UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive.     

The codetermined firm in a Cournot duopoly: A stability analysis

This paper aims to study the stability issue in a Cournot duopoly with codetermined firms. We show that when both firms codetermine employment together with decentralised employees' representatives, a rise in wages acts as an economic (de)stabiliser when the wage is fairly (high) low, while under profit maximisation a rise in wages always acts as a stabilising device because the parametric stability region monotonically increases with the wage in such a case. Moreover, a rise in the union's bargaining power has a de-stabilising effect, except when the wage is low and the firm power is already high. Therefore, under codetermination a change either in the wage or firm power in the Nash bargaining plays an ambiguous role on stability. We also show with numerical simulations that complex dynamics can also occur.     

The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: A reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining

This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labor union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition - when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes - is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents’ preferences and on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function.     

The labor market effects of trade union heterogeneity

Empirical evidence suggests that the bargaining power of trade unions differs across firms and sectors. Standard models of unionization ignore this pattern by assuming a uniform bargaining strength. In this paper, we incorporate union heterogeneity into a Melitz (2003) type model. Union bargaining power is assumed to be firm-specific and varies with firm productivity. This framework allows us to re-analyze the labor market effects of (i) a symmetric increase in the bargaining power of all unions and (ii) trade liberalization. We show that union heterogeneity unambiguously reduces the negative employment effects of stronger unions. Firm-specific bargaining power creates a link between unionization and the entry and exit of firms, implying a reduction of the unions' expected bargaining power. Moreover, union heterogeneity constitutes an (un)employment effect of trade liberalization. If unions are most powerful in the high-productivity (low-productivity) firms, trade liberalization will increase (decrease) unemployment.     

Profit Sharing,Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment*

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options, increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options, this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections—measured by the bargaining power of trade unions—are sufficiently strong and the benefit–replacement ratio is sufficiently high. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.     

Profit-sharing in a unionized cournot duopoly

The main purpose of this paper is to analyze when it is optimal for firms in a unionized duopoly to introduce profit-sharing. It is shown that a firm only prefers a profit-sharing system if its own union does not have “too much” bargaining power, and if the union in the other firm does not have “too much” bargaining power. However, if a firm introduces profit-sharing, the employment increases, and the price in the goods market decreases. Hence, even if it is not in the own interest of a firm to introduce profit-sharing, it may be in the interest of the society.     

Labor standards, labor-management bargaining and international rivalry

Using the labor union's bargaining power as an indication of government policy on labor standards issues, we analyze the competition between a domestic (North) firm and a foreign (South) firm, and their relationship with optimal labor standards (LS). First, we show that the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when they are not. Second, it is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if labor unions are employment-oriented. Third, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS occurs in the case of wage-oriented unions. Fourth, the North's imposing a tariff to force the Southern government to raise its LS is effective only if the Southern union is wage-oriented. In order to raise Southern LS, both countries may need some deeper form of economic integration, if the North does not want to abandon its free trade system.     

Profit sharing as entry deterrence mechanism

In a right-to-manage framework, this paper analyzes the optimal choice of the pay scheme (profit sharing vs. fixed wage) in a unionized duopoly with potential market entry and decentralized bargaining. The paper shows that, depending on the institutional features, both pay systems can arise as equilibria in Nash strategies. Under duopoly with committed bargaining, the fixed wage is the Nash equilibrium; with flexible bargaining, an agreement between the incumbent firm and its union about profit sharing arises as Nash equilibrium, if the union is not too strong. A monopoly with threat of entry reinforces the selection of profit sharing as a deterrent mechanism.     

Reforming the Labour Market: An Assessment of the UK Policies of the Thatcher Era

Under Thatcher the United Kingdom introduced a major program of labour market deregulation, claimed to have made the United Kingdom one of the least regulated labour markets in the OECD. This paper reviews the measures implemented and assesses their impact. Trade union membership declined steeply, and collective bargaining was curtailed even more sharply. The impact of the legislation curbing unions can be exaggerated, given that it coincided with wider developments. At the microeconomic level there is some evidence that the decline of unions contributed to productivity gains, but no clear evidence on employment, investment, profitability or wage premia. UK macroeconomic performance improved, but not dramatically. The most marked features of the more flexible labour markets are the growth of part-time and temporary work, while job insecurity has become a common perception. The most striking development is the growth in earnings inequality, in part reflecting the weakening of collective bargaining. The evolution and consequences of inequality will be a major criterion in assessing the moves to labour market flexibility.     

Networks of knowledge among unionized firms

Abstract.  We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) and vice versa.     

Timing of endogenous bargaining over costs and firms’ locations

This work analyzes a duopoly in which firms choose their locations and then bargain over wages with their unions. The timing of the bargaining process is endogeously determined. We obtain that bargaining is simultaneous if and only if both firms decide when negotiations take place. Otherwise negotiation takes place sequentially. Under simultaneous or sequential negotiations, the market is equally shared and both firms have the same price-cost margins and profits. When bargaining is sequential firms have higher profits, the leader locates closer to the market than in the simultaneous case, the follower locates further away and the distance between the two firms is greater.      

