A comparison of Japanese and U.S. firms completing initial public offerings

We set out to examine firms breaking into the top tier of for-profit companies in the U.S. and Japan to find differences across the two groups. To accomplish this, we conducted a questionnaire survey of companies that had recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in each country and compared them on characteristics frequently associated with new firms.As we expected, even when the different sizes of the two economies were taken into account, there were considerably fewer listings in Japan than in the U.S. One reason for this is that the listing requirements for young Japanese firms, although not stricter, are much more strictly enforced. Hence, fewer Japanese firms are able to list.Our results show that the Japanese firms were markedly different from their U.S. counterparts on several characteristics. They tended to be older and larger, which is consistent with more stringent listing requirements in Japan. They were also much more often led by their original founders. This is a surprising result given that the Japanese firms, being older, had longer to lose their founders. When a successor to the founder was president, it was much more often a relative of the founder than in the U.S. The Japanese founders rated themselves higher on relatively emotional characteristics, such as aggressiveness, paternalism, and charisma than did either the U.S. presidents or the Japanese nonfounder presidents.The Japanese firms relied solely on the president for decision-making prior to the IPO more often than the U.S. firms did. However, the Japanese firms also moved in greater numbers to group decision-making around the time of the IPO.The post-IPO investment strategies of the Japanese firms were characterized by a focus on new product development, an increase in R&D spending, and investment in the company's capital plant. In contrast, the U.S. firms reported more interest in exploiting their existing market and buying other companies, usually leaving R&D spending at its pre-IPO level.Overall, it is surprising that on many characteristics, the Japanese IPOs tended to fall more to the extreme associated with new companies than did the U.S. firms. They were dominated by founder influence, the founders were apparently highly emotional, their management style was initially autocratic, and their strategies targeted innovation and internal development as avenues to growth. This pattern is consistent with a prior hypothesis that the lack of structural support for new firms in Japan results in only the most extreme personalities pursuing and succeeding in company formation.For researchers, a significant implication of this research is that Japanese ventures may not behave according to the same rules as U.S. ventures. Research samples that fail to distinguish nationality may obscure cross-regional variations.For practitioners, the major lesson is that a Japanese venture is likely to be much different from one in the U.S. Dealing with one is probably even more unlike dealing with an established company than working with a U.S. start-up might be.     

Is venture capital worth it? Effects on firm performance and founder returns

This paper extends research on venture capital (VC) finance by studying its effects on a venture's performance and on its founders' returns beyond an initial public offering (IPO). A “founder performance” construct, defined as a founder's financial and nonfinancial returns, is proposed and used to measure and compare returns to founders with returns to investors and firm performance. In general, venture characteristics pre-IPO and venture performance post-IPO were not significantly different when comparing ventures with and without VC backing. Only when VC backing is very high, do pre-IPO resources and funding improve significantly. However, higher levels of resource endowments did not seem to affect post-IPO performance for the venture or its investors. On the other hand, founders resorting to VC funding before taking their company public generated significantly less wealth for themselves and were less likely to remain as CEOs of their ventures after the IPO. Results suggest that founders motivated primarily by wealth creation and those motivated by remaining in control of their ventures should, in both instances, minimize VC backing when taking their ventures public. The finding that founder performance differs from venture and investor performance calls for future research to explore potential conflicts of interest that may arise from the double role of founders as principals and agents.     

Explaining the formation of international new ventures: The limits of theories from international business research

