住房抵押贷款提前还贷风险管理研究

从现代金融和风险管理角度看,住房抵押贷款提前还贷对商业银行是一种期权性风险,对其收取违约金并非国际惯例,也并不是有效的风险补偿方式。商业银行应适应市场竞争需要,接受风险转嫁并提供风险管理服务,运用风险定价技术在按揭交易价格中对提前还贷风险进行补偿。对于已承担的风险,商业银行应构建抵押贷款提前还贷的数据库,通过表内对冲和市场对冲,推出多样化的住房抵押贷款方式,积极推进住房抵押贷款证券化,从而最终增强银行的盈利来源和核心竞争力。     

An Early Assessment of Residential Mortgage Performance in China

The residential mortgage market becomes a financial engine for the booming residential housing development and sustained economic growth in China. Our study provides the first rigorous empirical analysis on the earlier performance of residential mortgage market in China based on a unique micro dataset of mortgage loan history collected from a major residential mortgage lender in China. We found that while the option theory fails to explain prepayment and default behavior in the residential mortgage market in China, other non-option theory related financial economic factors play major roles in determining the prepayment and default risks in China. We also found that borrower’s characteristics are significant in determining prepayment behavior, hence may be used as an effective tool for screening potential high risk borrowers in the loan origination process. Adopting a risk-based pricing in residential mortgage lending in China can improve the efficiency of the market, and enhance the credit availability to the most needed households, i.e., the younger households, blue-collar workers, lower income households, and help them become homeowners.     

A Dynamic Analysis of Fixed- and Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Terminations

This paper provides a side-by-side comparison of loan-level statistical models for fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgages. Multinomial logit models for quarterly conditional probabilities of default and prepayment are estimated. We find that the estimated impacts of embedded option values for prepayment and default are generally quite similar across both FRM and ARM loans, providing additional empirical support for the basic predictions of the options theory. We also find that differences in estimates of conditional probabilities of prepayment and default associated with mortgage age, origination period, original LTV, and relative loan size, indicate the continued significance of these other economic and demographic factors for empirical models of mortgage terminations.     

SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET PURCHASE COMMITMENT YIELDS

We provide empirical evidence that quoted secondary market mortgage yields conform to the predictions of option theory. We compare Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac origination yields offered in the secondary market from 1985 to 2003 with the predictions of a two‐state binomial mortgage option valuation model. Our two‐state approach considers a mean‐reverting interest rate process as well as a stochastic housing price. Using predictions from option simulations, we find strong links between market practice and mortgage option prepayment and default factors over time. We also find cross‐sectional differences that are consistent with the institutional structure of the markets.     

Differential Impacts of Structural and Cyclical Unemployment on Mortgage Default and Prepayment

The Great Recession (the fourth quarter of 2007 through the second quarter of 2009) has been characterized by high rates of foreclosures and unemployment. Using a sample of community reinvestment loans, we examine the impact of structural unemployment and cyclical unemployment on mortgage terminations (default and prepayment). We find that mortgage default and prepayment are more sensitive to changes in the structural component of the local unemployment rate than in the cyclical component. In addition, depending on whether structural unemployment rates are high or low, borrowers and lenders react differently to the incentives to terminate a loan.     

Commercial Mortgage Workout Strategy and Conditional Default Probability: Evidence from Special Serviced CMBS Loans

This study recognizes that commercial mortgage default is not a one-step process and examines a previously under explored aspect in the whole default process, that is the stage between the initial delinquency and default. We distinguish the servicers’ behavior from the borrowers’ behavior. A multinomial logit model is applied to analyze the servicers’ choice of workout options and a proportional hazard model is applied to analyze the borrower’s default decision-making process under time-varying conditions. We find that cash flow condition is the most significant factor in the servicers’ decision making process. We also find that borrowers make default decisions based upon both the equity position in the mortgage and the cash flow condition in the space market. Key real estate space market variables, such as market-level vacancy rates, also provide useful information in explaining commercial mortgage defaults. We find that special service seems to be successful in reducing the probability that a troubled loan will default. Finally, sensitivity analysis shows nontrivial economic significance of the impact of explanatory variables, real estate market variables in particular have the most significant impact on the pricing of special-serviced loans.     

Omitted Mobility Characteristics and Property Market Dynamics: Application to Mortgage Termination

Property market dynamics depend on changes in long run equilibrium and on impediments to adjustment towards equilibrium. Mortgage termination due to mobility, default and refinancing provides a lens for evaluating property market adjustments. The borrower’s decision to move as an adjustment mechanism in the property market is associated with utility-maximizing decisions to either prepay or default on the mortgage. The optimal choice between these two termination events may depend on unobserved propensities related to change in income, job location, or family size, and substantial inertial forces including search costs, neighborhood change and attachment to an area. We propose a method for modeling variables determining the impact of mobility on mortgage terminations with imperfect household and loan level data. Since omitted variables contribute to moving decisions and therefore to mortgage prepayment and default decisions, utility functions for sale and default are correlated through these unobservable variables; thus, the IIA assumption of the widely used Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) is violated. Under such circumstances, econometric theory suggests that the Nested Logit Model (NMNL) is a better choice, which obviates the limitation of MNL by allowing correlation in unobserved factors across alternatives. Using loan level micro data, we find empirical evidence showing significant correlation between sale and default due to omitted borrower mobility characteristics. Our simulations find that NMNL out performs MNL in out-of-sample prediction. Improved predictions of moves and defaults are applicable to micro and macro analysis of the housing market system.     

