Trade,environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under‐ or over‐internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade‐off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.     

Optimality properties of alternative systems of taxation of foreign capital income

Foreign source capital income taxes are examined from the point of view of optimal taxation. In the framework of a simple economy with international real capital flows, a taxonomy of alternative systems of such taxation is first presented, showing how crediting and other tax parameters induce what are called source-based, residence-based and related systems. Next, tax rates are determined that are optimal from a single country's point of view, given those of the others. The achievability of these rates under the various systems is analyzed. Finally, tax rates that are optimal from an international point of view are considered. Again, achievability of an international optimum under the various systems is considered, leading to the main conclusions that (i) a pure residence-based system in all countries can achieve an international fiscal optimum; (ii) it cannot, however, be sustained as an equilibrium.     

Voting over income taxation

A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context is not a trivial task. We do this here in the context of nonlinear taxation and attempt to provide a formal argument in support of this heuristic claim. We first establish the existence of mixed strategy equilibria and identify certain cases in which marginal-rate progressive taxes are chosen almost surely by the political parties. Unfortunately, we also find that if the tax policy space is not artificially constrained, the support of at least one equilibrium cannot be contained within the set of marginal-rate progressive taxes.     

Anti-inflation taxation policy: An alternative to wage and price controls

One reason the postwar economy has become increasingly inflation prone is that oligopolistic firms tend to act as if demand is completely inelastic for price increases no greater than the expected rate of inflation. Hence, in the absence of mandatory price controls, there is no effective disincentive at the individual firm level to price increases of this magnitude. The policy proposed below provides such a disincentive by linking each firm's tax rate to the increase in its revenues attributable to price changes.     

Risk taking and taxation: An alternative perspective

The analysis of risk taking and taxation has almost invariably been in a portfolio choice framework. This paper presents the alternative perspective of an occupational choice framework, where risk taking involves the additional element of discrete choice between safe and risky activities. It is shown that the specification of equilibrium must of necessity have a general equilibrium character. In this setting the paper develops rules for government intervention in the market equilibrium, and analyses the effects of taxation on risk taking.     

Foreign ownership and corporate income taxation: An empirical evaluation

Foreign ownership allows countries to effectively export part of their corporate tax burden. Hence, countries with high foreign ownership are expected to impose relatively high corporate taxes. The findings of this paper suggest that there indeed is an economically significant positive relationship between foreign ownership and tax burdens in Europe. Already significant foreign ownership levels in Europe offer an explanation for the absence of a ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate tax levels.     

The optimal taxation of risky capital income: An elasticity rule

Should risky capital income be taxed like safe income or should tax rates be differentiated? The question is analyzed in a 2-assets model of portfolio choice. Flat tax rates are chosen in order to maximize the investor's expected utility from terminal wealth subject to an expected tax revenue constraint. If lump-sum taxes are not available, optimal tax rates are characterized by an elasticity rule: The relative change in the risk remuneration should be equal to the inverse of the product of two elasticities. One is the output elasticity of capital. The other is the demand elasticity for risky investments with respect to a revenue preserving tax variation.     

Carbon-reducing taxes and income inequality: general equilibrium evaluation of alternative energy taxation in Taiwan

Recently, several studies have been a detailed evaluation of the economic implications of energy taxation as a policy instrument to conserve energy and reduce carbon emissions. However, little attention has been devoted to inquiring about the economic implications of energy taxation in the newly industrialized countries (the so-called NICs). In this paper, we use a multisector, multihousehold computable general equilibrium model to assess the distributional effects of alternative energy taxation on the Taiwan economy. The counterfactual simulation technique is applied to investigate the income distribution implications of: (1) an increase in the import taxes of crude oil; and (2) an increase in the excise taxes of petroleum products. Our empirical results basing on Taiwan's data show that both energy taxes increase government revenue and the Gini coefficient, but reduce net value-added, private consumption, disposable income and equivalent variation. A raise in the Gini coefficient implies that there is a worsening in the distribution of income. The lowest income group suffers relatively large welfare and income loss, but the highest income group suffers a relatively small welfare and income loss. The distributional effects differ from household to household depending on the composition of their total consumption and the source of their factor income. Our findings reveal that the energy tax appears to be mildly regressive, there are broadly consistent with those cases of developed countries reported in previous studies.     

Optimal income taxation with tax avoidance

We determine the optimal income tax schedule when individuals have the possibility of avoiding paying taxes. Considering a convex concealment cost function, we find that a subset of individuals, located in the interior of the income distribution, should be allowed to avoid taxes, provided that the marginal cost of avoiding the first euro is sufficiently small. This contrasts with the results of Grochulski who shows that, using a subadditive cost function, all individuals should report their true income. We also provide a characterization of the optimal income tax curve.     

