatively safe and liquid. We introduce a risk of theft and a safe-keeping role for banks into modern monetary theory. This provides a general equilibrium framework for analyzing banking in historical and contemporary contexts. The model can generate the concurrent circulation of cash and bank liabilities as media of exchange, or inside and outside money. It also yields novel policy implications. For example, negative nominal interest rates are feasible, and for some parameters optimal; for other parameters, strictly positive nominal rates are optimal.     

The Regulation of Private Money*

Financial crises are bank runs. At root, the problem is short-term debt (private money), which while an essential feature of market economies, is inherently vulnerable to runs in all its forms (not just demand deposits). Bank regulation aims at preventing bank runs. History shows two approaches to bank regulation: the use of high-quality collateral to back banks’ short-term debt and government insurance for the short-term debt. Also, explicit or implicit limitations on entry into banking can create charter value (an intangible asset) that is lost if the bank fails. This can create an incentive for the bank to abide by the regulations and not take too much risk.     

Deregulation and oligopolistic rivalry in bank deposit markets

This paper provides a partial equilibrium analysis of a deregulated market for bank deposits in which banks behave oligopolistically but entry and exit are freely permitted. It is demonstrated that the effects of variations in market interest rates, reserve requirements, and bank cost and demand conditions upon the market quantity of bank deposit money are fundamentally altered if the degree of bank rivalry adjusts endogenously. Hence, banking deregulation may produce significant changes in the relationships between these variables and the stock of deposit money.     

Equilibrium Dynamics in an Endogenous Growth Model of Money and Banking

We construct an analytically tractable endogenous growth model of money and banking where money provides "liquidity services" to facilitate transactions and banks convert non-reserve deposits into productive capital. We examine both the long- and short-run effects of changes in the money growth rate or the reserve requirement ratio. In response to a change in the required reserve ratio, the inflation rate and the growth rates of capital, real balances, and consumption need not adjust monotonically along the transition path. While the balanced growth equilibrium may be either a saddle or a source locally, the global dynamical system exhibits flip bifurcation.     

A Model of QE,Reserve Demand,and the Money Multiplier

Quantitative easing (QE) programs have driven unprecedented expansions in the supply of central bank reserves around the world over the past two decades, fundamentally changing the implementation of monetary policy. The collapse in money multipliers following QE episodes has often been interpreted as implying banks are happy to passively hold most of the reserves created by QE. This paper develops a simple microsimulation model of the banking sector that adapts the traditional money multiplier model and allows for bank reserve demand to be inferred from monetary aggregates. The model allows the use of unwanted reserves by banks to play out over time alongside QE purchases and incorporates both significantly higher reserve demand after 2008 and capital constraints. With these additions, the model explains the persistently lower money multipliers seen in the United States following QE, as well as the growth in commercial bank deposits. The model suggests the demand from banks for reserves has increased substantially since the introduction of QE but not to the point where banks are passively absorbing all newly created reserves.     

Aftermath of banking crises: Effects on real and monetary variables

This paper models the effects of a banking crisis, and in particular distinguishes between a short-term crisis, such as a banking panic, and a longer-term crisis, such as a banking insolvency. Using an optimizing framework, it shows that depositors shift from deposits into cash in both types of crises, which results in an increase in the interest rates on deposits and loans, and a contraction in output and consumption. However, when the crisis is resolved in a finite time period, there is an intertemporal substitution of consumption, and consumption is postponed until the crisis is resolved. This in turn results in a further decline in the demand for money, availability of credit and output.     

Correlated bank runs,interbank markets and reserve requirements

This article extends the application of global games of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) in the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to account for correlation in the quality of banks’ long term investment, when banks are linked through cross deposits and there is a central bank. The goal is to study how these elements affect the deposit contract that banks offer to depositors and the ex ante probability of a bank run. We show that the coexistence of a central bank, which determines banks’ reserve requirements, and an interbank market, which redistributes reserves, leads to a smaller probability of a bank run and to fewer inefficient bank runs, relative to the case with no central bank and no interbank market. By adequately choosing the level of reserves to store, the central bank can improve the equilibrium outcome and allow banks to offer a higher interim payment to depositors, relative to the situation with no cross deposits.     