Credit Counseling and Mortgage Termination by Low-Income Households

Published research on credit counseling and mortgage termination is surprisingly scarce, despite substantial growth in this industry. While the purpose of counseling is to assist low-income borrowers to improve their handling of debt and thereby reduce default, counseling may also improve the borrowers understanding of their financial position and thus induce optimal mortgage termination. Using a competing-risks framework, we study the effects on default and prepayment of a counseling program implemented in several Midwest states. We find weak evidence of that the default hazard was lower for graduates of the counseling program, but that their default behavior was more optimal. The prepayment hazard was higher for counseled borrowers, but their prepayment behavior was not more optimal. Overall, counseling seems to affect the lenders profits, but the net effect should be evaluated both in terms of prepayment and default.     

Bias in an Empirical Approach to Determining Bond and Mortgage Risk Premiums

Empirical studies of bond and commercial mortgage performance often quantify a required risk premium by examining the difference between the promised yield and the realized yield as adjusted for default occurrence. These studies omit the effects of various other sources of risk, however, including collateral asset market risk, interest rate risk, and possibly call risk. These omissions downwardly bias the empirical risk premium estimate on the debt. In this paper, we disentangle and quantify the sources of this bias by modeling secured coupon debt (the commercial mortgage) as used in the calculation of a realized investment return. We consider deterministic and stochastic interest rate economies with mortgage contracts that are either noncallable or subject to a temporary prepayment lockout period. Given realistic parameter values associated with the term structure, underlying asset dynamics, and debt contracting, we show that the magnitude of the bias can be significant.     

Mortgage Termination: An Empirical Hazard Model with a Stochastic Term Structure

Pricing for mortgage and mortgage-backed securities is complicated due to the stochastic and interdependent nature of prepayment and default risks. This paper presents a unified economic model of the contingent claims and competing risks of mortgage termination by prepayment and default. I adopt a proportional hazard framework to analyze these competing and interdependent risks in a model with time-varying covariates. The paper incorporates a stochastic interest rate model into the hazard function for prepayment. The empirical results reported in the paper provide new evidence about the ruthlessness of default and prepayment behavior and the sensitivity of these decisions to demographic as well as financial phenomena. The results also illustrate that evaluating the interest rate contingent claims with a stochastic term structure has effects on predicting not only the mortgage prepayment behavior but also the mortgage default behavior.     

The Effects of Purchases of Mortgages and Securitization by Government Sponsored Enterprises on Mortgage Yield Spreads and Volatility

In this paper, we investigate the effects of GSE (government sponsored enterprise) activities on mortgage yield spreads and volatility. Using various regression procedures (i.e., vector error correction (VEC) and GARCH models) and controlling for default and prepayment risk, we find that securitizations and purchases of mortgages by GSEs reduce mortgage yield spreads and volatility. In particular, we find that the yield spread between conforming and 10-year constant maturity treasury (CMT) rates decreases by 8.0 bp per $1billion increase in the level of GSE securitizations. Similarly, if GSEs increase mortgage purchases, the yield spread decreases 10.5 bp per $1billion increase of purchases. In addition, we hypothesize and find that GSE activities have a spillover effect to the non-conforming mortgage market; via investor substitutions, GSE purchases and securitizations of conforming loans reduce non-conforming loan rates. Thus, the measured influence of GSE activities is biased downward when measured using the spread of non-conforming loans over conforming loan rates. We also find that purchases of mortgages by GSEs significantly reduce mortgage yield volatility. In sum, our findings show that GSE activities reduce and stabilize mortgage market rates.     

What Drives Default and Prepayment on Subprime Auto Loans?

This paper uses novel data on the performance of loan pools underlying asset-backed securities to estimate a competing risks model of default and prepayment on subprime automobile loans. We find that prepayment rates increase rapidly with loan age but are not affected by prevailing market interest rates. Default rates are much more sensitive to aggregate shocks than are prepayment rates. Increases in unemployment precede increases in default rates, suggesting that defaults on subprime automobile loans are driven largely by shocks to household liquidity. There are significant differences in the default and prepayment rates faced by different subprime lenders. Those lenders that charge the highest interest rates experience the highest default rates, but also experience somewhat lower prepayment rates. We conjecture that there is substantial heterogeneity among subprime borrowers, and that different lenders target different segments of the subprime market. Because of their higher default rates, loans that carry the highest interest rates do not appear to yield the highest expected returns.     

