会计师事务所的进入、退出与审计市场的竞争

本文主要从进入、退出的角度研究审计市场的竞争。本文的分析表明,审计市场的市场占有率变动率更为合理地衡量市场的动态变化,审计市场的进入壁垒主要是准入壁垒(管制壁垒),而结构性壁垒和流动性壁垒主要存在于大客户市场,对于小客户市场的影响作用很小。为了防止进入者的进入,在位者通过各种流动性壁垒的设置以提高进入者的成本。但从总体看,审计市场仍然是高度竞争的。     

加入WTO后国有企业的人才竞争策略

我国加入世界贸易组织 ( WTO)已为期不远 ,根据 WTO的宗旨和基本原则 ,其成员国必须 :取消歧视性贸易 ,取消保护性的高额关税 ,不断扩大市场准入。为此 ,我国将进一步扩大开放的领域 ,开放原来受禁的金融、保险、房地产、商业零售、咨询、会计等服务行业 ;同时 ,将逐步在汽车、石油化工、计算机等行业取消关税保护。这些举措将把我国的企业推向经济全球化的国际市场竞争的前列。面临我国加入 WTO后的新形势 ,及时地研究我国企业入世后的战略和策略 ,已经是迫在眉睫了。众所周知 ,人、财、物、信息是决定现代企业兴衰的四大要素 ,而人在…     

Asymmetric information,foreign entry and multi-period credit competition in banking industry

In a credit market, a low-cost foreign entrant is likely less informed than a domestic bank with information endowments. We present a steady-state model in an infinite-period framework, and analyze how the informational asymmetry affects the lending equilibrium and the foreign banks’ entry modes. Firstly, we show that the domestic bank's initial informational advantage from its relatively large market share at the beginning of competition is not enough to hinder the entry of a low-cost foreign bank. In addition, the foreign bank is more likely to be the winner in the steady state of an infinite-period game than that in a static game. Secondly, the comparative static analysis show that the likelihood of foreign bank becoming the winning party increases with borrower quality, project payoff and the growth rate of potential new borrowers. Thirdly, when the foreign bank wins game in the steady state, its market share is decreasing in project payoff and the growth rate of new borrowers, while changes non-monotonically with borrower quality. Finally, we extend our model to characterize the domestic bank's sustainable advantage in being relatively familiar with new market, and provide valuable explanations for the observed entry modes of foreign banks in China.     

浅谈我国入世后零售业竞争发展战略

面临入世后外资零售企业的涌入,我国的零售业要摆脱困境,关键在于经营创新战略定位,文章从市场定位、成本战略、服务意识、商品战略等方面对此进行阐述。     

On probability models in voting theory

This paper illustrates the use of probability models to study properties of voting rules. In particular, a simple occupancy distribution and its limiting Dlrichlet form are introduced, corresponding to simplifying assumptions about voters' preferences. We use as illustrations the occurrence probability of the Condorcet Paradox, a vintage problem in social choice theory, along with the related concept of Condorcet efficiency, a measure of goodness for voting rules. Further examples include properties of a lottery rule and the vulnerability of certain voting rules to strategic manipulation. Prospects for future work are indicated.     

醴陵市陶瓷产业过度竞争分析

文章探讨了醴陵市陶瓷产业过度竞争的识别和产业过度竞争的成因,并对缓解过度竞争提出了若干对策。     

Spatial competition with free entry, Chamberlinian tangencies, and social efficiency

Free entry in Löschian spatial competition leads to a tangency between each firm's negatively sloped average revenue and the downsloping portion of average costs—as in Chamberlin's monopolistic competition. It is generally concluded that this equilibrium involves too many inefficiently small firms. However, this conclusion is incorrect. The difference between price and firm marginal production costs in spatial equilibrium is just sufficient to cover the additional marginal cost of output resulting from availability of multiple locations. This Chamberlinian tangency does not imply inefficiency, because it does not include all the social costs and benefits resulting from spatial competition.     

On characterizing the probability of survival in a large competitive economy

We consider a Walrasian exchange economy in which an agent is characterized by a utility function, a random endowment vector, and a function that specifies the minimum expenditure necessary for survival at a given price system. If at any equilibrium price system, the income of the agent is no more than the minimum expenditure for survival, it is ruined. The main results characterize the probability of ruin when the number of agents is large. The implications of stochastic dependence among agents are explored.     