A lost century in economics: Three theories of banking and the conclusive evidence

How do banks operate and where does the money supply come from? The financial crisis has heightened awareness that these questions have been unduly neglected by many researchers. During the past century, three different theories of banking were dominant at different times: (1) The currently prevalent financial intermediation theory of banking says that banks collect deposits and then lend these out, just like other non-bank financial intermediaries. (2) The older fractional reserve theory of banking says that each individual bank is a financial intermediary without the power to create money, but the banking system collectively is able to create money through the process of ‘multiple deposit expansion’ (the ‘money multiplier’). (3) The credit creation theory of banking, predominant a century ago, does not consider banks as financial intermediaries that gather deposits to lend out, but instead argues that each individual bank creates credit and money newly when granting a bank loan. The theories differ in their accounting treatment of bank lending as well as in their policy implications. Since according to the dominant financial intermediation theory banks are virtually identical with other non-bank financial intermediaries, they are not usually included in the economic models used in economics or by central bankers. Moreover, the theory of banks as intermediaries provides the rationale for capital adequacy-based bank regulation. Should this theory not be correct, currently prevailing economics modelling and policy-making would be without empirical foundation. Despite the importance of this question, so far only one empirical test of the three theories has been reported in learned journals. This paper presents a second empirical test, using an alternative methodology, which allows control for all other factors. The financial intermediation and the fractional reserve theories of banking are rejected by the evidence. This finding throws doubt on the rationale for regulating bank capital adequacy to avoid banking crises, as the case study of Credit Suisse during the crisis illustrates. The finding indicates that advice to encourage developing countries to borrow from abroad is misguided. The question is considered why the economics profession has failed over most of the past century to make any progress concerning knowledge of the monetary system, and why it instead moved ever further away from the truth as already recognised by the credit creation theory well over a century ago. The role of conflicts of interest and interested parties in shaping the current bank-free academic consensus is discussed. A number of avenues for needed further research are indicated.     

Money,interest, inflation and growth in Turkey

This paper estimates a two equation model of inflation and growth in Turkey over the period 1950–1977. Inflation is determined by the difference between the rates of change in nominal money supply and real money demand. The short-run growth function consists of an expectations augmented Phillips curve, to which a credit availability effect is added. Under Turkey's disequilibrium institutional interest rate and exchange control systems, the real supply of domestic credit is determined, in large part, by real money demand which is, in turn, influenced by the real deposit rate of interest. The central bank can use both the nominal money supply and the nominal deposit rate of interest as policy instruments for stabilisation purposes.     

Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking

Central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the lender-of-last-resort function. This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems. Depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets, so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic. The likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system. Banking systems with well-diversified big banks are less prone to inefficient bank runs because diversification alleviates the information asymmetry. In addition, big banks can self-monitor through publicly observable branch closure. Systems of many small banks form incentive-compatible bank coalitions to emulate the big banks during times of crisis. Such coalitions improve efficiency by monitoring member banks and issuing money that is a kind of deposit insurance—a precursor of central banking.     

Bank runs, welfare and policy implications

This paper studies the welfare implications of various government policies that have been used to prevent bank runs. The benchmark model suggests that a bank run is a business-cycle-state-related phenomenon and it leads to the failure of the risk-sharing mechanism provided by the banking sector. Extensions of the model show that a number of policy instruments, including the suspension of convertibility of deposits, the taxation on short-term deposits, reserve requirement and blanket guarantee, turn out to be inefficient. Instead, I propose that a limited-coverage deposit insurance scheme or capital requirements can be welfare-improving.     

A Model of Systemic Bank Runs

We develop a tractable model of systemic bank runs. The market-based banking system features a two-layer structure: banks with heterogeneous fundamentals face potential runs by their creditors while they trade short-term funding in the asset (interbank) market in response to creditor withdrawals. The possibility of a run on a particular bank depends on its assets' interim liquidation value, and this value depends endogenously in turn on the status of other banks in the asset market. The within-bank coordination problem among creditors and the cross-bank price externality feed into each other. A small shock can be amplified into a systemic crisis.     

