Measuring the impact of road rehabilitation on spatial market efficiency in maize markets in Mozambique

This article analyzes the impact of road rehabilitation on the spatial market efficiency of maize markets in Mozambique. We estimate a modified version of the Parity Bounds Model (PBM) that allows us to test the impact of road rehabilitation on spatial efficiency. This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, a unique data set, where road rehabilitation episodes between market pairs are identified, is developed. Second, special care is devoted to estimation of transaction costs due to the sensitivity of the PBM model to the quality of transaction costs estimates. Finally, as opposed to most existing literature that focuses on relatively distant markets, the article focuses on spatially closed markets. We find that maize markets tend to be segmented due to high transport costs. Following road rehabilitation, inefficiency and average absolute price differentials tend to decrease, and market pairs have tended to shift toward autarky regimes. Overall, while the results point broadly toward a positive impact of road rehabilitation on spatial efficiency, they are not as strong or as robust as one would like. Large increases in fuel prices likely offset the positive impacts of road rehabilitation on transaction costs, contributing to the increase in the probability of being in an autarky regime.     

Fragmentation and Embeddedness: An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Rural Financial Markets

Political economy approaches to analysing the efficiency of rural financial markets have focused on the role of power and social relations. Neo-classical institutional economics, on the other hand, has used information and transaction costs to explain performance. Recognizing the limitations of both approaches, this paper presents an alternative that focuses on the institutional form of financial intermediaries, that is, the governance structure of rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that enable them to operate. This structure is supported by both formal and informal rules, norms and sanctions. As a result, the ways in which transaction costs are affected by governance structures can be identified and the embeddedness of financial intermediaries in social relations can be theorized. The application of this approach in Central Kenya demonstrates the insights that it offers into explaining borrower preferences in the financial market.     

Transaction Costs and Cattle Marketing: The Information Content of Seller-Provided Presale Data at Bull Auctions

At sales of breeding bulls, prospective buyers have strong incentives to undertake presale measurement activities. To reduce these transaction costs, sellers often provide information on sale bulls. We examine the information content of two measures of the expected performance of the bulls and find that within a given herd, older, simpler measures of performance contain more information about prices (from buyers' perspectives) than newer, more sophisticated measures known as expected progeny differences, or EPDs. We also find, however, that buyers appear to pay considerable attention to annual changes in herd-average EPD values when comparing animals from different sellers.     

Private Insurance Company Involvement in the U.S. Crop Insurance Program

The participation of intermediaries in either public policy or private markets can be justified on the basis of efficiency gains. With respect to private insurance companies and the crop insurance program, efficiency gains may arise from either decreased transaction costs through better established delivery channels and/or the revelation of asymmetric information. However, anecdotal evidence indicates that delivery costs are excessive and it appears that for political economy reasons, rates have and will not be adjusted in response to new information. In conclusion, the value-added of private insurance companies is questioned in light of the current political economy and thus should serve as a caution to other countries wishing to emulate the U.S. system.     

Inventories and Public Information in Private Negotiation: A Laboratory Market Study

Using laboratory markets, this research investigates the impacts of reporting different kinds of aggregated trade information to buyers and sellers who conduct transactions through bilateral/private negotiation. There are a limited number of bargaining rounds or matches between buyer and seller pairs. Sellers hold a perishable inventory before negotiations begin. We find that knowledge of trades, along with price, improves the coordination and bargaining position of buyers. Trade prices are lower and buyer earnings are higher, relative to the no-information treatment or when just-past quantities or just-past prices are reported. Market efficiency declines as public information is reported.     

