A bioeconomic view of the Neolithic transition to agriculture

Abstract .  Adoption of agriculture at the expense of hunting and gathering was the dramatic precondition for all modern civilization. Recent data suggest that, because of this transition, humans initially were more disease prone, smaller, less nourished, and shorter-lived. To explain why individuals chose agriculture over hunting and gathering, this paper develops a simple model of the evolution of preferences over the quality and quantity of children, as would have been generated by our long history as a species. These preferences would have induced the choice of agriculture, but also would have led to these otherwise puzzling health effects.     

DOES CULTURE AFFECT ELECTORAL OUTCOMES? EVIDENCE FROM TRANSITION COUNTRIES

Why do some societies fail to adopt “good” economic institutions? Recent literature points to the role of complementarities between social norms and proposed formal rules in advancing institutional change. To shed light on one potential mechanism, we track election performance of executive parties in up to 18 post‐communist democracies over 1991–2015 to test whether cultural attitudes influenced voters' response to market reform. We show that in more individualistic cultures, reform is associated with greater reward for the incumbent in the next election. The implication is that in democracies, voters select policies and institutions that are in line with prevailing culture. (JEL O17, P35, Z1)     

Love,war and cultures: a reply to my commentators

The purpose of this short reply is to consider the issue of the evolution of the exceptional human intellectual capabilities which has been the focus of the majority of the comments to my article “love, war and culture: an institutional approach to human evolution” all published in the April 2013 of the Journal of Bioeconomics. All the contributions are submitted to the test of two plausibility conditions. The first requires that the explanation of the emergence of human capabilities should rely on circumstances peculiar, or better unique, to human evolution. The second states that the explanation should not rely on factors that require the pre-existence of these capabilities. The claim, advanced in this short article, is that only the “sexual subsidy hypothesis” satisfies these conditions.     

人情社会中的制度安排——基于互动行为的博弈分析

在人情社会中,制度安排要适应文化环境。非正式制度安排的自发性、非强制性和广泛性特征体现了这种制度安排在自发形成过程中社会伦理文化的决定性作用。正式制度安排具有强制性,但是,也必须与文化环境兼容,否则这种制度安排就将是无效的,或者是不可持续的。本文基于行为互动的博弈方法,以监考制度为例,以说明人情与制度的冲突,以及如何设计制度以实现集体理性与个体理性兼容,制度与人情兼容问题。     

The evolutionary roots of human hyper-cognition

While Professor Pagano’s general argument is attractive and may be valid, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis that he employs is extremely implausible from a sociobiological perspective. It posits the evolution of massive social inefficiencies in hominin societies over a long period during which there was doubtless severe competition among hominin groups for the same large animal scavenging/hunting niche. I propose an alternative to this part of Pagano’s argument that renders his overall theory more plausible. In this alternative, human hyper-cognition is a social good because it supplies powerful and flexible group leadership, which was likely a key element in the evolution of hominin hyper-cognition.     

Anti-Malthus: Conflict and the evolution of societies

The Malthusian theory of evolution disregards a pervasive fact about human societies: they expand through conflict. When this is taken account of the long-run favors not a large population at the level of subsistence, nor yet institutions that maximize welfare or per capita output, but rather institutions that generate large amount of free resources and direct these towards state power. Free resources are the output available to society after deducting the payments necessary for subsistence and for the incentives needed to induce production, and the other claims to production such as transfer payments and resources absorbed by elites. We develop the evolutionary underpinnings of this model, and examine the implications for the evolution of societies in several applications. Since free resources are increasing both in per capita income and population, evolution will favor large rich societies. We will show how technological improvement can increase or decrease per capita output as well as increasing population.     

Institutional Change and the Evolution of the World Leisure Industries

I explore the changing institutions of leisure and their dynamic relationship with the evolution of the world leisure industries through an analytical framework that incorporates the theory of institutional change of Paul Dale Bush and related evidence worldwide. I find a ceremonial-instrumental dichotomy in terms of the forces that enter the different phases of institutional change and the receptivity of the markets. Since the mid-twentieth century, the world leisure industries have rapidly advanced because they are not only interactively promoted by an increasing number of mass leisure institutions, but also due to technological advancements and industrial innovations. Indeed, the development paths of these industries in different countries are influenced by institutional factors, such as public interests, culture, and education, and their interactions and changes over time. Given that the paths may not be so straightforward, my findings show that Bush’s related works provide a synthetic framework which deserves further examination in the economics of leisure.     

