Demographic structure and growth: The effect of unfunded social security

This paper examines how demographics affect economic growth in an OLG model with unfunded social security. We derive two interesting results. First, the relationship between population growth and per capita output growth is hump shaped. Second, the relationship between life expectancy and per capita output growth is also hump shaped.     

The role of the private sector under insecure property rights

It is well known that the so-called voracity effect can be observed in an economy with a weak property rights system. Voracious behavior is regarded as one of the excess uses of the common assets. In this paper, we seek to examine voracious behavior from a different perspective by introducing a new direction of capital flow: from the private sector to the common sector. A government mandates that all competing interest groups invest their private capital in the common sector to mitigate the effects of excess use of the commons. In this situation, we study how this capital flow affects the voracious behavior of the groups and the growth rate of the economy. The main findings are that, while there is no standard voracity effect, an increase in the contribution of the private sector into the common sector causes more voracious behavior and thus reduces economic growth. This suggests that policies designed to preserve the commons can lead to a harmful effect on the economy.     

The role of property rights in determining the environmental quality-income relationship

This paper examines the role of property rights in shaping the relationship between environmental quality and income. It develops an analytical framework that integrates the effects of property rights evolution, natural resource attributes, agent characteristics, and production technology on the environment-income relationship. The substantive strength of this framework lies in its ability to rationalize a wide range of environment-income relationships. The model shows that the U-shaped environment-income relationship, which is consistent with the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis, can arise only under specific model conditions. Thus the framework provides an additional explanation for non-universality of EKC. We provide evidence in support of our framework from case studies of various natural resources.     

The role of contracts and intellectual property rights in open innovation

Our exploratory empirical study, based on interviews and a survey of firms, addresses a number of questions on the role of formal contracts and intellectual property rights (IPR) in the context of firm-to-firm open innovation (OI). We find that firms active in OI have a very strong preference for the governance of their OI relationships with other firms through formal contracts. Also, despite the open nature of OI, firms still see IPR as highly relevant to the protection of their innovative capabilities. We find the degree of openness of firms, their formal legal attitude, and the competitive dynamics of their product market environment to be related to the preference of OI firms for IPR. Furthermore, the strength of firms’ internal R&D capabilities increases the positive relationship between openness and the preference for IPR.     

Intellectual property rights as development determinants

Abstract While intellectual property rights (IPRs) are the key drivers of economic performance in R&D based growth models, they have not been fully explored in empirical development studies. We introduce IPRs to this literature, using Two‐Stage Least Squares Bayesian Model Averaging to address endogeneity and model uncertainty at the instrument and income stages. We show that IPRs exert effects similar to ‘Rule of Law’ and therefore provide robust evidence that both physical and intellectual property rights are crucial development determinants. We document that unenforced IPRs exert no effect on development. Instead, it is the level of enforced IPRs that causes development.     

The competitive enforcement of property rights in medieval Japan: The role of temples and monasteries

Medieval Japanese governments only haphazardly enforced claims to scarce resources. Necessarily, this presented landholders with a void. To obtain the enforcement they needed, many turned to institutions affiliated with the fractious Buddhist faith instead. Temples and monasteries enjoyed an exemption from tax on their lands and controlled an array of financial and human resources with which they could adjudicate and enforce claims to scarce resources. To obtain access to that exemption and those resources, landholders “commended” their rights in land to them, and paid them a share of the harvest. In exchange, the temples and monasteries exempted them from tax, adjudicated disputes internal to the estate and protected their estates against external threats. Effectively, the temples and monasteries competed in a market for basic governmental services.By helping to secure basic claims to property, the temples and monasteries helped to promote investment and growth; by competing against the government itself, they helped to forestall the crippling effect of a predatory monopolistic state.     

Unbundling democracy: Political rights and civil liberties

Much recent political economy and political science literature views democracy in terms of political rights. This view, often referred to as electoral democracy, is particularly pronounced in the empirical literature. We reincorporate the role of civil liberties, which are at the core of modern democracy, in two ways. We identify four fundamental sources of potential differences in the evolution of political rights and civil liberties. We present systematic, robust and varied empirical evidence on the direct impact of two of these potential sources of differences using cross-national panel data and accounting for the modernization hypothesis. We obtain two noteworthy empirical results: civil liberties exhibit greater persistence than political rights in affecting subsequent outcomes; and, our main result, civil liberties are complementary to political rights when affecting subsequent outcomes, while the reverse is not the case. Consequently, one must incorporate civil liberties as a determinant of electoral democracy. More generally, both dimensions must be considered to understand the setbacks recently experienced by many democracies, despite their holding of free and fair elections.     

Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth

The key institution that determines sustained growth in R&D-based growth models is the strength of intellectual property rights, which are usually assumed to be exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the strength of the intellectual property rights and show how private incentives to protect these rights affect economic development and growth. Our model explains endogenous differences in intellectual property rights across countries as private incentives to invest in property rights generate multiple equilibria. We show that the resulting institutional threshold offers an explanation for why the effect of a transfer of institutions from one country to another depends on the quality of the institutions that were imported.     