International new ventures (INVs) represent a growing and important type of start-up. An INV is defined as a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries (Oviatt and McDougall 1994). Their increasing prevalence and important role in international competition indicates a need for greater understanding of these new ventures (Oviatt and McDougall 1994).Logitech, as described in a case study by Alahuhta (1990), is a vivid example of an INV. Its founders were from two different countries and had a global vision for the company from its inception. The venture, which produces peripheral devices for personal computers, established headquarters in both Switzerland and the U.S. Manufacturing and R&D were split between the U.S. and Switzerland, and then quickly spread to Taiwan and Ireland. The venture's first commercial contract was with a Japanese company.Using 24 case studies of INVs, we found that their formation process is not explained by existing theories from the field of international business. Specifically, neither monopolistic advantage theory, product cycle theory, stage theory of internationalization, oligopolistic reaction theory, nor internalization theory can explain the formation process of INVs. These theories fail because they assume that firms become international long after they have been formed, and they therefore highlight large, mature firms. They also focus too much on the firm level and largely ignore the individual and small group level of analysis (i.e., the entrepreneur and his or her network of business alliances).We propose that an explanation for the formation process of INVs must answer three questions: (1) who are the founders of INVs? (2) why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? and (3) what form do their international business activities take?Who are the founders of INVs? We argue that founders of INVs are individuals who see opportunities from establishing ventures that operate across national borders. They are “alert” to the possibilities of combining resources from different national markets because of the competencies (networks, knowledge, and background) that they have developed from their earlier activities. Following the logic of the resource-based view of the firm, we argue that the possession of these competencies is not matched by other entrepreneurs. Only the entrepreneur possessing these competencies is able to combine a particular set of resources across national borders and form a given INV.Why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries? The founders of INVs recognize they must create international business competencies from the time of venture formation. Otherwise, the venture may become path-dependent on the development of domestic competencies and the entrepreneur will find it difficult to change strategic direction when international expansion eventually becomes necessary. As the founder of one INV explained, “The advantage of starting internationally is that you establish an international spirit from the very beginning” (Mamis 1989:38).What form do their international business activities take? Founders of INVs prefer to use hybrid structures (i.e., strategic alliances and networks) for their international activities as a way to overcome the usual poverty of resources at the time of start-up.This study has important implications for the practice of management. In financing decisions relating to INVs, venture capitalists and other venture financiers should look for entrepreneurs who have a global vision, international business competence, and an established international network. When entrepreneurs start INVs they should create hybrid structures to preserve scarce resources. Finally, given the path-dependence of competence development, founders of new ventures should consider whether establishing a domestic new venture with plans to later internationalize will be as successful a strategy as establishing a new venture that is international from inception.     

Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries

The rapid internationalization of markets for venture capital is expanding the funding alternatives available to entrepreneurs. For venture capital firms, this trend spells intensified competition in markets already at or past saturation. At issue for both entrepreneurs and venture capital firms is how and when venture capitalists (VCs) can provide meaningful oversight and add value to their portfolio companies beyond the provision of capital. An important way VCs add value beyond the money they provide is through their close relationships with the managers of their portfolio companies. Whereas some VCs take a very hands-off approach to oversight, others become deeply involved in the development of their portfolio companies.Utilizing surveys of VCs in the United States and the three largest markets in Europe (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France), we examined the determinants of interaction between VCs and CEOs, the roles VCs assume, and VCs' perceptions of how much value they add through these roles. We examined the strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles through which VCs are involved in their portfolio companies, and we analyzed how successful such efforts were. By so doing we were able to shed light on how and when VCs in four major markets expend their greatest effort to provide oversight and value-added assistance to their investment companies.Consistent with prior empirical work, we found that VCs saw strategic involvement as their most important role, i.e., providing financial and business advice and functioning as a sounding board. They rated their interpersonal roles (as mentor and confidant to CEOs) as next in value.Finally, they rated their networking roles (i.e., as contacts to other firms and professionals) as third most important. These ratings were consistent across all four markets. VCs in the United States and the United Kingdom were the most involved in their ventures, and they added the most value. VCs in France were the least involved and added the least value; VCs in France appeared to be least like