Corporation Diversification and Firm Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms

We examine the effect of corporate diversification on the performance of firms listed on the Vietnamese stock exchanges, using 2744 firm year observations over the period from 2007 to 2012. We find that corporate diversification has a negative impact on firm performance. Our results are robust to various econometric estimation techniques including fixed effect, instrumental fixed effect, Heckman selection model and system generalised method of moments. In the Vietnamese context, the lack of an efficient corporate governance system may encourage firms to follow corporate diversification strategies, thus impairing their performance.     

The role of corporate governance strength in crisis and non-crisis times

This study evaluates corporate governance practices of listed firms in the United Arab Emirates and investigates whether corporate governance mitigates/exacerbates the impact of leverage and risk on firm performance during crisis and non-crisis times. The study constructs a corporate governance index not only to examine the dispute of the role of corporate governance during the crisis but also its influence on other factors that fuelled the crisis. A firm-level panel data is used that spans the period 2008–2012 of all listed firms on Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and Dubai Financial Market (DFM). The study finds a positive influence of corporate governance strength on the accounting performance, but a negative influence on the firms’ economic performance. In normal times, corporate governance mitigates the negative influence of leverage and risk on the accounting and economic firm performance. However, this synergy effect varies across performance indicators during crisis.     

Shareholding structure, depoliticization and firm performance

In this study we use a dataset that provides information on Chinese Communist Party grassroots organizations’ political control over decision‐making in China's listed firms. Specifically, we examine how different types of shareholders affect (1) the party's level of decision‐making power and (2) the implications of party control for firm performance. We obtain two major results. First, we find that the proportion of shares held by domestic individual shareholders is negatively related to the party's level of decision‐making power. Second, we find that the existence of large institutional investors is associated with a reduced negative performance effect of party control. Our results suggest that both the exit and the voice channels may offer mechanisms for depoliticizing China's listed firms and improving their performance. This study both addresses an important corporate governance issue relevant to China's listed firms and offers interesting information in terms of comparative studies of corporate governance and reform strategies in transitional economies.     

第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析

本文以 1 997年以前在中国上市的 50 8个上市公司 1 997— 2 0 0 0年 4年间的2 0 3 2个观察值为样本 ,研究了第一大股东的所有权性质、第一大股东的变更对公司治理效力和企业业绩的影响。本文的研究发现 ,上市公司第一大股东的所有权性质不同 ,其公司业绩、股权结构和治理效力也不同。第一大股东为非国家股股东的公司有着更高的企业价值和更强的盈利能力 ,在经营上更具灵活性 ,公司治理的效力更高 ,其高级管理层也面临着更多的来自企业内部和市场的监督和激励。另外 ,本文的研究还发现 ,对于不同性质的公司 ,第一大股东的变更带来的影响也有所不同 ,但基本上都是正面的。第一大股东的变更有利于公司治理效力的提高 ,有利于公司规模的扩大和管理的更加专业化。本文的研究为国有股减持和股权多元化提供了经验证据 ,论证了控制权转移市场对深化改革和完善公司治理的重要性     

Determinants and value relevance of UK CEO pay slice

This paper studies the CEO pay slice (CPS) of UK listed firms during the period 2003 to 2009. We investigate the determinants of CPS. We study the links between CPS and measures of firm performance. We find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance ratings and those with more independent boards tend to have higher CPS. In addition, we find that CEOs are more likely to receive lower compensation when they chair the board and when they work in firms with large board size. We also find that higher CPS is positively associated with firm performance after controlling for the firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance variables. We get compatible results when we examine the association between equity-based CPS and firm performance. Our results remain robust to alternative accounting measures of firm performance. Our results suggest that high UK CPS levels do indeed reflect top managerial talent rather than managerial power.     

公司治理、代理成本与审计定价--基于2001-2003年我国A股上市公司的实证研究

笔者借助公司内部治理框架,运用2001-2003年我国A股上市公司面板数据,考察了代理成本对于审计定价的影响.研究结果显示,当存在其他变量时,独立董事制度、高管层持股和董事长与总经理两职设置情况对审计定价存在显著影响,这一结果表明独立董事制度、高管层持股对于公司内部治理具有积极意义;加快董事长和总经理的两职分离有助于降低代理成本,改善公司内部治理.     

Riding out of a financial crisis: The joint effect of trust and corporate ownership

We study how generalized trust shapes the ability of firms with different ownership forms to obtain trade financing and perform during a financial crisis. Exploiting geographic variations in trust across Italian regions and the occurrence of the 2008-09 financial crisis in a difference-in-differences setting, we show that generalized trust makes family firms less able to obtain trade financing during the crisis. This finding maps into performance results: trust alleviates the negative effect of a crisis for non-family firms, while it aggravates the negative effect for family firms. This latter result depends crucially on a firm's corporate governance: trust does not harm family firms whose board is open to non-family directors. Collectively, our findings illustrate how culture interacts with corporate attributes in shaping a firm's prospects.     