Imitation and innovation driven development under imperfect intellectual property rights

Developing countries employ about two-fifth of the world's researchers, originate one quarter of world expenditures on R&D, and their inventions are subject to imitation. Nevertheless, the previous literature focuses on North–South setups in which the South is restricted to imitating northern inventions. To analyze the effects of IPR policies on developed and developing countries, we extend this literature to allow not only for southern innovation and imitation of northern goods, but also for imitation targeted at southern innovations. We find the effects of IPRs on R&D and welfare to be non-monotonic and dependent on innovation efficiency and an innovation threshold in the South. For sufficiently strong IPRs the South engages in original R&D and stronger IPRs promote southern innovation, welfare, and a reduction in the North–South wage gap. Below the threshold, a strengthening of IPR protection fails to promote innovation and decreases welfare. Stronger IPRs exclusively for southern firms can benefit both regions by shifting southern resources from the imitation of northern goods to original southern innovation.     

Explaining the effect of financial development on the quality of property rights

Empirical evidence suggests that financial development can catalyze property rights reforms. This paper offers a theory of financial markets to explain these facts defining the relationship. The explanation is based on a simple trade‐off between the costs and the benefits of securing property. Securing the right to property at a cost allows agents to post collateral against loans. However, the benefits of collateral vary according to the existing credit market conditions, which we take into account in the tradeoff between the costs and the benefits of securing property rights along the path of financial development to explain the conditions under which financial development can create incentives for better property rights institutions.     

产权界定、产权流动与产权维护

诺斯认为,有效率的产权具有三大激励功能:即降低费用、保证人们的预期收益和使个人的投资收益充分接近于社会收益,这对经济增长起着十分重要的作用。本文认为,要使产权功能真正发挥作用,需要有合理的产权界定、规范的产权流动和公平的产权维护,三者缺一不可。文章从整体观的角度讨论了落实这三者的重要意义和各自存在的问题,并提出了党政分开和政企分开是解决问题的关键。     

Fiscal decentralization and government size: The role of democracy

This paper examines how the level of democracy in a country affects the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. We argue that political regimes, proxied by their democracy levels, are important for different decentralization theories to predict the impact of fiscal decentralization on government size. We test this argument using panel data from 76 developed and developing countries during 1972–2013. We find strong and robust evidence that fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with government size and that a higher level of democracy tends to mitigate the negative impact of fiscal decentralization. Therefore, our study contributes to the literature by offering a novel insight on mixed results regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size in the literature.     

Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages

In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats’ investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.     

Insecure property rights and growth: the role of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity

Summary. We extend the model from Tornell and Velasco [13] and Tornell and Lane [12] by adding three features: (i) extracting the common property asset involves a private appropriation cost, (ii) agents derive utility from wealth as well as from consumption, and (iii) agents can be heterogeneous. We show that both an increase in the appropriation cost and, when appropriation costs vary across agents, an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of these costs reduce the growth rate of the public capital stock. We also show that, in the interior equilibrium, the private asset can have either a lower or a higher money rate of return than the common property asset.Received: 22 June 2004, Revised: 20 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C73, O40.This research is supported by SSHRC, FQRSC, and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). Thanks are due to Hassan Benchekroun, Parkash Chander, Gerard Gaudet, Basant Kapur, Kim Long, Colin Rowat, Koji Shimomura, and an anonymous referee for comments and discussions.     

Defining national property rights to a common property resource: The case of the West Bank aquifers

This article introduces a methodology to define Israeli and Palestinian property rights to the three aquifers straddling the Green Line between Israel and the West Bank, i.e. the Yarqon-Tanninim, Northern, and Nablus-Jenin aquifers. A set of procedures for determining a fair division of waters is described for the hypothetical planning year 2000. Following this, the calculated allocation of water rights is evaluated in terms of the projected over-all water consumption and supply balance for Israel and a Palestinian sovereign authority (PSA) for the year 2000. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts on the relative merits of this methodology.     

Basque versus Illyrian labor-managed firms: The problem of property rights

The property-rights structure of the “Basque” firm, directly derived from Mondragon industrial cooperatives, is discussed in this paper which focuses on two prominent characteristics: the “capital accounts” and the collective reserve fund. It is shown that the Basque firm, although it does not allow membership rights to be traded, is in a better position than the Illyrian firm to cope with problems of weak property rights, in particular the lack of personal commitment and incorrect incentives for both the admission of new members and investment.     

Conceptions of property rights and norms

The social norm literature in law and economics fails to account for the differences between the two major conceptions of property rights. The differences between the two conceptions affect people’s utility function by affecting how increases in property rights are perceived. This paper discusses how the modern, in rem, conception evolved from an older, in personam, conception; it also discusses how economics has absorbed the modern, in rem, conception. The paper demonstrates that if people do not perceive the benefits of modern property rights, they will follow their social norms if the government or planner imposes modern property rights on them. In the end, this allows one to make a fuller discussion of why norms economize information. This discussion has various consequences ranging from developmental economics to financial market economics and cannot be ignored.