Informal Financial Networks: Theory and Evidence

We develop a model of informal financial networks and presentcorroborating evidence by studying the role of property brokersin the U.S. commercial real estate market. Our model demonstratesthat service intermediaries, who do not themselves supply loans,can facilitate their clients' access to finance through informalrelationships with lenders. Empirically we find that, controllingfor endogenous broker selection, hiring a broker strikinglyincreases the probability of obtaining bank finance. Our resultsdemonstrate that even in the United States, with its well-developedcapital markets, informal networks play an important role incontrolling access to finance.     

On the efficiency of long intermediation chains

Intermediation chains represent a common pattern of trade in over-the-counter markets. We study a classic problem impeding trade in these markets: an agent uses his market power to inefficiently screen a privately informed counterparty. We show that, generically, if efficient trade is implementable via any incentive-compatible mechanism, it is also implementable via a trading network that takes the form of a sufficiently long intermediation chain. We characterize information sets of intermediaries that ensure this striking result. Sparse trading networks featuring long intermediation chains might thus constitute an efficient market response to frictions, in which case no regulatory action is warranted.     

Intermediation and (Mis‐)Matching in Insurance Markets—Who Should Pay the Insurance Broker?

This article addresses the role of independent insurance intermediaries in markets where matching is important. We compare fee‐based and commission‐based compensation systems and show that they are payoff equivalent if the intermediary is completely honest. Allowing for strategic behavior, we discuss the impact of remuneration on the quality of advice. The possibility of mismatching gives the intermediary substantial market power, which will not translate into mismatching if consumers are rational. Furthermore, we offer a rationale for the use of contingent commissions and address whether or not the ban of any commission payments is an appropriate market intervention.     

Financial networks with electronic transactions: modelling,analysis and computations

Abstract

Advances in telecommunication networks, and, in particular, the Internet have transformed the economic landscape for financial decision-making. In this paper, we focus on financial networks with electronic transactions and with different tiers of decision-makers and we develop an integrated framework for the modelling, analysis and computation of solutions to such problems. Specifically, we consider an economy consisting of three types of decision-makers: those with sources of funds; intermediary ones, and consumers associated with the financial products at the demand markets. Those with sources of funds can transact with the intermediaries either physically or electronically as well as directly in an electronic manner with the consumers. The intermediaries, in turn, can also transact with the consumers either in a physical or an electronic fashion. We address the behaviour of the decision-makers, identify the network structure of the problem, derive the equilibrium conditions, and establish the variational inequality formulation. In addition, we propose a continuous time adjustment process for the study of the disequilibrium dynamics and prove that the set of stationary points of the resulting projected dynamical system coincides with the set of solutions of the variational inequality. We then utilize variational inequality theory to derive qualitative properties of the equilibrium price and financial flow pattern. Finally, we apply an algorithm for the determination of equilibrium prices and financial flows in several examples.     

Common liquidity shocks and market collapse: Lessons from the market for perps

We show how a high degree of commonality in investor liquidity shocks can diminish incentives for intermediaries to keep markets open and lead to market collapse, even without information asymmetry or news affecting fundamentals. We motivate our model using the perpetual floating-rate note market where two years of explosive growth – in which issues by high quality borrowers were placed with institutional investors and traded in a liquid secondary market – were followed by a precipitous collapse when market intermediaries withdrew due to large order imbalances. We shed new light on the trade-off between ownership concentration and market liquidity.     

Measuring Pricing Inefficiencies Under Stressful Market Conditions

This study examines the mispricing and time between arbitrage trades of the Hong Kong Hang Seng index futures and index options contracts under various stressed market conditions. Ex‐ante trading profits and differences in time between trades across up and down as well as stressed and non‐stressed markets are used to measure how well the derivative markets perform under emotional distress. We find evidence of illiquidity in stressed and down markets. In stressful markets and down markets, liquidity suppliers are less likely to trade against the informed traders. This, in turn, leads to longer time between trades and higher arbitrage profits.     

Ökonomische Aspekte der Entlohnung und Regulierung unabhängiger Versicherungsvermittler

The compensation and regulation of independent intermediaries is an important issue in insurance markets. With this respect, the profitability and importance of fee-for-service and commission compensation of intermediaries is lively discussed in academia and in the insurance industry. This paper summarizes economic rationales why and in which lines of business insurance companies sell their products via independent intermediaries. With this respect, it is analyzed how different forms of compensation affect important market functions of independent intermediaries. Finally, the economic impact of certain regulatory interventions, like a mandatory disclosure or a general ban of any commissions and the German ban for intermediaries to share commission with policyholders, on market efficiency is discussed.     

