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This article, based on empirical work by the authors over the past decade, argues that city planners and policy-makers lack an effective future-oriented approach enabling them to comprehend current complexity, anticipate impending change and shape a preferred future condition.Reflecting on more than a dozen recent city futures exercises, three overriding themes emerge: changing values systems will be the single biggest driver over the next thirty years; the forging of shared visions is a prerequisite to strategic city planning; and the nature, force and direction of the various vectors of collaborative leadership by constituent stakeholders will determine the future success or otherwise of city stewardship.The article concludes by calling for the formulation of a Unified Theory for Sustainable Cities by reference to Gaia and the application of a futures oriented approach such as Prospective Through Scenarios.  相似文献   

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Uplands around the world are facing significant social, economic and environmental changes, and decision-makers need to better understand what the future may hold if they are to adapt and maintain upland goods and services. This paper draws together all major research comprising eight studies that have used scenarios to describe possible futures for UK uplands. The paper evaluates which scenarios are perceived by stakeholders to be most likely and desirable, and assesses the benefits and drawbacks of the scenario methods used in UK uplands to date. Stakeholders agreed that the most desirable and likely scenario would be a continuation of hill farming (albeit at reduced levels) based on cross-compliance with environmental measures. The least desirable scenario is a withdrawal of government financial support for hill farming. Although this was deemed by stakeholders to be the least likely scenario, the loss of government support warrants close attention due to its potential implications for the local economy. Stakeholders noted that the environmental implications of this scenario are much less clear-cut. As such, there is an urgent need to understand the full implications of this scenario, so that upland stakeholders can adequately prepare, and policy-makers can better evaluate the likely implications of different policy options. The paper concludes that in future, upland scenario research needs to: (1) better integrate in-depth and representative participation from stakeholders during both scenario development and evaluation; and (2) make more effective use of visualisation techniques and simulation models.  相似文献   

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David Wright   《Futures》2008,40(5):473-488
In the last few decades, scenarios have provided a way of analysing the implications of alternative futures, especially as they might be impacted by new technologies. This has been no less true of ambient intelligence (AmI), which may be embedded everywhere in the not so distant future. Most of the scenarios developed by AmI enthusiasts have been rather ‘sunny’, showing how the new technologies promise to make our lives more efficient, enjoyable, productive, enriching. A European project, called Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence (SWAMI), deliberately developed ‘dark scenarios’ to highlight the threats to privacy, identity, trust, security and inclusiveness posed by the new technologies. The SWAMI consortium also developed a methodological structure for deconstructing and analysing the dark scenarios. This paper takes that approach a step further by applying it to a cultural artefact, partly to test the validity, utility, applicability of the SWAMI methodology to a scenario not constructed by the consortium and partly to show how some cultural artefacts can be regarded as scenarios in their own right as well as warnings about future technologies. The cultural artefact chosen here was the Steven Spielberg film Minority Report, because it features so many AmI technologies and draws attention to the issues that have been the focus of the SWAMI project.  相似文献   

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Ageing societies need to supply support to an ever growing segment of elderly dependent population without compromising the future sustainability for the currently young or unborn population. Current tendencies to focus on policy solutions like automatic stabilisers and norm-based pre-commitment strategies with decisions delegated to experts carry a high risk of political breakdown when the future population re-evaluates this with new information. Using the Swedish pension reform as a concrete example we show how the futurity problem associated with the current non-existence of the future population makes the political process prone to avoid bringing issues with very long horizons into the public debate. Alternative demographic scenarios for Sweden are used to illustrate how even very small variations in the assumptions of demographic projections lead to radically different future population structures. Hence, the majority preferences in a distant future cannot be foreseen. Adding to this, the complex interactions with a changing environment of technology and nature time-consistent decision making at the far future horizon must be virtually impossible. Thus, the sustainability of long-term social security systems requires constitutional balances that provide for orderly and continual adaptation rather than once-for-all fixes that are likely to be rejected by future electorates.  相似文献   

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Ed Dammers 《Futures》2010,42(8):785-793
Three paradigmatic traditions of scenario-building can be seen to exist. The model approach with its roots in American military scenarios of the 1950s, the design approach in French urban and regional development of the 1960s, and the strategic conversation approach in scenarios made in the private sector since the 1970s. In theory, these traditions can be integrated by organising the scenario project in a cyclical way. The territorial scenarios for Europe were made by combining workshops, a literature review and modelling. Thematic scenarios were produced for various themes, like demography, the economy, energy, and climate change. These thematic scenarios were combined into four integrated scenarios. The robustness of the scenarios was tested by introducing several “wild cards” and by exploring their territorial impacts throughout Europe. This applied approach succeeded in combining important strengths from the different scenario traditions. Improvements, however, could still be made.  相似文献   