others in terms of what factors drove their efforts. Our theoretical models explained a greater proportion of variance in governance and value added in the United States than elsewhere. Clear patterns of behavior emerged that reflect the manner in which different markets operate. Among the European markets, practices in the United Kingdom appear to be most like that in the United States.Determinants of Governance (Face-to-Face Interaction)We operationalized VC governance or monitoring of ventures as the amount of face-to-face interaction VCs had with venture CEOs. We found some evidence that VCs increase monitoring in response to agency risks, but the results were mixed. Lack of experience on the part of CEOs did not prompt significant additional monitoring as had been predicted. A more potent determinant was how long the VC-CEO pairs worked together; longer relationships mitigated agency concerns and reduced monitoring. Contrary to expectations, perceived business risk in the form of VCs' satisfaction with recent venture performance had little impact on face-to-face interaction. Monitoring was greatest in early stage ventures, indicating that VCs respond to high uncertainty by increased information exchange with CEOs. We measured two types of VC experience and found different patterns for the two. Generally speaking, VCs with greater experience in the venture capital industry required less interaction with CEOs, whereas VCs with greater experience in the portfolio company's industry interacted more frequently with CEOs than did VCs without such experience.Determinants of Value AddedWe argued that VCs would most add value to ventures when the venture lacked resources or faced perceived business risks, when the task environment was highly uncertain, and when VCs had great investing and operating experience. Contrary to expectations, VCs added most value to those ventures already performing well. As we had predicted, VCs did add relatively more value when uncertainty was high: e.g., for ventures in the earliest stages and for ventures pursuing innovation strategies. Finally, we found that VCs with operating experience in the venture's focal industry added significantly more value than those with less industry-specific experience. These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurs have a strong preference for VCs with similar backgrounds as their own. We found no evidence that experience in the venture capital industry contributed significantly to value added. Together, these results suggest that investigations of the social as well as economic dimensions of venture building may prove a fruitful avenue for future study. Overall, the results showed that value-added is strongly related to the amount of face-to-face interaction between VC-CEO pairs and to the number of hours VCs put in on each individual venture.Implications for Venture CapitalistsThe competition for attractive investments is heating up as economies become more globalized. Thus, the pressure on venture capital firms to operate both efficiently and effectively is also likely to build. It is as yet unclear whether the recent trend toward later stage, safer investments will continue, and how those venture capital firms following this path can differentiate themselves from other sources of capital. Venture capital firms that are able to choose the appropriate bases for determining governance effort and the appropriate roles for delivering added value to their portfolio companies will be those most likely to survive.In the largest, most robust markets (i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom), more effort is expended by venture capitalists to deliver something of value beyond the money. This suggests that the tradeoff preferred by those succeeding is to be more rather than less involved in their investments. Our results indicate that VCs clearly economize on the time they devote to involvement in their portfolio companies. However, our results also indicate that they do this at the great peril of producing value insufficient to justify the cost of their product.Implications for EntrepreneursOur findings provide two important insights for entrepreneurs. First, they show that where and when they obtain venture capital is likely to have an impact on the extent and nature of effort delivered by their venture capital investors. It appears that on average entrepreneurs receiving venture capital in the United States and the United Kingdom will be more closely monitored and will receive more value-adding effort from their VCs than will those in France or the Netherlands. Needless to say, entrepreneurs should consider their preferences for level and type of involvement from their investors as they consider their choice of partners. In France, for example, VCs put great emphasis on their financial role in comparison with other roles, but they contribute much less than VCs elswhere via other strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles.The second key implication of our findings is that entrepreneurs may be able to gauge what roles VCs will see as most important, when VCs are more or less apt to become involved in their companies, and when they believe they can most add value. Such knowledge may help CEOs anticipate VC activity, be aware of the parameters of VCs' preferences, communicate their own preferences, and negotiate the timing and extent of interaction. For example, although our results indicate that geographic distance significantly limits face-to-face interaction, it appears to have less impact on the amount of value added.Implications for ResearchersMuch more can be learned about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of alternative governance arrangements. Little is known about how formal structures such as contract covenants and board control work in conjunction with informal oversight and interaction. Even less is known about how value is added and how it is best measured. Although this study took a step toward developing a model of the circumstances under which value is added, the theory and its operationalization await further development.     