On the determinants of yield spreads between mortgage pass-through and Treasury securities

Yield spreads between mortgage pass-through and U.S. Treasury securities may reflect differences in taxation, phenomena affecting relative supply and demand, and compensation for default, call, and marketability risks on mortgage instruments. Our research empirically models differences in yields between pass-throughs and comparable-maturity Treasuries. We find that interest-rate volatility and the term structure of rates, factors often cited in the mortgage pricing literature as affecting the mortgage call premium, are the primary determinants of movements in these spreads. Moreover, these effects have grown in importance in recent years as exercise of the prepayment option has increased. We also find evidence that liquidity and credit concerns affect the pricing of pass-through securities.     

The inefficiency of refinancing: Why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of prepayment penalties in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. When considering improvements in the borrower's creditworthiness as one of the reasons for refinancing mortgages, we show that refinancing penalties can be welfare improving and that they can be particularly beneficial to riskier borrowers in the form of lower mortgage rates, reduced defaults, and increased availability of credit. Thus, a high concentration of prepayment penalties among the riskiest borrowers can be an outcome of efficient equilibrium in a mortgage market. We also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the key predictions of our model.     

Residential Mortgage Lending and Borrower Risk: The Relationship Between Mortgage Spreads and Individual Characteristics

The mortgage banking environment in Hong Kong is quite different from that in the United States. For example, the secondary mortgage market and mortgage insurance only started after 1997. Using a large data set on mortgages, we examine empirically how mortgage rates in this market vary with various individual borrower, property, and loan characteristics. We find that mortgage rates in Hong Kong do vary with individual characteristics, which suggests credit sorting according to both prepayment risk and default risk, as a higher mortgage rate is found to be related to either higher collateral (a lower loan-to-value ratio) or slower prepayment. The empirical results suggest that lenders in Hong Kong can observe the risk type of individual borrowers to a certain extent and charge a corresponding mortgage spread. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm as in Berger and Udell (1990).     

An empirical analysis of home equity loan and line performance

Given the growth in home equity lending during the 1990s, it is imperative that lenders and regulators understand the risks associated with this segment of the residential mortgage market. Using a unique panel data set of over 135,000 homeowners with second mortgages, our analysis indicates that significant differences exist in the prepayment and default probabilities of home equity loans and lines, providing insights into bank minimum capital requirements. We find that households with equity loans are relatively more sensitive to changes in interest rates. By contrast, households with equity lines are more sensitive to appreciation in property value.     

Mortgage contract design and systemic risk immunization

This paper provides theoretical results for the design of contracts used in the market for residential household mortgages and mortgage securities. Critical elements in the problem of immunizing systemic risk through efficient contract design are identified. Using an extension of classical immunization theory, this paper demonstrates that systemic risk of long amortization mortgage contracts is reduced when term to maturity of the contract at origination is significantly less than the amortization period. In addition, incorporating prepayment and limited recourse default options into the mortgage contract increases systemic risk when compared with full recourse mortgage contracts having yield maintenance prepayment penalties. The theoretical results are used to evaluate the systemic risk management problems that have plagued the US mortgage funding system.     

Mortgage Pricing Implications of Prepayment: Separating Pecuniary and Non-pecuniary Prepayment

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - In the study of mortgage loan pricing, prepayment and default hazards are considered. While default results in loss of initial capital, prepayment...     

Household Income, Termination Risk and Mortgage Pricing

The premium embedded in home mortgage loans to compensate investors for their exposure to prepayment risk is a significant component of the cost of home mortgage lending. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that prepayment risk may be lower for loans to lower-income housing borrowers, especially those that are first-time home owners. If so, investor recognition of this advantage should facilitate greater willingness to acquire portfolios of lower-income housing loans, and encourage more competitive pricing in this segment of the market. This study investigates the possibility of differential mortgage prepayment behavior between lower-income home owners and non-low income home owners. The investigation relies on samples of the American Housing Survey spanning ten years of experience from 1985 to 1995. We find no significant difference between the termination or refinancing behavior of non-low income and low-income households. This result is robust to a number of alternative specifications such as restricting the low-income test group to non-moving households and to first-time owners. The same conclusions are derived from both aggregate prepayment rates and from analysis of individual household prepayment behavior.     

Characteristics of Mortgage Terminations: an Analysis of a Loan-Level Dataset

Understanding mortgage termination behavior is crucial for valuating mortgage-backed securities. Analyzing a unique loan-level dataset, this study examines the characteristics of mortgage prepayment and default behaviors in the Korean housing and housing finance markets. We also analyze mortgage termination behaviors across regions, loan purposes, and periods. The results suggest that the prepayment rate of fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and the ratio of adjustable-rate mortgages to FRMs can provide meaningful signals for the Korean household economy. Although the macro-prudential policies pertaining to the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-to-income ratio (DTI) are very effective, their effects can vary depending on the region or loan purpose. Furthermore, the DTI and credit score cannot always identify the default risks of mortgages not intended for housing purchases even though such mortgages are more vulnerable to macroeconomic changes. The observed changes in default behavior indicate that the government’s policies to promote fixed-rate loans have achieved a certain degree of success.