Contagion and banking crisis – International evidence for 2007–2009

Policy makers aim to avoid banking crises, and although they can to some extent control domestic conditions, internationally transmitted crises are difficult to tackle. This paper identifies international contagion in banking during the 2007–2009 crisis for 54 economies. We identify three channels of contagion – systematic, idiosyncratic and volatility – and find evidence for these in 45 countries. Banking crises are overwhelmingly associated with the presence of both systematic and idiosyncratic contagion. The results reveal that crisis shocks transmitted from a foreign jurisdiction via idiosyncratic contagion increase the likelihood of a systemic crisis in the domestic banking system by almost 37 percent, whereas increased exposure via systematic contagion does not necessarily destabilize the domestic banking system. Thus while policy makers and regulatory authorities are rightly concerned with the systematic transmission of banking crises, reducing the potential for idiosyncratic contagion can importantly reduce the consequences for the domestic economy.     

The effects of systemic banking crises in the inter-war period

This paper examines the time-profile of the impact of systemic banking crises on GDP and industrial production using a panel of 24 countries over the inter-war period and compares this to the post-war experience of these countries. We show that banking crises have effects that induce medium-term adjustments on economies. Focussing on an eight-year horizon, it is clear that the negative effects of systemic banking crises last over the entirety of this time-horizon. The effect has been identified for GDP and industrial production. The adverse effect on the industrial sector stands out as being substantially larger in magnitude relative to the macroeconomic effect. Comparing the results across long-run historical periods for the same selection of countries and variables identifies some differences that stand out: the short term macroeconomic impact effects are much larger in the post-war period, suggesting that the propagation channels of shocks operate at a faster pace in the more recent period. Moreover, the time-profile of effects differs, suggesting that modern policies may be modulating the temporal shape of the response to banking crises shocks. However, the broad magnitude of the adverse effect of banking crises remains comparable across these time periods.     

Financial liberalization,insurance market,and the likelihood of financial crises

This paper provides empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and examines the roles of insurance market, country risk, and economic conditional variables on the relationship between financial liberalization and financial crises in 39 countries. Our empirical results support that financial liberalization does have a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and that the indirect effects of insurance development and lower country risk decrease the probability of crises, but the indirect effect of economic conditional proxies is enhanced with the likelihood of a financial crisis. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of the insurance sector in order to combat financial crises.     

Banking crises: An equal opportunity menace

The historical frequency of banking crises is similar in advanced and developing countries, with quantitative parallels in both the run-ups and the aftermath. We establish these regularities using a dataset spanning from the early 1800s to the present. Banking crises weaken fiscal positions, with government revenues invariably contracting. Three years after a crisis central government debt increases by about 86%. The fiscal burden of banking crisis extends beyond the cost of the bailouts. We find that systemic banking crises are typically preceded by asset price bubbles, large capital inflows and credit booms, in rich and poor countries alike.     

Larger crises cost more: Impact of banking sector instability on output growth

We propose a method for calculating the macroeconomic costs of banking crises that controls for the downward impact of recessions on banking activity. This method uses an event-study approach and a multiple-equation identification and estimation technique. In contrast to earlier research, we estimate the cost of crises based on the size of banking crises. The extent of a crisis is measured using banking sector aggregates. The results, based on our method and data from over 100 banking crises, suggest that it is the size of the crisis that matters for economic growth. Lower credit and money growth during crises cause GDP growth to decline.     

The role of household and business credit in banking crises

Private credit expansions are an important predictor of subsequent banking crises. We revisit that result with a new dataset from developed and developing countries that decomposes private credit into household credit and enterprise credit. We argue that household credit growth raises debt levels without much effect on long-term income. Rapid household credit expansions generate vulnerabilities that can precipitate a banking crisis. Enterprise credit expansions can have the same effects but it is tempered by the associated increase in income. Our estimates show that household credit expansions have been a statistically and economically significant predictor of banking crises. Enterprise credit expansions are also associated with banking crises but their effect is weaker and less robust.     

Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it.     