The advantage of experienced start-up founders in venture capital acquisition: evidence from serial entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs with prior firm-founding experience are expected to have more skills and social connections than novice entrepreneurs. Such skills and social connections could give experienced founders some advantage in the process of raising venture capital. This paper uses a large database of venture-backed companies and their founders to examine the advantage associated with prior founding experience. Compared with novice entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs with venture-backed founding experience tend to raise more venture capital at an early round of financing and tend to complete the early round much more quickly. In contrast, experienced founders whose earlier firms were not venture-backed do not show a similar advantage over novice entrepreneurs, suggesting the importance of connections with venture capitalists in the early stage of venture capital financing. However, when the analysis also takes into account later rounds of financing, all entrepreneurs with prior founding experience appear to raise more venture capital. This implies that skills acquired from any previous founding experience can make an entrepreneur perform better and in turn attract more venture capital.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

The ambitious entrepreneur: High growth strategies of women-owned enterprises

During the last two decades, researchers have sought to develop categories of entrepreneurs and their businesses along a variety of dimensions to better comprehend and analyze the entrepreneurial growth process. Some of this research has focused on differences related to industrial sectors, firm size, the geographical region in which a business is located, the use of high-technology or low-technology, and the life-cycle stage of the firm (i.e., start-up vs. more mature, formalized companies). Researchers have also considered ways in which entrepreneurs can be differentiated from small business managers. One of these classifications is based on the entrepreneur's desire to grow the business rapidly. This is the focus of our study.To date, the media have paid considerable attention to rapidly growing new ventures. However, still lacking are large-scale research studies guided by theory through which we can expand our knowledge of the underlying factors supporting ambitious expansion plans. Some research has identified factors that enhance or reduce the willingness of the entrepreneur to grow the business. Factors include the strategic origin of the business (i.e., the methods and paths through which the firm was founded); previous experience of the founder/owner; and the ability of the entrepreneur to set realistic, measurable goals and to manage conflict effectively.Our study attempted to identify the strategic paths chosen by entrepreneurs and the relation of those paths to the growth orientation of the firm. The entrepreneurs sampled in this study are women entrepreneurs across a wide range of industrial sectors. Recent reviews of entrepreneurship research have suggested the need for more studies comparing high-growth firms with slower-growth firms to better delineate their differences in strategic choices and behaviors.Our study sought to answer the following questions: What characterizes a “high growth-oriented entrepreneur?” Is this distinction associated with specific strategic intentions, prior experience, equity held in previous firms, the type of company structure in place, or success factors the entrepreneur perceives are important to the business? Do “high growth” entrepreneurs show greater entrepreneurial “intensity” (i.e., commitment to the firm's success)? Are they willing to “pay the price” for their own and their firm's success? (i.e., the “opportunity costs” associated with business success and growth). Other relationships under investigation included different patterns of financing the business' start-up and early growth. Do “high-growth” entrepreneurs use unique sources of funding compared with “lower-growth” entrepreneurs?Eight hundred thirty-two entrepreneurs responded to a survey in which they were asked to describe their growth intentions along nineteen strategic dimensions, as well as respond to the foregoing questions. Some of the strategic activity measures included adding a new product or service, expanding operations, selling to a new market, and applying for a loan to expand operations. Actual growth rates based on sales revenues were calculated, and average annualized growth rates of the industrial sectors represented in the sample were obtained. This study showed that high-growth-oriented entrepreneurs were clearly different from low-growth-oriented entrepreneurs along several dimensions. The former were much more likely to select strategies for their firms that permitted greater focus on market expansion and new technologies, to exhibit greater intensity towards business ownership (“my business is the most important activity in my life”), and to be willing to incur greater opportunity costs for the success of their firms (“I would rather own my own business than earn a higher salary while employed by someone else”).The high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs tended to have a more structured approach to organizing their businesses, which suggests a more disciplined perception of managing the firm. In summary, results showed the group of high-growth–oriented entrepreneurs, labeled “ambitious,” as having the following distinctions: strategic intentions that emphasize market growth and technological change, stronger commitment to the success of the business, greater willingness to sacrifice on behalf of the business, earlier planning for the growth of the business, utilization of a team-based form of organization design, concern for reputation and quality, adequate capitalization, strong leadership, and utilization of a wider range of financing sources for the expansion of the venture. The purpose in uncovering these differences is to enable entrepreneurs and researchers to identify more clearly the attributes of rapid-growth ventures and their founders and to move closer to a field-based model of the entrepreneurial growth process which will help delineate the alternative paths to venture growth and organizational change.     

Will the startup succeed in your eyes? Venture evaluation of resource providers during entrepreneurs' informational signaling

Experienced founders and investors are arguably the venture community members most likely to possess needed financial and social resources for startups. We present a model of venture evaluation where entrepreneurs solicit these resource providers for needed financial and social resources. Our model addresses how resource providers' venture investment propensity influences their evaluation of entrepreneurs' informational signals and how their venture evaluation predicts their willingness to provide financial and social resources. We test our model using real-time decisions and find resource providers with founding experience (both non-investor founders and investors with founding experience) leverage their investment propensity more than non-founder investors when evaluating new ventures. In addition, our post-hoc analysis reveals that resource providers' founding experience is associated with their willingness to confer social resources. Overall, this paper focuses on the perspective of resource providers and addresses how their investment propensity, types of venturing experience, and venture evaluation influence their willingness to render resource support to new ventures.     

New venture internationalization,strategic change,and performance: A follow-up study

