Are private banks more efficient than public banks?

We study whether bank efficiency is related to bank ownership in Russia. We find that foreign banks are more efficient than domestic private banks and, surprisingly, that domestic private banks are not more efficient than domestic public banks. These results are not driven by the choice of production process, the bank's environment, management's risk preferences, the bank's activity mix or size, the econometric approach, or the introduction of deposit insurance. The policy conclusion is that the efficiency of the Russian banking system may benefit more from increased levels of competition and greater access of foreign banks than from bank privatization.     

Why do growth rates differ? Evidence from cross-country data on private sector production

We estimate standard production functions with a new cross-country data set on business sector production, wages and R&D investment for a selection of 14 OECD countries including the US. The data sample covers years the 1960–2004. The data suggest that growth differences can largely be explained by capital deepening and the ability to produce new technology in the form of new patents. We also find strong evidence of complementarity between patents and openness of the economy, but little evidence of increasing elasticity of substitution over time.     

Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?

This paper studies the effect of the governance of modern central banks on the ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies Standard and Poor's and Moody's. Until recently, the rating process was not public. Even still, the factors or precise methodologies used by the agencies remain uncertain and analyst judgment remains important. We argue that, given uncertainty over the future paths of countries, the quality of the central bank governance serves as a useful heuristic for a stable and favorable country trajectory. In particular, the central bank's independence signals that the government is committed to general macroeconomic stability, including debt repayment. Additionally, central bank transparency clarifies who is the principal of the bank and provides information about how the central bank understands the economy and monetary policy. Finally, tensions between the central bank and the government, as reflected by irregular turnover of central bank governors, raise doubts about countries’ future prospects. Empirically, we use a variety of models, including mediation analysis, to ensure that the effect we identify stems from the central bank governance itself, as a heuristic for the future paths of countries, and not the central bank's direct contribution to the macroeconomy, as reflected in the available data.     

Why are governmental R&D and private R&D complements?

It is well known that government R&D and private R&D have a complementary relationship. However, no previous study has provided an explanation for why that complementary relationship exists. This paper argues that infratechnology is the critical link between governmental and private R&D and that the observed complementarity is the result of technical complementarity at the production level between funding, infratechnology, and knowledge sharing. A theoritical framework based on this argument is developed and examined empirically for supporting evidence. Evidence of technical complementary is found as well as evidence that governmental R&D stimulates the sharing of knowledge.     

Did efficiency of Indian public sector banks converge with banking reforms?

This paper examines the issue of convergence of efficiency levels among Indian public sector banks (PSBs) during the post-reforms period spanning from 1992/1993 to 2005/2006. The empirical results indicate that the majority of PSBs have observed an ascent in technical efficiency during the post-reforms years. Further, the inefficient PSBs have been noted to be catching up with the efficient ones. That is, the banks with low level of efficiency at the beginning of the period are growing more rapidly than the highly efficient banks. In sum, the study confirms a presence of convergence phenomenon in the Indian public sector banking industry.

Democratization and the depoliticization of the banking sector: Are all banks affected equally?

This paper shows that the influence of the dramatic change in political ties of the Indonesian banking sector following democratization varies widely by bank ownership type. Panel estimates using several unique data-sets show that the decrease in political ties over democratization positively influences the performance of government-owned banks while negatively influencing the performance for privately held banks. Results remain robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and sensitivity tests. This study provides evidence not only of the differential impact of depoliticization, but also suggests that the relationship between political connections and performance may be different based on bank ownership.     

How have inflation-targeting central banks responded to supply shocks?

This paper examines how inflation-targeting central banks have responded to supply shocks, based on the sign-restriction VAR approach. It is found that inflation-targeting central banks have become accommodative to adverse supply shocks following the adoption of inflation targeting.     

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer–seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the value of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary whether buyers can interrogate the seller and the contextual richness. The buyers’ prediction accuracy is above chance, and is substantial for confident buyers. There is no evidence that the option to interrogate is important and only weak support that contextual richness matters. These results show that the information asymmetry is partly eliminated by people’s ability to spot deception.     

Who provides the capital for Chinese growth: the public or the private sector?

We focus on the role of the government in the provision of investment in China, through the medium of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model of the economy in which the form of the production function reflects this governmental role. Using indirect inference, we estimate and test for the elasticity of substitution between government and nongovernment capital in both Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and Cobb–Douglas technologies. The results underscore the strong substitution relationship between government and nongovernment capital from 1949, supporting CES rather than the Cobb–Douglas technology. They also show that the orientation of public investment changed after the start of the ‘Socialist Market Economy’ in 1992: government capital became more complementary to nongovernment capital as it focused more on infrastructure and withdrew from industrial production, intervening only in times of crisis, for stabilization purposes, indirectly via the state banks.     

How do central banks react to wealth composition and asset prices?

We assess the response of monetary policy to developments in asset markets in the euro area, the US and the UK. We estimate the reaction of monetary policy to wealth composition and asset prices using: (i) a linear framework based on a fully simultaneous system approach in a Bayesian environment; and (ii) a nonlinear specification that relies on a smooth transition regression model.     