Industry dynamics with knowledge-based competition: a computational study of entry and exit patterns

I propose a computational model of industry evolution capable of matching many stylized facts. It views the firm as a myopic but adaptive entity whose survival depends on its ability to perform various activities with greater efficiency than its rivals. In this model, the shakeout pattern arises naturally in the early stage of industrial development. I provide a full comparative dynamics analysis of how various industry-specific factors determine the numbers and the rates of entries and exits over time as well as the ages of the exiting firms. An earlier version of this paper was circulated and presented under the title, “Non-Equilibrium Industry Dynamics with Knowledge-Based Competition: An Agent-Based Computational Model.” I would like to thank the two anonymous referees, Jason Barr, Ed Bell, Jon Harford, Joe Harrington, Bill Kosteas, Edward Nell, and the conference participants at the EEA-2007 Meetings (New York, NY) as well as the 2007 International System Dynamics Conference (Boston, MA) for their helpful comments and suggestions. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the College of Graduate Studies at Cleveland State University.     

On the two armed bandit with one probability known

Summary The dynamic programming approach to the solution of the two armed bandit problem with one probability known is discussed, for a general prior distribution for the unknown probability. Properties of the objective function and of the stopping boundaries are obtained. The problem of costly observations is discussed.     

On second-price auctions and imperfect competition

Consider two sellers each of whom has one unit of an indivisible good and two buyers each of whom is interested in buying one unit. The sellers simultaneously set reserve prices and use second-price auctions as rationing device. An equilibrium in pure strategies where each seller has a regular customer is characterized. The result is applied in order to demonstrate that not allowing sellers to use second-price auctions may enhance total surplus.     

On two properties of an unequal probability sampling scheme

Summary For an inclusion probability proportional to size (IPPS) sampling scheme recently proposed by Saxena, Singh and Srivastava (1986), it is shown that under certain simple verifiable conditions (1) the Horvitz-Thompson (1952) estimator based on it has a smaller variance than the variance of the Hansen-Hurwitz (1943) estimator based on probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling with replacement (WR) both involving the same size-measures and the expected sample size in the former being equal to the number of draws in the latter and (2) the Yates-Grundy (1953) estimator for the variance of the Horvitz-Thompson estimator based on this IPPS scheme is uniformly non-negative.     

On the existence of a probability measure compatible with a total preorder on a Boolean algebra

If an economic agent's beliefs about the relative likelihood of events are characterized by a total preorder ? on the algebra $\text{A}$ of events, the problem arises to know under which conditions, ? is representable by a probability measure. Here we show that there exists a probability measure compatible with a total preorder on a Boolean algebra, if and only if, the Boolean algebra is well bounded, weakly Archimedean, and perfectly separable, this last condition substituting for Villegas' monotone condition used in Chateauneuf and Jaffray (1984); if σ-additivity is required. Villegas' monotone condition, must merely be added.     

Measuring efficiency in the presence of head-to-head competition

We develop a new DEA model that measures organizational efficiency in the presence of head-to-head competition. Our model differs from existing DEA models that ignore competition (or any other form of interaction) among the organizations under analysis. The model assumes that organizations deploy inputs for the explicit purpose of increasing its own outputs while reducing the outputs of its competitors. We apply this model to the 2002, 2004, and 2006 political campaigns in New York State for the US. House of Representatives in which candidates spent money to increase the number of votes that they received and decrease the number of votes that their opponents received. We show that campaign inefficiency can alter the outcome of an election. Specifically, a loser would have won in six of the 57 races had he or she been efficient. We also show that incumbents are more likely to spend inefficiently than are challengers. Overall, inefficiency accounts for less than 5% of campaign funding but a loss of about 9% in votes received. We find evidence that campaign efficiency has increased since the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, known widely as the McCain-Feingold Act.     

Models for the probability of concordance in cross-classification tables

For cross-classification tables having an ordinal response variable, logit and probit models are formulated for the probability that a pair of subjects is concordant. For multidimensional tables, generalized models are given for the probability that the response at one setting of explanatory variables exceeds the response at another setting. Related measures of association are discussed for two-way tables.     

欠发达地区城镇化建设的后发优势

运用科学发展观,分析了我国欠发达地区在新形势下推进城镇化建设具有规划起点高、产业结构调整选择余地大、主动接受大城市圈辐射效应、争取国家宏观政策支持、城镇管理体制创新、建立人与自然和谐发展等方面的后发优势,并提出了相应的政策建议.