Does fiscal decentralization promote the inflow of FDI in China?

This paper tests whether China's fiscal decentralization promotes the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Using provincial panel data during 1995–2002, we find that fiscal decentralization has a positive and significant effect on inward FDI, after controlling for other factors, and fixed time and province effects in both LSDV (Least squares dummy variables) regression and system GMM (Generalized method of moments) estimations that address the endogeneity of fiscal decentralization. The results are robust to six measures of fiscal decentralization that consider budgetary amount, extra-budgetary funds and inter-governmental transfers. A simple theory is offered to explain the findings. The results during 1987–1994 are further contrasted. Policy implications are also presented.     

Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?

Corruption is harmful for public finances and appears closely related to fiscal deficits. We open a new avenue in addressing the effects of corruption on public deficits through fiscal decentralization. For a sample of 31 OECD countries over the period 1986–2010, we find that fiscal decentralization contributes to mitigating the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits. In addition, our findings indicate diversity in the effects of fiscal decentralization, in that it appears related to lower deficits in countries with higher levels of corruption but not in less corrupt countries. Our results suggest that bringing the government closer to the people through fiscal decentralization in relatively corrupt countries leads to more responsible fiscal management.     

Does fiscal decentralization affect local governments' strategic behaviours? Evidence from South Korea

Local governments tend to show strategic behaviours when making their spending decisions. However, few studies have examined strategic behaviours when promoting fiscal decentralization. Thus, this study empirically examines the presence of strategic interactions in expenditure decisions in South Korea as well as how fiscal decentralization affects those interactions, using a panel data set from 2010 to 2017. The results demonstrate that a local government mimics other governments' spending when those governments' residents share similar age demographics. Moreover, local governments in South Korea engage in strategic interactions as their expenditure side becomes more decentralized. However, local governments tend to demonstrate less isomorphic behaviour in welfare spending decisions when they have higher revenue decentralization. This is because local governments have no motive to emulate other welfare policies, as the central government delegates the provision of social services to local governments by providing grants with strings attached.     

Does trade foster contract enforcement?

Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in competing markets are complements (substitutes) if the supply of traders is sufficiently elastic (inelastic). The model provides a useful structure of endogenous enforcement that gives promise of explaining patterns of institutional development. Presented to the GEP Conference on ‘New Directions in International Trade Theory’, 8 and 9 June, 2007. An earlier version of this paper under another title was presented to the American Economic Association meetings, January 2004.     

Should mobile capital pay for public infrastructure investment?

The paper contributes to the discussion of fiscal competition with infrastructure goods. We explicitly focus on the costs of providing public infrastructure capital that appear in the public budget as investment. Thus we analyse the problem in a dynamic framework. Public infrastructure is considered as a marginal product complement to private capital. A central result of the model is that the fact that public capital is a complement to private capital, so that an increase in the supply of public capital ceteris paribus improves the marginal productivity of private capital, cannot be used as an argument to support a source tax. The so-called indirect productivity effect on private capital induced by public inputs does not justify the taxation of mobile capital. Rather, the efficiency of a source tax on mobile capital income depends on the question of whether or not the public input generates a factor rent to private capital.

Is fiscal policy stationary in China? A regional study by local government

In this study, we apply a stationarity test with a flexible Fourier function proposed by Enders and Lee (2012) to test the stationarity of the deficit–GDP ratio in China. We find that our approximation has a higher power to detect U-shaped breaks and to smooth breaks than the linear method if the true data-generating process of the deficit–GDP ratio convergence is, in fact, a stationary non-linear process. The results show that the stationarity for fiscal policy varies across different regions and that the deficit–GDP ratio of half of the regions is stationary. The results related to the budget structural balance and the fiscal deficit indicate no expansion in the Eastern and Central regions. We find that China's provinces in these two regions meet the stability theory of fiscal policy in the current stage of development. The deficit–GDP ratio is not stationary in the Western and Northeastern regions. These results indicate that the fiscal deficits in these regions are expanding and cannot be controlled by automatic market adjustment, and the government should therefore avoid deficit expansion in favor of a balanced budget policy.     

Does venture capital really foster innovation?

Using panel data of 17 European Union countries, we find robust empirical support for a positive impact of venture capital on innovation. After controlling for the potential endogenous relationship between venture capital and innovation, the results indicate that venture capital fosters innovation but mainly at a later stage.     

Does FDI crowd out domestic investment in transition countries?

The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment in a sample of 10 Central and Eastern European countries over the period 1995–2015. We find FDI to lead to a creative destruction phenomenon, with a short‐term crowding out effect on domestic investment, followed by a long‐term crowding in. Greenfield FDI develops stronger long‐run complementarities with domestic investment, while mergers and acquisitions do not show a significant effect on domestic investment. Financial development seems to mitigate crowding out pressures and even foster a crowding in for mergers and acquisitions.     