Optimum income taxation and layoff taxes

This paper analyzes optimum income taxation in a model with endogenous job destruction that gives rise to unemployment. It is shown that optimal tax schemes comprise both payroll and layoff taxes when the state provides public unemployment insurance and aims at redistributing income. The optimal layoff tax is equal to the social cost of job destruction, which amounts to the sum of unemployment benefits (that the state pays to unemployed workers) and payroll taxes (that the state does not get when workers are unemployed).     

Capital income taxation and perfect foresight

This paper develops a perfect foresight model of capital income taxation in a representative household neoclassical one-sector framework. The household sector is based on intertemporal utility maximization. The main result is the equivalence of a perfect foresight solution and an artificial central planning solution; if there is no tax, this is the equivalence of a market equilibrium and social optinum. The equivalence result is used to deduce the implications of a partial tax reform policy. It is shown that a partial reform increases capital at each time following the initial period of the program.     

Inequality-growth nexus under progressive income taxation

Within heterogeneous-household extensions of Romer’s (1986) one-sector representative agent model of endogenous growth, this paper finds that changes made to the U.S. statutory income tax in the past decades account for a substantial portion of the following stylized facts: (i) U.S. income inequality significantly deteriorates since the mid-1980s; (ii) the inequality-growth nexus displays a positive slope before and after the implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA-86); and (iii) the slope of the inequality-growth nexus sharply declines between the pre- and post-TRA-86-reform periods, indicating less deterioration in real GDP per capita growth when pursuing a more equal income distribution after 1986. In addition to income inequality, the responses of several other measurements of inequality to changes in the tax code parameters are also explored.     

An alternative approach to aggregate surplus analysis

This paper suggests a dual to the many-person applied welfare economics problem with constraints on lymp-sum redistribution. The dual has the property of minimizing an aggregator function over individual income transfers. The properties of the aggregator are dependent upon the resource costs of redistribution and not upon the distributional preferences embodied in the social welfare function. An interpretation of the dual problem in terms of consumer surplus is offered.     

An alternative approach to simulating var models

This paper proposes a simple approach to the problem of handling contemporaneous correlation of the error terms when simulating VAR models. The approach is illustrated with an example using an estimated VAR model of the New Zealand economy.     

Optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing

This paper examines a two-period model of optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing, in which second-period wages are an increasing function of first-period labour supply. We consider the cases when the government can and cannot commit to its second-period tax policy. In both cases, the canonical Mirrlees/Stiglitz results regarding optimal marginal tax rates generally no longer apply. In particular, if the government cannot commit and each consumer's skill-type is revealed, it is optimal to distort the high-skill type's labour supply downwards through a positive marginal tax rate to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint. Our analysis therefore identifies a setting in which a positive marginal tax rate on the highest-skill individual can be justified, despite its depressing effect on both labour supply and wages.     

A contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation

The paper provides a new formulation of the Mirrlees–Seade theorem on the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax, under weaker assumptions and in a more general model. The formulation of the theorem is independent of whether the model involves finitely many types or a continuous type distribution. The formal argument makes the underlying logic transparent, relating the mathematics to the economics and showing precisely how each assumption enters the analysis.     

The efficient side of progressive income taxation

This paper examines allocative properties of progressive income taxation when individuals care about their relative income. It shows that introducing a progressive income tax can yield a Pareto improvement if pre-tax income is evenly distributed. Implementing undistorted choices of working hours requires a progressive tax schedule, and the optimal degree of progressivity decreases with pre-tax income inequality.     

Public health insurance and optimal income taxation

If individuals differ not only in their inherent capacity to earn income, but also in the probability that they will fall ill, can subsidized public health insurance be justified on the grounds that it serves as an efficient tool to redistribute welfare? This question is analyzed in a model where the social welfare function is a weighted average of individual expected utilities, and where taxation is by a linear income tax. The answer is ‘yes’, except in certain special cases.     

Differential income taxation and household asset allocation

This article empirically investigates the effects of differential income taxation on households’ portfolio choice and asset allocation, applying a two-stage budgeting model of asset demand to German survey data. The model is structured into the discrete and the continuous asset choice. Cross-sectional variation in marginal tax rates, appropriately instrumented, as well as over-time variation from a major tax reform are used to identify the tax effects. Households with higher tax rates are found to have relatively greater demand for tax-privileged assets, such as nonowner-occupied housing, mortgage repayments, building society deposits, stocks, insurances and consumer credits, than households with lower tax rates. Demand at higher tax rates is lower for owner-occupied housing, bank deposits and bonds.