Competition and ownership structure: Substitutes or complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange

In this paper we analyse the impact of product market competition and ownership structure on firm performance. Our results show that product market competition has a positive and significant impact on performance. Concerning the effect of ownership concentration, we find a U–shaped relationship with performance. Firms with relatively dispersed and relatively concentrated ownership have higher productivity growth than firms with an intermediate level of ownership concentration. This correlation between concentration of ownership and productivity growth is not explained by the type of the controlling shareholder. Finally, product market competition and good governance tend to reinforce each other rather than to be substitutes. Competition has no significant effect on performance for the firms with ‘poor’ governance; on the contrary, it has a significant positive effect in the case of firms with ‘good’ corporate governance. JEL classification: D24, G32, L1, P2.     

Corporate governance practices in emerging markets: The case of GCC countries

This paper examines the corporate governance (CG) practices in emerging markets with special reference to the listed firms in the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) oil rich countries. It develops an un-weighted Corporate Governance Index (CGI) model for non-financial firms using recent data. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated with a specific country example. The index identifies thirty internal governance attributes which are abridged in three categories of all the selected firms to form the best CG practices in the region. The results demonstrate that GCC companies adhere to 69% of the attributes addressed in the CGI. The results also show that the firms listed in the United Arab Emirates stock markets exhibit the best adherence to the CG attributes examined in the study followed by Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, respectively. The current paper offers valuable recommendations to policy makers to gradually embed strong and specific governance practices. Special emphasis is placed to board effectiveness and structural and organizational frameworks in order to ensure a sustainable quality of CG practices in the region.     

Duopoly Competition with Corporate Social Responsibility

This paper highlights the effect of firms’ position on firms’ strategies with corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices under three different cases: Cournot competition; Stackelberg competition with the CSR firm taking the leader position and turnover, with the profit maximising (PM) firm playing as the leader. Some interesting conclusions are achieved. First, the CSR firm always produces more than the PM firm. Second, the outputs of both firms (the consumer surplus) under the PM firm's leading position are larger than those under Cournot. Third, the profits of both firms (producer surplus) under the PM firm playing the leading position are less than those under Cournot. Surprisingly, when the PM firm first moves, the PM firm's profits are the lowest while the CSR firm's outputs are the highest in all three cases. Finally, the relationship of social welfare under the three cases is ambiguous.     

Does corporate governance still affect firm performance after controlling the distress factor?

We explore the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. We first identify whether corporate governance can still be an influential factor or has been largely captured by the traditional Fama-French three-factor model. More importantly, our study adds a financial distress factor to the Fama-French three-factor model to form a four-factor pricing model (labelled as the ‘financial distress four-factor model’). We find that for the US Russell 1000 firms, the financial distress four-factor model is the better model of the two models considered. We further find that the financial distress four-factor model has a higher explanatory power in capturing the return variation. We find that the differences between the return of firms with good (weak) corporate governance and the expected return are insignificantly different from zero for most portfolios in all the two models. The financial distress four-factor model, however, has the fewer portfolios with return difference being significantly different from zero, implying that corporate governance has been better priced in the financial distress factor.     

Do corporate governance mechanisms affect cash dividends? An empirical investigation of UK firms

The study examines whether corporate governance mechanisms and the compliance with good governance practice are related to cash dividends. In particular, the study assesses the effect of institutional ownership and board structure on the decision to pay cash dividends. A study on UK firms is interesting because firms are expected to voluntarily structure governance mechanisms based on their own needs. We find that institutional owners positively affect cash dividend payments, suggesting that UK institutions are effective in forcing firms to disgorge cash. There is limited evidence that independent directors affect the cash dividends. The results also show that firm specifics affect the cash dividends, namely, business risk, firm size, and leverage ratio. The results are consistent across several robustness checks.     

国有上市公司治理转型、治理要素提炼与公司绩效

国有企业的公司治理改革呈现出由传统的行政型治理向经济型治理演进转型的过程。选取2005-2009年持续经营的国有上市公司为样本,构建了行政型治理指数;进而对行政型治理与公司绩效的关系从不同维度进行了分析。研究结果显示,行政型治理度对公司绩效产生负面影响。其中,国有股权集中度是行政型治理“负效应”的“主要贡献者”;而政府经营政治化、高管人员的政治联系则在一定程度上有利于公司绩效的提升;最后,揭示了行政型治理对公司绩效的作用路径,行政型治理度越强,资产利用效率越低,进而影响到公司绩效的提升。相关结论有利于政府作为公司重要外部监管力量来界定监管和干预的边界;为探索党组织嵌入公司治理的有效途径提供了一定的理论基础。     

The impact of privatization on firm performance in a transition economy

The Vietnamese privatization programme, launched in 1992, differs from the usual Western privatization programmes in terms of the residual percentage of shares owned by the state and the portion of shares owned by insiders. This begs the question whether these differences influence the effects of the programme on firm performance. This study measures the impact of privatization on firm performance in Vietnam by comparing the pre‐ and post‐privatization financial and operating performance of 121 former state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find significant increases in profitability, sales revenues, efficiency and employee income. Results of applying the ‘difference‐in‐difference’ (DID) method, wherein a control group of firms is used to pick up the influence of other determinants of firm performance, suggest that the performance improvements may indeed be associated with equitization. Regression analyses reveal that firm size, residual state ownership, corporate governance and stock market listing are key determinants of performance improvements.     