Does forced solidarity hamper investment in small and micro enterprises?

Summary: Previous research has shown that small firms in poor countries achieve high marginal returns to capital but show low reinvestment rates. We investigate whether transfers motivated by risk sharing and forced redistribution can explain this pattern and may therefore hamper private sector development. The idea is that the more redistribution distorts the fairness of insurance, the more potentially successful entrepreneurs may be hindered to undertake profitable investments. The empirical results based on a sample of small firms operating in Burkina Faso support the main propositions of this paper.     

Does anti-bribery enforcement deter foreign investment?

This article presents the first empirical evidence that bilateral fixed capital flows fall in response to anti-bribery enforcement actions. We hand-collect data on individual enforcement actions initiated by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and show that anti-bribery enforcement in a country is followed by a 40% reduction in foreign fixed capital investments made by US companies in that country.     

Does decentralization contribute to efficiency? Evidence from OECD countries

This article provides evidence on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and technical efficiency. We begin the first stage of this study with a data envelopment analysis to obtain technical efficiency estimates for a sample of 23 OECD countries over the period 1992–2009. In a second stage, we explore the effects of fiscal decentralization and other control variables on technical efficiency. The results including all the control variables reveal a statistically significant negative relationship between fiscal decentralization of public expenditure and technical efficiency.     

Does democracy foster financial development? An empirical analysis

This paper examines whether democracy promotes financial development. While cross-section results show a positive association between democracy and bank development, this relationship disappears in panel regressions. The data also reveals that democracy is not positively related to stock market development.     

Weakness of investment in Portugal: what role do credit supply and fiscal consolidation shocks play?

Portuguese Economic Journal - In order to illustrate how tightened financial conditions have hampered investment in Portugal, we estimate a Factor Augmented Vector AutoRegressive model (FAVAR) with...     

Does competition cause government decentralization? The case of state-owned enterprises

This paper examines the causal effects of competition on governments’ incentives in decentralizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By using the shocks to product market competition caused by China's trade liberalization, we find that competition substantially improves SOEs’ decentralization. Furthermore, we also provide evidence of the incentive to exploit local information and roll out an alternative interpretation that government divests itself of SOEs because they become burdensome. Finally, we find that the effect of competition on decentralization is augmented when governments are geographically distant from their SOEs or when SOEs are located in regions characterized by low social trust, high dialect diversity, or heavy pressure for economic growth.     

Does corporate social responsibility make over-educated workers more productive?

This article provides first evidence on whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) influences the productivity effects of over-education. By relying on detailed Belgian-linked employer–employee panel data covering the period 1999–2010, our empirical results exhibit a positive and significant impact of over-education on firm productivity. Moreover, they suggest that the effect of over-education is positively enhanced when the firm implements a CSR process, especially when it aims to have: (i) a good match between job requirements and workers’ educational level, (ii) a diverse workforce in terms of gender and age, and (iii) a long-term relationship with its workers. When focussing on required education and over-education, the results suggest that CSR, besides representing an innovative and proactive approach for the firms’ stakeholders, may also be beneficial for the firm itself through a bigger increase in productivity for each additional year of required education or over-education.     

Foreign direct investment and inequality in developing countries: Does sector matter?

Scholars have studied the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and within‐country income inequality in cross‐national contexts, but have not empirically investigated how FDI in different sectors might affect inequality in different ways. We use error correction models to analyze sectoral FDI data compiled from UNCTAD investment reports in 60 middle‐income countries from 1989 to 2010, arguing that FDI in services is more likely to be associated with inequality than FDI in other sectors. We argue that skill biases and changes in employment patterns associated with service sector investments can help explain these findings.     

Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives

Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment 1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness, but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions. Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a “blinding effect” on considerations such as betrayal and inequality aversion.     

Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.     

Does the new digital infrastructure improve total factor productivity?

Improving total factor productivity (TFP) is essential to achieving high-quality and sustainable economic development. The existing literature mainly focuses on the impact of traditional infrastructure on TFP but generally ignores the role of new digital infrastructure in TFP and does not test impact mechanisms and whether there is heterogeneity in effects. Using panel data of 30 regions in China from 2006 to 2017, this paper analyzes the impact of new digital infrastructure on TFP and its mechanisms. The results are as follows: (1) New digital infrastructure can significantly improve regional TFP. After the robustness test, the results still support the findings. (2) New digital infrastructure can promote technological innovation, optimize factor allocation, and achieve economies of scale, thus improving TFP. (3) Further analysis shows that the positive effect of new digital infrastructure on TFP shows significant heterogeneity. In regions with high economic development levels, high research and development ( R&D) levels, and high traditional infrastructure development levels, the positive effect of new digital infrastructure on TFP is more obvious. These findings not only enrich the literature on digital infrastructure and economic growth but also serve as a reference for governmental departments as they optimize their strategy for developing digital infrastructure and realizing sustainable economic development.