Although many scholars, business experts, and government agencies enthusiastically advise all firms, including new and small ventures, to internationalize, such advice does not appear to be based on empirical evidence. Few researchers have empirically examined the link between new venture performance and the internationalization of new ventures. At best, the evidence suggests that there is no significant relationship.We used a sample of 62 U.S. new venture manufacturers in the computer and communications equipment industries during the late 1980s. These industries were purportedly globalizing and may have been leading other industries into increased international operations. We found that higher levels of internationalization (percentage of foreign sales to total venture sales) were associated with higher relative market share two years later. However, there was no significant direct relationship between percentage of international sales and subsequent return on investment (ROI). Perhaps international operations simply cost more than expected. Or perhaps, as MacMillan and Day (1987) found in their study of corporate ventures over a 4-year time period, increases in market share may be a prelude to higher ROI as scale benefits translate into higher profitability. However, the 2-year time period of our study may simply not be long enough for investments in higher market shares to produce improved profits.During the 2-year study period, many of the ventures changed their level of internationalization. Of the 36 ventures who were domestic (no international sales) in the prior study, 10 expanded into international markets over the 2 years. Of the 26 originally international ventures (international sales of at least 5%), half increased their percentage of international sales, nine reduced it, and four stayed the same. Whereas the average change in international sales percentage of the ventures was only 2.9 percentage points, the large standard deviation of 13.0 percentage points, and the leptokurtic distribution (9.2) reflected the dramatic changes made by some of the ventures. Using subgroup analysis we examined these changes in percentage of international sales in conjunction with changes in strategies and performance. Ventures that had increased international sales, relative to those that had not, exhibited more positive associations between the degree of strategic change and performance as measured in terms of both relative market share and ROI. Increased international sales in technology-based new ventures seems to require simultaneous strategic changes in order to positively impact venture performance.This study is a follow-up to McDougall's (1989) finding that technology-based new ventures that had sales in foreign markets had significantly different strategies than similar ventures that sold their products only domestically. The current study enriches the previous findings by adding consideration of (1) changes in degree of internationalization, (2) changes in strategy, and (3) venture performance.Although we found no performance penalty associated with increasing international sales alone, indiscriminant advice for new ventures to sell in foreign markets without other supporting strategic actions is inconsistent with our findings. Internationalization, alone, did not lead to increased profitability.Entrepreneurs of young technology-based firms who are considering internationalization should take heed of our results. Internationalization of sales does not appear to be a simple matter of applying established strategies and procedures developed for a domestic arena. Successful internationalization appears to require changes in the venture's strategy as well.     

University revenues from technology transfer: Licensing fees vs. equity positions

This paper analyzes the financial return of universities' taking equity in their spin-off companies, and the prevailing attitudes toward taking equity. The reasons for taking equity include: the flexibility it gives licensing managers in structuring deals, the possibility that the university will still hold something of value if their technology is replaced, and, the reduced time required to generate revenue compared to a traditional license. A traditional license is preferred when the technology is not suitable for a spin-off company, or when the technology is one of the rare jackpot licenses that bring in millions of dollars every year.The financial reward of taking equity was determined by comparing the value of equity sold in public spin-off companies to the return on an average license. A traditional license consists of a license issue fee between $10,000 and $250,000 and an annual royalty on sales. In 1996 the average annual income from a traditional license was $63,832. The average value of equity sold in 16 university spin-off companies is $1,384,242. If one assumes that half the spin-offs fail before they go public, the average value of equity is $692,121. This is more than 10 times the average annual income from a traditional license, and is significantly higher than the amount usually received as a license issue fee.The high average value of equity depends on the presence of a few million-dollar equity sales. If those sales are excluded, the average value of equity is $139,722, which is within the range that can be received as a license issue fee. There is a high correlation between million-dollar equity sales and the amount of venture capital spending in the region. The million-dollar sales in this study all occurred in the top 11 states in the country in terms of venture capital spending in 1997.From a financial viewpoint it makes sense for licensing managers to take equity in their start-up companies. Our data show that even if none of the start-ups produces a million-dollar equity sale, the financial return of equity will be within the range normally received as a license issue fee. Taking equity leaves the door open for the occasional jackpot, which will bring in significantly more money than a standard license. When combined with a strong program of traditional licensing, taking equity in start-up companies maximizes the financial return that universities realize from their intellectual property.     

Entry and innovation: an analysis of the fabless semiconductor business

The relationship between pre-entry experience and patenting for a sample of 133 firms active in the fabless semiconductor business between 1984 and 2005 is studied. Controlling for variables such as venture capital, post-entry experience and parent involvement in the creation of the new venture, it is found that firms with better educated founders have a higher hazard to patent soon after entry. Additionally, firms whose founders have a longer tenure in the parent firm have a relatively higher hazard of patenting. Finally, firms whose founders have innovated in the past are more likely to innovate. Results suggest that both general and specific human capital are important preconditions of pre-entry experience.     

Parent inheritance,founder expertise,and venture strategy: Determinants of new venture knowledge impact

A genealogical theory of new venture creation posits that “parent” firm routines are transferred to “progeny” ventures founded by the former employees of these parents. This study examines how the knowledge available to a venture from its parent firms and individual founders, as well as its initial technological direction, influences its own creation of impactful knowledge. We argue that new knowledge creation involves the recombination of underlying knowledge elements and hypothesize that the degree to which the venture's knowledge domain overlaps with the parents' knowledge has positive, but diminishing effects on the impact of knowledge created by the venture. We also predict that the breadth of founders' personal knowledge has a positive effect, but that the divergence between individual founders' and parent firm's knowledge domains has a negative effect on the creation of impactful knowledge by the venture. We test our predictions using a sample of 219 biotechnology ventures founded over the eleven year period 1990–2000 and tracked through 2010. Our results contribute to the entrepreneurship, knowledge creation, and genealogical literatures.     

