混合寡头下的横向合并及反垄断控制研究

本文在混合所有制下研究了市场结构及企业产权结构对企业间横向合并福利结果的影响。研究显示，即使存在能够降低企业生产成本的协同效应，合并仍将导致消费者福利的下降；合并引起的社会总福利改变则随混合所有制企业中私有产权比重的上升呈现倒U型特征。以上结果显示，在混合所有制下企业间合并的反垄断审查中，反垄断机构应充分考虑产权因素对合并福利结果的影响，并在此基础上形成适用于不同产权类型企业统一的反垄断控制标准。     

探析企业合并中的反垄断问题

随着社会主义市场经济的深入发展,中国加入WTO,对外开放进一步扩大,越来越多的跨国公司进军中国市场。可以预见,未来几年在中国市场上会掀起一股企业合并的热潮。与经济生活形成强烈反差的是,我国控制企业合并的立法却相对滞后,作为市场经济法核心地位的《反垄断法》至今尚未出台。没有法律约束下的企业合并,必然会加强市场势力而形成垄断。本文拟对企业合并反垄断控制问题予以分析,以期有助于我国的反垄断立法。一、企业合并反垄断控制的必要性(一)经济垄断在我国已经出现自政府20世纪80年代中期开始倡导企业联合,大力发展企业集团,中国…     

标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位的反垄断问题研究

标准必要专利在标准与专利的整合中应运而生并提升了知识经济效能。但是，专利标准化的同时也扩大了专利权人在相关市场的支配力，很容易产生专利权滥用行为，如不公平高价许可、不合理搭售、无正当理由要求反向许可等。以标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位为切入点，以高通案为例,分析标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位的反垄断问题，针对反垄断法体系，从立法与执法两个方面提出政策建议,为涉及标准必要专利的反垄断行政执法和反垄断诉讼提供借鉴。     

标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位的反垄断问题研究——以高通案为例

标准必要专利在标准与专利的整合中应运而生并提升了知识经济效能。但是,专利标准化的同时也扩大了专利权人在相关市场的支配力,很容易产生专利权滥用行为,如不公平高价许可、不合理搭售、无正当理由要求反向许可等。以标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位为切入点,以高通案为例,分析标准必要专利权人滥用市场支配地位的反垄断问题,针对反垄断法体系,从立法与执法两个方面提出政策建议,为涉及标准必要专利的反垄断行政执法和反垄断诉讼提供借鉴。     

技术创新与我国反垄断立法

从技术经济和产业组织的角度观察,企业技术创新除了高知识性、高不确定性和高沉没成本外,溢出性是其重要特征之一.本文提出在我国的反垄断立法中应采纳动态竞争而非静态竞争的思想;对与技术创新相关的企业合并采取创新市场分析而非产品市场分析,从创新要素投入而非创新产出的角度评价;正确处理保护知识产权和反垄断的均衡关系,为我国企业技术创新营造一个良好的市场经济环境.     

合并反垄断审查中消费者证词的证据功能及其限制——以美国为实证视角

在合并反垄断案件中,消费者证词是反垄断机构和法院界定相关市场、认定合并反竞争效应的重要证据之一,具有独特的地位和意义。但是,消费者证词也具有较强的主观性和片面性,因此,立法机构或法院往往对其设定有严格的可采性规则和排除性规则,以发挥其证据功能,又限制其滥用。     

反垄断实施宽严特征研究:一个分析框架

中国反垄断实施的宽严问题一直是业内争议的一个焦点,但从现有文献看,对这个问题还缺乏规范和系统的研究。通过引入执法决策的积极失误成本和消极失误成本概念,建立最优执法标准决定模型,可确立衡量反垄断执法宽严变化的标准。通过对各变量对最优执法标准的影响机理分析,可得出反垄断执法标准的宽严受市场制度、法制环境、执法投入、执法效率和执法收益等因素影响。中国当前反垄断执法较为宽松的重要原因是执法供给能力不足,并具有结构性、相对性、阶段性等特征。现阶段中国的反垄断执法应采用宽严相济的政策组合工具,加强反垄断执法能力建设,建立执法机构协调机制,构建反垄断与管制行业分类监管体制,淡化反行政垄断职能。     

