横向税收竞争的环境效应研究

在我国,提供公共产品的事权多在地方。在财力有限的情况下,为了较好地履行职责,地方政府不得不通过参与激烈的税收竞争来增强本地的经济和财政实力。文章通过分析地方税收竞争的诱因,提出地方政府之间存在激烈的横向税收竞争也会影响环境污染的理论推断,并依经济发展水平的不同,将全国分为东、中、西部三个地区,尝试探讨了不同地区环境污染的相似性及差异性。运用面板数据分析地方政府之间横向税收竞争对辖区环境质量的影响情况,结果发现,在横向税收竞争的作用下,不同地区在工业三废排放方面既存在一定的相似性又有所差异。建议采取必要的对应措施解决地方政府之间横向税收竞争所造成的不良环境后果。     

税收竞争、分成激励与政府偏好——兼论均等化转移支付的作用

财政分权为地方政府大力发展经济提供激励的同时，也引发了地区之间的税收竞争。分成激励将如何影响地区间的税收竞争强度?在不同政府偏好下税收竞争将怎样影响地区投资、产出差距和居民福利?均等化转移支付在税收竞争中扮演着什么样的角色?为了解答上述问题，本文构建一个税收竞争模型并进行多个维度的拓展，结合数值模拟分析表明：(1)地方政府税收分成比例增加会提高税收竞争强度；(2)地区之间的税收竞争、投资和税收政策显著受到地方政府偏好的影响；(3)随着分成激励的加强，税收竞争将导致地区之间的产出差距和居民福利差距逐渐增加；(4)均等化转移支付制度能够缓解地区间税收竞争。因此，上级政府在制定对地方主政官员考核方式时应该考虑地方政府偏好对地区税收政策和财政支出政策的影响，同时要做好地区统筹，为欠发达地区提供相应政策支持并合理利用均等化转移支付政策工具。     

地方政府税收竞争助推了经济发展不平衡吗——基于劳动力流动的视角

立足新时代中国社会主要矛盾的根本转变和经济转向高质量发展这一新目标,科学厘清地方政府税收竞争与地区经济发展不平衡之间关系,不仅有利于通过规范地方政府间税收竞争加快推进现代财政制度基本框架的确立,还可以促使地方政府以新发展理念为指引,切实推动经济高质量发展。本文从理论层面系统诠释地方政府税收竞争与经济发展不平衡之间的关系及其影响机制,然后构建包含双重固定效应的空间杜宾模型,实证考察地方政府税收竞争对经济发展不平衡的影响效应。本文发现：(1)地方政府之间不仅存在策略互动的税收竞争行为,而且对于地区经济发展不均衡具有正向影响,即地区间税收竞争越激烈,经济发展不平衡程度越高;(2)异质性检验显示,地方政府税收竞争的核心主要源于对营业税和所得税税基的争夺,而且在人口规模较大的城市中该效应更为明显;(3)机制分析表明,地方政府税收竞争主要通过改变劳动力要素的数量和质量对地区经济发展不平衡产生影响。对于上述研究结论,通过改变空间权重矩阵与核心变量的测度方法等进行稳健性检验依然成立。     

税收竞争对中国环境污染的影响的实证检验

以中国30个省、自治区和直辖市的工业污染数据为样本建立三维时序立体数据表,运用极值熵值法测度中国环境污染排放强度,从税收总量和税收结构双重视角建立动态面板回归模型,利用差分广义矩估计方法对税收竞争对环境污染的影响进行实证检验,得出以下结论:①2000—2016年,中国环境污染呈现上升趋势。2003年以前,东部地区污染排放强度高于中西部地区,此后,东部地区环境污染改善明显;2005年以后,中部地区环境污染压力上升;2012年以前,西部地区污染排放强度呈现交替升降的演变趋势,而近年来西部地区环境污染压力超越东部和中部地区。②从税收总量来看,政府间税收竞争显著抑制污染排放,是一种"趋优竞争"。③从税收结构来看,增值税竞争加剧污染恶化,企业所得税竞争有效抑制污染排放。④分地区看,东部地区税收竞争程度低,对污染排放影响不显著,而中西部地区税收竞争对污染排放的影响较为显著。⑤从政府环境管制来看,政府间税收竞争与政府环保政策相互影响,显著抑制环境污染。改革官员晋升考核体系、完善税收分权体制和实行差异化税收政策是当务之急。     

我国省际间税收竞争的实证研究

运用地方税收竞争模型,以我国29个省级政府2006-2010年的财政收入以及地方税收收入为依据,对省级政府间税收竞争进行了实证研究。结果表明,省级政府间存在税收绝对竞争和税收相对竞争两种类型。在竞争能力方面,前者与地方的市场化程度呈正比;后者与地方的规模经济效率呈正比。当前我国省际间的税收竞争非常激烈,是现有财政体制的必然结果。因此,完善分税制财政体制,建立合理的地方税体系,规范地方政府债务,是解决省际间税收不良竞争的必然选择。     