Evolutionary Theory and Economic Policy with Reference to Sustainability

Synopsis The policy recommendations of most economists are driven by a view of economic reality embodied in Walrasian general equilibrium theory. Ironically, the Walrasian system has been all but abandoned by leading economic theorists. It has been demonstrated to be theoretically untenable, its basic assumptions about human decision making have been empirically falsified, and it consistently makes poor predictions of economic behavior. The current revolution in welfare economics offers opportunities on two related fronts for an evolutionary perspective on human behavior to reshape economic theory and policy. The first opportunity is to incorporate empirically-based information about human behavior to the study of human wants and their formation. This includes information about the evolution of the genetic component of decision making as well as the cultural dimensions of behavior. Expanding the role of economic analysis beyond stylized market behavior to focus on well-being (real utility) has far-reaching consequences for microeconomic policy. Secondly, abandoning the Walrasian model also means rethinking the microfoundations approach to the economic analysis of sustainability. This opens the door for economists to engage with the growing body of research on the evolution of whole societies. One link between the evolution of human behavior and the evolution of human societies is the psychological phenomenon of considering sunk costs. Understanding and overcoming the sunk cost fallacy may be the key to creating a sustainable society.     

Bioeconomics of some nonhuman and human societies: new institutional economics approach

New institutional economics (NIE) has been very successful in explaining the role of institutions such as the firm, money, and contract law in facilitating production and exchange in human societies. In this paper, I will show that the NIE approach, which so far has been used by economists to analyze institutions and organizations in human society, including the ethnically homogeneous middleman groups, can also be extended to explain the high degree of cooperation and coordination of activities of honeybees, ants, and schooling fish. In addition, the paper emphasize the importance of identity in nonhuman and human societies in eliciting cooperation and in detecting cheaters or fakers. This paper thus contribute to the integration/consilience of economics and biology by providing a more unified view of aspects of the bioeconomics of nonhuman and human societies.     

Viewpoint: The economics of hunter‐gatherer societies and the evolution of human characteristics

Abstract.  We argue for attention to the evolutionary origins of economic behaviour. Going beyond this, we argue that the economy of hunting and gathering was the context in which evolution shaped human characteristics that underlie modern economic behaviour. We first reconsider the basic biological question of why aging occurs at all. We then illustrate the usefulness of considering foraging economics by asking why it is biologically advantageous for humans to live long after their reproductive career is over. Further, we argue that foraging economics would have led to the simultaneous exaggeration of intelligence and of longevity that is characteristic of humans. JEL classification: A12, J10     

Land relations under unbearable stress: Rwanda caught in the Malthusian trap

This paper describes how the distribution of land access rights and the prevailing social fabric have evolved in a Rwandan village in the face of extreme land pressure. The study was conducted to gain a better understanding of the equity impact of land tenure individualization and the rising incidence of market transactions in such a context. The densely populated area studied during 1988-93 was in northwest Rwanda and belongs to the commune of Kanama in Gisenyi prefecture. Acute competition for land in a context characterized by too slow expansion of non-agricultural income opportunities has led to increasingly unequal land distribution and rapid processes of land dispossession through the functioning of the illegal land market and evolution of indigenous tenure arrangements. Also, the many land disputes and the threat of landlessness have led to rising tensions in social relations and even within the core of family life, paving the way for more overt expressions of discontentment and violence. A connection between those conditions and the civil war which erupted in 1994 is established.     

Religion and Economic Development in History: Institutions and the Role of Religious Networks

I argue that the role of religion on economic performance is mainly through the networks of small religious groups. These groups form social networks that enable individuals to conduct non-formal contract enforcement mechanisms. I analyze the effects of religions on societies, focusing mainly on the institutional aspects that affect the capabilities of creating social capital via networks which enhance cooperation and decrease transaction costs. Since the interaction between institutions and organizations is expected to shape the institutional evolution and economic performance of an economy, religions that have a communal form of organization rather than a vertical (hierarchical) structure, thus allowing many different denominational sub-communities within a society, can be more beneficiary for development and growth. Such institutions may not only provide allocative and production efficiency, but also adaptive efficiency that is a key to long-run growth. However, these effects may turn negative depending on these institutions’ role in causing group hostility and exclusion.     

Institutional Bioeconomics and the Division of Labor: Reflections on Yarbrough & Yarbrough' Paper

The New Institutional Economics might have significant interactions with the economics of non-human societies. Some possibilities are considered in connection with the ideas of Yarbrough and Yarbrough on human societies. First, the need for enforcement may be less when the organisms in question treat one another as resources. Second, theories of the division of labor that have been developed in biology are applicable to human societies. There may be some interesting alternatives to traditional sociobiology as well.     

Human resource management in Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of multinational corporations

This article reports the results of a survey of top executives at Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs). We examine the prevailing types of job contracts and the use of monetary and non-monetary benefits, and compare such arrangements with those in locally-owned industrial companies. We also reveal differences in human resource management (HRM) policies based on the source of authority over HRM issues (global headquarters, regional headquarters, local groups of companies, etc.). These findings can be used to help predict the evolution of HRM policies in Russian manufacturing subsidiaries of MNCs.     

