Dynamic capital structure with heterogeneous beliefs and market timing

This paper builds a dynamic trade-off model of corporate financing with differences in belief between the insider manager and outside investors. The optimal leverage depends on differences of opinion and can differ significantly from that in standard trade-off models. The manager's market timing behavior leads to several stylized facts, such as the low average debt ratios of firms in the cross section, the substantial presence of zero-debt firms that pay larger dividends and keep higher cash balances than other firms, and negative long-run abnormal returns following stock issuance. Market timing behavior leads to substantial losses of firm value through excessive financing activities. Market timing and debt conservatism depend negatively on shareholder control of the firm.     

Time-varying risk preferences and emerging market co-movements

This paper examines how shocks can transmit across international stock markets through the channel of time-varying investor risk preferences. We highlight the effects of this channel by comparing the conventional constant relative risk aversion utility function with the habit-formation utility function of Campbell and Cochrane (J. Pol. Econ. 107 (1999) 205). Calibrating our model with data from Argentina, Korea and Mexico, we find that in the presence of time-varying investor risk preferences, market integration generates a substantial increase in cross-country co-movements of stock returns.     

Subordinated debt,market discipline,and banks' risk taking

The present paper demonstrates the ambiguous impact of subordinated debt on the risk-taking incentives of banks. It is shown that in comparison with full deposit insurance, subordinated debt reduces risk only if banks can credibly commit to a given level of risk. If, however, banks are not able to commit, subordinated debt leads to an increase in risk. This is because due to limited liability banks always have an incentive to increase their risk after the interest rate is contracted in order to reduce the expected costs of debt. Rational debt holders anticipate this behavior and accordingly require a higher risk premium ex ante. The higher interest rates in turn further aggravate the excessive risk-taking incentives of banks.     

Asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs

This paper studies the dynamic behavior of security prices in the presence of investors’ heterogeneous beliefs. We provide a tractable continuous-time pure-exchange model and highlight the mechanism through which investors’ differences of opinion enter into security prices. In the determination of equilibrium, we employ a representative investor with stochastic weights and solve for all economic quantities in closed form, including the perceived market prices of risk and interest rate. The basic analysis is generalized to incorporate multiple sources of risk, disagreement about nonfundamentals, and multiple investors. Other applications involving multiple goods and nominal asset pricing within monetary economies are discussed.     

Public debt in economies with heterogeneous agents

We study public debt in competitive equilibria in which a government chooses transfers and taxes optimally and in addition decides how thoroughly to enforce debt contracts. If the government enforces perfectly, asset inequality is determined in an optimum competitive equilibrium but the level of government debt is not. Welfare increases if private debt contracts are not enforced. Borrowing frictions let the government gather monopoly rents that come from issuing public debt without facing competing private borrowers. Regardless of whether the government chooses to enforce private debt contracts, the level of initial government debt does not affect an optimal allocation.     

Capital asset prices with heterogeneous beliefs

Assuming continuous trading in continuous time with Brownian motion processes, the basic capital asset pricing model of Sharpe, Lintner, and Mossin is developed under arbitrary distributions of investors' beliefs consistent with available information. Results on the processing of information are reported, and properties of investors' portfolios are derived.     

加强市场基础建设 提高风险预警能力——希腊主权债务危机的反思

近来,希腊债务危机成为全球经济舆论的焦点。文章指出,希腊债务危机是希腊经济自身缺陷、主权债务信息披露不完善、欧元区体制弊端等问题的集中体现。借鉴希腊债务危机的教训,我们应进一步强化信息披露对金融市场发展基础性作用的认识,通过发展直接融资促进地方政府融资的显性化,并尽快建立和完善我国金融市场的风险监控、预警和处理机制。     

Asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs and relative performance

We propose an equilibrium asset pricing model in which agents with heterogeneous beliefs care about relative performance. We find that the concern with relative performance leads agents to trade more similarly, a development that has two effects. First, similar trading directly decreases volatility. Second, similar trading decreases the impact of dominant agents. The second effect dominates the first when agents expect large differences between their final performances, and vice versa when agents expect small differences between their final performances. Compared with the case in which agents are unconcerned about relative performance, the stock return volatility is higher when the second effect dominates, and lower when the first effect dominates. This paper also demonstrates that the concern about relative performance influences investors’ holdings, stock prices and risk premia.     

Privatization,political risk and stock market development in emerging economies

This paper investigates whether privatization in emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through the resolution of political risk. We argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty over political commitment to a market-oriented policy as well as to regulatory and private property rights. We present evidence suggesting that progress in privatization is indeed correlated with improvements in perceived political risk. Our analysis further shows that changes in political risk in general tend to have a strong effect on local stock market development and excess returns in emerging economies. We conclude that the resolution of political risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the rapid growth of stock markets in emerging economies.     

The effects of bank relationships on firm private debt restructuring: Evidence from an emerging market

Our paper seeks to examine the direct benefit of bank relationships for a distressed borrower by assessing its influence on the success of firm private debt restructuring. We find that a distressed firm with a stronger bank relationship has a greater probability to successfully restructure its debt through private renegotiation. Accordingly, an analysis of credit rating recovery provides complementary evidence on the factors of successful debt restructuring. A duration analysis of the length of time needed for a debt restructuring to be completed is fully consistent with our documented results. We conclude that in a bank dominated financial system like Taiwan's where firms are heavily bank-dependent, the bank-firm relationship is of crucial importance to the success of financially distressed firms in private debt restructuring.     

Corporate debt issues and interest rate risk management: Hedging or market timing?