The economic and financial gains from water markets in Chile

Chile is one of the few countries that has encouraged the use of markets in water resource management. In order to assess the impact of water markets and transactions costs in Chile, four river valleys, the Maipo, Elqui, Limarí, and the Azapa were selected as case studies. Transactions from the Elqui and Limarí valleys, during the years 1986 to 1993, were analyzed to determine the gains-from-trade from market transfers. In the economic and financial analysis of water markets, crop budgets were used to estimate the value of water in agricultural production. The value of water-use rights to urban water-supply companies was estimated using the avoided cost of an alternative investment in a water-storage reservoir. The analysis demonstrated that the market transfer of water-use rights does produce substantial economic gains-from-trade in both the Elqui and Limarí Valleys. These economic gains produce rents for both buyers and sellers. But buyers, especially farmers growing profitable crops who buy water-use rights and individuals buying water-use rights for potable water supply, receive higher rents then sellers. Large table-grape producers in the Limarí Valley and individuals buying water for human consumption in the Elqui Valley received the highest rents. In the Elqui Valley net gains-from-trade per share were within the range of recent transfer prices of US$1000. In the Limarí Valley, gains-from-trade per share are 3.4 times the recent prices of US$3000 for a share of water from the Cogotí Reservoir. Where trading was active, especially in the Limarí Valley, transactions costs have not presented an appreciable barrier to trading. Nonetheless, in the large canal systems with fixed flow dividers in the Elqui and Maipo Valley there have been very few transactions. Various factors contribute to the lack of trading, but the absence of trading in these large canal systems highlights the costs of modifying fixed infrastructure, especially for trades between farmers.     

Asymmetric information in cattle auctions: the problem of revaccinations

We analyze the problem of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers in cattle auctions, using the problem of revaccinations as the point of departure. We present a simple model to show that if buyers do not know and cannot verify whether sellers have vaccinated their animals, then they may consider revaccination. Revaccination is only a part of the broader problem of information asymmetry that includes other quality issues and costs that can be saved, thereby affecting the welfare of both buyers and sellers. We consider structural characteristics of ranching, traditions, and consumers' preferences as well as proposals regarding third‐party certification to argue that the problem of asymmetric information in cattle auctions is a persistent one. We also argue for a comprehensive empirical study of the incidence and impacts of buyer revaccination.     

Market intermediaries,storage and policy reforms

Intermediaries play a crucial role in the functioning of agricultural and food markets in developing countries through linking production, imports and storage with consumption. We analyse how competition in the intermediary sector and alternative forms of intermediaries determine the incentives for storage and market outcomes more generally. We apply this framework to the Egyptian wheat sector as an illustrative case study, a country where food security is a priority, where both forms of intermediaries co-exist and undertake storage but where issues of reforms to the role of intermediaries have been raised. Through stochastic simulation, we analyse two changes in government policy: first, the effects of changing the policy instruments with both types of intermediaries undertaking storage; second, relating to market reforms where the private sector replaces the storage function of the parastatal. These issues have wider significance for addressing the interaction between food security and a wide range of policy reforms including de-regulation of parastatals in developing countries.     

Raising offtake from cattle grazed on natural rangelands in sub-Saharan Africa: a transaction cost economics approach

Farmers in sub‐Saharan Africa are constrained by large transaction costs associated with marketing of their livestock. However, transaction costs are often not taken into account in the analysis of factors hampering the development of livestock marketing in this region. This article empirically measures the influence of transaction costs on the offtake from cattle grazed on natural rangelands in Uganda. The study is based on the monitoring of 696 cattle transactions in three districts of Uganda from August 2004 to August 2005. The estimated models suggest that proportional transaction costs represented by the state of roads, distance to markets, and time taken to reach the market are important variables constraining market participation. In order to raise offtake from the national herd, it is essential to explicitly address these costs. One potential solution is collective action in marketing of livestock in which proportional and fixed transaction costs are reduced and shared among the group members.     

Subsistence Response to Market Shocks

Microeconomic models posit that transaction costs isolate subsistence producers from output market shocks. We integrate microeconomic models of many heterogeneous households into a general equilibrium model and show that supply on subsistence farms may respond, in apparently perverse ways, to changes in output market prices. Price shocks in markets for staple goods are transmitted to subsistence producers through interactions in factor markets. In the case presented, a decrease in the market price of maize reduces wages and land rents, stimulating maize production by subsistence households; however, real incomes of subsistence households fall.     

