Banking panics and policy responses

When policy makers have limited commitment power, self-fulfilling bank runs can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. We study how such banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. A run in this setting is necessarily partial, with only some depositors participating. In addition, a run naturally occurs in waves, with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further response from policy makers. In this way, the interplay between the actions of depositors and the responses of policy makers shapes the course of a crisis.     

Could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank runs?

Restrictions placed on bank portfolios are analyzed in a banking model designed to capture the role of checking accounts in facilitating transactions. Forcing banks to hold only liquid assets creates the incentive for liquidity-based runs. Even when a run does not occur, welfare is reduced as a result of overinvestment in the liquid asset.     

Bank runs, foreign exchange reserves and credibility: When size does not matter

The paper considers the sizes of banking sectors that are vulnerable to runs when the central bank cares about economic stability and currency peg credibility. It is shown that when banks are small, the central bank will recapitalize unhealthy banks because doing so will not compromise its peg. While recapitalizations of large banking sectors will compromise a peg, central banks will also bailout large banking sectors in distress to prevent great economic instability. Given the central bank's expected response, a range of sizes for banking systems, which are vulnerable to runs, is found along with a condition in which size will not matter. That is, if that condition is satisfied, banking sectors of all sizes will be immune to runs. The experiences of Asia and Argentina are discussed to provide anecdotal support for the model.     

影子银行体系与流动性管理

影子银行体系具有特殊的形成机理,是金融抑制制度背景下的博弈产物。目前,影子银行体系在金融市场上以证券化的方式创造流动性,容易在短期内出现从流动性过剩到流动性紧缩的转变,造成宏观经济的不稳定,需要作出必要的监管安排。     

Bank runs, welfare and policy implications

This paper studies the welfare implications of various government policies that have been used to prevent bank runs. The benchmark model suggests that a bank run is a business-cycle-state-related phenomenon and it leads to the failure of the risk-sharing mechanism provided by the banking sector. Extensions of the model show that a number of policy instruments, including the suspension of convertibility of deposits, the taxation on short-term deposits, reserve requirement and blanket guarantee, turn out to be inefficient. Instead, I propose that a limited-coverage deposit insurance scheme or capital requirements can be welfare-improving.     

关于中国货币流通速度对通胀影响的几个事实的研究

该文比较研究了中国、美国和欧元区不同时期货币流通速度的变动特征。研究发现：货币流通速度在经济和金融危机期间急剧下降,使得巨量的货币供给在短期内并不会带来严重通货膨胀;货币流通速度通常会受到资产价格上升的抑制,在一定条件下,资产价格上升与通货膨胀之间存在替代关系;货币流通速度在长期（10年以上）呈U型,中国可能已经进入货币流通速度的上升期,等量的货币供应可能对应更高的通胀水平。     

景气指数分析显示：专来一段时期内货币信贷增速将放缓

货币政策目标体系由最终目标、中间目标和操作目标三个层次构成,中央银行对它们的可控性由弱至强。为能够及时而有效地观测与控制货币政策的实施效果与力度,需要对便于观测与控制的货币政策中间目标进行有效的监测、预测与预警．文章应用基于先行指标体系的景气指数分析方法,分析货币政策中间目标的周期波动,揭示中间目标的运行趋向。测算结果显示,未来一段时期内货币信贷增速将放缓。     

Deposit insurance and money market freezes

In the presence of deposit insurance, a rise in counterparty risk may cause a freeze in interbank money markets. We show this in a general equilibrium model with regionally segmented bank-based retail financial markets, in which money markets facilitate the reallocation of funds across banks from different regions. Counterparty risk creates an asymmetry between banks in savings-rich regions, which remain marginally financed by the abundant regional insured deposits, and in savings-poor regions, which have to pay large spreads in money markets. This asymmetry distorts the aggregate allocation of credit and, in the presence of demand externalities, can cause large output losses.     

Transferability, finality, and debt settlement

Payment, fundamental to exchange in a decentralized economy, often takes the form of transfers of inside money, i.e., specialized forms of debt. Associated with each type of inside money is a set of rules that governs both the legitimacy of such transfers as means of extinguishing other debts, and the allocation of the ensuing risks.In this paper we develop a model of debt as inside money. In a simple mechanism design framework we show that transferable debt that can be used to settle other debt obligations with finality can be a welfare improving arrangement in the presence of limited enforcement powers. Transferable debt has two advantages over simple chains of credit: it allows for removal of less-than-perfectly reliable agents from the chain in a timely fashion, and it allows agents to direct payments to the proper party without direct communication with other members of the credit chain.     

Money, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking

Anna Schwartz's insights and careful analysis of the forces shaping institutions have contributed greatly to our understanding of money, central banks, and monetary policy. We discuss these contributions in the context of three issues. The first concerns governments' role in money. First, we focus on Anna's contribution to our understanding of the quality of money. In this context, we consider how the acceleration of globalization and developments in information technology has, as an external development, forced improvements in institutions and social arrangements. The second issue concerns the potential for currency boards to serve as an intermediate institution in the evolution toward and, perhaps now, away from so many central banks and sovereign monetary authorities. Finally, we turn our attention to current issues in the implementation of monetary policy.     