The entrepreneur's search for capital

The popular media have been inundated with stories of the spectacular success of start-up companies whose very existence, let alone their meteoric growth, would not have been possible without the infusion of venture capital. By comparison, there is a dearth of scientific research on the topic of venture capital. In this article we take a systematic look at entrepreneurs in search of risk capital. This inquiry is based upon five data bases including surveys of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. We have tracked 193 ventures which were denied venture capital, surveyed 179 new high-technology companies in Northern California, and reviewed the Dun & Bradstreet credit reports of 145 new ventures in California in SIC codes related to the high tech sector with follow-up interviews of 86 of these 145 start-ups.     

Academics' organizational characteristics and the generation of successful business ideas

This paper deals with the generation of Business Ideas (BI) by academics. It investigates organizational factors affecting the process through which new ventures are established by academics and are likely to affect their performance. The BI Market Attractiveness and the BI Articulation are addressed as two characteristics of academic spin-off companies which are likely to lead to their success. Two research hypotheses are formulated: (a) that the BI Market Attractiveness at the time of establishment of the new venture is positively influenced by the market orientation of the academic founders, and by their frequency of interaction with external agents; (b) that the BI Articulation at the time of establishment of the new venture is positively affected by the articulation of roles, and by the degree of prior joint experience of the academic founders. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 42 Italian academic start-ups. Implications for both universities and academic entrepreneurs are discussed.     

Informal risk capital investors: Investment patterns on the East Coast of the U.S.A.

In this study we profile a group of informal investors, their investment criteria and the nature of their referral network. The study supports the findings of several earlier studies. It indicates the existence of an extensive informal investment community on the East Coast of the U.S.A., which can provide substantial financial resources to startup and young firms. A full 58% of the sample investments were in startups; a huge proportion compared with formal venture capital sources. The study further supports earlier findings that this group is difficult to locate, for entrepreneurs and researchers alike. This opaque market consists primarily of friends and business colleagues who individually provide modest sums of money ($20,000–$50,000), but are often able to use their network to assemble a group of investors who will sponsor the entire funding requirement. 130 informal investors report that in three years they and their networks raised 38 million dollars to support 286 new venture proposals.There are also encouraging indications that these angels are both enthusiastic and persistent. Many of them claim that they have achieved higher returns via angel activity than any other investment options that they have tried. Of the angels who did better with alternative investment options, more than 80% are still prepared to make further investments. Even those who reported failed investments in the informal risk capital market remain supportive: over 65% indicate a willingness to invest again.The criteria by which the angels screen the proposals differ markedly from those of the venture capital community. In particular, the angels do not appear to be interested in a thorough business plan, a sine qua non for venture capitalists. Unlike the capital firms, angels are not interested in competitive insulation. They do not limit their investments to industries that are appealing, or with which they are familiar, nor do they care very much about the degree to which the entrepreneur has identified competition. However, they are in close agreement with the venture capital community in their concern with the management ability of the venture team and a requirement that there be a clear, demonstrated need for the product or service, preferably in a market with large potential.The study has shed some light on the structure of the referral networks of angels. Though we do not know from this study how the respondents themselves first heard of the ventures that were described in this survey, we do know that their referral network is composed primarily of friends and business colleagues; to whom they refer as much as 60% of the proposals that they receive and in which they themselves eventually invest. Thus they pass on serious opportunities to their network. Their referees are inclined to be very supportive; in our sample almost 75% of them also invested in the venture. The current strategy for informal investors is to approach mainly close contacts. These are inclined to be supportive (85% also invested in the venture) and to follow a trusting investment behavior pattern, relying mainly on the recommendation of the angel. This strategem ensures that the total capital requirements are met via the network. However, given the results of this study; the angels might be well-advised not to stop here, they might also approach at least one professional. Only a small proportion of professionals were approached by our sample of angels (less than 30%). As the study shows, professionals are more effective at selecting successful ventures. Thus a mixed strategy may be called for; use mainly trusting referees to ensure full capitalization and a limited number of professional referees to screen the proposals. This will help ensure that those proposals that do get supported by the more trusting members of the network have been competently screened, thus increasing to the probability of venture success.A discriminant analysis revealed some useful pointers in helping the informal investor select successful ventures. First it is critical to select only ventures in which the entrepeneur can be relied on to evaluate the risks of the ventures and manage these risks well; Angels do not need entrepreneurs that will gamble with their money. Equally important is to avoid placing too much credence on highly articulate sales pitches by the venture team, or too much reliance on ventures in which the main emphasis is on product and proprietary protection. Rather insist on being shown clear evidence that the product or service has channel and/or market acceptance. It is also important for Angels to stick to investments where they know the industry well, and to back venture teams with a solid reputation and a propensity to get involved in the details rather than gloss them over. As in the case of studies of venture capital investments, competitive insulation in the early stages of the venture is also important.     