美国反垄断分析方法研究

美国不同时期的经济竞争理论及观点存在分歧。其先后颁布施行的《谢尔曼法》、《克莱顿法》及《美国联邦贸易委员会法》确立了反垄断分析的基本标准、方法和程序,并先后通过判例,明确了＂本身违法原则＂、＂合理原则＂,成立了联邦贸易委员会;同时,对于＂相关产品市场＂及＂同一地理市场＂的界定确定了标准和方法。至此,从方法论角度美国建立了其反垄断分析的基本框架。     

企业间所有权、国际卡特尔与进口钾肥定价权缺失

本文研究了中国进口钾肥定价权缺失的形成原因,结合国内外钾肥市场实际情况,构建了中国进口钾肥谈判博弈模型,证明了在国内外企业间具有所有权关系情况下,中国进口钾肥价格被抬高,钾肥国际卡特尔容易维持。本文经验分析发现,全球钾肥市场存在很多利于合谋的条件,国外主要钾肥企业扩大产能,控制产量,钾肥价格严重偏离生产成本,利润率过高。本文提出中国反垄断执法机构应对国内外主要钾肥企业进行反垄断调查,应努力构建全球反垄断体系;中国应进一步实质放开钾肥进口谈判权。     

信息产业的垄断形成机理及其反垄断政策研究

本文从信息产业最基本的特征人手,通过建立理论模型研究信息产业垄断的形成机理,并结合微软、苹果和谷歌的案例,分析垄断力量的形成以及反垄断新格局的出现,并在此基础上得出反垄断政策。在以信息技术为代表的当代信息产业,垄断具有了新的特征,即对于建立在专利技术之上的技术标准的垄断。信息时代反垄断面临着如何解决标准的公共产品性和专利技术的私有性之间的矛盾,如何在促进公共利益的同时又不妨害企业创新的激励,反垄断政策需要作相应的改变。我们主张,反垄断政策在真实网络领域和虚拟网络领域应该有所不同。在真实网络领域,反垄断政策应以引入竞争为主;而在虚拟网络领域,政府应尽可能促进垄断性技术（标准）的开放,有效限制垄断者的反竞争行为,并在鼓励技术创新和促进社会福利提高之间找到恰当的均衡;同时应适当限制垄断产品的价格。除了反垄断措施以外,促进竞争性技术创新的市场环境对于瓦解垄断势力和限制垄断行为具有重要作用。     

Mergers in the food retailing sector: An empirical investigation

We address the problem of merger evaluation, for competition policy purposes, in the retailing sector. The likely effects of a possible merger are analysed ex ante. The novelty of the paper lies in the inclusion of downstream and upstream market power effects on the retailers. Also, it provides an empirical application to the Portuguese food retailing market. The effects of additional concentration on prices are estimated, as well as the price reduction insiders are likely to obtain via an improved bargaining position. The final effect on prices depends on how these cost reductions are reflected in insiders’ prices, i.e., on the pass-through rate. For realistic values of this rate we find that the merger in question will most likely increase consumer prices and, therefore, should not be allowed on an antitrust legislation basis.     

对上市公司并购效应的实证研究

随着中国资本市场的发展,并购在社会存量资本重组中己经占据着越来越重要的位置。实证研究发现中国上市公司并购绩效在并购前后呈现先上升后下降的趋势,并购存在严重的短期效应,未能实质性提高并购绩效。因此,中国应逐步建立职业经理市场,努力做好整合后的并购工作。     

关于企业合并的立法思考

企业合并在其对社会经济的发展起积极促进作用的同时，在一定条件下，还有可能对市场经济的公平竞争产生消极的妨碍作用。从反垄断和维护公平竞争出发，我国的企业合并立法，应从我国市场经济发展的实际出发，吸收国外的成功经验，并与国际惯例接轨，在全球经济一体化过程中，保障国家利益并维护本国企业的利益。     

HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN A DIFFERENTIATED COURNOT OLIGOPOLY

Using a standard differentiated goods quantity competition setting, we show three facts about horizontal two‐firm mergers that are not true for a homogeneous goods Cournot market. First, merger of two firms is profitable for the merging firms provided that goods are sufficiently distant substitutes. Second, merging of two firms can lead to more two‐firm mergers. Third, an initially non‐profitable two‐firm merger can occur in anticipation of subsequent mergers. These facts imply that mergers are more likely to occur in differentiated goods markets than in homogeneous goods markets.     

Safe Harbours in Merger Guidelines: What Should They Be?

Safe harbours in merger guidelines define post‐merger market concentration or concentration change thresholds below which proposed mergers are unlikely to be anti‐competitive; anti‐competitiveness is usually measured as a ‘substantial lessening of competition’. Yet competition agencies have different safe harbours. We used merger models to run many simulations involving a wide range of market structures and merger‐induced aggregations. The post‐merger unilateral price increases in these scenarios were used to gauge what the safe harbours should be to keep price increases below a specified threshold. The safe harbour thresholds commonly used were found typically to be too restrictive, in that they failed to screen out mergers that were almost certainly competitively benign.     

浅析中国企业并购中的突出问题及应对策略

企业的并购是市场经济的产物 ,也是市场发展的必然结果。伴随着中国市场经济体制的逐步建立 ,企业之间的并购日渐频繁 ,同时暴露出来的问题也越来越多 ,必须认真地加以解决。否则 ,这将会对中国的经济发展产生不利影响。该文从中国企业并购中出现的突出问题着手 ,有针对性地提出了应对策略。     

On the “merger paradox” in price competition with asymmetric product differentiation

By assuming asymmetric product differentiation, we consider the “merger paradox” in price competition (or the incentive to collude in prices). We investigate whether the emergence of the merger paradox depends on the degree of product differentiation between firms. In particular, unlike Deneckere and Davidson (1985), we demonstrate that if the degree of product differentiation between the insider and outsider is sufficiently small, then they are strategic substitutes, and thus, the merger paradox arises in price competition.     

A test of the impact of mergers on bank competition

We propose a new test to evaluate the impact of horizontal mergers on competition in the banking industry. The test is designed to be applied ex ante to potential mergers while being parsimonious in terms of data, as it only uses information on branches in local markets. The test is a counterfactual exercise based on a two‐stage model where banks compete in branching and interest rates and requires comparing the estimated degree of competition in the status quo, where branching networks by banks are those actually observed, with a counterfactual scenario, where the branching network of the new entity is the sum of the branches of the banks involved in the horizontal merger. The statistical difference between the two estimated measures of competition quantifies the impact of the merger. We apply our test to French and Italian mergers.     

How Horizontal Mergers Improve Industrial Structure？

By reviewing the research on the effect of corporate merger, we find that knowledge is still limited to the effect of corporate merger on industrial structure. In this article, firstly we study the effect of horizontal merger on market structure, then explore the effect of market performance on industrial structure. Finally we present a new model that can explain how horizontal merger improves the adjustment of industrial structure.     

Merger policy,entry, and entrepreneurship

We assess the impact of merger policy on entry and entrepreneurship. When faced with uncertainty about its prospects, and foreseeing that it may wish to leave the market should profitability prove poor, a rational entrant considers possible exit routes. Horizontal merger reduces competition post-merger which, all else being equal, lowers welfare; but merger also provides a valuable exit route. By facilitating exit and thus raising the value of entry, more lenient merger policy may stimulate entry sufficiently that welfare is increased overall. We calculate the optimal merger policy in the form of a low, but positive, profitability threshold below which merger is permitted despite the adverse impact on post-merger competition. This may be viewed as an extension of the “failing firm defence” to include ailing, low profitability firms as well as imminently failing ones. Merger policy is compared with an entry subsidy, and the implications of strategic firm behaviour for the choice of merger policy are also examined.