Apart from the obvious reasons for raising capital, a firm can hedge its interest rate exposure by issuing debt, the value of which moves in an opposite direction from the value of its assets as interest rate varies. We examine whether firms in the UK market make full use of debt issuances for hedging purposes or if they have other considerations. Our evidence shows that firms’ choices of debt issues are primarily driven by debt market conditions in an effort to lower their costs of capital rather than managing their firm-specific interest rate exposures. This suggests that market timing, as opposed to hedging, is the primary motivation behind corporate debt issuances.     

Capital market equilibrium with heterogeneous investors

As a two-parameter model that satisfies stochastic dominance, the mean-extended Gini model is used to build efficient portfolios. The model quantifies risk aversion heterogeneity in capital markets. In a simple Edgeworth box framework, we show how capital market equilibrium is achieved for risky assets. This approach provides a richer basis for analysing the pricing of risky assets under heterogeneous preferences. Our main results are: (1) identical investors, who use the same statistic to represent risk, hold identical portfolios of risky assets equal to the market portfolio; and (2) heterogeneous investors as expressed by the variance or the extended Gini hold different risky assets in portfolios, and therefore no one holds the market portfolio.     

Resaleable debt and systemic risk

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions.     

Impact of portfolio flows and heterogeneous expectations on FX jumps: Evidence from an emerging market

Motivated by the recent currency crisis in Turkey, we investigate the role of portfolio flows and heterogeneous expectations on the high frequency stochastic jump behavior of the US dollar value against the Turkish lira, one of the most traded emerging market currencies in the world. We group the detected jumps into different types with respect to their direction (up and down) and timing (local and off-shore trading hours). For each type of jumps, we examine their relation with portfolio flows (in the form of equity and bond flows, and carry trade activity), and dispersion in beliefs for the future exchange rate level and key macroeconomic variables. We find that inflows to both equity and bond markets, and increasing carry trade activity significantly reduce the size of jumps and (partially) their intensity. On the other hand, heterogeneous expectations for the future exchange rate level, consumer price index and gross domestic product are found to increase the number of jumps and the average jump size.     

Portfolio and welfare consequences of debt market dominance

The ability to issue debt that pays in units of the domestic good leads a country to accumulate a large and negative net foreign asset position while maintaining a positive position in equity. This debt market advantage also helps to explain the weak relationship between the real exchange rate and relative consumption. Our stylized model matches the key facts about the U.S. international portfolio, the U.S. real exchange rate, and explains nearly 50% of the observed variation in the valuation effects. We find that taxing bond market transactions increases the volatility of the exchange rate, capital flows and allocations. In contrast, taxing equity positions stabilizes the exchange rate and capital flows while having little impact on the allocation. Lastly, the paper describes a global solution method for portfolio problems under incomplete markets.     

Asset pricing with heterogeneous preferences,beliefs, and portfolio constraints

Portfolio constraints are widespread and have significant effects on asset prices. This paper studies the effects of constraints in a dynamic economy populated by investors with different risk aversions and beliefs about the rate of economic growth. The paper provides a comparison of various constraints and conditions under which these constraints help match certain empirical facts about asset prices. Under these conditions, borrowing and short-sale constraints decrease stock return volatilities, whereas limited stock market participation constraints amplify them. Moreover, borrowing constraints generate spikes in interest rates and volatilities and have stronger effects on asset prices than short-sale constraints.     

CEO inside debt and internal capital market efficiency

Agency theory argues that managerial equity-based incentives are more effective when firm solvency is likely while debt-based incentives are more effective when firms face a greater likelihood of bankruptcy. We examine the relation between chief executive officers' (CEOs') inside debt holdings and the internal capital market allocation of multi-segment firms. We find that CEO inside debt holdings are associated with conservative capital allocation to firm segments, with the result driven by financially distressed firms. Further analysis indicates that although CEO inside debt, on average, is negatively related to firm value, the relation is positive for financially distressed firms. Our evidence indicates that inside debt holdings align the interests of managers and external creditors, inducing managers to pursue conservative capital allocation strategies that appear to be optimal for firms facing insolvency.     

从两宗非洲拖欠案看新兴市场的出口风险防范

非洲等新兴国家地区由于大部分国家经济不发达、法律不完善,导致出口企业遭遇买家拖欠、拒收甚至破产等不利情况时追讨难度大大增加。如何进行风险防范？请看中国信保专家的案例分析     

Firm-level political risk and debt choice

We examine the effect of firm-level political risk on debt choices and find: (i) firms with higher political risk display a preference for private debt over public debt; (ii) the magnitude of this preference varies with the aggregate policy uncertainty; (iii) politically risky firms indeed receive less favorable terms in the bond market. To explain such findings, we show that private lenders have several advantages in serving politically risky borrowers. First, to the extent that lenders cannot perfectly foresee the adoption of new government policies, private lenders' expertise in implementing the reorganization process is important to limit their potential loss. Second, politically risky borrowers must undertake significant operation adjustments facing rising policy uncertainty. Private lenders can gather accurate information and closely monitor these adjustments. Last, as the severity of political risk varies with aggregate policy uncertainty, there exists an implicit contract between a borrower and its relationship bank, whereby a borrower accepts less favorable terms during normal times in exchange for the bank's support during difficult times. Taken together, this study advances our understanding of how cross-sectionally heterogeneous political risk influences corporate debt choice.     

Idiosyncratic risk and debt maturity dispersion

We investigate the relation between idiosyncratic asset risk and debt maturity dispersion. Idiosyncratic asset volatility represents significant risk, which can impede the ability to obtain or maintain external debt financing necessary for business operations, and is difficult to control given its unpredictable nature. We find that this risk is managed through the maturity structure of debt: firms with higher idiosyncratic asset volatility also have more dispersed maturity structures. Consistent with active management of rollover risk, this relation is weaker for younger firms and stronger for firms without significant credit lines.