An examination of the influence of industry structure on eight alternative measures of new venture performance for high potential independent new ventures

This study examined the influence of the structure of new ventures’ entered industries on eight alternative measures of new venture performance for 199 high potential independent new ventures. Each of the 199 entrepreneurial ventures had undertaken an initial public offering (IPO) within the first 6 years of the venture’s founding date and were free of corporate sponsorship or prior corporate parentage.Specifically, this research examined the influence of: (1) stage of the life cycle; (2) industry concentration; (3) entry barriers; and (4) product differentiation on eight alternative measures of new venture performance. The eight measures of new venture performance examined in this research consisted of: (1) change in sales; (2) sales level; (3) net profit; (4) earnings before interest and taxes; (5) return on sales; (6) return on assets; (7) return on invested capital; and (8) return on equity.Most prior research examining the influence of industry structure on new venture performance has: (1) utilized only one or two measures of new venture performance as indicators of the venture’s overall effectiveness and efficiency; (2) often failed to provide theoretical justification for the measure(s) of new venture performance or industry structure examined; and (3) utilized data derived from questionnaires and/or the PIMS data base of corporate-sponsored new ventures. In addition, prior industry structure studies examining independent new ventures have often utilized relatively small sample sizes.This study sought to advance the progress in the field of entrepreneurship with regard to understanding the influence of the structure of new ventures’ entered industries on new venture performance by: (1) examining eight alternative measures of new venture performance; (2) providing theoretical justification for the measures of new venture performance and industry structure examined; and (3) utilizing the largest nonquestionnaire data base of independent new ventures developed to date.This research found that the stage of the life cycle of the venture’s entered industry was the most important determinant of new venture performance among the four industry structural elements examined. Stage of the life cycle had a statistically significant relationship, at a 0.05 level, with the majority of the new venture performance measures examined in this research. In addition, ventures entering industries in the introductory stage of the life cycle achieved the highest levels of venture performance, particularly when compared with those ventures that entered industries in the mature stage of the life cycle.However, this study did not find a statistically significant relationship between stage of the life cycle and change in sales. This suggests that there is a trade-off between profitability and sales growth, and that new ventures that undertake an IPO have a stronger focus on achieving profitable operations rather than sales growth during the initial years after their IPO. This may be due to pressures placed on the new ventures to achieve profitability by the external credit market.Conversely, this research found that: (1) industry concentration; (2) entry barriers; and (3) product differentiation did not have statistically significant relationships, at a 0.10 level, with any of the eight alternative measures of new venture performance examined in this research. However, this research did find that over 90% of the new ventures entered industries characterized by: (1) a low degree of industry concentration and (2) a high degree of product differentiation.The relative absence of new venture entry into industries characterized by: (1) high degrees of concentration and (2) low degrees of product differentiation provides support for prior theory, which suggests that successful entry into such industry environments may be substantially more difficult.In sum, the results of this research suggest that high potential independent new ventures that undertake an IPO should enter industries in the introductory stage of the life cycle. In addition, the results of this research suggest that industries characterized by: (1) relatively low degrees of industry concentration and (2) highly heterogenous products may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful entry by high potential independent new ventures seeking to raise equity capital through an IPO.     