宏观审慎政策协调能否抑制国际性银行危机传染？——基于跨境金融关联视角的实证研究

本文基于跨境金融关联视角对宏观审慎政策能否抑制国际性银行危机传染这一重要的理论与实践问题进行了实证研究。选取亚洲金融危机和全球金融危机时期遭受冲击的10个代表性国家作为样本,构建Logit模型和多元回归模型探讨本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策对本国系统性银行危机传染的影响。研究表明,具有金融关联的国家出现金融危机会显著增加本国系统性银行危机的发生概率,具有金融关联的国家实施宏观审慎政策对本国信贷的影响比对房价的影响更明显,本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策会显著降低本国系统性银行危机的发生概率。在调整银行危机指标及考虑贸易关联和流动性风险的影响后,研究结果依然保持稳健。本文的研究结论揭示了加强宏观审慎政策协调有助于维护全球金融稳定,对于中国政策当局强化宏观审慎管理具有极其重要的政策含义。     

利率市场化背景下银行系统性危机的实证研究

从利率市场化的国际经验来看,无论是在发达国家还是发展中国家,其实施过程都容易导致不同程度的银行业危机。采用1973~2012年42个国家的面板数据,对利率市场化背景下的银行业危机进行的实证研究表明：利率市场化的推进将增加银行系统性危机发生的机率,特别是在存款利率市场化阶段,而严格的银行监管是抑制银行系统危机发生的有效方法;显性存款保险制度的设立无助于利率市场化后银行系统性风险的防范,甚至有可能会增加危机发生的机率;资本账户开放下进行利率市场化会增加银行系统危机发生的机率。利率市场化进程中允许开设民营银行不会增加银行系统危机的发生机率。     

Early warning systems and systemic banking crises in low income countries: A multinomial logit approach

This paper estimates an early warning system (EWS) for predicting systemic banking crises in a sample of low income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the average duration of crises in this sample of countries is longer than one year, the predictive performance of standard binomial logit models is likely to be hampered by the so-called crisis duration bias. The bias arises from the decision to either treat crisis years after the onset of a crisis as non-crisis years or remove them altogether from the model. To overcome this potential drawback, we propose a multinomial logit approach, which is shown to improve the predictive power of our EWS compared to the binomial logit model. Our results suggest that crisis events in low income countries are associated with low economic growth, drying up of banking system liquidity and widening of foreign exchange net open positions.     

Does inequality lead to a financial crisis?

The recent global crisis has sparked interest in the relationship between income inequality, credit booms, and financial crises. Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Rancière (2011) propose that rising inequality led to a credit boom and eventually to a financial crisis in the US in the first decade of the 21st century as it did in the 1920s. Data from 14 advanced countries between 1920 and 2000 suggest these are not general relationships. Credit booms heighten the probability of a banking crisis, but we find no evidence that a rise in top income shares leads to credit booms. Instead, low interest rates and economic expansions are the only two robust determinants of credit booms in our data set. Anecdotal evidence from US experience in the 1920s and in the years up to 2007 and from other countries does not support the inequality, credit, crisis nexus. Rather, it points back to a familiar boom-bust pattern of declines in interest rates, strong growth, rising credit, asset price booms and crises.     

A network analysis of global banking: 1978–2010

We analyze the global banking network using data on cross-border banking flows for 184 countries during 1978–2010. We find that the density of the global banking network defined by these flows is pro-cyclical, expanding and contracting with the global cycle of capital flows. We also find that country connectedness in the network tends to rise before banking and debt crises and to fall in their aftermath. Despite a historically unique build-up in aggregate flows prior to the global financial crisis, network density in 2007 was comparable to earlier peaks. This suggests that factors other than connectedness, such as the location of the initial shock to the core of the network, have contributed to the severity of the crisis. The global financial crisis stands out as an unusually large perturbation to the global banking network, with indicators of network density in 2008 reaching all-time lows.     

Costs of financial instability, household-sector balance sheets and consumption

Extant work on costs of financial instability focuses on fiscal costs and declines in aggregate GDP following banking crises. We estimate effects of banking and currency crises on consumption in 19 OECD countries, showing consumption plays an important role in the adjustment following a crisis, and effects are not captured solely by the impact of crises on standard consumption determinants, income and wealth. Additional effects, attributable to factors such as time-varying confidence, uncertainty and credit rationing, are aggravated by high and rising leverage, despite financial liberalisation easing liquidity constraints. High leverage implies that banking crises taking place now could have greater incidence than in the past.     

Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Crises

This article develops an index of money market pressure to identify banking crises. We define banking crises as periods in which there is excessive demand for liquidity in the money market. We begin with the theoretical foundation of this new method. With the newly defined crisis episodes, we examine the determinants of banking crises using data complied from 47 countries. We find that slowdown of real GDP, lower real interest rates, extremely high inflation, large fiscal deficits, and over-valued exchange rates tend to precede banking crises. The effects of monetary base growth on the probability of banking crises are negligible.     

Testing the fire-sale FDI hypothesis for the European financial crisis

Using a panel of corporate transactions in 27 EU countries from 1999 to 2012, we investigate the impact of the financial crisis on the market for corporate assets. In particular, we test the ‘fire-sale FDI’ hypothesis by analyzing the number of cross-border transactions, the price of corporate assets and the impact of credit and macroeconomic conditions. According to the fire-sale FDI hypothesis, countries affected by a crisis attract foreign buyers selling assets at a discount. We find a dampening effect of the crisis on cross-border transactions in all EU countries. Although countries with higher sovereign default risk and lower economic demand attracted more foreign buyers in the crisis, lower domestic credit is associated with less cross-border transactions. Corporate assets in crisis countries are cheaper, particularly if domestic credit is low; however, these findings are not limited to the crisis period. This pattern is strikingly different from the East Asian and Latin American financial crises. Overall, we find little evidence for ‘fire-sale FDI’ suggesting an integrated European market without significant frictions.     

De facto exchange rate regimes and currency crises: Are pegged regimes with capital account liberalization really more prone to speculative attacks?

This paper empirically examines whether de facto exchange rate regimes affect the occurrence of currency crises in 84 countries over the 1980–2001 period by using the probit model. We employ the de facto classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that allows us to estimate the impact of relatively long-lived exchange rate regimes on currency crises with much greater precision. We find that pegged regimes significantly decrease the likelihood of currency crises compared with floating regimes. By using the combined data of exchange rate regimes and the existence of capital controls, we also find interesting evidence that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization significantly lower the likelihood of currency crises compared with other regimes. These results are robust to a wide variety of samples and models. From the standpoint of the macroeconomic policy trilemma, we can conjecture that pegged regimes with capital account liberalization are substantially less prone to speculative attacks because they can enhance greater credibility in their currencies by abandoning monetary policy autonomy.     

How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline

This paper analyzes in an international sample of banks from 104 countries if the sensitivity of the cost of deposits to bank risk varies across banks depending on their systemic and absolute size. We analyze a period before the 2007 financial crisis and control for endogeneity of bank size, intervention policies in past banking crises, and soundness of countries’ public finances. Our results are consistent with the predominance of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, although this effect is stronger in countries that did not impose losses on depositors in past banking crises and in countries with sounder public finances.     

Crises and confidence: Systemic banking crises and depositor behavior

We show that individuals who have experienced a systemic banking crisis are 11 percentage points less likely to use banks in the U.S. than otherwise similar individuals who emigrated from the same country but did not live through a crisis. This finding is robust to controlling for exposure to other macroeconomic events and to various methods for addressing potential bias due to migrant self-selection. Consistent with the view that personal experience plays an important role in decision-making, the effects are larger for individuals who were older and more likely to have had wealth entrusted to the banking system at the time of the crisis and for people who experienced crises in countries without deposit insurance.     

Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.     

Explaining banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa

The study examined banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results reveal that banking spread (Net Interest Margin – NIM) is the main determinant of stability and the major means to achieve stability during crises periods. We however find the existence of a threshold effect in NIM.Crises in the banking sector consistently showed to reduce stability. While the results show that high percentage of foreign banks reduce stability, we find foreign banks help stabilize the banking sector in periods of crises. The results show that diversification could also have a positive impact on stability (Z-score) even though this relationship was not robust enough. The results also largely support the competition-fragility view. Particularly, we find that less competition during crises periods can help improve stability. Again, we find evidence for both concentration-stability and concentration-fragility hypotheses depending on the stability measure used. We however find that when large banks in concentrated markets are well regulated, stability could be improved. Weak regulatory environment reduces stability (Z-score) directly and matters during crises periods. Our results are robust to the use of different indicators of stability and estimation methods.