Interbank tiering and money center banks

This paper provides evidence that interbank markets are tiered rather than flat, in the sense that most banks do not lend to each other directly but through money center banks acting as intermediaries. We capture the concept of tiering by developing a core-periphery model, and devise a procedure for fitting the model to real-world networks. Using Bundesbank data on bilateral interbank exposures among 2000 banks from 1999 to 2012, we find strong evidence of tiering in the German banking system. This extent of tiering is unlikely to arise in standard random networks. Indeed, we show that bank specialization and balance sheet variables predict how banks position themselves in the interbank market. This link provides a promising avenue for understanding the formation of financial networks.     

Investment Strategies and Market Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Bank Branching Decisions

This paper analyzes the relationship between the competitive environment faced by depository institutions and the decisions these institutions make regarding the size of their branch networks. Specifically, we consider branches as a sunk investment that potentially increases utility for consumers and examine how local competition and product differentiation affect firms’ decisions regarding whether to make such investments. We account for endogenous market structure using an equilibrium structural model, which corrects for bias caused by correlation in the unobservables associated with market structure and branching activity. We estimate the model using data from 1,882 concentrated rural markets. Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for market structure and product differentiation, and are consistent with a potential entry-deterring effect of bank branch investments.     

The Value of Reputation in Corporate Finance and Investment Banking (and the Related Roles of Regulation and Market Efficiency)

This article explores the roles of reputation, efficient capital markets, and capital market regulation in preserving and creating economic value. Each of these three mechanisms serves as a substitute for the other two, with each playing a role in maintaining the credibility and reliability of markets. While efficient markets and effective regulation are market-wide phenomena that affect all firms, reputation is a firm-specific corporate asset. Companies develop reputational capital by treating customers and counterparties fairly (while forgoing the temptation to achieve short-term profits at their expense). At the same time, companies seeking access to the capital markets but lacking a reputation must typically employ reputational intermediaries. Investment banks, credit rating agencies, accounting firm s, law firms, and organized stock exchanges have all served as reputational intermediaries at various times during the last 200 years. One contributor to the recent financial crisis was a kind of experimentation by some reputational intermediaries with an opportunistic and two-tiered “customer differentiation” strategy in which some customers were treated very well, while others were treated with little or no regard for their legitimate expectations as to how they would be treated. This strategy has proved to be a failure, imposing significant costs on those organizations as well as their customers. The available substitutes for reputation, capital market effciency and effective regulation, did not provide sufcient offsetting protection for investors. While the two-tiered “customer differentiation” strategy has failed, the central message of the economic theory of reputation remains intact. This message is that a company's reputation is a valuable asset that must be preserved to ensure the future of the organization. For all financial intermediaries that rely heavily on their reputations when selling their products and services, the author recommends large and continuous investment in maintaining those reputations. For investment banks in particular—a group whose reputations have held up reasonably well—the author suggests that they continue to view their role as reputational intermediaries as a core part of their businesses.     

Financial Intermediaries, Markets, and Growth

We build a model in which financial intermediaries provide insurance to households against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. Households can invest in financial markets directly if they pay a cost. In equilibrium, the ability of intermediaries to share risk is constrained by the market. From a growth perspective, this can be beneficial because intermediaries invest less in the productive technology when they provide more risk-sharing. Our model predicts that bank-oriented economies can grow more slowly than more market-oriented economies, which is consistent with some recent empirical evidence.     

Breaking down the barriers: Competition,syndicate structure,and underwriting incentives

We argue that the entry of commercial banks into bond underwriting led to the evolution of co-led underwriting arrangements and lowered the screening incentives of underwriters. Lead underwriters in co-led syndicates faced weaker incentives to screen issuer quality. In boom markets, issues underwritten by co-led syndicates were more likely to be involved in financial misrepresentation events. Underwriter incentives in co-led syndicates were particularly weak in industries where commercial banks stole substantial market share. Similar patterns do not hold in bust markets where investors are likely to engage in their own information collection efforts. Our results suggest that competition may have an adverse effect on the incentives of financial intermediaries in market environments where their information production is more valuable to investors.     

The internet as an information intermediary

The internet is an enormous and growing source of information for investors about the opinions of others. Virtually any individual with internet access can express opinions about firms and editorialize about company news. However, to date we know very little about the impact these nontraditional internet intermediaries have on markets. We develop a framework wherein internet information intermediaries fall along a spectrum of professionalism and document a nuanced relationship between coverage by these intermediaries and capital market effects. Using a novel dataset that tracks coverage of companies by individuals posting on thousands of websites, we find that coverage by professional and semi-professional intermediaries is associated with positive capital market effects but coverage by nonprofessional internet intermediaries has the opposite effect—hindering price formation. The detrimental effects of nonprofessional coverage are observed most strongly when the intermediaries have larger audiences.     

