The impact of multinational entry on domestic market structure and investment

We model the impact of different modes of multinational entry on the choices of domestic firms. Focusing on the competitive effects of foreign entry for the host country we demonstrate that greenfield investment will increase competition only if it is not countered by anti-competitive reactions on the part of the domestic firms. Together with cross-border mergers and acquisitions the model, thus, provides two alternative explanations for the increase in concentration ratios in industries with mostly horizontal foreign direct investment. Moreover, foreign presence is shown to raise total investment in the local industry at the cost of crowding out domestic investment.     

International Competition in one Country: Comparative Static Analysis

A comparative static analysis is conducted for international competition among several domestic and foreign firms in one country in relation to a change in the domestic firms' cost parameter, which could be technological, export subsidy or tax, or pollution tax rate. The general result is made more transparent for some simple cases. The effects of entry of a new domestic firm are analyzed.     

Entry Policy and Entry Subsidies

Optimal entry policy is considered in markets served by both domestic and foreign firms. Compared with the prior entry literature, introducing foreign producers as market participants reduces incentives for entry deterrence and enhances incentives for entry subsidization. Incentives are changed because entry produces "terms-of-trade" gains. The optimal entry subsidy is analyzed under complete and incomplete information regarding the entrant's costs. Incomplete cost information creates differences in the optimal subsidy for domestic and foreign entrants, with foreign entrants relatively less subsidized. Domestic entrants with low marginal costs are oversubsidized and those with high marginal costs are undersubsidized.     

Why does China protect its labour‐intensive industries more?*

China's tariff structure favours labour‐intensive sectors, and this is at odds with traditional theory of comparative advantage. The paper argues that tariffs in China are a mechanism for protecting technology‐backward domestic – especially state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from competition technology‐advanced foreign enterprises producing in China. With relatively integrated labour markets and cross‐firm technology differences, SOEs’ subsistence is supported by subsidized credit and limited access of foreign firms’ local production to tariff‐protected domestic markets. Labour market integration and capital subsidies increase the relative cost of labour in SOEs compared to their foreign competitors, hurting more domestic firms in industries that use labour more intensively. Restrictions to FIEs’ (foreign‐invested enterprises) access to tariff‐protected product markets, which protect more labour‐intensive industries, compensate for the greater cost disadvantage of SOEs in labour‐intensive sectors.     

Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms

This is the first paper to consider a mixed oligopoly in which a public Stackelberg leader competes with both domestic and foreign private firms. The welfare maximising leader is shown to always produce less than under previous Cournot conjectures. Introducing leadership also alters previous public pricing rules resulting in prices that may be either greater than or less than marginal cost depending on the relative number of domestic firms. Furthermore, entry of a foreign firm will increase welfare only when the relative number of domestic firms is small, but that share is shown to be larger than has been indicated without leadership. Unlike previous models, the influence on public profit of a foreign acquisition is ambiguous and is related to the relative number of domestic firms. Finally, the consequences of privatisation are shown, for the first time, to depend on the relative number of domestic firms.     

Interrelationship among foreign presence,domestic sales and export intensity in Chinese manufacturing industries

Using panel data on six Chinese manufacturing industries over the period 2005–2007, this article explores the interrelationship among foreign presence, domestic sales and export intensity of local firms. We find that the domestic sales and exports are complementary for local firms in China’s pharmaceutical industry, whereas in the case of the textile, transportation equipment, beverage, communication equipment and general equipment manufacturing industries, domestic sales and exports are substitutes. An increase in the average domestic sales increases foreign presence in all industries. The same applies to an increase in the average export intensity. An increase in the level of competition in China’s textile industry increases the export intensity as well as domestic sales of local textile firms. However, an increase in the level of competition in the pharmaceutical industry leads to a very large decrease in export intensity of local pharmaceutical firms. In the case of China’s transportation equipment manufacturing industry, an increase in the level of competition decreases domestic sales of local firms. Furthermore, an increase in the firm size increases domestic sales of Chinese firms in all six manufacturing industries.     

基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析

文章在贸易主体间成本信息缺失的基础上,重新探讨了VER的政策含义。研究结果发现,在本国对外国厂商成本信息缺失的情境下,若产品市场为Cournot竞争,则VER将对两国产生实质的影响:对出口国而言,不论其厂商为何种类型,此时的VER政策都是非自愿的;本国的福利变化则需视出口厂商的类型而定。而在Bertrand竞争下,VER只在出口厂商为高成本类型时方对出口国有利,且不论外国厂商为何种类型,VER皆无法使两国同时获利。     

Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment

We analyze strategic environmental standards in the presence of foreign direct investment. A number of foreign firms located in a host country compete with a domestic firm in another country to export a homogeneous good to a third country. When the number of foreign firms is exogenous, the host country applies a stricter environmental regulation than the other producing country. However, under free entry and exit of foreign firms, the host country may apply a less severe standard under both non-cooperative and cooperative equilibrium. We also find that the nature market structure does not affect the equilibrium values of total pollution if export subsidies are also used.JEL Classification: F2, H2     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

Exports, unemployment, and the welfare state

Abstract .  The paper analyzes the labour market effects of globalization when foreign market entry is costly and risky. With flexible labour markets, a fall in foreign market entry cost tends to generate more income inequality, but not necessarily so, as more firms pay foreign entry cost. By contrast, when labour markets are inflexible in the short run, globalization tends to increase unemployment. In this situation, government unemployment benefits reduce the wages that exporting firms need to pay workers as risk compensation. Thus more firms within an industry and more industries enter the foreign market, which in turn tends to increase unemployment.     