The relationship between business diversification and productivity: considering the impact of process innovation at different corporate life cycles

This paper investigates the link between a firm's process innovation (PI) and its segment productivity at different life cycles. The results show that business diversification is negatively associated with a firm's productivity, and further reveal that a firm's PI moderates the above relationship. In addition, the corporate life cycle literature builds blocks for this study to explain that the involvement of administrative costs varies across life cycles when diversified firms get mature and bigger. Our empirical evidence indicates that the potential costs of a complex organisational structure contingent on business diversification at a firm's mature life cycle could be alleviated by the conduct of process innovation. As process innovation at different life cycles may alter managerial incentive that leads to different firm performance, the managerial implication is that diversified firms should appropriately engage in process innovation to prevent unfavourable liability from the development of their businesses.     

Organisational form and the economic impacts of innovation: the case of patent grant announcements

This study investigates the impact of corporate diversification on the value creation of patent grants. We find that focussed firms experience significantly greater market reactions to patent announcements than diversified firms. Diversification into related industries has little effect on the wealth gains of granted patents, while diversification into unrelated industries significantly reduces the wealth gains. We further find that post-announcement operating performance is significantly associated with the degree of diversification. Overall, our findings suggest that the selection of diversification as a firm's organisational structure has a negative influence on the value creation of innovation, and this influence is exacerbated when this diversification involves unrelated industries.     

What does tax aggressiveness signal? Evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement

We study the stock price reaction to news about corporate tax aggressiveness. We find that, on average, a company's stock price declines when there is news about its involvement in tax shelters. We find some limited evidence for cross-sectional variation in the reaction. For example, the reaction is more negative for firms in the retail sector, suggesting that part of the reaction may be a consumer/taxpayer backlash. In addition, the reaction is less negative for firms that are viewed to be generally less tax aggressive, as proxied by the firm's cash effective tax rate. We interpret this as being consistent with the market reacting positively to evidence that a firm is trying to reduce taxes when their financial reports would lead one to believe the firm is not tax aggressive.     

How corporate cultures coevolve with the business environment: The case of firm growth crises and industry evolution

This paper shows how cognitive human dispositions that take effect at the level of an individual firm's corporate culture have repercussions on an industry's evolution. In our theory, the latter is attributable to evolving corporate cultures coupled with changes in a firm's business environment. With the help of a formal model of evolving corporate cultures, we demonstrate how firms can establish a cooperative cultural regime that yields competitive advantages in an innovative, fast changing environment. Depending on within-firm social learning processes and cognitive constraints of human agents, organizations then reach a critical cognitive firm size in their development beyond which the level of cooperation deteriorates rapidly—they systematically face a growth crisis. Organizations successful in such an environment and reaching a critical technological size may, however, reap economies of scale in a later, mature and stable business environment with altered corporate culture. Furthermore, we relate these findings to empirical evidence on firm survival and performance in different industries, the evolution of organizational structures, and technological advancements in production technologies, and we identify some determinants of market structures.     

Does dividend tax impede competition for corporate charters?

We develop a model of jurisdictional competition for corporate charters among the states in which a firm’s agency cost depends on the federal dividend income tax rate and the takeover regulations of its domicile state. When firms are mobile across states, the federal dividend income tax rate affects both the intensity of competition among the states and the equilibrium level of state takeover regulations. Our model shows that increasing dividend tax rate weakens the competition for corporate charters under a condition: dividend-paying and the market for corporate control are complementary corporate governance mechanisms. This condition holds empirically, suggesting that dividend tax not only discourages firms from paying dividends but also weakens their corporate governance by disincentivizing states to improve their corporate laws.     

Competition and Privatisation Policies in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly: The Pay‐off‐interdependence Approach

I revisit the relationship between competition and privatisation policies in a mixed oligopoly with differentiated goods, following the pay‐off‐interdependence approach in the fashion of Matsumura and Okamura. We find that although the intensity of market competition increases with the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance, the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease in a differentiated goods mixed oligopoly in both the increasing marginal costs case and the constant marginal costs case. Further, given the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance and the number of private firms, we find that the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease as the degree of product differentiation declines. Finally, by considering an alternative‐pay‐off model in both cases, we compare the optimal degree of privatisation of the public firm.