地方政府税收竞争对产能过剩的影响

使用2001—2011年我国省际面板数据,测算了我国30个省(自治区、直辖市)的产能过剩程度,进一步实证检验了地方政府的税收竞争对产能过剩的影响。结果表明:产能过剩主要出现在重工业领域;地方政府的税收竞争加剧了重工业的产能过剩程度,其中增值税竞争的影响大于总税收竞争和企业所得税竞争的影响,地方政府税收竞争的滞后影响大于当期影响;在中、西部地区,地方政府的税收竞争对重工业产能过剩的影响更为显著。指出:减弱地方政府的税收竞争有利于缓解我国产能过剩问题。     

地方政府税收竞争对产能过剩的影响

使用2001—2011年我国省际面板数据,测算了我国30个省(自治区、直辖市)的产能过剩程度,进一步实证检验了地方政府的税收竞争对产能过剩的影响。结果表明:产能过剩主要出现在重工业领域;地方政府的税收竞争加剧了重工业的产能过剩程度,其中增值税竞争的影响大于总税收竞争和企业所得税竞争的影响,地方政府税收竞争的滞后影响大于当期影响;在中、西部地区,地方政府的税收竞争对重工业产能过剩的影响更为显著。指出:减弱地方政府的税收竞争有利于缓解我国产能过剩问题。     

地方政府竞争与地方政府债务使用效率的非线性关系——来自省际面板数据的经验证据

将三阶段DEA模型与Bootstrap方法相结合,选取地方债务投入和产出指标,构建了地方债务使用效率测评模型。以中国30个省级行政区域作为研究样本,检验地方债务使用效率测评模型的准确性和可靠性。在此基础上,引入税收与引资竞争反映地方政府竞争强度,构建面板门限模型,分析地方政府竞争与地方债务使用效率之间的非线性关系,挖掘最优地方政府竞争程度与机制。实证结果表明:地方政府竞争与地方债务使用效率之间存在倒U形关系;当地方政府竞争强度低于门限值时,地方政府竞争会提高债务使用效率;竞争高于门限值会造成地方债务使用效率损失;不同区域的地方政府竞争最优强度各不相同,其中东部地区最低,而中部地区和西部地区的地方政府竞争最优强度相对更高;近年来地方债务使用效率呈逐步增长趋势,但是目前整体仍相对偏低,有较大的提高空间。     

财政竞争中地方政府非税收入的空间经济效应分析

非税收入具有一定的灵活性,往往成为地方政府财政竞争的重要方式。通过构建一个财政竞争模型分析了地方政府的非税收筹资行为影响要素流动的空间经济效应,研究发现:(1)地方政府间存在非税收竞争行为,且会显著促进地区经济增长;(2)地方政府的非税收筹资行为不但没有发挥其作为竞争手段在缩小区域经济发展差异中应有的作用,反而因相对落后地区对非税收入的依赖度偏高而起到负作用。     

高质量发展、税收竞争与税收可持续增长——基于广东的证据

在推动经济高质量发展的现阶段,税收竞争与税收可持续增长关系是有待深入探讨的问题。从高质量发展视角出发,用熵值法测算2013—2019年广东省21个地级市的税收可持续增长指数。使用面板模型从税收总量和税收结构两个层面实证分析税收竞争对税收可持续增长的影响,结果表明：(1)从税收总量看,税收竞争阻碍了税收可持续增长;从税收结构看,增值税竞争对税收可持续增长的抑制作用大于企业所得税竞争。(2)总税收竞争、增值税竞争和企业所得税竞争均抑制了税收可持续增长,且估计系数呈现出递增趋势的单一门槛效应。(3)异质性检验发现,欠发达地区的总税收竞争和增值税竞争对税收可持续增长的抑制效应大于发达地区,企业所得税竞争则相反。税收竞争对税收可持续增长的影响效应为鼓励发展可持续性税源、规范地方政府税收竞争行为以及因地制宜发展提供了经验证据。     

Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does FDI Influence Environmental Regulations?*

We suggest a novel perspective on the relationship between the stringency of environmental policies and foreign direct investment (FDI). We develop a political economy model with imperfect product market competition where local and foreign firms jointly lobby the local government for a favorable pollution tax. FDI is found to affect environmental policy, and the effect is conditional on the local government's degree of corruptibility. If the degree of corruptibility is sufficiently high (low), FDI leads to less (more) stringent environmental policy, and FDI thus contributes to (mitigates) the creation of a pollution haven. Our empirical results using panel data from 33 countries support the predictions of the model.     

Environmental Tax in a Green Market

We examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers’ environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices. The unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed. We show that the emission tax improves welfare, thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation. The higher the marginal environmental damage is, the higher the optimal tax will be. The optimal tax, however, becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large. Finally, when marginal environmental damage is not too low, the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly.     