Strategic Delegation of Multiple Tasks

This paper studies both the owner–manager relationship and the union–firm relationship in a model of unionised duopoly to analyse whether a firm's owner delegates the task of wage bargaining to a manager along with the task of output determination. We also analyse the profit and welfare effects of multiple‐task delegation. It has been shown in the literature that, when there is only one delegation task – output determination – delegation of output decisions to managers leads to lower profits for owners than non‐delegation as pure profit‐maximisation. However, when there are two delegation tasks as in our model – output determination and wage bargaining – we show that owners are better off delegating both tasks than delegating only the output decision or not delegating at all. This result provides a rationale and managerial insight for strategically delegating multiple tasks to managers. Moreover, we show that union utility, consumer surplus and social welfare are all higher when owners do not delegate the task of wage bargaining than when they do. This result suggests that governments implement union contracts that require owners, rather than managers, to negotiate wages with unions in order to benefit unions and consumers and to improve social welfare as well.     

Wage–Setting Institutions, Unemployment, and Voters' Demand for Redistribution Policy

This paper examines unemployment, wages, and voters' demand for redistribution policy under three different labour market structures: laissez–faire, wage–setting by company or industrial unions, and wage–setting by a central union. Decisions on the level of taxes and benefits are made by majority rule. Taxes, wages, and unemployment are lowest under competitive wage–setting and highest with decentralised unions. A higher degree of centralisation of union wage–setting implies lower unemployment and taxes because a fiscal externality is internalised. Under some conditions about the composition of the population, the political–economic equilibrium can further be improved upon by cooperation between the government and the central union. This seems to have happened in the Netherlands where the unions and the government agreed to cut taxes and restrain wages, which has led to the 'Dutch Miracle'.     

NON‐RIGID WAGES AND MERGER PROFITABILITY REVERSAL UNDER CONVEX COSTS AND CENTRALIZED UNIONIZATION

Can a merger from duopoly to monopoly be detrimental for profits? This paper deals with this issue by focusing on the interaction between decreasing returns to labour (which imply firms’ convex costs) and centralized unionization. First, it is highlighted that a wage ‘non‐rigidity’ result applies: the post‐merger wage is higher than in the pre‐merger equilibrium. Second, it is shown that a ‘reversal result’ in relation to merger profitability actually realizes when the union is sufficiently oriented towards wages. Moreover, the higher the reservation wage, the degree of product differentiation, and the union's relative bargaining power, the higher the probability that a merger reduces profits.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.     

Product market competition, open shop union and wage

We show that if the product market is not very much concentrated, open shop union, where the union density is less than one, may not be a justification for a positive relationship between product market competition and unionized wage, irrespective of the union density, bargaining power of the union and the union??s preference for wage and employment.     

The Interplay of Wage and Exchange Rate Policies in Singapore: A Case of Collective Bargaining in Macroeconomic Management

This article analyzes an optimization model of the policy game between Singapore's National Wage Council and the Monetary Authority of Singapore and further simulates the model over policy rules (Nash game versus non-Nash game), economic scenarios, and the game players' preference and bargaining power. The results indicate that the exchange rate appreciation and wage growth act as substitutes under the Nash rule of policy responses, whereas they act as complements under the non-Nash rule. Under the Nash rule, the exchange rate appreciation tends to be procyclical and wage growth countercyclical; union workers' bargaining power relative to employers' strengthens the procyclical appreciation uniformly but reinforces the countercyclical wage growth only when the economy undergoes a downturn. Both the Nash and non-Nash rules call for more moderate appreciation and more flexible wage adjustments than their actual movements. (JEL E64 , E61 , F41 )     

The Level of Wage Bargaining as a Firm–Union Choice

There is a trade-off between central bargaining which allows local externalities to be internalized and local bargaining which gives firms and unions the scope to determine both wages and employment simultaneously and efficiently in the sense of McDonald and Solow (1981). A model of strong unions is presented where workers are also concerned with relative wages. The trade-off is resolved by the individual firm and union on the basis of choice, using the Pareto-criterion. In the presence of a small extra contract cost under local bargaining, the main findings are: (i) central bargaining is Pareto-optimal only for extreme values of the reservation income level—a change in unemployment remuneration may cause centralization to breakdown; and (ii) centralization may also be sustained as a suboptimal Nash-equilibrium through workers' concern with relative wages—the familiar Keynesian coordination failure.     

Product market competition with differentiated goods and social welfare in the presence of an industry-wide union

Mainstream locus communis indicates that a more competitive product market leads to higher social welfare levels. Using a Conjectural Variation (CV) model, this research note analyzes the effects on welfare of different degrees of product market competition in a duopoly with differentiated goods. Bargaining between the firms and the industry-wide union occurs under the Efficient Bargaining (EB) model. The work indicates that, with close substitute goods, social welfare is maximized for the intermediate levels of market competition, whereas more independent goods lead to the standard result of a high welfare level under competitive markets.     

Labour market segmentation and union wage gaps

Abstract

There has been a great deal of research regard the effects of unions on union – non-union wage gap. Most of the studies regarding the impact of unions on wages have assumed that apart from the division between union and non-union workers, the labour market is relatively homogeneous. A number of economists, however, have argued that the labour market is segmented, implying that there are distinct labour markets and that some workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “bad jobs” while other workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “good jobs” which are rationed.

This paper will explore whether the relative wage differential between union and non-union workers differs between the independent primary, subordinate primary and secondary labour markets. Labour market segments are defined using “job zones”. “Job zones” are distinct groups defined by the level of specific vocational preparation necessary for a particular occupation, allowing for the comparison of skill levels and training for each occupation. The data on “job zones” comes from the Occupational Information Network database (O?Net). We estimate separate equations for union and non-union workers in each segment using data from the Current Population Survey and calculate union non-union differentials for each labour market segment. The findings of this paper suggest that the greatest differentials are in secondary labour markets followed by differentials in the subordinate primary labour market and that the smallest wage differentials are in the independent primary labour market.