Food Safety and Adverse Selection in Rural Maize Markets

Without enforced standards or reliable third-party verification, food safety threats such as pesticide residues and aflatoxin contamination are generally unobservable or only partially observable to both buyers and sellers, especially of staple foods in rural maize markets in sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, sellers have more information about food quality than do buyers. Such information asymmetries can impede market development and undermine human health. We study farm household behaviour in the context of imperfect food safety information. We pool observations obtained from 707 food storage containers maintained by 309 farm households in Benin, surveyed following the maize harvests of 2011/2012 and 2013/2014. Our results indicate that when a household perceives a food safety risk associated with application of insecticides, on average it is 33 percentage points less likely to apply insecticides to maize it intends to consume than it is to maize it intends to sell. These individuals are also more likely to sell maize than households without food safety concerns. Results highlight the potential value of improved storage technologies and quality control to promote market transactions and reduce hidden health risks.     

Disciplining exporting state trading enterprises under economies of scale and oligopoly

The paper develops a two-stage duopoly model to investigatethe effects of eliminating subsidies to state trading enterprises(STEs) as discussed in the WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiationson agriculture. Unlike the STE, the private firm may chooseto integrate vertically in order to avoid transaction costsarising from dealing with downstream operators. The theoreticalmodel shows that eliminating subsidies to the STE may inducea change in market structure and not necessarily lead to increasedcompetition. In fact, if transaction costs are large enoughrelative to fixed costs, then the result may be a monopoly bythe private firm.     

How do institutional market players matter in farmland pricing?

In this paper we analyse how institutional sellers within the privatisation process shape price formation in agricultural land markets by taking the German reunification as an example. These institutions sell the formerly state owned land within first-price sealed bid auctions, publish calls and obtained prices, and are hypothesised to exploit their market power. Based on the conceptual framework of hedonic pricing models, we use a spatio-temporal modelling approach to empirically quantify these impacts. We thereby control for land productivity characteristics, potential buyers and whether farmers purchase the land. We find that privatisation agencies sell at significantly higher prices, while one agency sells at lower prices to farmers.     

The Matching Problem (and Inventories) in Private Negotiation

This study examines laboratory market outcomes under alternative matching risk scenarios and advance production. Limited access and/or asymmetry in the number of buyers and sellers cause a matching problem. When sellers hold inventory before sale and there is buyer concentration, prices are about 23% below the competitive level and close to the predicted monopsony price. The bargaining advantage shifts to buyers in this market environment. Sellers can benefit by creating alliances or cooperatives to increase their bargaining position for price and overcome poor access to buyers.     

The effects of NCPB marketing policies on maize market prices in Kenya

The Government of Kenya pursues maize marketing policy objectives through the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), which procures and sells maize at administratively determined prices, and stores maize as a contingency against future shortages. A private sector marketing channel competes with the NCPB. This article estimates the effects of NCPB activities on the historical path of private sector prices in Kenyan maize markets between 1989 and 2004. The analysis is carried out using a reduced form vector autoregression model (VAR) estimated with sparse data and imposing only minimal identification restrictions. Results show that NCPB activities have stabilized maize market prices in Kenya, reduced price levels in the early 1990s, and raised average price levels by roughly 20% between 1995 and 2004. Over the past decade, the price-raising activities of the NCPB have transferred income from urban consumers and a majority of small-scale farm households that are net buyers of maize to a relatively small number of large- and small-scale farmers who are sellers of maize.     

Water markets in Australia: an experimental analysis of alternative market mechanisms

Formal water markets in Australia began as uniform price open call markets. As water markets in Australia continue to expand and mature, water managers are introducing double auction water markets, believing that such markets will produce more efficient outcomes. It is therefore timely and policy relevant to explore the relative merits of the two auction mechanisms in context. To date, experimental comparisons of these auction mechanisms have been based on balanced, single unit designs with defined buyers and sellers. However, many resource markets involve trade in multiple unit, often thin, double auction markets. This paper questions whether a multiple unit double auction performs as well as the more traditional open multiple unit call auction in a series of thin water market experiments.     