Effective credit costs in retail financial markets: Leasing versus borrowing

This study examines reported credit cost information in the automobile sales market to determine if vehicle leasing really is cheaper than installment borrowing. In addition, the study evaluates the accuracy of credit cost data furnished to consumers by commercial banks, vehicle leasing firms, and automobile dealers to gauge whether any systematic differences exist in the accuracy of reported credit cost information. Results of the study suggest that the cost of leasing is significantly different from borrowing, yet neither financing alternative is unilaterally cheaper than the other. In addition, suppliers of credit in consumer finance markets routinely and significantly understate effective credit costs reported to consumers.     

Multi-part tariffs and differentiated commodity taxation

We study commodity taxation in markets where firms, such as Internet Service Providers, energy suppliers, and payment card platforms, adopt multi-part tariffs. We show that ad valorem taxes can correct underprovision and hence increase welfare, provided the government applies differentiated tax rates to the usage and access parts of the tariff. We obtain this result in different settings, including vertically interlinked markets, markets where firms adopt menus of tariffs to screen consumers, and where they compete with multi-part tariffs. Our results suggest that exempting these markets from taxation may be inefficient.     

Business marketing: understand what customers value

How do you define the value of your market offering? Can you measure it? Few suppliers in business markets are able to answer those questions, and yet the ability to pinpoint the value of a product or service for one's customers has never been more important. By creating and using what the authors call customer value models, suppliers are able to figure out exactly what their offerings are worth to customers. Field value assessments--the most commonly used method for building customer value models--call for suppliers to gather data about their customers firsthand whenever possible. Through these assessments, a supplier can build a value model for an individual customer or for a market segment, drawing on data gathered form several customers in that segment. Suppliers can use customer value models to create competitive advantage in several ways. First, they can capitalize on the inevitable variation in customers' requirements by providing flexible market offerings. Second, they can use value models to demonstrate how a new product or service they are offering will provide greater value. Third, they can use their knowledge of how their market offerings specifically deliver value to craft persuasive value propositions. And fourth, they can use value models to provide evidence to customers of their accomplishments. Doing business based on value delivered gives companies the means to get an equitable return for their efforts. Once suppliers truly understand value, they will be able to realize the benefits of measuring and monitoring it for their customers.     

Unstable banking

We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment. In our model, banks make, securitize, distribute, and trade loans, or they hold cash. They also borrow money, using their security holdings as collateral. Banks maximize profits, and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors. The theory predicts that bank credit and real investment will be volatile when market prices of loans are volatile, but it also points to the instability of banks, especially leveraged banks, participating in markets. Profit-maximizing behavior by banks creates systemic risk.     

The anatomy of corporate securitizations and contract design

Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), intermediaries situated between investors and traditional banks, play an increasingly central role in the provision of credit to constrained corporations, holding as much as 75% of all new institutional leveraged loans. Despite their ascendancy in the risky corporate credit market, there has been little academic research on the CLO market. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the design and structure of the CLO market, describing the general macroeconomic milieu that has facilitated the rapid growth of the market, the mechanics therein, as well as recent risks that have emerged. Understanding the anatomy and dynamics of CLOs is paramount for developing insights into the role of non-bank financial intermediaries in financial markets.     

Electricity markets and oligopolistic behaviors: The impact of a multimarket structure

The article analyses the development of retail competition in electricity markets, compares market structures and performance in Great Britain and Norway, and concludes that there is no satisfactory outcome in a multimarket setting like Great Britain. We study differences in retail profits between Norway and Great Britain, both considered as benchmarks for competitive markets. We highlight the price parallelism of British suppliers whatever the trend of wholesale prices. These behaviors contrast with the small and stable retail mark-ups in each group of suppliers in Norway. The main explanation comes from the combination of vertical integration and multimarket setting, which allows parallel pricing behaviors in the British retail market. We also evaluate the impact of other factors that influence the dynamic of retail competition: national fuel mixes and institutional design of retail and wholesale markets. However, we demonstrate that a multimarket setting, which is a major feature of most retail markets, remains the main determinant of oligopolistic profit. Remedies must be implemented to correct these market imperfections.     

Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediaries: Stylized Facts

World stock markets are booming, and emerging stock marketsaccount for a disproportionate share of this growth. Yet economistslack a common concept or measure of stock market development.This article collects and compares a broad array of indicatorsof stock market and financial intermediary development, usingdata from forty-four developing and industrial countries duringthe period from 1986 to 1993. The empirical results exhibitwide cross-country differences for each indicator as well asintuitively appealing correlations between various indicators.The article constructs aggregate indexes and analyzes them todocument the relationship between the emergence of stock marketsand the growth of financial intermediaries. It produces a setof stylized facts that facilitates and stimulates research intothe links among stock markets, economic development, and corporatefinancing decisions.