Re-employment probabilities of unemployment benefit recipients

This article studies transitions out of unemployment for benefit recipients in Spain. We analyse the duration of unemployment, distinguishing between spells that end in recall (workers returning to the previous employer) and spells that end in exit to a new job. This distinction allows us to find that the recall hazard rate increases around the time of exhaustion of benefits. However, this happens only for workers receiving Unemployment Insurance (UI). Because we are unable to replicate this result for workers receiving Unemployment Assistance (UA), we believe the finding lends support to the hypothesis that in Spain firms and workers make a strategic use of UI.     

Institutional specifics and unemployment insurance eligibility in Canada: How sensitive are employment duration effects?

The paper examines the influence of unemployment insurance on the duration of employment spells in Canada using the 1988–90 Labour Market Activity Survey. The primary focus of the paper is to evaluate whether estimated UI effects are sensitive to the degree to which institutional rules and regulations governing UI eligibility and entitlement are explicitly modelled. The key result of the paper is that it is indeed important to allow for institutional detail when estimating unemployment insurance effects. Estimates using simple proxies for eligibility indicate small, often insignificant UI effects. The size and significance of the effects rise as more realistic versions of the variables are adopted. The estimates using the eligibility variables incorporating the greatest level of institutional detail suggest that a jump in the hazard rate by a factor of 2.3 may not be an unreasonable estimate of the effect.     

HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND REEMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES AMONG OLDER DISPLACED WORKERS

This article investigates the relationship between health insurance coverage and employment behavior among older workers with an involuntary job loss. It finds that various sources of health insurance are available to mitigate the circumstances where employer-sponsored health insurance is terminated when older workers lose jobs involuntarily. However, older displaced workers remain less likely to be insured than comparable nondisplaced workers by 7.6 percentage points one year after the job loss. The analysis also reveals that having secure health coverage before job displacement is associated with lower probabilities of reemployment and longer postdisplacement nonemployment spells. (JEL I12 , J32 , J63 , J14 )     

Labor market cycles, unemployment insurance eligibility, and moral hazard

If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to working, so, by itself, it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, then there is a UI contribution scheme that eliminates any effect of UI on employment decisions. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the effects of UI to violations of its premises. Our baseline simulation shows that if the neutral contribution scheme derived in this paper were to be implemented, the average unemployment rate in the United States would fall from 5.7 to 4.7 percent. Also, the results show that with endogenous UI eligibility, one can simultaneously generate realistic productivity driven cycles and realistic responses of unemployment to changes in UI benefits.     

Sick of being “Activated?”

Do unemployment insurance (UI) benefit recipients take sick leave more often when facing “activation” by the employment office? We answer this question using administrative data from the German Federal Employment Agency on vacancy referrals sent to UI benefit recipients. Applying duration analysis, we find an increased transition rate into short-term sick leave among individuals who had received vacancy referrals from the employment office. We find that while men on average report less sick compared to women, they respond stronger to a vacancy referral. In subsequent steps, we test the hypothesis that the results are driven by real illnesses as opposed to shirking. Our findings do not support this hypothesis. We interpret the findings as evidence of moral hazard behavior and as evidence of a side effect of an activation measure.     

The Dynamics of Public Housing Tenure in Australia

The analysis in this paper presents evidence on the behaviour of tenants in public housing in Australia. Using a unique administrative dataset for West Australia, we identify the nature of spells in public housing and the determinants of the length of those spells. Our results indicate that lone parents and single individuals experience longer spells in public housing compared with couple households. We find that an increase in the market rent of a property in the order of $100 per month reduces the hazard out of public housing by between 17 per cent (lone parents) and 10 per cent (couples).     

Do time limits in the sickness insurance system increase return to work?

This article analyzes the effect of stricter enforcement of the eligibility criteria in the Swedish sickness insurance (SI) system. In 2008, time-restricted assessments of the individual’s working capacity on the 91st and 181st sick day was introduced. Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental feature of the intervention, I find a large and significant increased exit rate around the 181-day assessment. The impact is the result of longer spells outside SI-benefits, indicating that the stricter rules create disincentives to report sick.     

Optimal Unemployment Insurance and Employment History

In existing unemployment insurance programmes, it is standard to condition eligibility on the previous employment record of unemployed workers. The purpose of this article is to study conditions under which the efficient contract exhibits these properties. In order to do so, we characterize the optimal unemployment insurance contract in asymmetric information environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. We show that if quits cannot be distinguished from layoffs, it is optimal to condition the benefits paid to unemployed workers on their employment history, in particular, the coverage should increase with the length of previous employment spells.     

Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance

This paper examines the incentive effects of interactions between unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components of Sweden's social insurance system. The main topic is how the sickness‐report rate among the unemployed is affected by (i) the limit of 300 workdays for UI benefits, and (ii) the difference in maximum compensation between UI and SI benefits. Results obtained by duration analysis suggest that sick reports increase as the UI benefit expiration date approaches. There is also evidence of an incentive effect on the sick‐report rate because SI offers higher compensation than UI.     

Time Past and Time Present: a Duration Analysis of IMF Program Spells*

The programs of the IMF were designed to provide short‐term assistance to countries with balance‐of‐ payments disequilibria. Over time, however, the Fund instituted new facilities with longer time horizons, while many countries adopted consecutive programs. As a result, the length of time spent by countries in IMF programs has grown. This paper analyzes IMF program spells for a group of developing economies over the period of 1982–2000. Duration models are used to investigate the time dependence of the spells and the factors that affect their duration. The hazard ratio of spells has a nonmonotonic shape, first rising and then falling. Spell duration is independent of previous spell length or the number of spells. Program duration is extended for countries with lower income, exports concentrated in primary goods, landlocked geographic status and autocratic regimes. Governments that are polarized have shorter spells, which may reflect a breakdown in governance.     

Unemployment insurance, moral hazard, and economic growth

It is important but difficult to distinguish between desirable and undesirable effects of unemployment insurance (UI) that are observationally equivalent when designing optimal UI schemes. For example, a UI-induced rise in the wage rate caused by workers taking more time to match their skills with job vacancies is desirable. However, another view of the same observation is that UI causes permanently higher involuntary unemployment by raising the reservation wage. This paper avoids this problem by regarding the trade-off between the UI replacement rates and unemployment as an intermediate relationship that matters only as far as it impacts economic growth. An empirical analysis of UI replacement rates, unemployment rates, and growth rates using annual panel data finds UI replacement rates are associated with higher unemployment. However, no significant relationship is found between UI-related unemployment and the real growth rate of gross domestic product.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fiftieth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 15–18, 2000, Charleston, South Carolina. Financial support from the Scottish Economic Society and the University of Stirling is gratefully acknowledged. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development generously provided access to their database on benefit entitlements and gross replacement rates. The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for constructive comments.     

Optimal unemployment insurance in an estimated job search model with savings

This paper estimates a job search model with savings on Danish micro data that include observations on wealth and wages. Controlling for extensive observed and unobserved worker characteristics heterogeneity, the estimation relates observed unemployment spells to the model implied hazard rate for each worker. The model estimates are sensible and fit the data well. Optimal UI policy is determined in the estimated model as a trade-off between insurance provision and distortion of search incentives. The analysis emphasizes an important policy sensitivity to the interest rate and the importance of including transitional dynamics in the analysis.     

Unemployment Duration and Inflows onto the Disability Support Pension Program: Evidence from FaCS LDS Data

From the administrative data of the Australian Department of Family and Community Services it is found that a large proportion of Disability Support Pension (DSP) recipients transferred from unemployment benefits. Among those who transferred to DSP from unemployment benefits, a large proportion experienced multiple spells of income support receipt prior to the transition and a majority had more than a half‐year pre‐transition unemployment duration, with the average pre‐transition unemployment duration being more than one year. These findings suggest that the unemployment benefit is not simply a‘hold‐on’ benefit for those who experienced the unemployment—DSP transition. This article further examines what factors are associated with the transition. It is found that, among other things, the probability of transition to DSP from unemployment increases with duration on unemployment benefits.     

Running out of time: Limited unemployment benefits and reservation wages

We study unemployment insurance (UI) in an equilibrium environment in which unemployed workers only receive benefits for a finite length of time. Although all workers have identical productivity and leisure value, the random arrival of job offers creates ex-post differences with respect to their time remaining until benefit expiration. Firms, which are also homogeneous, can exploit these differences, leading to an endogenous wage distribution.This allows us to examine the equilibrium effect of policy changes in both the size and length of UI benefits. Surprisingly, an increase in benefits can actually cause wages to fall, which is contrary to the predictions of on-the-job-search models. Moreover, we explain well-documented patterns of how the hazard rate of exiting unemployment responds to these policy changes. Our theory also explains why this hazard rate jumps at the time of benefit exhaustion.     

