Fiscal Consolidations: A Theoretical Essay with a Heterogeneous-Agent Model

Since the emergence of the financial crisis, most of the EU countries have promoted impressive public interventions to support financial institutions, contributing to a significant rise in general government gross debt-to-GDP ratios. As such, the issue of how to best pursue a fiscal consolidation will become crucial regarding the fiscal policy stance. This paper aims at characterizing four different stylized debt consolidation strategies extensively identified in the literature (one pure revenue-based and three expenditure-based) in order to assess welfare affects and, in particular, the inequality effects involved. For this purpose, we built a general equilibrium heterogeneous-agent model capable of exploring the relationship between fiscal policy and the endogenous cross-section distribution of income and wealth. Moreover, we decompose the impacts on welfare criteria in order to distinguish pure efficiency effects from insurance and inequality effects. According to our simulations, the adjustment based on the reduction of unproductive expenditures came out to be the most welfare-enhancing compared to those based on tax increases or on social transfer reductions.     

The pace of fiscal consolidations,fiscal sustainability,and welfare: An overlapping generations approach

This study investigates expenditure- and tax-based consolidations under the rule of reductions in debt-to-GDP ratios to the target level and the effects of these consolidations on fiscal sustainability and welfare, using an overlapping generations model with exogenous growth settings. We derive (i) a threshold (ceiling) of public debt to ensure fiscal sustainability, (ii) sustainable paces of these consolidations, and (iii) the optimal pace of consolidations under both expenditure- and tax-based consolidations, examining whether these consolidations are effective in the sense that they are sustainable, increase welfare, and induce fairness of welfare distribution across generations (lower intergenerational conflicts over welfare). We find that the pace of tax-based consolidation required to ensure fiscal sustainability is higher than that required for expenditure-based consolidation. As for welfare, countries may differ in their choice of the type of consolidation, which depends on the size of outstanding debts relative to capital, the economy’s productivity, tax rate levels, and the extent of utility derived by individuals from public goods and services. More importantly, it may also depend on whether policymakers emphasize social welfare or fairness of welfare distribution between generations. By contrast, a common result from the viewpoints of both social welfare and fair distribution of welfare across generations is that fiscal consolidation cannot persist much longer than 30 years (one period in the model). This result will support the pace of consolidation in the EU: the Stability and Growth Pact.     

The Economic Adjustment Program for Portugal: assessing welfare impact in a heterogeneous-agent framework

The sovereign debt crisis, triggered by the 2007-08 global financial crisis, has affected several European Union (EU) countries, leading to unprecedented financial assistance programs. In May 2011, the Portuguese Government set an agreement with the Troika (a supranational institution composed by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)), through which, in exchange for external help, the Portuguese authorities committed to an Economic Adjustment Program (EAP). In order to assess the impacts of the EAP on welfare and, in particular, on inequality, this paper simulates the debt consolidation strategy proposed by the Troika using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. The model enables to explore the impacts of the fiscal adjustment on the endogenous cross-section distribution of income, wealth and welfare. Our results predict a positive net welfare gain, despite the existence of significant transition costs in terms of output losses and inequality, especially during the first years of implementation. Overall, the net positive welfare gains are biased towards the poorer, which means that the consolidation plan will be, in the end, equality-enhancing. These results reflect the instruments involved in the consolidation strategy: productive and unproductive expenditure cuts combined with a slight increase in social transfers. Furthermore, the simulation predicts a positive impact on the Portuguese net foreign asset (NFA) position. Assuming this prediction is correct, this strongly supports the motivation for the adoption of the Economic Adjustment Program which considers the large external indebtedness of Portugal as a central issue in the economic diagnosis.     

FISCAL CONSOLIDATION PROGRAMS AND INCOME INEQUALITY

We document a strong empirical relationship between higher income inequality and stronger recessive impacts of fiscal consolidation episodes across time and space. To explain this finding, we develop a life‐cycle economy with uninsurable income risk. We calibrate our model to match key characteristics of several European economies, including inequality and fiscal structures, and study the effects of fiscal consolidation programs. In our model, higher income risk induces precautionary savings behavior, which decreases the proportion of credit‐constrained agents in the economy. These agents have less elastic labor supply responses to fiscal consolidations, which explain the correlation with inequality in the data.     

Fiscal policy reforms in general equilibrium: The case of Greece

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic and welfare implications of (i) changes in the tax-spending mix and (ii) debt consolidation policies. The setup is a neoclassical growth model augmented with a relatively rich public sector. The model is calibrated to the Greek economy. The results suggest that, if the goal of fiscal policy is to stimulate the economy and increase welfare by changing the tax mix, then it should decrease the tax rate on labour income and increase the consumption tax rate. While higher public investment spending is good for the economy, it is lower public consumption spending that is found to be expansionary. The results also suggest that both tax- and expenditure-based debt consolidation policies lead to worse economic activity in the short run, but they have strong beneficial effects in the medium and long run when the consolidation period finishes.     