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This article discusses the alternative futures for a multi-civilizational European Union; in other words, its capacity to embrace non-Western civilizations such as the Indian, Islamic, Chinese and others. It brings out three scenarios: (1) a Eurocentric future; (2) a pragmatically multi-civilizational European Union; and (3) a multi-civilizational European Union. Normatively, the third scenario, a genuinely multi-civilizational future appears the most preferred alternative for the rise of European Union as a respected and credible global actor, which plays a significant role in the stabilization and development of its neighbourhood regions and in the resolution of global level issues. Along with incentives, barriers, as discussed in relevant sections, are also explicit which might lead to two other scenarios if not eliminated. Practically, the article concludes that the co-existence of European and other civilizations within the European Union is more likely to lead to a multi-civilizational future than any attempt to integrate those civilizations within the dominant European tradition.  相似文献   

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Morphological analysis allows any number of dimensions to be retained when framing future conditions, and techniques within morphological analysis determine which combinations of those dimensions represent plausible futures. However, even a relatively low number of dimensions in future conditions can lead to hundreds or even thousands of plausible future scenarios. Creating highly diverse but conceivable visions of the future in which to explore decision-making, exploratory futures techniques rely on the selection of a small number of plausible scenarios from the larger set. In this paper we describe a new method for finding maximally diverse sets containing a small number of plausible scenarios from a multi-dimensional morphological analysis. It is based on a mathematical optimization of diversity that is robust to the uncertainty in the framing of future factors and states and in what stakeholders might consider diverse combinations of those factors and states. We also describe implementation of the method as a software tool and its performance in recent exploratory scenario development by CGIAR and partners for regional environmental change, food security and livelihoods.  相似文献   

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There is a growing scientific consensus that limiting the increase in global average temperature to around 2 °C above pre-industrial levels is necessary to avoid unacceptable impact on the climate system. This requires that the developed countries’ emissions are radically reduced during the next 40 years. Energy scenario studies provide insights on the societal transitions that might be implied by such low-carbon futures, and in this paper we discuss how a greater attention to different governance and institutional issues can complement future scenario exercises. The analysis is based on a critical review of 20 quantitative and qualitative scenario studies, all of relevance for meeting long-term climate policy objectives. The paper: (a) analyzes some key differences in energy technology mixes and primary energy use patterns across these studies; (b) briefly explores the extent and the nature of the societal challenges and policy responses implied; and (c) discusses a number of important implications for the design and scope of future scenario studies. Our review shows that in previous scenario studies the main attention is typically paid to analyzing the impact of well-defined and uniform policy instruments, while fewer studies factor in the role of institutional change in achieving different energy futures. We therefore point towards a number of strategies of integrating issues of transition governance into future scenario analyses, and argue for a closer synthesis of qualitative and quantitative scenario building.  相似文献   

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In this paper, we present a strategy for the development of interactive media scenarios to help communicate uncertainties and complexities in coupled human and natural systems. Insights arising from Complex Adaptive Systems theory advocate the need for more adaptive perspectives on natural resources management. For the collaborative exploration of future complexities and uncertainties, participatory scenario development has proven to be a powerful approach. A range of communication strategies with benefits for conveying complexity, however, has not yet been adopted by scenario developers. We present a framework of criteria with which we structurally analyze the benefits of interactive media communication. First, we consider requirements of feasibility, flexibility and stakeholder contributions. Then, we synthesize criteria for the communication of Complex Adaptive Systems. Finally, we set criteria for communicatory clarity and engagement. Using this framework, we review several science communication fields, including landscape visualization, serious gaming and visual analytics. We then develop a strategy for interactive media communication in participatory scenario development, including two work-in-progress examples. This strategy employs mixed media, micro-games and accessible stakeholder contributions in a geo-web context, and is suitable for participatory work in live settings as well as on-line, from a local to a global scale.  相似文献   