The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe: Payments for wildlife services

Payments for environmental services (PES) have been distinguished from the more common integrated conservation and development projects on the grounds that PES are direct, more cost-effective, less complex institutionally, and therefore more likely to produce the desired results. Both kinds of schemes aim to achieve similar conservation outcomes, however, and generally function in analogous social, political and economic environments. Given the relative novelty of PES, what lessons can be learnt and applied from earlier initiatives? In this paper, we describe the evolution over the first 12 years (1989-2001) of Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), a community-based natural resource management programme in which Rural District Councils, on behalf of communities on communal land, are granted the authority to market access to wildlife in their district to safari operators. These in turn sell hunting and photographic safaris to mostly foreign sport hunters and eco-tourists. The District Councils pay the communities a dividend according to an agreed formula. In practice, there have been some underpayments and frequent delays. During 1989-2001, CAMPFIRE generated over US$20 million of transfers to the participating communities, 89% of which came from sport hunting. The scale of benefits varied greatly across districts, wards and households. Twelve of the 37 districts with authority to market wildlife produced 97% of all CAMPFIRE revenues, reflecting the variability in wildlife resources and local institutional arrangements. The programme has been widely emulated in southern and eastern Africa. We suggest five main lessons for emerging PES schemes: community-level commercial transactions can seldom be pursued in isolation; non-differentiated payments weaken incentives; start-up costs can be high and may need to be underwritten; competitive bidding can allow service providers to hold on to rents; and schemes must be flexible and adaptive.     

THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: GROWTH, IDEAS, AND TECHNOLOGY

In the following articles Freedman and Jordan examine institutional arrangements that promote high and rising incomes. The quality of institutions may be as important as human capital, investment, and population growth in determining which nations are most prosperous.     

Review Essay

Sen's capability approach has a culturally specific side, with capabilities influenced by social structures and institutions. Although Sen acknowledges this, he expresses his theory in individualistic terms and makes little allowance for culture or social structure. The present paper draws from recent social theory to discuss how the capability approach could be developed to give an explicit treatment of cultural and structural matters. Capabilities depend not only on entitlements but on institutional roles and personal relations: these can be represented openly if capabilities are disaggregated into individual, social and structural capacities. The three layers interact, and a full analysis of capabilities should consider them all. A stratified method implies that raising entitlements will not on its own be enough to enhance capabilities and that cultural and structural changes will be needed.     

Does cultural diversity increase the rate of entrepreneurship?

In the economic development literature, cultural diversity (for example, ethnolinguistic fractionalization) has been shown to have a negative impact on economic outcomes in many underdeveloped countries. We hypothesize that the impact of diversity on economic performance depends on the quality of a country's institutions. Under bad institutions diversity leads to conflict and expropriation, while under good institutions diversity leads to economic progress. A culturally diverse society or interaction among different cultures encourages exchange of, and competition between ideas and different world views. Under good institutions, this amalgamation of ideas and views leads to greater entrepreneurial initiatives. We show that higher levels of cultural diversity increase the rate of entrepreneurship in the presence of good institutions using evidence from the USA.     

A Paleoeconomic Theory of Co-Evolution and Extinction of Domesticable Animals

One Pleistocene mystery is why early North Americans eradicated their large, potentially domesticable animals (e.g., horses), whereas early Europeans did not. A commonly‐held hypothesis is that European species were evasive due to co‐evolution with hominids, whereas North American animals were naïve and unable to adapt quickly enough when experienced human hunters arrived from Eurasia. We explore this hypothesis with a paleoeconomic model of co‐evolution that integrates human hunting investments and wildlife population responses. We find that investments in hunting ability, based on the relative scarcity of prey species, could have mattered more than wildlife ‘naivety’ in explaining the extinction.     

The moderating role of culture on the benefits of economic freedom: Cross-country analysis

The implementation of pro-market policies and institutions is often suggested for enhancing a country's development. However, implementing pro-market policies and institutions has a mixed track record. Some have ascribed the bad results to the neglect of people's predispositions, often described as culture. In this study, we argue that successful implementation of pro-market policies and institutions requires that large parts of the population know how to use the resulting freedom in a way that can bring long term benefits. A panel analysis on a sample of 67 countries from 1970 to 2019 confirms this theoretical argument. We find that Long Term Orientation increases the effect of economic freedom on income per capita, whereas Uncertainty Avoidance weakens the positive relationship between economic freedom and income per capita. The policy implication is that the introduction of free market policies and institutions will particularly foster economic development in long-term oriented societies and in societies with low Uncertainty Avoidance.