Forecasting performance of private sector’s unemployment forecasts in advanced economies

This paper provides a full characterization of unemployment rate forecasts using the mean values from Consensus Economics for a sample of nine advanced economies between 1989 and 2012. It also assesses the performance of unemployment rate forecasts around business cycles’ turning points. We find evidence for biasedness, inefficiency or information rigidities and lack of accuracy of unemployment rate forecasts and the distribution of projection errors appears to be slightly twisted to over-prediction (which decreases during recession episodes). Additionally, there is a sense of ‘pessimism’ among forecasters during recovery periods.     

Why Has Japan Failed to Escape from Deflation?

Japan has failed to escape from deflation despite an extraordinary monetary policy easing over the past 4 years. Monetary easing undoubtedly stimulated aggregate demand, leading to an improvement in the output gap. However, since the Phillips curve was almost flat, prices have hardly reacted at all. Against this background, the key question is why prices were so sticky. To examine this, we use sectoral price data for Japan and seven other countries including the USA, and use these data to compare the shape of the price change distribution across the eight countries. Our main finding is that Japan differs significantly from the other countries in that the mode of the distribution is very close to zero for Japan, while it is near 2% for other countries. This suggests that while in the USA and other countries the “default” is for firms to raise prices by about 2% each year, in Japan the default is that, as a result of prolonged deflation, firms keep their prices unchanged.     

Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?

This paper studies the pattern of allocation of foreign aid from various donors to receiving countries. We find considerable evidence that the direction of foreign aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients. Colonial past and political alliances are major determinants of foreign aid. At the margin, however, countries that democratize receive more aid, ceteris paribus. While foreign aid flows respond to political variables, foreign direct investments are more sensitive to economic incentives, particularly good policies and protection of property rights in the receiving countries. We also uncover significant differences in the behavior of different donors.     

Why are firms sometimes unwilling to reduce costs?

This paper identifies the environments in which it does not pay for a multiproduct firm to engage in small cost reductions. Specifically, it shows that a multiproduct Bertrand firm’s profits will decrease in response to a small reduction in one product’s marginal cost if and only if the output share of the cost-reducing unit is below a threshold. Because cost reductions by a single-product firm or by a multiproduct Cournot firm always increase the firm’s profits, this result is unique to multiproduct Bertrand firms.     

Do bank bondholders price banks’ ability to manage risk/return?

In this paper, we empirically investigate whether bank bondholders value risk management, measured as risk-return efficiency (RRE), when pricing bond spreads. Based on a sample of 2,452 bonds issued by 78 European listed banks, for the period 2001–2015, we find evidence that the ability of banks to manage risk affects bond spreads: banks with more capable managers obtain a lower cost of debt. In particular our results show that bank bondholders are even more sensitive to RRE during the crisis period, for relatively poorly rated bonds, for unsecured/subordinated debt, and for long maturity debt. Our findings highlight that bondholders’ monitoring of banks is effective and takes into account the efficiency of risk management during financial and economic downturns, but during sound periods bank bondholders should strengthen their monitoring of risk management.     

Did foreign banks stay committed to emerging Europe during recent financial crises?

Our objective is to investigate empirically the behavior of foreign banks with respect to real loan growth during periods of financial crisis for a set of countries in which foreign banks dominate the banking sectors due primarily to having taken over large existing former state-owned banks. The eight countries are among the most developed in emerging Europe, their banking sectors having been modernized by the middle of the last decade. We consider a data period that includes an initial credit boom (2005 – 2007) followed by the global financial crisis (2008 & 2009) and the onset of the Eurozone crisis (2010). Our two innovations with respect to the existing literature on banking during the financial crisis are to separate foreign banks into two categories, namely, subsidiaries of the Big 6 European multinational banks (MNBs) and all other foreign-controlled banks, and to take account of the impact of exchange rates during the period. Our results show that bank lending was impacted adversely by both crises but that the two types of foreign banks behaved differently. The Big 6 banks remained committed to the region in that their lending behavior was not different from that of domestic banks supporting the notion that these countries are treated as a “second home market” by these European MNBs. Contrariwise, the other foreign banks active in the region were involved in fueling the credit boom but then decreased their lending aggressively during the crisis periods. Our results also indicate that bank behavior in countries having flexible exchange rate regimes differs from that in those in (or effectively in) the Eurozone. Our results suggest that both innovations matter for studying bank behavior during crisis periods in the region and, by extension, to other small countries in which banking sectors are dominated by foreign financial institutions having different business models.     

Why Excel?

Advanced Placement economics leaves thousands of high school students with a misleading impression of modern economics. The courses fail to cover key sources of growth and prosperity, including private ownership, dynamic competition, and entrepreneurship. The tools of public choice economics are totally ignored. Government is modeled as a corrective device available to impose ideal solutions. Market failure is covered, but there is no such thing as government failure. The macroeconomics course reflects the simplistic 1960s Keynesian view of stabilization policy. Time lags, incentive effects, secondary effects of budget deficits, and other factors that complicate effective use of stabilization policy are almost entirely ignored. In contrast, the 20 Voluntary National Content Standards in Economics of the Council for Economic Education illustrate what a balanced course in modern economics would look like.