Welfare-improving government behavior and inequality in a heterogeneous agents model

Government’s behavior is expected to be non-neutral in terms of impacts on both welfare and inequality. It is acknowledged in most literature that fiscal policy often involves trade-offs between economic growth and inequality.By applying an equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, capable of exploring the relationship between fiscal policy variables and the endogenous cross-section distribution of income, wealth, consumption and leisure, this paper aims at assessing (i) the optimal menu of government expenditures as well as of (ii) their inter-temporal financing. These are key issues in times of fiscal imbalances and their correction is dominating the current (European) policy agenda.     

Understanding China’s official statistics

In response to the three influential doubts about government statistics, this article expounds the differences between relevant common economic statistical indicators and the national account indicators that reflect demand structure and national income distribution structure. The comparisons include the following aspects: the differences between household consumption expenditure from household survey and from expenditure-based GDP; the differences between total retail sales of consumer goods and final consumption expenditure from expenditure-based GDP; the differences between government expenditure from government fiscal statistics and government consumption expenditure from expenditure-based GDP; the differences between total investment in fixed assets from investment statistics and gross fixed capital formation from expenditure-based GDP; the differences between inventories and change in inventories from expenditure-based GDP; the differences between foreign trade balance from customs statistics and net exports of goods and services from expenditure-based GDP; and the differences between household disposable income from the household survey and from the Flow of Funds Table, etc. In addition, this article answers the questions proposed by the three doubts correspondingly.     

A political foundation of public investment and welfare spending

This paper develops a political economy model to examine the implications of political selection under an authoritarian regime. We formalize the fiscal policy choice of local governments, focusing on two political selection mechanisms and their implications for public investment and welfare spending. A growth-oriented promotion system induces local officials to increase public investment, which may increase output but crowd out welfare transfers. This mimics the recent investment-driven growth in China and relatively low effort to tackle high inequality. Under a broader incentive structure, we show that it is possible for an authoritarian regime to attain the social welfare of a democracy.     

The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: Fiscal restrictions and regional stability

We study how constrained fiscal policy can affect macroeconomic stability and welfare in a two-region model of a monetary union with sticky prices and distortionary taxation. Both government spending and taxes can be used to stabilize regional variables; however, the best welfare outcome is obtained under some tax variability and constant regional inflations. We use a variety of rules to characterize constrained fiscal policy and find that strict fiscal rules coupled with a monetary policy that targets union-wide inflation result in regional inflation stability and the welfare costs of such rules are not as unbearable as one would expect. Fiscal authorities can enhance welfare by targeting the regional output gap, while targeting regional inflation is less successful since inflation stability is guaranteed by the central bank.     

Taking down the wall: Transition and inequality

In this article, we investigate the main determinants of income inequality in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States during the period 1990–2018. To this end, we address a major methodological challenge that lies at the core of the cross‐country literature on income inequality: the potential endogeneity of income per capita, which is largely ignored by most empirical studies. We adopt a two‐pronged empirical strategy by (1) using trading partners’ weighted average real GDP as an instrumental variable and (2) estimating the model via the two‐stage least squares approach for static models and the generalized method of moments estimator for dynamic models. Our empirical findings are consistent with the Kuznets curve that illustrates a nonlinear relationship between income inequality and the level of economic development. We also find that the redistributive impact of fiscal policy is statistically insignificant and taxation and government spending appear to have the opposing effects on income inequality in transition economies over the sample period.     

The growth impact of discretionary fiscal policy measures

This paper looks at the impact of discretionary fiscal policy on economic growth for a sample of 18 EU countries over the period 1998–2011. The main novelty of this paper is the use, on the revenue side, of a dataset of fiscal measures based on the yield of actual legislative and budgetary measures, rather than approximations, such as changes in cyclically-adjusted variables. Using static and dynamic panel data techniques, we find that fiscal consolidation generally has a negative impact on growth in the short run, although some specific budget categories are not found to be statistically significant. In general, expenditure-based measures are found to have a slightly lower detrimental effect on growth compared to revenue measures, although the difference is not statistically significant. Among expenditure cuts, reductions in government investment and consumption are found to be growth reducing. Among revenues, indirect tax increases are found to have a particularly strong negative impact. Dynamic specifications suggest that consolidation reduces growth mainly in the year of fiscal adjustment, while future growth rates are affected only through the usual time persistence. Non-linear specifications indicate that spreading out consolidation may reduce the negative impact on growth slightly, and there is weak evidence that this is especially the case for revenue-based adjustment.     

How much to share: Welfare effects of fiscal transfers

Recent sovereign debt crisis has challenged policy makers to explore the possibility of establishing a fiscal transfer system that could alleviate the negative impact of asymmetric shocks across countries. Using a simple labour production economy, we first derive an analytically tractable solution for optimal degree of fiscal transfers. In this economy, fiscal transfers can improve welfare by moving the competitive equilibrium with fiscal transfers closer to the social planner's solution. We then extend the model to a DSGE setting with capital, international bond and linear taxes, and we analyze how implementation of a simple revenue sharing rule affects welfare and macroeconomic variables over time. Simulation results show that risk sharing through fiscal transfers always improves welfare in the long run. However, under certain model specifications, short‐run transitional welfare loss can outweigh the long‐run benefits. These results suggest that, in designing fiscal transfers across countries, government should take into consideration the intertemporal nature of welfare gains.     