A CGE analysis of trade costs in the Russian agrofood sector

Ten years after the end of central planning, enormous interregional price differences indicate that Russian food markets are not well integrated spatially. Trade potentials are thus not exploited, most probably because of high trade costs. Besides transport costs, transaction costs seem to play an important role as an impediment to interregional arbitrage. These transaction costs can be very high in transition countries due to underdeveloped market structures and weak public institutions. After subtracting transport costs from interregional price differences, large differences remain, particularly in the case of high‐value products. It is assumed that these residual price differences constitute the transaction cost component of total trade costs. The regional economic impact of different trade cost components is quantified using a bi‐regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Simulations show that the results are quite different between the two stylized regions (East and West), depending on which trade cost component is reduced. While the welfare effects of varying customs tariffs and transport margins are rather limited, lower transaction costs of trade seem to be a promising way to achieve a better functioning food market in Russia.     

基于两部门模型的黄河水权转换影响因素研究

运用模型分析法,在黄河水权转换的现实约束条件基础上建立了水权转换的两部门模型,通过系统分析水权转换双方的成本、收益及行为选择,归纳总结了影响水权转换实施的因素,包括初始水权界定、水权转换价格、交易费用、节水成本、企业水资源生产效率等,提出了促进黄河水权转换规范发展的建议：进一步明晰和保护初始水权,充分保障相关者的利益,构建黄河水权转换市场。     

Farm demand for quality potato seed in Indonesia

Seed is the one of the most costly components of potato production in developing countries. Since potato is a vegetatively reproduced crop, diseases such as viruses build up and yield declines as tubers are saved from one harvest for use as seed the next season. Replacing farm‐saved seed with clean seed is one means to increase yield, but information asymmetry between buyers and sellers on seed quality may restrict market supply of this input. In this article we develop a model of the seed market in which clean seed is treated as a capital good providing benefits over several seasons. To determine farm demand for clean seed, we conducted a survey of 182 potato farmers in the major potato growing areas of Indonesia to elicit their perceptions of seed quality from different sources, and derive farmers' “willingness‐to‐pay” for quality potato seed. Results indicate that the effects of information asymmetry on seed supply may be partially offset by the “reputation” of specialized seed producers. Nevertheless, marginal returns to disease‐free seed appear to significantly exceed marginal costs, indicating that improving supply of quality seed will contribute strongly to productivity growth in potato. We discuss several policy options to encourage supply and utilization of quality potato seed.     

Spot water markets and risk in water supply

Water availability patterns in semiarid regions are typically extremely variable. Even in basins with a highly developed infrastructure, users are subject to unreliable water supplies, incurring substantial economic losses during periods of scarcity. More flexible instruments, such as voluntary exchanges of water among users, can help users to reduce risk exposure. This article looks at the effects of spot water markets on the economic risk caused by water availability variations. Our theoretical and empirical risk analyses are based on the random profits of water users. Profit probability density functions are formally and graphically characterized for both water sellers and buyers under several possible market outcomes. We conclude from this analysis that, where water supply is stochastic, water markets unambiguously reduce both parties' risk exposure. The empirical study is conducted on an irrigation district in the Guadalquivir Valley (Southern Spain), where there is a high probability of periods of extreme water scarcity. Water demand functions for the district representative irrigators and a spatial equilibrium model are used to simulate market exchanges and equilibrium. This programming model is combined with statistical simulation techniques. We show that the profit probability distribution of a representative irrigator is modified if water exchanges are authorized, leading to risk reductions. Results also indicate that if the market were extended to several districts and users that are subject to varying hydrological risk exposure, extremely low‐profit events would be less likely to occur. In sum, we show that exchanging water in annual spot markets can reduce farmers' economic vulnerability caused by water supply variability across irrigation seasons. These results support the water policy reform carried out in Spain in 1999 to allow for voluntary water exchanges among right holders.