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A significant change in trends regarding energy prices (in particular oil) has taken place in 2003 at the beginning of the Iraq War. It has revealed a very strong tension between oil prices on the one hand and the relationship between global oil supply and demand on the other. The strong growth rates of emerging economies up to 2008 have generated a very sharp increase in oil prices. The temporary economic recession of 2008-2009 has resulted in turn into a significant decrease of oil prices, down to a level which remained, however, twice as high as that of early 2003. With the economy recovering from the recession, it is highly probable that energy prices will continue to increase and that Europe will be confronted with high energy prices in the coming decades. Against this general background, two scenarios have been elaborated which differ mainly by the time of occurrence of oil peaking.1 The differences between the scenario hypotheses are therefore differences of context in relation to exogenous factors. Policies are also considered in the scenarios, but they are not at the forefront and their impact is considered as limited in relation to that of exogenous factors.The first scenario “Europe in a context of high energy price” assumes that the process of oil peaking will not take place before 2030, but that oil price increase will nevertheless be sustained and substantial until then. Numerous adjustments will have to be made in the economy and their territorial impacts will be significant (less polycentricity, more compact cities, decline of the importance of road and air transport). The second scenario “Europe after oil production peaking” assumes that oil production will peak around the mid-2010s (followed by gas production peaking around 2025), despite significant investments to increase production. In a context of steadily growing oil and gas demand, Europe will be confronted with serious economic difficulties. The territorial impacts will be different from those suggested by the first scenario, with stronger pressure put on rural areas and a loss of attractiveness of large cities related to increasing unemployment and social tensions. In both scenarios, the countries of central and eastern Europe will be more severely hit by the new energy context.The scenarios were elaborated in 2005 and slightly reviewed in 2009 in order to take account of the impacts of the economic recession in Europe and of the growing concerns about climate change.  相似文献   

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The ESPON 2006 scenario project generated three integrated roll-forward scenarios (A roll-forward scenario is a scenario in which the hypotheses define the parameters at the start of the covered time period and the scenario then explores the unfolding of events based on theses hypotheses. This is opposed to a roll-backward scenario in which the situation at the end of the time period is defined and the scenario then explores the path to reach this situation.). In the trend scenario renewed efforts are made for the Lisbon strategy, demanding extra investments in R&D and education. Regional policy will also be continued with vigour. In the Competition Scenario bold decisions are made regarding Europe's continued prosperity. The Lisbon strategy takes precedence over institutional reform and other sectoral policies. In the Cohesion Scenario Europe is confronted with the challenge of fully integrating the various regions in Europe. The budgets for Regional Policy and Rural Development Policy are enhanced and targeted to the most needy regions. The scenarios are described as stories about the future, supported by model calculations and visualised by various maps. They concentrate on urban and rural development and on territorial developments in different parts of Europe, like North-West Europe, the Alpine Space and Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, a proactive, roll-back scenario explores the possibilities to combine competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability. A message, derived from the scenarios, is that independent of the explored policy options the European territory will be confronted with large challenges like a (rapid) decline of fossil energy resources and increasing impacts of climate change. The scenarios appear particularly helpful in the context of the current paradigm shift in European regional policy from a policy for balance to a policy for aggregate growth.  相似文献   

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M.W. Thring 《Futures》1975,7(4):329-334
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Stuart Sandow 《Futures》1971,3(4):324-337
This essay questions expertise about the future and offers an assessment of the methods used and questions addressed by planners as they determine the inputs for setting their goals. It outlines, challenges and redefines several planning methods and suggests a more generous framework through which to focus thought about the future.  相似文献   

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Martha J Garrett   《Futures》1995,27(9-10):927-933
A good ‘market’ for health futures and easy access to relevant information are among the reasons that health futures is currently centred in the wealthy nations. Interest in health futures is growing in the less developed countries, however, in part because of efforts by WHO and its regional office. Many benefits can be expected if the field becomes more international, including an influx of fresh ideas about health futures study designs and about innovative approaches to health care. A shift to a more global orientation is also imperative simply because health futures deals with the well-being of human beings, and most human beings live in the less developed countries of the world.  相似文献   

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Ian Miles  Michiel Schwarz 《Futures》1982,14(5):462-482
Space developments do not exist in a vacuum! The shape of future space activities will depend on a combination of social, economic and political forces, creating the determinants for different patterns of space utilization. Forecasts of alternative space futures can therefore be explored by integrating different scenarios of world development and space trends. Here, alternative world trends are related to the underlying dynamics of space development, in terms of the economic, military and scientific utilization of space. The importance of space as a political issue is thus emphasized, in that the outcomes of policy choices to be made both now and in the future will help shape the social and economic contexts in which space technology will be used in the decades ahead.  相似文献   

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Futures studies is likely to evolve through changes in five areas. They are: (1) forecasting to anticipatory action learning; (2) reductionist to complex; (3) horizontal to vertical; (4) from short-term empiricist research to the return of long-term history, including grand narratives; and (5) scenario development to moral futures.  相似文献   

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