The inequality channel of monetary transmission

We examine optimal monetary policy in the presence of inequality by introducing unskilled agents with no access to the financial system into a DSGE model with sticky prices. Our main results are: (i) a contractionary interest rate shock increases inequality, while inflation and the output gap fall; (ii) the welfare-based objective of monetary policy includes inequality stabilization; (iii) as the proportion of unskilled agents increases, welfare decreases; and (iv) under scarcity of skilled agents, monetary policy is weakened, while fiscal policy produces a more relevant impact on the economy.     

Can fiscal redistribution undo skill-biased technical change?: Evidence from the French experience

The inequality of labor earnings among working-age individuals has gone up in all western countries during the past 25 years, either through rising wage inequality (US, UK) or through rising unemployment (Continental Europe). Policy regimes did matter a great deal, however, as far as the inequality of disposable income is concerned. In a country like France, transfers to the unemployed were sufficiently massive to prevent income inequality from rising. This paper argues that the way fiscal redistribution has managed to counteract skill-biased technical change in countries like France is somewhat paradoxical. The same distributive stability could have been obtained at a lower cost by following a job subsidies strategy rather than an income maintenance strategy, simply because it is always less costly to have people at work producing something. We explore several potential explanations for this paradox.     

Less Government—More Wealth? On the Macroeconomics of a Smaller Public Sector in Europe

In this paper, we analyze the reactions of European economies to a fiscal policy strategy aiming at diminishing the public sector. Within the framework of the MSG3 model, a macroeconomic model of the world economy, we perform several simulation experiments to explore the effects of reducing government expenditures permanently in different phases of the business cycle. For this purpose, we combine the fiscal contraction with negative and positive, Euro Area-wide and global, supply and demand shocks. It turns out that adverse Keynesian effects on output and employment tend to be mostly weak and short-lived, whereas long-run effects on output and employment are favorable. Due to these long-run effects, the fiscal contraction policy raises welfare as measured by an asymmetric quadratic objective function. The size of these welfare effects depends on the initial situation in a non-trivial manner.     

Who pays for fiscal expansion? Distributional effects of fiscal spending in a small open economy with foreign capital

Utilizing a static two-sector general equilibrium model, the distributional implications of fiscal spending in a small open economy are studied. In the presence of foreign capital, two “perverse” effects of fiscal expansion are shown to be possible in stable equilibrium: 1) fiscal expansion may worsen the fiscal authority's welfare even if more resources are allocated for their consumption; 2) fiscal expansion may improve the private agent's welfare even if the agent directly pays for the expansion. We discussed the conditions under which these results can happen.     

Investment scaling up and the role of government

This article studies the fiscal and welfare implications of a scaling up of public investment when the government is subject to inefficiencies on the spending and on the tax collection side. In our simulations, the scaling up of public investments results in higher long-run output and consumption levels but requires a fiscal stabilization package in order to preserve fiscal sustainability. The effects on consumers’ welfare after the fiscal adjustment are nontrivial. Our welfare analysis shows that consumers’ welfare is increased when the government smooths the fiscal adjustment via higher borrowing and not through an increase in taxation. Moreover, the comparison between several stabilization packages via tax adjustment shows that higher welfare is achieved when the government relies mostly on taxation of capital as this allows higher levels of consumption. Lower fiscal costs that do not undermine fiscal sustainability can however be achieved if the government manages to reduce inefficiency in tax collection. Finally, we consider a change in the trade regime that causes a decline in revenues. We find that the higher fiscal burden required to preserve fiscal sustainability would completely wipe out the welfare gain of higher public investments.     

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis‐à‐vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.     

Equitable fiscal consolidations

Empirical research has uncovered an equity-efficiency trade-off in alternative fiscal consolidation strategies. Spending-based adjustments are associated with more limited output losses but greater inequality than tax-based adjustments. Moreover, spending-based adjustments are less likely to be reversed, but an increase in inequality reduces the likelihood of achieving a successful consolidation. We investigate the issue of designing a debt consolidation plan which is achieved through a reduction in public consumption and yet is equitable because temporary targeted transfers and tax reductions stabilize consumption of the poorer part of the population. This causes a limited slow-down in the pace of debt reduction because fiscal multipliers associated to the tax/transfer policies are large.     

Defense planning and fiscal strategy

In this article, we consider the optimal fiscal strategy of a government interested in maximizing expected social welfare in the face of a potential future security threat. While the common wisdom is that countries facing security threats should seek to bolster their fiscal position in order to ‘save for a rainy day’, we find that the optimization of expected social welfare may require governments to run ‘precautionary’ fiscal deficits.