Does University-Industry collaboration improve innovation efficiency? Evidence from Chinese Firms⋄

This paper investigates the impact of university-industry (UI) collaboration on firms' innovation efficiency using a balanced panel of 443 innovative firms in China from 2008 to 2011. An evaluation of firms' innovation efficiency shows that innovative firms do not show consistent performance across the two stages of the innovation process, namely, the R&D stage and the commercialisation stage. The empirical results demonstrate that UI collaboration can be detrimental to a firm's innovation efficiency initially but that the firm can benefit from UI collaboration as engagement deepens. In addition, UI collaboration affects innovation efficiency differently across the two stages once regional institutional factors are taken into consideration. Thus, pertinent policies may be required in order to facilitate UI collaboration and its role in improving innovation efficiency at different stages.     

Effectiveness of One-Euro-Jobs: do programme characteristics matter?

Recent German labour market reforms introduced a large scale workfare programme called One-Euro-Jobs to activate welfare recipients and improve their employment prospects. In programme design leeway is left to regional actors. Using administrative data and Propensity Score (PS) matching, this article investigates the association between programme design and effectiveness, so as to provide insight on how to increase programme effectiveness. First, effects of different types of One-Euro-Jobs according to planned duration and weekly working hours compared to ‘waiting’ are estimated. Second, programme types are compared directly to disentangle selection and programme effects. As expected lock-in effects are larger for participations with a longer planned duration, but not for those with longer weekly working hours. One-Euro-Jobs do not generally increase the employment prospects for East German men beyond 2 years after programme start and longer and more intensive participations even decrease employment prospects. In West Germany, One-Euro-Jobs generally increase the employment chances and longer participations lead to slightly greater employment opportunities roughly 2 years after programme start. The initial advantages of short participations decrease over time. Following these results, a reallocation of participants might improve programme effectiveness.     

Incidence and Duration of Unemployment Spells: Implications on the Wage Differentials of Part-Time and Full-Time Workers

This article analyzes the extent to which incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells affect the wage differentials between full-time and part-time workers. The estimation results of a sample selectivity bias–adjusted wage equation reveal that high incidences of unemployment are associated with low wages for both full-time and part-time workers. However, the reduction in wages due to incidence of unemployment is larger for full-time workers in high-paid jobs than for their part-time counterparts. Duration of unemployment spells affects full-time and part-time workers differently. In general, longer unemployment spells tend to increase the wages of full-time workers but tend to depress the wages of part-time workers. Although the probability of unemployment is not a factor in explaining the wage differential, the duration of unemployment accounts for a substantial portion (about 66.6% in full sample) of the wage differential that exists between full-time and part-time workers.     

DO TARGETED VOUCHERS INSTILL HABITS? EVIDENCE FROM WOMEN,INFANTS, AND CHILDREN

We examine whether programs that provide vouchers to households continue to influence behavior after the household leaves the program. Using detailed scanner data, we test whether benefit vouchers received through the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) change household purchasing decisions and whether these changes persist even after households are no longer eligible to participate in the program. In 2009, the package of goods available through WIC vouchers changed. Examining variation due to this package change, we show that the WIC vouchers change purchasing decisions during eligibility, but that effects fade after eligibility ends. (JEL I38, I18, J13)     

Women's unemployment during transition Evidence from Czech and Slovak micro-data

We analyse women’s weekly probabilities of leaving unemployment in the Czech and Slovak Republics (CR and SR) in order to investigate three questions: 1) Why are unemployment rates much lower in the CR than the SR?; 2) Does the unemployment compensation scheme (UCS) substantially lengthen unemploy-mentspells?; and 3) Why are women’s unemployment rates higher than men’s? We find that differences in the behaviour of the individuals, employers and institutions in the SR and CR (as measured by differences in coefficients) play a larger role in determining the CR’s shorter female unemployment spells than do differences in measured demand and demographic variables. The UCS has only a moderate effect on duration and its impact is greater in the CR. The differences between men’s and women’s spells (in each republic) are explained more by differences in coefficients than by differences in observed characteristics. JEL classification: C41, H53, J23, J64, O15, P2.     

Moral hazard among the sick and unemployed: evidence from a Swedish social insurance reform

This paper studies a specific type of moral hazard that arises in the interplay between two large public social insurance systems in Sweden, namely the sickness insurance (SI) and the unemployment insurance (UI). Moral hazard can arise from the structure of the benefit levels as for some unemployed persons benefits from the SI are higher than benefits from the UI. We use a reform of the SI system that came into force on 1 July 2003 to identify the effect of economic incentives arising from the different benefit levels. The purpose of the reform was to eliminate the difference in benefits between the two social insurance systems. Our results from a duration analysis show clearly that the higher the sickness benefits, the higher the probability of reporting sick.