Trade costs, wage rates, technologies, and reverse imports

Abstract .  This paper explores the effects of transport costs, tariffs, and foreign wage rates on the domestic economy in the presence of reverse imports, with special emphasis on inter-firm cost asymmetry in an international oligopoly model. To serve the domestic market, a foreign firm produces in the foreign country, while two domestic firms produce either at home or abroad. Surprisingly, an increase in the foreign wage rate may increase the profits of a firm producing in the foreign country. Even if all firms produce in the foreign country, an increase in the foreign wage rate may improve domestic welfare.     

Foreign direct investment,input prices,and host country welfare

This paper analyzes a multinational firm’s foreign direct investment decision, through either greenfield investment or cross‐border merger and acquisition, into a host country with an input monopoly that adopts either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. The optimal foreign entry mode could differ under each pricing policy. Under Cournot competition, firms’ technological gap and the initial local market structure are critical to the choice of foreign entry mode, whereas product substitutability is important under Bertrand competition. In the presence of foreign entry, this paper also examines the welfare effects of input price discrimination for the host country.     

STAY OR LEAVE? CHOICE OF PLANT LOCATION WITH COST HETEROGENEITY

Using a two-country model, we examine location choices by two domestic firms when they serve only the domestic market and their cost structures differ. The findings indicate that whether the firm that has a greater incentive for foreign direct investment is more or less efficient depends on the differences in domestic and foreign marginal costs, trade costs, and the presence of fixed costs. Plant locations may not be uniquely determined. In particular, a small change in trade costs may reverse plant location. Moreover, a decrease in transport costs in the presence of foreign direct investment may deteriorate domestic welfare.     

Domestic R&D,Foreign Direct Investment and Welfare

This paper provides a new rationale to examine the two‐way relationship between domestic research and development (R&D) and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as their impacts on domestic welfare. Our analysis is based on the strategic interaction in cost‐reducing investment decisions between domestic firms and a foreign firm, which is different from the common factors that are discussed in the literature such as spillovers and technology sourcing. Our results are as follows. We show that domestic R&D investment may either increase or decrease the foreign firm's FDI incentives. Further, depending on the marginal cost of domestic firms, domestic R&D incentives can always increase regardless of the effects of domestic R&D investment on the foreign firm's FDI decision. Finally, we find that domestic welfare improves under domestic cost reduction if the slope of the marginal cost of domestic R&D investment is sufficiently small.     

Export–Oriented Foreign Direct Investment and Local Content Requirement

We develop a model in which foreign firms locate in a host country and export their produce to another (consuming) country. We consider both exogenous and endogenous numbers of foreign firms. These firms compete with domestic firms in the consuming country under oligopoly. Unemployment exists in both countries. We analyse the conflict of interest between the two countries on the level of local content for the foreign firms. Under free entry of foreign firms, the consuming country may want a less severe restriction on local contents than the host country, but not so when the number of foreign firms is exogenous.     

Entry of foreign firms and the R&D behaviour: a panel data study of domestic and foreign firms in China's manufacturing sector

Rapid globalization has resulted in increased competitive pressures. The entry of foreign firms in a host economy increases the level of competition faced by not only the domestic firms but also the existing foreign firms. We argue that domestic firms, especially in developing countries, respond to this situation by increasing their research and development (R&D) spending, whereas the foreign firms decrease their R&D spending. By making use of firm-level panel data from China's manufacturing sector, over the period 2005–2007, this paper investigates the impact of the entry of foreign firms on R&D behaviour of domestic and foreign firms. Empirical analysis, based on Tobit and Instrumental Variables Tobit regression, reveals that foreign entry increases the R&D intensity of domestic firms but its impact on R&D intensity of foreign firms is negative. The estimated results are found to be robust across balanced and unbalanced panels.     

Privatization,Underpricing, and Welfare in the Presence of Foreign Competition

We analyze privatization in a differentiated oligopoly setting with a domestic public firm and foreign profit‐maximizing firms. In particular, we examine pricing below marginal cost by the public firm, the optimal degree of privatization, and the relationship between privatization and foreign ownership restrictions. When market structure is exogenous, partial privatization of the public firm improves welfare by reducing public sector losses. Surprisingly, even at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly below marginal cost, resulting in losses. Our analysis also reveals a potential conflict between privatization and investment liberalization (i.e., relaxing restrictions on foreign ownership) in the short run. With endogenous market structure (i.e., free entry of foreign firms), partial privatization improves welfare through an additional channel: more foreign varieties. Furthermore, at the optimal level of privatization, the public firm's price lies strictly above marginal cost and earns positive profits.     

The impact of foreign direct investment on UK manufacturing: is there a profit squeeze in domestic firms?

This paper examines the extent to which foreign direct investment (FDI) in selected UK manufacturing sectors has an impact on reported profits in domestic firms. Foreign manufacturing firms are characterized by relatively high labour productivity and low wage shares. Entry by foreign firms not only impacts on domestic market shares, but also on domestic cost conditions. As a result, profitability in the indigenous sector may be reduced. There are a number of policy implications of this analysis which are explored.     

Welfare‐reducing Domestic Cost Reduction*

We show that cost reduction by a domestic firm may reduce domestic welfare if it changes a foreign firm’s production strategy from foreign direct investment to export. Domestic cost reduction can be welfare reducing when the domestic market is sufficiently small and domestic firm’s marginal cost of production is higher than the foreign firm’s marginal cost of production under foreign direct investment, which is a usual feature of trade between developed and developing countries. So, developing countries with small domestic markets need competent competition policies when encouraging domestic innovation and also trying to attract foreign direct investment.     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.