New venture development: The costs and benefits of public sector assistance

In recent years there has been an extraordinary level of entrepreneurial activity occurring in the United States. Venture start-ups, new incorporations even bankruptcies are reaching record numbers. Concurrent with the increase in entrepreneurial activity has been an effort within the Reagan Administration to privatize public sector programs designed to aid new and small, ongoing business ventures. The premise behind this movement is that private sector initiatives can better, and more efficiently, serve the needs of entrepreneurs and small business managers and can also offer new business opportunities for some entrepreneurs. At the same time, however, privatization could reduce the assistance programs currently targeting fledgling ventures, many of which are unable to afford a private consultant.The purpose of this article is to examine the economic impact of one public sector assistance program, the Small Business Development Center (SBDC), in terms of its contributions to new venture initiation in Georgia and South Carolina. The focus on the SBDC program is appropriate since over 50% of the counseling activities of most of the centers is devoted to pre-venture clients, i.e., individuals or groups considering starting a business. This study is important and timely, not only in respect to assessing the effectiveness of public sector assistance programs for pre-ventures, but also for assessing whether it is worthwhile from an economic perspective, to offer assistance to such individuals in the first place.Although it is difficult to be precise in attributing cause to effects in dynamic business ventures, our study indicates that the Small Business Development Center's client sample experienced a greater than expected number of business starts, and a higher than expected rate of survival. The results suggest that the net taxable sales, generated by these new ventures in 1984. was approximately $20 million in Georgia and $10 million in South Carolina. Results also suggest that almost 500 new jobs were created in Georgia and 600 new jobs were created in South Carolina between 1981 and 1984 as a result of successful business starts among SBDC pre-venture clients.While such figures are impressive, the bottom line of this study is that the new tax revenues generated by client firms exceeded the cost of delivering the services. Specifically, our conservative estimates suggest a $3.80 to $1.00 and $1.50 to $1.00 benefit to cost ratio for the center's pre-venture consulting services in Georgia and South Carolina, respectively. Furthermore, the value attached to the assistance received, by the entrepreneurs themselves, closely paralleled our estimates, lending additional validity to our conclusions. Resource constrained entrepreneurs can obtain effective business assistance from the SBDC free-of-charge, and the benefits to society accruing from this service far outweigh the cost of providing them.     

Market attractiveness,resource-based capabilities,venture strategies,and venture performance

This research seeks to identify variables that should be related to venture performance. It is hypothesized that both market attractiveness and resource-based capabilities are directly related to new venture performance. In addition, specific resource-based capabilities are hypothesized to be directly related to the competitive strategies chosen by a firm. Finally, the “fit” between strategies and resource-based capabilities is hypothesized to be related to venture performance.The sample consisted of all manufacturing businesses (SIC codes 20–39) started or reorganized in the corporate form between 1980 and 1991 in nine counties in northwestern Pennsylvania, as identified by a major marketing research service. Of the 800 companies surveyed, completed questionnaires were returned for 155, representing a 19% response rate. The 155 responding companies had a median age of 5 years with a median of 15 employees. The major products of companies in the sample included flour, lumber, household and office furniture, plastic containers, tools and dies, ready mixed concrete, pipe fittings, measuring devices, paint and varnish, machine tools, electroplate, carbon and graphite composite products, plastic laminated products, circuit boards, electronic components, and parts for internal combustion engines.In general, the results confirm the validity of the measures of environmental and organizational characteristics as we have adapted them for new ventures. As hypothesized, perceived market attractiveness and the overall abundance of resource-based capabilities were significantly related to venture performance. Also, in two of three cases, the evidence suggests that specific resource-based capabilities are related to the firm's stated competitive strategies. Finally, although the relationship between “fit” and performance is not supported in all cases, the performance of the emerging manufacturing ventures included in this sample appears to be enhanced when resource-based capabilities are supportive of a cost leadership strategy and when firms seeking to differentiate based on product and service quality have the resource-based capabilities to support that strategy. The results of this emerging research stream will make an important contribution to our understanding of the factors that impact firm performance. For scholars the results provide additional information needed to develop comprehensive new venture performance models. A clear understanding of the factors that have a strong influence on venture performance will enable practitioners to better identify viable business opportunities and academicians to provide potential business founders with tools to help them recognize opportunity. In addition, the identification of appropriate levels of abstraction will provide building blocks for future research that seeks to integrate environmental and firm-level constructs.     

The Impact of Knowledge Resources on New Venture Performance

A new venture's strategy—and thus its performance—is based upon the knowledge the firm has about its market, its opportunity in that market, and its appropriate conduct to take advantage of that opportunity. Resource-based theory underscores knowledge as a type of resource that confers competitive advantage and the potential for sustainability, two factors that are critical for start-ups. Three types of procedural knowledge are considered to be important at start-up: (1) about the industry in which the venture competes; (2) about the type of business approach the venture is pursuing; and (3) about creating, building, and harvesting new ventures. Knowledge useful to the new venture is developed either through relevant personal experiences or by accessing relevant knowledge possessed by others. Hypotheses are developed regarding the impact on the performance of new ventures as a result of these sources of knowledge, and these relationships are explored in a study of new technology-based firms.