Banking on the principles: Compliance with Basel Core Principles and bank soundness

This study finds that banks receive more favorable Moody's financial strength ratings in countries with better compliance with Basel Core Principles related to information provision. The results are robust to controlling for broad indexes of institutional quality, macroeconomic variables, sovereign ratings, and reverse causality. Compliance with other Core Principles does not affect ratings robustly. Measuring bank soundness through Z-scores yields broadly similar results for advanced and emerging markets. Countries aiming to upgrade banking regulation and supervision should consider giving priority to information provision over other elements of the core principles.     

我国中外资银行私人银行业务的比较分析及启示

目前,我国私人银行业务的发展正处在起步阶段。本文对国内中资银行和外资银行在组织结构模式、品牌忠诚度、产品与服务以及专业化水平的竞争力进行对比,分析中资银行在发展私人银行业务中的不足,进而提出中资银行在发展私人银行业务的过程中应不断完善自身财富资产管理能力和服务团队的建设,既要加强与外资金融机构的合作,也要注重金融产品创新、建立高端的专业化人才队伍以及注重私人银行离岸业务的发展。     

Access policy and money market segmentation

Deviations between interest rates paid in the Swiss franc unsecured money market and the respective Libor rate are analysed for a period spanning the financial crisis. First, banks that have access to sources of secured central bank and interbank funding pay less than other banks. Second, foreign banks (not chartered in Switzerland) pay more than domestic banks. Third, both lines of segmentation are economically relevant but limited due to open access to sources of secured funding. Thus, access policy matters for monetary policy implementation and financial stability.     

虚拟货币市场的特征与规范发展

随着信息与互联网技术的高速发展,虚拟货币交易以其便捷、高效和经济的特点在网络小额支付中被广泛采用,然而,其应用也带来了一定的风险。文章概括了虚拟货币的定义、功能与特点,分析了虚拟货币在发行、流通等环节存在的风险隐患,并从明确监管原则、建立虚拟货币发行主体信用评级机制等方面就进一步规范虚拟货币市场发展提出相关建议。     

CEO inside debt and investment‐cash flow sensitivity

This paper provides a new explanation for investment‐cash flow sensitivity from the perspective of CEO inside debt holdings. We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on investment‐cash flow sensitivity for a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms from 2006 to 2012. We find that the firms with higher relative CEO leverage ratios (CEO's debt/equity ratio scaled by the firm's debt/equity ratio) generate higher investment‐cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the relative CEO leverage ratio enlarges investment‐cash flow sensitivity by 50 per cent. This positive relationship still holds even after we take account of endogeneity and financial constraints.     

对货币供应，产出缺口在通胀传导中机制的研究

随着经济全球化和金融市场日益发达,通胀的形成和传导机制发生了较大变化,即使存在较大产出缺口,宽松货币政策引发的通胀预期还是会推升上游初级产品价格,并迅速向下游传导。但该文认为,总需求仍是影响通货膨胀的重要因素。一方面,货币乘数顺周期内生,风险溢价逆周期内生,总需求低迷会抑制货币扩张的程度;另一方面,货币对需求的刺激程度也具有顺周期特性,总需求低迷时,即使成功扩张了货币,其对总需求的刺激作用也打了折扣;不仅如此,通胀预期虽然会推高国际大宗商品价格和资产价格,但只要货币政策保持稳定,这两种价格能否持续上涨终究还是取决于总需求。     

Asset prices and banking distress: A macroeconomic approach

This paper links banking with asset prices in a dynamic macroeconomic model, to provide a simple characterization of financial instability. In contrast with historical bank runs, recent banking crises were driven by deteriorating bank assets. Hence, in contrast with bank run models, this paper focuses on the interaction of falling asset prices, bank losses, credit contraction and bankruptcies. This interaction can explain credit crunches, financial instability, and banking crises, either as fundamental or as self-fulfilling outcomes. The model distinguishes between macroeconomic and financial stability. Its simplicity helps understand balance sheet effects and delivers closed-form solutions without resorting to linearization. For instance, the critical threshold beyond which an asset price decline triggers financial instability can be related explicitly to the structural parameters of the economy.     

美国货币市场与联储救市政策工具的实施效果

金融危机爆发后,美国货币市场流动性几近枯竭,为重启和恢复货币市场功能,美联储新增多种政策工具向金融机构提供了大量流动性。该文重点分析了这些政策工具的设计意图及实施效果,指出实施救助后,美国货币市场运行趋于正常,但除短期国债市场外,其他子市场的融资量尚未恢复到危机前水平;美国货币市场的表现再现了美国实体经济的问题,而要解决这些问题,单靠联储的货币政策是远远不够的。     

美国银行业压力测试最新实践的经验与启示

金融危机以来,压力测试作为现有风险管理技术的重要补充,受到了广泛的关注。本文介绍了银行业压力测试的基本定义、宗旨理念、步骤程序、结论的关注点与积极作用,深入研究了美国银行业压力测试最新实践的设计和实施框架,总结了压力测试范围、情景设置、组织与资源保障、信息披露与应对措施等方面值得我国借鉴的经验,进而提出我国银行业压力测试在数据方法、覆盖范围、治理结构与结果应用等方面的建议。     

银行竞争与银行业稳定研究述评

近期有大量文献分别从竞争与银行风险转嫁激励,竞争与银行授信行为, 以及竞争与银行危机传染等不同的角度研究了银行竞争与银行业稳定之间是否存在权衡关系。虽然理论研究和实证研究并未就此达成一致的看法,但某些观点对于制定银行管制政策却给出了新的思路。