经济增长、结构失衡与流动性过剩——论我国当前流动性过剩的成因与对策

由于社会保障制度的不完善和分配结构的不合理,经济增长带来居民收入增长的同时,消费需求难以有效放大,储蓄和净出口的高增长成为必然。储蓄的高增长导致银行的存贷差上升,其分流导致股市和房市的流动性过剩;净出口的持续高增长和国际资本的大量涌入导致国际收支持续的高顺差。由于汇率缺乏弹性,基础货币的被动增加和货币乘数的预期外上升一并导致货币供给过剩。强化储备货币发行国的发行约束;调整外贸发展战略,优化产业结构;扩大消费需求;扩大汇率浮动区间;提高货币政策的科学性等措施可以有效控制和利用流动性过剩。     

Quantitative easing in an open economy—Not a liquidity but a reserve trap

Expansionary monetary policy is ineffective in a liquidity trap. In another case, which we call a “reserve trap,” money supply increase is trapped in bank reserves; there is no credit expansion through the banking system. In such case, quantitative easing (QE) will not boost credit to the real sector and revitalize the economy. To analyze a reserve trap, we modify the open economy model to include multiple interest rates. Trade is included since exports can be financed externally even during domestic credit constriction. We show the conditions under which QE can lead to currency depreciation and trigger an export-led recovery.     

On the social usefulness of fractional reserve banking

In this paper we argue that if monetary policy has insufficient deflation, private agents have incentives to set up alternative payment systems like fractionally backed bank deposits, which pay interest on the means of payment. In a competitive environment with free entry, these alternative systems are inherently fragile in the sense that they are subject to socially costly bank runs. These social costs are not internalized by private individuals and banks and may exceed their social benefits. We argue that as communication technologies improve, the social benefits of fractional reserve banking decrease, but the private benefits may still exceed the private costs so that such systems continue to be used. In such situations, 100% reserve requirements are optimal.     

时变概率的区制转换泰勒规则设计及其“稳定器”作用机制研究

本文将传统泰勒规则发展为具有时变转换概率的马尔科夫区制转换泰勒规则,基于Kim(2004)以两步MLE方法估计了该货币政策规则,并证明了其稳定器作用。研究发现:(1)货币政策中规则性成分的稳定器作用存在非对称性,在区制一内,规则性成分不存在稳定器作用,在区制二内,规则性成分有较强稳定器作用;(2)货币政策中相机抉择成分可以影响各区制的自我演化概率,在进行相机抉择逆周期调控的同时,又可以引导经济系统转向规则性成分有稳定器作用的区制。文章最后根据该货币政策规则的稳定器作用机制给出货币政策操作模式,在经济增长放缓时期,中央银行应该以增大基础货币增长和宽松型窗口指导为直接操作工具,以短期名义利率为中间目标;在经济高涨时期,中央银行应该以提高直接标价法的中美汇率水平和上调存款准备金率为直接操作工具,以短期名义利率为中间目标。     

Convergence,capital accumulation and the nominal exchange rate

This paper develops a flexible price, two-sector growth model with a nominal side to study the role of the exchange rate in transition dynamics. We adopt a standard small open economy model with traded and nontraded goods, where the engines of growth are exogenous productivity improvements and capital accumulation. We enhance this standard framework by adding a preference for real money holdings, captured by money-in-the-utility. We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and assume that the interest rate on bonds issued by the small open economy is debt-dependent, and interpret it as a simple financial friction. We show analytically that the choice of the exchange rate regime influences the transition dynamics of a small open economy through the balance sheet of the central bank. We then calibrate the model to explore the quantitative significance of our results. We find that the choice of the exchange rate regime has significant and lasting effects on prices, consumption, investment and sectoral allocations, and the composition of financial assets.     

Banking in the theory of finance

Banks are financial intermediaries that issue deposits and use the proceeds to purchase securities. This paper argues that when banking is competitive, these portfolio management activities in principle fall under the Modigliani-Miller theorem on the irrelevance of pure financing decisions. It follows that there is no need to control the deposit creation or security purchasing activities of banks to obtain a stable general equilibrium with respect to prices and real activity. In practice, however, banks are forcibly involved in the process by which a pure nominal commodity or unit of account is made to play the role of numeraire in a monetary system. The paper examines the nature of such a nominal commodity and how, through reserve requirements, banks get involved in making it a real economic good.     

Balance-of-payments crises in a perfect foresight optimizing model

The paper extends the literature on balance-of-payments crises by treating the issue in a generalized equilibrium framework. Investors maximize a non-separble utility function, defined over consumption and real money balances, under the threat of a future collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime. The paper obtains real effects in the form of current account adjustments when agents realize that the fixed regime is not indefinitely viable. New information regarding official foreign lending can cause attacks at the central bank in the form of sudden shifts by investors out of domestic money into foreign bonds.