Optimal policy for environmental goods trade in asymmetric oligopolistic eco-industries

In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of an environmental tax to pollution, a production subsidy to a domestic eco-industry, and an import tariff on environmental goods (EGs) in a two-country model where the home country imports EGs from the foreign country. Home and foreign firms that produce EGs engage in Cournot competition. We then assume that the number of the home local firms which produce EGs is constant, but that of the foreign firms is variable. Our main findings are as follows: (I) The optimal environmental tax level may be lower than the Pigouvian level even if the tax has a positive impact on the output of EGs produced by a domestic firm. (II) The optimal tariff level may be positive when the country implements the first best policy combination in a closed economy regarding the environmental tax and the subsidy. (III) The optimal subsidy level may be positive, and then the subsidy may be substitutive for the import tariff on EGs.     

Regulating a Polluting Oligopoly: Emission Tax or Voluntary Agreement?

This paper compares, in a polluting oligopoly, an emission tax and a form of environmental policy called voluntary agreement (VA). Here there are two ways of reducing pollution: output contraction and end‐of‐pipe abatement. Given the imperfect competition, firms’ reaction to the tax is sub‐optimal. They reduce output excessively in order to raise the price and do not abate enough. The VA is a take‐it‐or‐leave‐it contract on abatement effort, offered to the firms with the threat of a tax. It has a limited effect on output and always allows higher abatement than the tax. We find that this kind of VA may be more efficient than the tax in a concentrated industry, when pollution is not too harmful and when the abatement technology is rather efficient and cheap.     

Financial structure and the effectiveness of pollution control in an oligopolistic industry

This paper explores the link between pollution taxes and the financial and output decisions of firms in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty. It is shown that environmental regulations such as pollution taxes may induce firms to alter their financial structure, which in turn influences both output levels and the effectiveness of the tax in controlling pollution emissions. It is demonstrated that there exist circumstances in which highly leveraged firms may respond to pollution taxes by expanding output and emission levels. This possibility arises in a leveraged oligopoly since the tax acts as a credible commitment device which leads to more aggressive competition in output markets.     

Commuting in Happyville: Taxation with interjurisdictional commuting and pollution

This paper presents a spatial model of tax competition in an asymmetric duocentric city with traffic‐related pollution. Jurisdictions differ in productivity and both wage or commuting and head taxes are applied. Residential location is given, but agents can choose their workplace. We show that the incentive for the high productive jurisdiction to export the tax burden by attracting cross‐commuters is reduced by the resulting pollution import; this affects the welfare impacts of tax competition. The possibility that households may misperceive their exposure to pollution is explored and its impact of fiscal competition is analyzed. When households are very optimistic about their exposure, aggregate welfare may be higher than in the first best.     

Local Pollution in Federal Systems

It is widely accepted that decentralized control of local pollution is inefficient if the central and the local authorities are imperfectly informed. This paper shows how the central authority can introduce a flexible grant-in-aid system that induces the local authority to use a weighted combination of local and central information when the local authority suffers from confirmatory bias. If the central authority is highly uncertain about the environmental effects of a specific pollutant, the tax/subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information to play an essential role in the environmental policy. If the central authority is certain that a pollutant must not exceed a specific limit, the tax/subsidy scheme can be designed to allow local information little influence on the environmental policy.     

Can Trade Be Good for the Environment?

We analyze the impact of trade in a differentiated good on environmental policy when there is local and transboundary pollution. In autarky, the (equivalent) pollution tax is set equal to the marginal damage from own emissions. If the strategic policy instrument is a tax, leakage occurs under trade and tends to lower the tax. The net terms of trade effect, due to the exportable and importable varieties of the differentiated good, tends to increase the tax. We derive conditions under which pollution taxes under trade are higher than the marginal damage from own emissions, i.e., higher than the Pigouvian tax and than that under autarky. Then, pollution falls under trade relative to autarky. When countries use quotas/permits to regulate pollution, there is no leakage, while the net terms of trade effect tends to make pollution policy stricter. The equivalent tax is always higher than the marginal damage from own emissions, i.e., always higher than the Pigouvian tax and than that under autarky; hence, pollution always falls under trade. Our analysis provides some insight into the findings in the empirical literature that trade might be good for the environment.     

Environmental regulation and intra-industry trade

The paper analyses complex interactions between intra-industry trade (IIT) and environment by extending Krugman's model of monopolistic competition and trade. It is found that an increase in exogenous environmental tax by a country leads to a fall in its output (the scale effect) and aggregate pollution, and an increase in its number of varieties (the selection effect). With IIT, if Home is a net exporter, an increase in its environmental stringency leads to a negative scale effect, which reduces its export demand and raises its import demand. In contrast, a positive selection effect reduces its import demand. However, the first-order scale effect on exports dominates the second-order effect on imports, implying a rise in Home's share of IIT with Foreign. The opposite holds true when Home is a net importer. Furthermore, the impact of a rise in environmental tax on aggregate welfare comprises the following counteracting effects: a negative scale effect, a positive selection effect, a lower level of aggregate pollution and a higher environmental tax revenue in autarky, and two additional effects, namely, changes in the level of exports and imports, under free trade. The overall change in aggregate welfare, in both autarky and free trade, is in general ambiguous.